August 10th, 2026

Politics - Senate passes Graham Sanctions Bill

- 30,000+North Korean troops 

- State Department oks weapons transfer

- Ukraine - Kosovo disagreement 

Combat Ops - Small changes on ground

- Drone Strikes continue

- Anti-Drone systems

Weather

Kharkiv

82 and sunny. Mostly sunny through the weekend. Daily lows in the 60s, daily highs in the upper 70s to low 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

87 and scattered showers, gusting to 20. Mostly sunny through the weekend. Daily lows in the upper 60s to low 70s, daily highs in the 90s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

79 and sunny, gusting over 30. Mostly sunny through the weekend. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the upper 70s to low 80s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics

On Friday the Senate passed the “Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act.” The bill now heads to the House. The bill:

• Authorizes the President to impose tariffs up to 100% on imports from the five largest buyers of Russian crude oil or natural gas
• Extends Iran sanctions
• Imposes sanctions targeting Putin, Putin’s close associates, various Russian banks and energy projects, and "shadow" of tankers
• Imposes tariffs up to 500% on direct Russian imports

President Zelenskyy claimed in an interview on Saturday that Russia and North Korea have agreed to a deployment of 30,000 - 50,000 North Korean troops into Russia. Where and when was not known (or not released).

On Friday the State Department approved transfer of the following from Turkey to Ukraine:

• 70 x M39 ATACMS 
• 12 x M270 MLRS 
• 2,524 x M26 MLRS rockets
• 47,000 x M509A1 203mm DPICM howitzer rounds

The Mayor of Pristina (the Capital of Kosovo) ordered the removal of the Ukrainian flag from city government displays following President Zelenskyy’s comments in Serbia on Friday.

Zelenskyy met with President Vucic of Serbia and during a news conference noted that Ukraine respected territorial integrity of its friends and allies, thanked Serbia for supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and said that the Ukrainain position on Kosovo remains unchanged.

Ukraine has not recognized Kosovo’s independence (2008).

Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Glauk Konjufca, commented:

“We note with regret President Zelenskyy’s statements in Belgrade, where he reaffirmed Ukraine’s non-recognition of the Republic of Kosovo. From the first day of Russia’s full-scale aggression, Kosovo has stood unequivocally with Ukraine. We condemned the invasion, fully aligned with the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, imposed sanctions on Russia and Belarus, provided humanitarian assistance and shelter for Ukrainian journalists, and contributed aid and military training in support of Ukraine’s defense. We did so despite Ukraine’s non-recognition of our state, because solidarity with a people defending its freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity is a matter of principle.”

Commenting on Balkan unrest in the 1990s and Kosovo’s independence, he added:

“What followed was not an act of annexation, invasion or territorial occupation, but a comprehensive international process under United Nations administration and years of internationally mediated negotiations on Kosovo’s final status. When those negotiations had exhausted every possibility for a solution accepted by both sides, the United Nations special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, recommended independence as Kosovo’s final status and presented a comprehensive framework for the new state, including some of the broadest constitutional guarantees in Europe for non-majority communities.”

Albania’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs also rejected comparisons between Kosovo’s independence and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Two unidentified drones conducted a total of 6 overflights of the Bundeswehr Patriot repair and maintenance facility at Mechernich (just south-west of Bonn) on August 7th.

On August 8th an Ukrainian drone exploded in a field in Bulgaria, about 650 feet from a gas compressor station, along the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline.

Ground Operations

There are a number of small gains by both sides, overall, infiltrations continue across much of the front.

Ukrainian forces appear to gained ground north-east of Kharkiv near the small towns of Lyman and Tsehelne. The terrain around these towns, except for just west of Lyman, is all open fields (west of Lyman is woods), and this activity represents movement up and down the tree lines. This terrain has see-sawed back and forth a bit in the recent past. Other reporting suggests Russian forces may have pushed into Ivanivka; again the lines are slowly flexing back and forth in this area, and it is not clear how well either side holds these particular positions.

Elsewhere in the area, Russian infiltrations continue, and Russian forces were active north of the Oskil river border crossing. This doesn’t represent a change in the lines, just a continuation of Russian operations.

East of the Oskil River Ukrainain forces made gains both north-east and south-east of Borova, but there is also other reporting suggesting Russian gains in the same area, which I suspect again represents the “see-saw” nature of some of these fronts. Part of it also reflects the reality that the gray zone - where neither side really has control - continues to widen as drones continue to become incrementally more effective.

There were no confirmed changes to the lines from Kostiantinivka west to Pokrovsk, but Russian forces continue to infiltrate more assets forward. Interestingly, Ukrainain forces noted that Russian forces are rotating fresh troops in even as they increase the number of infiltrations.

Russian infiltration efforts were also reported in Orikhiv, with Ukrainian sources saying that the infiltration team was destroyed. At the same time, Russian glide bomb strikes have been reported in and near Orikhiv, suggesting Russian efforts are moving in that direction.

Air and Maritime Operations

Both sides continue the long-range drone / cruise missile strikes. 

Both sides also continue the drone sniping across the front lines into the immediate rear (the vast majority less than 5 miles out). 

Blogger reports claim that Russian forces are trying to install signal repeaters in towns north of Kharkiv in order to extend signal coverage and thereby extend drone range. 

Imagery from August 7th showed a small Russian armored element - 7 tanks - conducting a brief attack near Dobropillia. What is of note is that Ukrainian forces responded with FPV drones and were only able to immobilize a single tank.

The tanks, (T-72B3Ms) were apparently equipped with an improved “Arena-M Armor Protection System.”

The system uses a radar linked to a dispenser of rounds that will explode close aboard the tank but destroy incoming anti-tank rounds or drones. The system has been criticized for only having a total of 12 rounds, but that they only lost one tank once they were attacked suggests the Russians are making progress…

Ukrainian Forces

On the 8th, Ukrainian strikes again hit Wildberries warehouses as well as two oil facilities. Oil facilities struck were:

• Oil refinery in Syzran - 450 miles south-east of Moscow
• Oil facility in Kstovo - 275 miles east-north-east of Moscow 
• Warehouses were hit in the Moscow and St Petersburg areas

Casualty reports included 15 civilians killed and 56 wounded.

Russian forces claimed its forces shot down 153 drones.

During August 7th-August 8th Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, and imagery showed the facility on fire.

Also struck was the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast; imagery again showed a fire at the facility.

On August 8 Ukrainian forces struck a tanker in the eastern Black Sea. There is no damage report for the ship.

During August 9th Ukrainian forces struck an oil tanker and 2 dry bulk cargo ships in the eastern Black Sea.

During the night of August 9th - August 10th Ukrainian forces struck an oil facility in Nizhnekamsk (500 miles east of Moscow). Russian reports claimed 13 civilians were killed in the attack and 39 others wounded.

Meanwhile, Russian sources claimed they intercepted 450 Ukrainian drones.

Additionally, Ukrainian drones struck the Sibur oil facility, in Tobolsk (about 600 miles north-east of Moscow).

And 1 ship was reported on fire off the coast of Novorossiysk (not clear if this was the ship mentioned above).

Russian Forces

Ukraine’s Deputy PM and Minster of Energy Shmyhal reported on Friday that Russian strikes on the Ukrainian power grid and power infrastructure in the past 12 months have caused some $70 billion in damage (additional damage) and that 80% of Ukraine’s power generation capacity has been damaged or destroyed and that there is now a 6GW generation gap.

Public estimates suggest that Ukraine is currently able to generate about 1/3rd of pre invasion installed capacity. Prior to the war Ukraine had roughly 43 GW of installed capacity and now has between 12 and 14 GW, with a need for 18-20GW as a minimum.

Statements from the government suggest that about 1/3rd of the population has access to steady power, 1/3rd have access to communal centers during periods of extreme cold, and about 1/3rd of the population will need to provide their own solutions.

Russian strikes over the next 6 months and through the winter will focus on making the situation worse.

During the night of August 7th-August 8th Russian forces launched at least 8 x Iskander ballistic missile and 152 x strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 135 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kyiv, and Odessa oblast.

Targets included power, transport, logistics infrastructure. The port facilities in Odessa were again struck. A power outage was reported in Kyiv.

Civilian casualties include at least  4 killed and 8 wounded.

1 Turkish ship was struck by drone off Novorossiysk.

RuAF tacair struck at least 2 towns.

During the night of August 8th-August 9th Russian forces launched 17 missiles (numbers not clear) to include Iskander ballistic missiles, and Onyx, Kh-31 and Banderol cruise missiles, and 202 x strike drones into Ukrainain air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 174 drones and 5 Banderol missiles..

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Odessa, Pavlohrad, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblast.

Targets included power, transport, logistics infrastructure.

Civilian casualties include at least  3 killed and 40 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck at least 1 town.

During the night of August 9th-August 10th Russian forces launched at least 1 x Kh-59/69 cruise missile, 3 x Banderol cruise missiles, and 126 strike drones not Ukrainain airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 3 Banderols and 92 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odessa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblast.

Targets included power, transport, logistics infrastructure; power and water infrastructure in Odessa were both damaged.

Civilian casualties include at least 5 killed and 39 wounded.

Of note, Ukrainian reports noted that 19 border towns in northern Ukraine (north-east of Kyiv) were struck with artillery fire.

Former MinDef Fedorov commented over the weekend that current Russian missile production exceeds Ukraine’s cumulative domestic and foreign production.

During July Russian attacks on maritime infrastructure has damaged 67 different port facilities, 35 ships in port, and 22 ships in the approaches to Ukrainian ports.

Russian long range strike totals for August 3rd - August 9th included more than 56 ballistic missiles, 5 cruise missiles, 1,560 strike drones, and 1,540 glide bombs.

Economic Reporting

       Feb22  Apr8 May8 Jun8 Jul9        Aug7 Aug10

Brent      94.71   91.78 100.50 93.82 77.93 81.75 84.82

WTI     92.10   93.53 94.91 90.59 73.11 76.66 79.49

NG       3.97      2.73          2.79 3.14          3.12  2.64 2.77

Wheat     8.52           5.79 6.14    5.82   6.06  6.35 6.50

Ruble     85          78.54 74.26 73.10 76.31 82.61 82.63

Hryvnia 28.6       43.45 43.90 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.86

Urals 91.66 124.85 92.56 86.33 57.80 79.19 81.08

ESPO 94.52 103.27 105.56 95.51 73.53 78.79 79.99

Sokol 99.31 96.88 95.96 89.90 71.56 77.42 77.91

Thoughts

Perhaps the most interesting piece of data that came out in the last 4 or 5 days is the comment from an Ukrainian unit commander that Russian forces are rotating troops even as they infiltrate troops.

The issue of troop rotation has been a painful one for both armies, and the nature of the “infiltration war” is that small units routinely get isolated and must survive for extended period of time - months - surrounded by the enemy. Then, once they return to the parent units the parent units spend very long periods on the front line. There are multiple units that, until early this year, had gone more than a year without rotating off the front line. One of DefMin Fedorov’s efforts as soon as he entered his office in January, was to fix that and he reportedly made substantive headway.

Nevertheless, the Russians appear to have been more consistent with their rotations than the Ukrainians. That the Ukrainian unit commander noted it makes me wonder if it may well be his way of poking his senior that they need to be better at rotating troops.

v/r pete    

 Failure to Deter

Failure to Deter

August 9th, 2026

In his book “Appeasement” author Tim Bouverie perfectly puts the question:

“Of course, the overwhelming responsibility for the Second World War rests with Adolph Hitler. Only he and his most fanatical henchman desired it. Only he willed the series of events that led to it. Yet, while Hitler was uniquely responsible for the tragedy, the question remains: How was he allowed to inflict such misery?”

It’s worth noting that Churchill dubbed World War II the “unnecessary war.” 

Arguably, we learned some things about deterring and preventing war in the wake of WWII, but we seem to be forgetting many of the lessons learned. The ongoing war in Ukraine is an object lesson in things we have gotten wrong in the last 35 years. So, what lessons can we learn from the 30 years between Ukrainian independence and the Russian invasion?

In 1948 Permanent Secretary of the Treasury Sir Warren Fisher commented:

“In 1935 we addressed moral platitudes to the Italians about the integrity of Abyssinia without any advantage to the latter and merely driving the Italians into Germany’s arms, and in 1936 we addressed questionnaire after questionnaire to the Germans about their military reoccupation of the Rhineland.

When the Spanish Civil War broke out we deceived ourselves with a non-intervention pact which nobody but us observed. And in 1938 we partitioned Czechoslovakia.

This brief sketch omits many things, including our fatuous performance or non-performance about Manchuria. But the moral for the future is plain…

Had the British Empire, the United States and France squarely faced the facts in unison, the horrors which started up with the rape of Manchuria, followed by the outrage of Abyssinia, the all-out attack on China, the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia and culminating in the years from September 1939 could have been prevented; and therefore none of these countries can disclaim or escape a haven measure of responsibility.”

With the Budapest Memorandum (1994) the US, the UK, and Russia gave security assurances to Ukraine, in exchange for Ukraine surrendering the 1600 nuclear weapons on its soil following the break up of the USSR. Of course, the security assurance was directed at Russia, the US and UK representing no conceivable security threat to Ukraine.

It is worth noting that President Clinton, in April 2023, said:

“I feel a personal stake because I got them [Ukraine] to agree to give up their nuclear weapons. And none of them believe that Russia would have pulled this stunt if Ukraine still had their weapons.”

“I knew that President Putin did not support the agreement President Yeltsin made never to interfere with Ukraine’s territorial boundaries – an agreement he made because he wanted Ukraine to give up their nuclear weapons.”

“They [Ukraine] were afraid to give them up because they thought that’s the only thing that protected them from an expansionist Russia.”

“When it became convenient to him, President Putin broke it and first took Crimea. And I feel terrible about it because Ukraine is a very important country.”

It might well be said that the unraveling of deterrence began in September 1991 when President Bush unilaterally moved to reduce US tactical nuclear forces. What followed has been a series of reductions in nuclear forces across the board, both tactical weapons and intercontinental forces.

Consider these numbers: 1992 versus today

ICBMs: 925 / 400

Bombers: 248 / 141

Missile Subs 30   /  14

At the same time there has been a remarkable reduction in conventional force size.

Fighters (USAF) 3,486  /  1,978

Tankers 668  /  510

Transports 1,185  /  633

Aircraft Carriers 14   /  11

Cruisers 49   /   3

DDGs 40  /  74 

Frigates 67  /   0   

SSN 85  /  54

Amphibious 58  /  32

Army Divisions 16   /  11

Tanks 7700 /  4650

The Marines remain the same size but are in the middle of a major reorganization that has included retiring all their tanks.

While all this was going on, the US became involved in a series of wars that, no matter how it might be argued from the inside, from the outside looked as though they dragged on and on and seemed to reflect a high command that was, from one administration to another, strategically adrift, culminating in the withdrawal from Kabul in the summer of 2021.

If the intention was to send signals of stability to our friends and to deter would be foes, the US seems to have done just the opposite over most of the past 34 years. As with Germany’s actions in the 1930s, Russian actions in the teens, the seizing of Crimea, followed by the seizing of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, were met with a flurry of sanctions directed at senior individuals in the Russian administration, and little else. 

Now, 12 years later, more than 4 years into a brutal war in eastern Ukraine, the west seems to not only have no plan to end the war, but doesn’t seem to have learned much else from the strategic malaise of the last three decades.

Arguably, one concrete step to reshape the future in the right direction - depriving the Shia state of Iran of nuclear weapons, is generally decried in Europe. And the alliance structure envisaged after WWII briefly came together in the 1950s and 1960s but was already well frayed by the mid 1970s and the US was left to uphold the Atlantic Alliance over years of protest. 

Europe, with 3 times as many people as Russia, 10 times the economic power, and two nuclear powers as well, ought to be able to secure Europe. But the militaries of the UK, Germany and much of western Europe are crumbling and many expect the US to simply carry the ball.

Meanwhile, US conventional forces are increasingly stretched thin and US weapons stockpiles, while perhaps more robust than many would have us believe, are not a bottomless pit. But conventional forces - large and capable conventional forces - are necessary to contain problems before they escalate; the issue remains the deterrence of the Great Powers - Russia and in particular China.

Eisenhower made the point that conventional forces, no matter how large, will not deter a great power, particularly in its own “theater;” only nuclear forces will do that. True deterrence then means the ability to contain a problem at any level with the understanding that no matter how much the enemy might wish to escalate, at each increment their pain will increase. 

But we have not only let our theater nuclear forces wither, we have over the last 30 years continued to cut our conventional forces. And all this went hand in hand with our allies also in many cases cutting their forces even more dramatically. 

The US and our Allies failed to deter Putin. We might want to blame this all on Putin but it is hard to blame a cobra from being a cobra. We shouldn’t act shocked that Putin wants more land. Nor should we try to rationalize statements by Xi about Taiwan; cobras are cobras.

We need to contain the damage that has been done in Ukraine and bring that war to an end. We need to take a hard turn on those alliances that can help us achieve our goals and deter Russia and China and others. And we need to rebuild both our conventional forces and our nuclear forces, with due regard to the all the changes in how war is being fought at various options around the world. 

But we mustn’t delude ourselves into believing that this is all going to work out. The next great power war is likely to be a great deal more destructive than World War II; we need to deter it. That means being ready to fight it in the air and at sea. But we really need to be strong enough - across the entire spectrum of war - to deter it. And that means acting now.