December 31st, 2024 Happy New Year

Next Summary 03 January 2025

The basic summation is that the Russians made along much of the front.

On the ground Russian forces continued to make gains along much of the front, taking terrain on the north-west  and south-east corners of the Kursk salient, to include ground south of Sudzha as they press to cut one of the two roads that supply Ukrainian forces in the salient.  North of the Donets River also sees Russian gains, and they appear to have taken more terrain west of Svatove as they push on the Oskil River, as well as taking the town of Terny (west of Kreminna) on the Zherebets River. There is also some reporting suggesting Russian forces north of Kupyansk have  have pushed further west of the Oskil River,

In both Chasiv Yar and Toretsk both sides appear to be in a series of smaller, see-saw engagements trading fighting positions and small pieces of terrain back and forth in the center of the two towns.

South of Pokrovsk the two sides are also trading ground back and forth but the overall trend remains that, just south of Pokrovsk, the Russians are slowly pushing westward on a fairly broad front and that just south of Pokrovsk there is a north - south line about 7 miles long, about 4 miles west of the western edge of Pokrovsk, and it is slowly rolling westward and the three small towns of  Nadezhdynka, Novovasylivka and Solone are now being attacked. There is no reason to believe these towns will fare any better than the towns just to their east.

Further to the south-east the Ukrainians are still holding in north-west Kurakhove, but the Russians elsewhere continue to move forward and the pockets of Ukrainian controlled terrain in this area are growing smaller. There is now a large pocket that runs roughly from Kurakhove to Nadezhdynka to  Bahatyr and then back to just east of the town of Sukhi Yaly, and then to Kurakhove, and that terrain is being squeezed by the Russians, a roughly triangular shaped piece of terrain about 10 miles across on the western edge, and maybe 12 miles long, east to west (perhaps 60-70 square miles in size).  All but one or two roads into the area from the west have been cut, and the weather continues to not cooperate, temperatures staying at or above freezing and the terrain remaining wet and muddy, preventing easy off-load travel and resupply.

Further south Russian forces continue to press northward from the south of Velyka Novosilke, but they have not yet entered the town. It does seem, however, that the roads into the town have been cut.

Reporting does suggest that several of islands in the mouth of the Dnepr river are now under Russian control as a result of the sustained small boat probes and raids, that the Russian have worn down the Ukrainian capacity to keep unseating every position the Russians set up.

The Ukrainian Air Force (the UAF operates the Surface to air (SAM) systems) reported that it brought down 16,000 targets over Ukraine in 2024, to include 11,200 strike drones, 3,200 reconnaissance drones 40 fixed wing aircraft and 6 helicopters. They did not give a count on the number of ballistic missiles or cruise missile that were brought down. Nor did they provide the number of each type launched against Ukraine.

Thoughts

While he made this statement, a report was released in Ukraine Pravda about the state of the Russian economy, notes that the Russians spent  in particular that Russia spent 16.3 trillion rubles ($145 billion) on defense this year, some 8% of their GDP, and some 40% of the federal government expenditures.

The gist of the article is that this is far too much and that the economy is, to use their words, “cracking.”

They also make the point that Russian soldiers’ motivations are based on bonuses.

The argument is that Russia faces a catastrophic collapse of its economy, and per LTGEN Budanov, this could happen as early the middle of 2025.

Budanov is the Director of Ukrainian Military Intelligence and is a favorite of President Zelenskyy (and reportedly the CIA) so his statements are often indicative of what is being thought in the inner circles of the President’s office. Budanov suggests that 2025 will be a better year for Ukraine than 2024 because the Russians will be forced - due to this looming economic crisis - to make major concessions to Ukraine.

It is possible that Budanov is doing nothing different from others - in Ukraine and Russia - in carving out an extreme position, from which they can negotiate to a more reasonable solution.

However, it may be that Budanov believes that Russia is facing imminent economic collapse and Ukraine needs to simply hold on - which is what he suggested in an interview.

To begin, anyone who has looked at history for the last 100 years will find few cases when a nation’s economic collapse has been accurately predicted. A few numbers suggest this is harder to judge than it seems: Russia’s total federal government expenditures sits at roughly 35% of GDP  (US is not quite 24%). Ukraine is above 60%, and many European nations are above 40% (Belgium 53%, Germany 49%, Portugal 45%, Slovakia 44%, Sweden 47%).

As for paying their troops bonuses, that may sound mercenary, but virtually every military in the west does the same. At the same time, since February 2022 Ukraine has had more than 100,000 desertions; Russia has had fewer than 10,000.

But finally there is this simple problem: Budanov is suggesting that, at its most fundamental, the Ukrainian strategy is simply to survive until the Russian economy collapses, and then the Russian army will withdraw. The level of economic chaos a country can endure is often extremely high: consider Germany, Japan or Italy. Let’s hope this is just a bargaining position.

v/r pete

 December 30, 2024

Overall

Overall, the fighting on the ground in the last several days has slowed, with Russian forces making marginal gains in most sectors but it would appear that movement, and attacks, are hampered by cold, but not freezing, weather and the occasional rain showers. Nevertheless, Russian forces continue to move forward and several small towns along the front that were contested are now under Russian control. None, however, represents substantial changes in the tactical picture at this point.

There was no sector in which Ukrainian forces appear to have made any gains.

Of note, in the Kursk salient, Russian forces continue to make small gains; they are clearly trying to inch towards a pincer, cutting across the salient just inside the Russian border.

In regards to the Pokrovsk salient, Russian forces inched westward from positions just east of Pokrovsk, these were small but real gains.

South and south-west of Pokrovsk Russian forces have established control over Shevchenko, Pishchane and Novovasylivka, Novoolenivka and Ukrainka, and are pushing into Solone. 

What this really means is that the Russian forces continue to take ground south and south-west of Pokrovsk as they seek to both cut off the south-west corner of Ukrainian controlled terrain, and set themselves up for a push northward, behind (west of) Pokrovsk and into the center of eastern Ukraine where there are few if any defensive positions.

Russian forces still do not have control over the north-west section of Kurakhove (the site of the thermal power plant), but the town is nearly surrounded, and the roads have all been cut.

Just to the south Russian forces continue to advance and Ukrainian forces have withdrawn north of the Sukhi Yaly river. A small pocket of terrain remains under nominal Ukrainian control but there is little likelihood that it will do so for more than another week or two.

Around Velyka Novosilke (VN) Russian forces once again hold Novyi Komar, and have advanced on VN from the south and west, but have not yet pressed into the town proper. However, once again the ground lines of communication are under Russian control, making sustaining the fight very difficult.

Elsewhere, there were marginal Russian gains across the south.

As for air operations, President Zelenskyy commented that for the week of December 22 - 28 Russian forces launched 370 x Shahed drones, 280 x guided glide bombs, and 80 x cruise and ballistic missiles into Ukraine.

Kyiv’s military administration office also released the following stats for 2024:  200 total attacks on Kyiv, consisting of:

1,300 x Shahed drones

200+ x cruise missiles

24 x ballistic missiles

22 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles

7 x Zircon missiles

There were also a series of aid announcements:

The White House announced a $2.5 billion military aid package that includes:

• Surface to air missiles (not further ID’d)
• HIMARS rockets
• 155MM and 105MM Ammo
• JDAM
• Anti-tank missiles
• Crew served weapons ammo and small arms ammo
• Demolition munitions
• Communication gear
• A wide range of training, maintenance and spare parts

The US Treasury Secretary announced a $3.4 billon direct budget support package for Ukraine. This brings direct budget support to the Ukrainian government, from the US, since February 2022 to just over $30 billion.

The World Bank and Ukraine agreed on a $15 billion grant - this grant is backed by the US.

Ukraine and Russia carried out a prisoner exchange, with each side turning over 189 prisoners.

Finally, Ukraine received the first Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) shipment from the US on December 27th. Private electricity company DTEK received 100 million cubic meters of gas, the first shipment of a deal that runs through 2026 and which is set to be extended through 2046.

Thoughts

In the first few days of the war, and continuing certainly through the first full year, the Ukrainians won the InfoWar dimension of the war, hands down. President Zelenskyy was masterful in his orchestration of the message, and it was that strategic messaging that really helped forge the ad hoc alliances that have kept Ukraine funded and armed.

In 2023 Zelenskyy may have had some missed steps, and the counter-offensive did not go well, but on the whole, he continued to win the InfoWar. However, the public disagreement with Gen. Zaluzhnyi (replaced at the beginning if 2024), and the simple fact that the army has continued to lose ground, has all seemed to take the its toll on Zelenskyy.

He has faced any number of diplomatic struggles in the past year, including would-be NATO allies (at least 7 countries - potential allies - voicing opposition to Ukraine joining NATO), calls by Hungary’s Prime Minster Orban for a ceasefire and talks to begin immediately, followed by Zelenskyy’s comment that Orban’s relationship with Putin is “too warm,” Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico voicing anger at Ukraine’s failure to maintain the transit agreement for Russian natural gas to move to eastern Europe (Slovakia, Moldova, and Hungary), etc. 

The problems from afar don’t seem insurmountable, but he seems more prone to make harsh statements, to answer quickly and somewhat rashly, and in doing so alienating those he needs to support Ukraine. It raises an issue to me for which there is no easy answer: Zelenskyy appears to be approaching burn-out. He may not collapse, but is he as crisp as he was, does he have all his wits about him? Or is he mentally exhausted? And if he is, who is there to replace him?

v/r pete

To the Next Secretary of the Navy

And to the soon brand new Secretaries of the Army, and Air Force: Congratulations on your new job(s). There is an awful lot on your plate: fixing readiness and recruiting, refilling our weapon magazines, saving our shipyards, saving the Merchant Marine, making the right choices about future forces and future weapons programs. These are all incredibly important issues that you face.

But none of them is your most important issue.

Your most important issue is leadership; the real root of every problem in the Navy, the real root of the issues just listed, is the failure of senior leadership. It will be up to you to fix that.

Nominally, you will address that via a series of letters: you write the guidance to those who sit on promotion boards, telling them what the Navy (you) want in the officers they pick. Obviously, it’s been a long time since a SecNav (or any service secretary) actually wrote the guidance himself, your staff does that. But you sign it out, you make it yours.

And that drives who becomes captains, and admirals. It drives who becomes commanders and lieutenant commanders as well. Frankly, that part is going moderately well, the services, all of them, have good “field grade” officers. But as I sit and think about the very best leaders I’ve met in the last 45 years, there have only been a handful of good admirals. Most of them are BOALs - Bumps On A Log, easily overlooked, and forgotten as soon as you met them. 

Where have the great officers gone? They never made captain, never mind admiral.

Very simply put, the services, with few exceptions, don’t want leaders as senior officers. Why is that? Because leaders do just that: they take charge, they move the organization, whether it’s a fleet, a great army, or a nation or any private enterprise, leaders embrace change, they create change.

But the services are, in fact, very large bureaucratic organizations that like stasis. The services, like Hobbes’ Leviathan, reward those that provide for and protect the organization itself. What that translates into in the Washington DC of today is a cadre of senior officers (each service does this) who protect budgets and position, who protect the service more than they protect the nation. Loyalty is not to the country, loyalty is to the service and the budget. Those who show promise to protect the service will be considered for flag, those who do not, will not. Conversely, those who stand out early in their career as true leaders will be shunted aside early as well. Hence they do not make captain (or colonel in the Marines). 

GK Chesterton once wrote that a man who likes something will like the dirt and the mess of the place, but a man who loves it will do anything to make it beautiful, he will tear it down and rebuild it to make it all it should be. The Navy for more than 15 years - and really, for perhaps 30 years, has been led by men who only liked the Navy - but loved their position, loved their credentials, loved their medals.

The sad proof of this is to look at the steps taken in the last 10-15 years by the 3 and 4 star officers in the Naval Service: what have they done to fix issues such as readiness or ship maintenance delays or a series of bad program decisions that have cost the Navy tens of billions of dollars? In fact, they’ve done very little. Endless papers have been written as they studied the problem, but little has actually been done.

What is needed is to find men who love the Navy and love their country and are willing to do nearly anything to fix the Naval service. 

Will this be easy? No. It will, in fact, be the most difficult thing you do. And you will get tremendous pushback from the flag ranks and the senior civilians. You will find that all of our flag officers look the part, they have the credentials on paper. But they do not possess the leadership skills necessary for what the Navy is likely to face in the next 2 decades. Your job is to change that.

The officers you want won’t necessarily be well liked, they won’t necessarily be smooth, or glib. In all likelihood if they have a masters degree it’s from the Naval War College or from Monterey. They didn’t go to Harvard, they don't have an MBA.

They will have lots of time in operational assignments; they will have less time in Washington DC.

They are professional in their approach to naval warfare and are unapologetic about it.

But there is little other common ground. The good ones come in all types - a look at the stellar officers of WWII reveals a wide range of characters, none of them perfect by any stretch, but truly superior leaders that the nation needed. But just consider how different each of these officers were from each other: Nimitz, King, Spruance, Halsey, Mitscher, McCain, Fletcher, Lockwood, Lee, Oldendorf, Kincaid. You and your immediate staff must learn - quickly - how to find such figures. And you have precious little time.

You need to find a few folks who understand the problem and also understand the types of officers the Navy needs, not the ones who look and feel right, but the ones who are right. As the Under Secretary has no fixed tasking, it might be that this becomes his tasking, working in coordination with you.

If everything else succeeds and you fail at this, you will have failed. Make no mistake, this is the most important thing you will do.

 December 27th, 2024  Next Summary December 30th, 2024

Overall, Russian forces in Ukraine continued to make gains on the ground. And Russian strikes assets conducted an extensive strike on the Ukrainian power grid on Christmas Day.

In most sectors of the front lines, the Russians showed minor gains, but there were some gains noted in each sector over the past two days. The most significant development was that in the area just west and southwest of Donetsk, in the last 24 hours, Russian forces appear to have forced Ukrainian forces out of Kurakhove. There may be a small pocket, perhaps 100 troops, remaining in the industrial sector of that town, to include the thermal power plant, but video of the last 24 hours shows that area being struck by a good deal of ordnance. 

Anecdotal reporting suggests that the Ukrainian forces are slowly withdrawing to the west, and that the Russians are closing the “pocket” south of Kurakhove.

At the same time, Russian forces made gains south of Pokrovsk, which not only moves the Russians closer to the goal of encircling Pokrovsk, it also is making any Ukrainian withdrawal from that pocket south of Kurakhove that much more difficult.

And around Velyka Novosilke (VN) Russian forces continue to make small gains, most significant of which is that the Russians have clearly reached the road running westward from VN, the last real road into and out of the town. At the same time there is an unconfirmed report that Ukrainian forces in Novyi Komar reached the O-0509 roadway that runs due north out of VN through Novyi Komar. If that is so, then the situation is not as grave as it would otherwise appear. But, that reports is still unconfirmed. Further, the momentum is on the Russian side and it is probable that all roads will be closed in the near term. In light of the warm and wet weather, this will substantially reduce logistical support into VN and make defense that much more difficult.

Overall, reports suggest additional Russian forces moving into the perimeter of the Kursk salient, into the the terrain west of Svatove - as they push for the Oskil River, and south of Pokrovsk, and the speculation is fairly safe in predicting that the Russian forces will continue their offensive through the winter. 

Russian forces also continued strikes against the Ukrainian power grid, with a daily strikes over rate last three days, the strike on Christmas Day being quite large.

The Russian strike on Christmas Day (2 x KN-23 ballistic missiles, 10 x S-300 missiles; 12 x Kalibr cruise missiles, 50 x Kh-101/55 cruise missiles, 4 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 106 x Shahed drones) was directed at the power grid; at least 7 cruise missiles, 12 ballistic missiles, and 4 drones penetrated air defenses and reached their targets. Blackouts were initially reported in Vinnytsia, Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts; in particular it was noted that a hospital in Dnipropetrovsk had no power and more than 100 patients were evacuated to other hospitals in the area.

Ukraine’s private power system operator (DTEK) reported serious damage to its Thermal Power Plants.

Thoughts

An article in European Pravda reports that European open-ended support for Ukraine is falling.

Citing results of a poll this month by YouGov, in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK, found public support for Ukraine “until victory” has declined in the last 12 months.

Willingness to support Ukraine until it defeats Russia compared to the same question in January:

Sweden  50% (57%)

Denmark  40% (51%)

UK  36% (50%)

In support of a negotiated peace compared to last January:

Italy 55% (45%)

Spain 46% (38%)

France  43% (35%)

Germany  45% 38(%)

Meanwhile, in Poland, 55% of Poles support an end to the war even if it means Ukraine loses parts of its territory; this number was 39% in September of this year. At the same time, Polish support for Ukraine fighting without any concessions now stands at 31%, down from 46% in September.

While it’s risky assigning too broad a meaning to any poll, the polling data would suggest a sense among Europeans that the war isn’t going the way the Ukrainians would like and it’s time to end it. When you are losing is, of course, the worst possible time to negotiate. 

At the same time, it’s hard to see how the Ukrainians can rapidly turn around the fight on the ground; in the final analysis, the Ukrainian army does not and will not have enough soldiers to defeat the Russians in the war of attrition that they are currently fighting.

But to change the fight, to move to a more highly trained force with the right mix of weapons to stop the Russian army - which will continue fighting a war of attrition, requires manpower, time, and space - ceding terrain while creating a new, professional army - and will also require a good deal of money and training support, much more than Ukraine has on its own.

That leaves Ukraine in the unpleasant situation of having to listen to others about its own defense. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t.

v/r pete

December 24th, 2024  Christmas Eve

To All:  Merry Christmas Next report on the 27th

Weather: There will be another few days of above freezing weather across most of Ukraine, and then below freezing weather for 4 or 5 days. There will also be gray skies and some rain showers. This will keep the ground from freezing, making cross country movement difficult until at least Saturday, but mid 30s weather returns next Wednesday, so - miserable conditions.

Overall, the ground war continues and the Russians continue to grind out small gains in most sectors. 

Of note, in the Kursk salient Russian forces made small gains, but in particular, made some gains south of Sudzha, the center of the Ukrainian position. Russian forces operating along the Oskil River north of Kupyansk slightly expanded their holdings on the west side of the River, and a bit further south Russian forces made gains west of Svatove as they work to expand their holdings along and near the Oskil River.

In the general Bakhmut area there was commentary on the Russian bombing of both Terny and Toretsk, and as can be seen in this picture of Toretsk (Terny is similar, as are scores of other towns) the towns are being reduced to rubble.

A drone view shows damage caused by Russian military strikes, in the town of Toretsk, Donetsk region, Ukraine, on Thursday [Handout: Сonsolidated Brigade 'Khyzhak' of the Ukrainian Patrol Police Department/Reuters]

Reports from Ukraine’s Southern Command (USC) note the activity of a Russian brigade along the east bank of the Dnepr, and increased number of small raids (8-10 men), and suggest to USC that the Russians are going to try to force their way across the river and seize a small bridgehead. 

There are not a lot of other Russian forces in the area, and there is much else the Russians are doing - this seems specious at best.

In the south, there were more incremental Russian gains around Velyka Novosilke, and anecdotal reports suggest supplies are no longer reaching the forces inside the town, but for the time-being the Ukrainians are holding.

Further north, Ukrainian forces appear to have withdrawn from the small towns of the Sukhi Yaly valley, though they remain in the north-west corner (the industrial section) of Kurakove, and in the terrain immediately west and south of Kurakove. Ukrainian forces need to hold that terrain if they intend to hold Kurakove itself, or they need to hold it until the forces in Kurakove withdraw and then they can back out and collapse the pocket as they move west.

South of Pokrovsk itself the Russians made small gains pushing west, and have also pushed closer to the southern edge of Pokrovsk itself. 

Drone strikes and missile strikes continued by both sides, civilians paying the price. 

Of note, Russian tacair strikes increased in several areas, and the Russians appear to be pounding Terny and Toretsk and Velyka Novosilke with FAB 500  (1100 lb) bombs, which are obviously far more destructive than individual artillery shells. 

Elsewhere, Sweden rejected China’s version of the now long-running story of the severed undersea cables, saying that the Chinese did not cooperate in the investigation of the cutting of the 2 Baltic Sea cables, possibly by the Chinese merchant ship Yi Peng 3 dragging (deliberately?) across two cables.

A Russian ship en route Tartus from St Petersburg (MV Ursa Major) had an engine room fire yesterday north of Algeria and has sunk. 13 crew were rescued, 2 are missing.

Thoughts

Near Velyka Novosilke (VN) the Ukraine forces stopped 4 armored vehicles making an assault over open terrain, labeling it as an “Armored Convoy” that was “destroyed” by Ukrainian forces. Technically that is correct. But the report reads more like a mixture of false bravado and propaganda for the Homefront; other reporting suggests they are already short of ammo in VN and there is no easy solution to that problem: the three main roads into VN remain under Russian control and the fields are mud.

The situation around VN, and the situation just to the north around Kurakove, and has steady inching west of forces just south of Pokrovsk, has a feel of the inevitable about it. Nothing is inevitable in war, but the Ukrainian army seems drained, low on manpower, low on air defense, still low on artillery in some if not all fights, and especially low on ideas. 

They keep coming up with new ideas for their drones, but the Russian army doesn’t seem to care and just keeps grinding forward. Velyka Novosilke could fall before the end of the year, and the pocket south of Kurakhove could also collapse before the end of the year. Toretsk will hold out longer, but how much longer isn’t clear - the manpower numbers are still a mystery. 

As for the Russian brigade active near the lower Dnepr, and the squad size (8-10 men) probes and raids along the West Bank, these are creating enough noise that Ukrainian forces have to maintain a higher troops strength on the West Bank than would otherwise be necessary, thereby depriving the rest of the front line the use of those forces. But it is doubtful that the Russians will try to create a serious lodgment with just one brigade.

All in all, a grim Christmas for an army in need of a miracle.

v/r pete