Holocaust or Surrender

July 13th, 2026

Imagine that we all wake up tomorrow morning and there is breaking news: a number of small - 1 or 2 kiloton - atomic weapons just went off across Ukraine, dropping every bridge across the Dnepr River, a half dozen other bridges, and striking a half dozen major industrial sites in Ukraine. Delivered by Islander ballistic missiles in a single salvo, Ukrainian has now been, logistically speaking, cut in half, and much more significantly, the nuclear threshold has now been crossed.

What do we do? 

To be clear, the “We” in this case are the other nuclear powers: the US, China, India Pakistan, France, UK, North Korea, Israel. Everyone else will be interested, but the nuclear-armed nations are the only ones with a meaningful vote.

First, everyone will condemn it in the harshest terms. So what? Are more sanctions going to change anything?

Of those, it’s fair to say that China and North Korea, President Xi’s recent words notwithstanding, are more or less on Russia’s side.

India and Pakistan would be strictly neutral - and, with the nuclear threshold now crossed, a little bit more than normally worried about the other. I would expect a good deal of diplomatic chatter between New Delhi and Islamabad as they sought to assure each other that politics between the two was stable.

Israel would, I think, maintain a strict neutrality while joining in the general condemnation.

The UK and France would, I suspect, go to some sort of alert status. But then what? Are they going to respond directly, militarily to Russia after a Russian use of nuclear weapons on a country with which neither France nor England has a binding defense alliance? Or, are they more likely to - as I am sure every country in NATO would - call an Article 5 meeting and most importantly, wait to see what the US is going to do.

Because only the US has a nuclear arsenal that challenges Russia’s in both "breadth and depth.”

So, it would really come down to what the US was going to do.

But what could the US do?

More economic and political sanctions aren’t going to do anything meaningful to Russia.

Conventional strikes (in my scenario here) are what led to Putin escalating to the use of nuclear weapons. More conventional strikes run the risk of simply further convincing the Kremlin that the only response is more nuclear weapons “down range.” And while a series of small nuclear weapons could be launched in response, further following the “logic” of “escalate to de-escalate,” what that would mean is that the two largest nuclear powers would be engaged in nuclear attacks, and in the case of the US, the US would be striking Russian terrain in response to a Russian strike on a non-treaty ally of the US.

Herman Kahn, writing in the 1960s, suggested that one intermediate step might well be - counter-intuitively to the idea of rapid response in the missile age - a formal declaration of war, moving all forces to alert posture while also engaging in crisis diplomacy. 

Of course, if the diplomacy fails, we would need to “demonstrate resolve,” which places us in a situation that President Kennedy termed the “Holocaust or surrender” option: either we go ahead with the strike - launch nuclear weapons at Russia, or we simply walk away and say “you win.”

Obviously, the point here is that getting to that point needs to be avoided. As the war continues to escalate (President Trump’s word last week), Russian leadership may well find that nuclear weapons do, in fact, offer a sort of “deus ex machina” resolution to the war, though the operational success would almost certainly be more than overshadowed by a massive strategic cost. But, that assumes everyone is making “rational’ decisions - based on the same world view. In fact, that has never been the case. Rather, as Mac Owens, one of those brilliant Naval War College professors teaching strategy, used to say "everyone thinks they are rational.” But they are all operating from different perspectives. I would add that this is particularly true of political leaders - of all stripes. Viewed from a certain perspective, the leadership of North Korea have been for 30 years or more, perhaps the most rational decision-makers of any national leadership.

Which leaves us where?

First, to those who say Putin will not use nuclear weapons (this usually includes some percentage: "not a 1% chance” or some such) the answer is that probabilities with humans don’t really work that way. The actually mathematical probability that someone will do something tomorrow (assuming they are physically capable of doing so), is 0.5 exactly. Perhaps they are seers and can see the future. But until they prove that, the answer is that he could decide today that it is the right answer, the “rational” answer and act; 50-50.

Second, there is no low risk response to a nuclear use; each option will come with risks, high risks.

Which leads to where we are: we have all watched for 4 years as the war has gradually escalated. It continues to appear that the only two leaders on the planet who really want the war to stop are President Trump and Pope Leo. The war needs to be stopped. Kahn again is instructive, pointing out that in any such scenario de-escalation will require “concessions and conciliation.” These are two words most people won’t want to discuss vis-a-vis the Russia - Ukraine war, and would be even less likely to discuss in the wake of the Russian tactical nuclear use. Which leads us back to the holocaust or surrender warning from Kennedy, where - once an escalation takes place - political considerations would so bind the President’s hands that there would be no path out of the crisis other than “holocaust or surrender.”

4 years into the war there are nearly 400,000 Russian KIAs and at least 220,000 Ukrainian KIAs (perhaps twice that). Russia is facing dire economic straits, while Ukraine exists only on the largesse of the West, which will need to provide perhaps $1 trillion in aid to rebuild the country, following war termination. And while Russia’s population is slowly contracting, Ukraine’s population, on top of one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, has decreased by 26% since February 2022, in excess of 100,000 people (net flow) leave the country every month, and 40% of the population would like to move out of the country. 

In 1994 the Clinton administration assured Ukraine that it would protect Ukrainian sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine turning its nuclear arsenal over to Russia, without considering what such an assurance might mean. This constituted a strategic mistake of significant proportions. Now we - Ukraine, Europe and the US - are paying for that mistake, some more than others. The question is, how much more are we willing to pay? 

 July 9th, 2026 Next Summary July 14th Tomorrow 

Politics - Trump approves production of Patriot missiles in Ukraine

Combat Ops - No change on the ground

- Drone and missile strikes continue

Economics - Russia to hald diesel exports

Weather

Kharkiv

70 and cloudy. Rain and isolated thunderstorms through Sunday midday, some clearing Sunday afternoon, more showers next Tuesday. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the low 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

72 and cloudy, rain showers tonight and tomorrow, followed by 4 days of mostly sunny weather. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the low 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

70 and mostly cloudy, gusting over 25. Mostly cloudy Friday, followed by three days of scattered thunderstorms and rain showers. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the low 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Politics

President Trump on Ukrainian licensing of Patriot missiles:

“We’re going to give a license to you to make ‌Patriots. That’s pretty cool. This way, you can’t complain that we’re not giving ‘em enough.”

As noted several days ago, Patriot missiles take some 30 months to build due to the curing time for the solid propellant. A simpler propellant could, theoretically, be used, but that would affect missile performance. If Ukrainian production came on line tomorrow, the first missile would be available in January 2029.

Trump also commented on increased number and depth of Ukrainian strikes into Russia;

“It’s an escalation, but it’s also an escalation that can help lead to an end.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov responded to Trump’s comment:

“We see certain misconceptions within the White House administration – that by escalating military pressure it can help move to a peace settlement. That is a mistaken view. Further escalation may prolong the special military operation to some extent.” 

Peskov later commented that Russia might need to answer these attacks “creating a larger security zone.”

Ground Operations

Fighting continues along the front lines and there are continued claims of gains by both sides - particularly by the Russians, but there are few confirmed changes in the line, and most of those are marginal.

Ukrainian forces did retake ground in the Stepnohirsk area (southern Ukraine, along the Dnepr River), and there is, as usual, changes in the “checkerboard” in and around Kostiantinivka, but overall, there is no confirmed tactically significant change in Kostiantinivka or elsewhere. Both sides continue to conduct artillery strikes into the city on known or suspected enemy positions and the city is being ground down into rubble.

There were also reports of Russian gains due north of Slovyansk about 10 miles, having pushed across the Donets river to the south / west side of the river into the village of Pryshyb, but this has yet to be confirmed. This would be of note if the Russians have made it across the river.

Ukrainian MinDef Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces conducted an extended operation targeting Russian artillery and that in the 4 months of March through June struck more than 7,300 Russian artillery pieces.

There is obviously no independent confirmation of this number, and an artillery piece is not necessarily destroyed if struck by a drone. But of note is that the average daily shelling reports (which can consist of anywhere from a single round to a dozen or more) from the Ukraiain General Staff which were cycling between 2,500 and 3,000 per day in January, continue at those same daily totals, with occasional transients to nearly 4,000. 

In fact, there has not been a decided reduction in Russian artillery round usage in the last 4 months, with most reports (open source obviously) noting Russian daily usage cycles in the 10,000 - 15,000 per day, consistent with other reporting noting production of 152MM, 122MM, and 120MM mortar rounds at 4,000 per day each.

Air and Maritime Operations

It’s of note that Ukrainian forces have difficulty in defending their entire country from Russian drone and missile attack, with Ukraine being only 225,000 square miles in size (slightly smaller than Texas). Russia, with an area of more than 6.6 million square miles thus presents 30 times more area to defend, a problem that the Russians have not solved, and the Ukrainians continue to exploit. 

Ukrainian Forces

The Ukrainian counter logistics effort in Crimea continues, with power outages noted yesterday across Crimea. One reported noted 18 raions (essentially counties) in Crimea were having power outages, but there are only 10 rains in Crimea. Power outages were also noted in several areas of occupied areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Strikes also continue to pick at Russian radar sites and surface-to-air missile sites.

Drone strikes also continue on Russian merchant ships of the Sea of Azov, smaller ships (normally of several thousand ton displacement) capable of navigating Russia’s rivers and inland waterways.

Reuters reports, from an oil industry source, that the strike on July 5th-6th on the refinery in Omsk, Russia damaged at least one and possibly two distillation units. The facility has 11 units, but apparently only three were operating.

The UAF claimed that it shot down an RuAF SU-35 over eastern Ukraine.

Russian Forces

During the night of July 8th-July 9th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace with at least 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 94  x Strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 72 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia oblast. Daily Russian drone strikes on gas stations are now being reported the length of the front line.

Civilian casualties include at least 2 dead and 7 injured.

RuAF aircraft struck at least 3 towns.

During the night of July 7th-July 8th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace with at least 5 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 2 x Kh-31 anti-radiation missiles, and 169  x Strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 139 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odessa, Poltava, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Power outages were reported in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. At least one ballistic missile strikes were reported in Odessa, and were noted to have struck elsewhere but sites were not reported.

Civilian casualties include at least 17 injured.

During the night of July 6th-July 7th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace with at least 123  x Strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW,  108 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk,  Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia oblast. Power outages were reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson and Sumy blasts. 

Civilian casualties include at least 4 dead and 46 injured.

RuAF aircraft struck at least 3 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Mar9 Apr8 May8 Jun8 Jul7 Jul9

Brent      94.71   106.40 91.78 100.50 93.82 73.38 77.93

WTI     92.10   103.60 93.53 94.91 90.59 69.86 73.11

NG       3.97      3.37 2.73 2.79 3.14 3.26 3.12

Wheat     8.52  6.25 5.79 6.14 5.82 6.15 6.06

Ruble     85          78.20 78.54 74.26 73.10 76.42 76.31

Hryvnia 28.6 43.93 43.45 43.90 44.64 44.42 44.51

Urals 91.66 90.97 124.85 92.56 86.33 52.49 57.80

ESPO 94.52 84.99 103.27 105.56 95.51 68.89 73.53

Sokol 99.31 101.55 96.88 95.96 89.90 68.06 71.56

News agencies are reporting that yesterday the Kremlin ordered a 100% ban on diesel exports in response to rising domestic fuel prices, a fallout of the Ukrainian strikes on the Russian oil industry.

Thoughts

I continue to sort through the numbers that trickle out of both capitals. Many of the numbers are pure fiction, others appear to have some small slice of accuracy in them, and others, on rare occasions, tell volumes, so bear with me as I try to unravel the tale of the drones.

First, note that there are several different families of drones: long range, larger strike drones with ranges of several hundred miles or more, and payloads of 100lbs or more of high explosive - these are a mix of controlled and some “fire and forget,” some of the latter now using AI to sort out tracks and targets. There are medium range drones with ranges of perhaps 20 - 150 miles and warheads measured in “tens of pounds” of explosives. These also are seeing the use of AI, but many are still under direct control, via Starlink. These first two groups number in the several hundred launched per day by each side, that is 100 to 500 (on occasion more) long range drones and a similar number of medium range drones. It is in the medium range drone area that we find the fiber optic controlled drones, of which the Russians have the edge - courtesy of China, with the latest versions having ranges of 100KM (60 miles). Ukraine is trying to copy these drones but still lags in numbers and range.

Finally, there are the short range drones, which can fly for perhaps 20 minutes and care warheads of normally less than 10 lbs, though payloads are growing. These constitute the overwhelming number of drones.

As of March 2026 Ukraine was producing 11,000 per day, with a goal to increase production to 19,000 per day (7 million per year) by the end of 2026, and a rate of 30,000 per day by the end of 2027.

Russia later claimed it was making 19,000 per day by the end of March, but some independent reports note Russian usage was in the 10,000 - 11,000 per day by the end of May. Gen Syrskyi recently claimed that Ukraine was using FPV drones at a rate of 1.5 to one compared to the Russians. This would place Ukrainian usage in the 15,000 - 16,000 per day range, which, for mid summer, would be consistent with a steadily increasing production schedule that should reach 19,000 per day by the end of the year. The Russians continue to work on increasing their production totals and a number of 12,000 per day is reasonable for July. Stated differently, that works out to 480,000 per month as current Ukrainian usage, and a total of perhaps 2.6 million FPV drones used so far this year. On the Russian side, monthly totals as of July are perhaps in the 360,000 per month range, total used about 2.2 million so far this year.

How many are getting through? Ukrainian sources again give a hint, reporting that they shot down 49,575 Russian drones in June. Russian long range drone attacks average about 2,000 per week or 8,000 per month; presumably that smaller total is in included in that larger number. This would suggest about 42,000 FPV drones were “shot down” in June, meaning some 320,000 got through air defenses. This is where it gets a bit confusing.

Gen Syrskyi, in talking about the Ukrainian drone campaign has reported a total (adding up monthly totals) of almost 1 million targets struck since the beginning of the year. As there are only 710,000 Russian troops in the Ukraine theater, and far fewer than 300,000 “things” of any kind, and the Russians are not replacing 300,000 troops every 6 months, the number can’t mean a real target was struck. Rather, it suggests that over the course of the last 6 months, roughly 1 million drones survived long enough to fly into something (40% survival (or 60% defeat)), that would suggest Russian soft kill capabilities continue to lead Ukrainian and western soft kill capabilities - lots of lessons need to be learned there. At the same time, the Russian number - assuming a generous count of 50,000 shot down per month - translates into as many as 1.8 - 1.9 million drones surviving to hit something - which would mean twice as many Russian drones “survived” crossing into or through no mans land as did Ukrainian drones. More realistically, it suggests that the totals are roughly the same, with perhaps a slight edge to Russian drones.

And as noted above, even if 7,000+ artillery pieces were struck, how many were returned to service isn’t clear, and overall artillery activity remains pretty much unchanged.

Which leads around to the question of casualties.

Where does that leave casualties? 

Before discussing each side, there is a significant comment from Gen Syrskyi: we are used to thinking of casualties in ratios of 3 wounded to one killed. But, Syrskyi stated that the ratio is now 1.5 killed to 1 wounded. While he suggested this had to do with the lethality of the drones in the initial strike, it also speaks to the increasing difficulty of getting wounded off of a battlefield; there are no helo CASEVACs operating in Ukraine, even armored vehicles carrying wounded back from the front lines are relentlessly attacked by both sides, and there are countless videos of men waiting a day or more to be evac’d after being wounded; there is no “golden hour” on the Ukraine battlefield.

Again, Mediazone is the only source that has a credible methodology of Russian casualties. Mediazone placed the total Russian KIAs at 352,000 as of December 31st 2025, and casualty rates since appear to have been consistent with casualty rates in the 2nd half of 2025, which appear to be between 6,000 and 7,000 KIA per month. This would yield a grand total current Russian KIAs in the 390,000 range.

What about Ukrainian KIAs? Numbers for Ukrainian casualties are, if anything, more difficult to come by, and there is no Mediazone analog tracking Ukrainian casualties. But, one point that is clear is that Russian FPV drones are as numerous or more numerous behind the front line (on the Ukrainian side) as Ukrainian FPV drones are present on the Russian side. In addition, Russian forces are firing about 3 times as many artillery rounds (152MM, 122MM rockets, 120MM mortars) as the Ukrainian army (12,000 / day versus 3,000 - 4,000 / day). And Russian AF tacair continues to drop some 200+ FAB glide bombs (Russian equivalent of US JDAM-ER) per day, while the UAF drops no more than a handful per day. It defies credulity that there could be a significant difference in casualties given those circumstances.

Thus, an estimate of 6,000+ Ukrainian KIAs per month and an overall total in excess of 300,000 KIA is a reasonable, if horrible number, minus any hard, independent  data.

One final note: if (IF - lots of IF), if the Russians are able to “defeat” 60% of Ukrainian drones before they get to any target area, what does that say about the next generation of drones? Will this force drones to be more survivable and hence more expensive?

v/r pete    

 July 7th, 2026 No Summary Tomorrow 

Politics - NATO Summit in Ankara 

- US in discussions with Europe on production of Patriot missiles 

Combat Ops - No change on ground

- Drone and missile strikes continue

Weather

Kharkiv

64 and clear. Partly cloudy tomorrow, followed by 6 days of thunderstorms and rain showers. Daily lows in the 60s, daily highs in the 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

70 and partly cloudy. Sunny or mostly sunny through Wednesday, then two days of rain showers. Daily lows in the low 60s, daily highs in the 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

63 and sunny, gusting to 35. Showers and thunderstorms Tuesday and Wednesday, then two days with some sun, then more thunderstorms. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the upper 60s to low 70s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.

Politics

At the NATO Summit:

NATO SecGen's Rutte:

“We don't have the luxury of time. We need the capabilities now to ensure we remain ready. Russia is putting almost half of its national budget into its war machine. Can you imagine Almost 50% of what Russia spends is put into the war machine. Its defense industry is working around the clock. And not only the defense industry — also the rest of the industrial base in Russia is supporting the war effort. China continues to modernize its armed forces and expand its nuclear capabilities without transparency. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear program and supply to Russia. While recent action has significantly degraded Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, we must remain vigilant. These countries are increasingly working together. And that should concern us all, because I assure you, they do not have our best interests in mind.”

President Trump on a resolution to the war:

“getting closer than people realize,” noted that he had a “good call” on Sunday with Putin. “This is one that I think we’re getting much closer than people realize. And President Putin wants it to end. I will tell you that very strongly.” 

The Kremlin said the 85 minute call was “constructive.” 

“And President Zelenskyy actually wants it to end now. And we’re going to be going to NATO, and we’re going to be talking about it, and I think we’re going to get it. I think we’re going to get it ended. It’s been a terrible situation.”

Kremlin spokesman Peskov commented:

“You know, President Trump, the U.S. president, has a fairly consistent stance, and all these fabrications about him supposedly changing his views like a weather vane are, of course, untrue… He is consistent and confident in his understanding of what is happening, but, most importantly, he is open to listening to the information that is conveyed to him by Putin.”

Putin aide Yuri Ushakov commented:

“The U.S. president reaffirmed his readiness to facilitate an early termination of the hostilities and the search for peaceful solutions to the crisis.”

President Zelenskyy posted:

“When not one hundred drones but a thousand start reaching Moscow, and when he [Putin] feels it and sees it, he will be advised to move somewhere beyond the Urals. And then there are the elites. Where do the Russian elites live? Moscow and St. Petersburg—the two major cities. Those places will be reached, because that is where they make the decisions to kill us.”

Dutch MinDef Yeşilgöz-Zegerius commented that the Netherlands is unable to provide any further aide to Ukraine. The Netherlands has provided EUR 9.1 billion ($10.4 billion) in military aid to Ukraine and has pledged another EUR 11.6 billion ($13.2 billion).

“We don’t have opportunities any more as the Netherlands because we have done so much… the Netherlands has reached the limits of its capabilities.”

Serhii Beskrestnov, an advisor to the Ukrainian MinDef, (known as “Flash”), commented that Ukraine has run out of missiles capable of intercepting Russian ballistic missiles.

“It was very painful. We have no missiles at all; we have nothing to use against ballistic missiles. And this problem isn’t unique to us.”

The only missiles that Ukraine has that are capable of intercepting the Russian ballistic missiles are Patriot PAC-3. There are other missiles with the capability, but they are not in the Ukrainian inventory (THAAD, SM-2 and SM-3). Ukraine did have 2 SAMP/T systems firing the Aster 30 missiles (a combined French - Italian system). The Aster 30 Block 1 has a capability against tactical ballistic missiles, but the unofficial reports suggest Ukrainian forces ran out of these missiles in 2025 and have not received any since.

The Pentagon is in negotiations with Germany and other NATO members discussing the joint production of AMRAAM (AIM-120) missiles and as well as Patriot missiles.

Ground Operations

Fighting continues the length of the front lines, but there is little movement in the lines. Imagery did confirm that Ukrainian forces in the south-east have pushed into the little town of Piddubne, a village with a population of about 680 before the war, located about 22 miles north-east of Hulyaipole, just west of the Mokri Yaly river. The village sits in the middle of farmland and has no particular tactical significance.

Elsewhere, there are multiple indications of continued recon probes and infiltrations by Russian elements and also indications of Ukrainian elements remaining dug in, in what might be interpreted as “behind the lines” but again more accurately is termed the ever widening no mans land and the resulting “checkerboard” of positions across that no mans land.

In the key city of Kostiantinivka, some Russian sources continue to insist that Russian forces control the city, others point out that at least a third of the city is still controlled by Ukrainian forces and another third is a gray area. What is of note is the Russian advance - albeit gruesomely slow - while Russian aircraft continue to strike targets in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk and Druzhivka with glide bombs. These three cities, as well as Zaporizhzhia city, are being struck regularly by glide bombs. Strikes may not be every day but at least several times per week, and, as noted previously, these glide bombs are 500, 1000 or 1500KG (1100, 2200, or 3300 lb bombs) that are far more destructive than anything else in the inventory with the exception of the Iskander ballistic missiles.

Air and Maritime Operations

The civilian death toll in Kyiv during the attack on the 6 now stands at 19 killed.

Ukrainian Forces

The oil refinery complex in Omsk continues to burn. There is no up to date independent damage assessment yet.

Ukrainian forces during the night of July 6th-July 7th struck 8 x tankers, 1 x dry cargo ship and 1 x ferry in the Sea of Azov.The ships all appear to be small ships, designed for use in the Sea of Azov and on Russian rivers and canals. All ships are reportedly listed as sanctions violators.

Ships involved included: Venera-3, Sanar-1, Sanar-17, Klymena, Teti, Alexey Savrasov, and Penelopa. The names of the other ships have not been released.

Russian Forces

During the night of July 6th-July 7th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace with at least 123  x Strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW,  108 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk,  Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia oblast. 

Civilian casualties include at least 4 dead and 46 injured.

RuAF aircraft struck at least 3 towns.

During the night of July 5th-July 6th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace with at least 6 x Zircon missiles 23 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 33 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 6 x Kalibr cruise missiles and 351 x Strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 37 of 39 cruise missiles, and 326 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kiev, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblast. In Kyiv, evacuations of several neighborhoods have been ordered.  

Civilian casualties include at least 11 dead and 60 injured.

RuAF aircraft struck at least 4 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Mar9 Apr8 May8 Jun8 Jul6 Jul7

Brent      94.71   106.40 91.78 100.50 93.82 71.86 73.38

WTI     92.10   103.60 93.53 94.91 90.59 68.43 69.86

NG       3.97      3.37 2.73 2.79 3.14 3.24 3.26

Wheat     8.52  6.25 5.79 6.14 5.82 6.14 6.15

Ruble     85          78.20 78.54 74.26 73.10 77.05 76.42

Hryvnia 28.6 43.93 43.45 43.90 44.64 44.57 44.42

Urals 91.66 90.97 124.85 92.56 86.33 51.61 52.49

ESPO 94.52 84.99 103.27 105.56 95.51 69.17 68.89

Sokol 99.31 101.55 96.88 95.96 89.90 68.41 68.06

Urals oil price listed as above, but contracts went for as low as $41.66 over the last several days.

Thoughts

As noted above, Ukraine is struggling for interceptors to address Russian ballistic missiles. Russian forces have noticed and Russian ballistic missile launch totals have dropped slightly in number as the survival rate has increased - a direct result of fewer Patriot missiles being launched to intercept them. Russian forces have launched at least 109 ballistic missiles since the first of June and only a handful (4 or 5) have been intercepted

Lockheed, which makes the Patriot missile, has been attempting to increase production but the rate has been stuck at 50 per month (600 per year) for more than a year, apparently as a result of the difficulty in increasing the production rate of certain components. The Foreign Policy Research Institute reports that the solid propellant takes 30 months to “cure,” and there are elements of the guidance and control systems that require 24 month lead time to assemble.

At the same time, during the engagements with Iran, US and allied forces used 900 Patriot missiles in the first 4 days and a total of 1,700 in 5 weeks. 

Patriot production is not expected to reach 2,000 per year until 2030. And prior to those engagements there was already a backlog of 4,300 missiles to a dozen countries (not to include Ukraine). 

v/r pete