October 5th, 2026

Politics - 5 Drones crash in Moldova

- Russian drone strikes  

- Rafale training to begin “soon”

Combat Ops - Strikes continue - targeting bridges 

- Small grains on ground

Economics  - Hyrvnia trades above 45 to the dollar for the first time

Weather

Kharkiv

62 and partly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy through the week. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

63 and mostly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy for the next 5 days. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 70s. Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

58 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Partly to mostly cloudy through Thursday morning, then some clearing but rain on Friday. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Politics

Russian drones - 5 total - crashed in Moldova Saturday morning. There does not appear to have been any damages, and no casualties. It is not yet clear how the drones “crashed.”

President Zelenskyy reported that 2 x Russian drones struck a Turkish owned ship, in neutral waters (western Black Sea, near Romanian territorial waters), killing 2 crew; the 11 other crew have been taken off the ship.

The vessel, Royad Mammadov (St Kitts & Nevis flag, 456 ft, 6900 deadweight tons), is damaged but afloat and in the Romanian EEZ; the ship had a load of corn and was en route Italy.

President Zelenskyy announced that UAF pilots will begin training on Rafale aircraft “soon.”

"New defence deliveries are now being prepared, and we expect a new package to arrive in Ukraine soon. We discussed its contents. Ukrainian pilots will also begin training on French Rafale aircraft in France in the near future. This is a strong step for Ukraine's combat aviation."

Ground Operations

Infiltrations continue along much of the line of contact and Russian activity appears to have increased a small amount both along the border east of Sumy City and along the border north of the Oskil River and then west towards Vovchansk. While there have been several small Russian gains in the area, there is no indication that there has been any substantive change in control of terrain.

Further south, in the terrain east of Lyman, fighting continues and Ukrainian forces may have made some small gains over the past 4 days, and may have reached the west bank of the Zherebets river, just north of Zarichne, along a spot in the river that was long ago broadened into pond-reservoir. There are two spots to get across the river, one just to the north and one just to the south of the pond, both are fairly narrow and are wide open with no real cover. Meanwhile reporting continues to indicate that there are small Russian elements still in the Ukrainian rear.

Weather has been cool and there has been some rain, but it is not clear whether off-load movement has become too difficult yet.

Infiltrations also continue into the northern edge of Kostiantinivka, Druzhivka and Dobripillia, but, again, there is no clear indication that there has been a substantive change in the amount of terrain controlled (though the propaganda reflux continues unabated).

On the southern front, fighting continues around Orikhiv, to the west, to the north-east, and south-east, but Russian forces are not inside that town, right now. To the north-east, along the T0408 roadway, Russian forces appear to have reached the eastern edge of the town of Omelnyk (6 miles up the road from Orikhiv), and have pushed into the east side of the town, but Ukraine forces are holding the center.

Air and Maritime Operations

Both sides continue the long-range drone / cruise missile strikes. 

Both sides also continue the drone sniping across the front lines into the immediate rear (the vast majority less than 5 miles out). These attacks can involve from a handful to scores of FPV drones per day into any given village.

Ukrainian Forces

Ukrainian forces continued long-range strikes against Russian oil and logistics grids.

Facilities struck on the 1st include Lukoil Oil Refinery in Volgograd City, and the Samara facility in Samara Oblast.

On the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian missiles struck and Iskander ballistic missile site in Bryansk Oblast and a Russian strike drone launch complex near Tsimbulova.

On the 4th Ukrainian forces struck Khanskaya Airbase and claim to have destroyed a Su-34 and a Su-35.

Russian Forces

Missile and drone strikes continued throughout the weekend, though it is of note that there are some contradictory and incomplete reports on numbers and types. As noted before, the UAF stopped providing detailed reports on numbers of Russian missiles launched or numbers intercepted. However, it appears that there were well more than 100 drones launched on each of the last 4 nights.

Drone hits were reported in multiple oblasts.

What is of note is that there were more strikes on bridges and on data centers.

Southern Bridge in Kyiv City was struck multiple times on October 1st and 2nd, in what Mayor Klitschko called 4 waves of drone strikes. Southern Bridge, as discussed last week, is a reinforced concrete - suspension bridge and would require multiple strikes with drones (particularly given the relatively small warheads) in order to seriously damage the bridge. 

On October 3rd Northern Bridge in Kyiv City was struck. Northern bridge is also a cable stayed reinforced concrete bridge and would also require multiple drone strikes to cause serious damage. 

Zelenskyy’s office noted that Russian forces are now using a network of repeaters to improve accuracy of Russian drones in the city by giving drone operators real-time control of the drones.

Of note, part of this network appears to be using the local internet grid. No one has suggested whether the recent strikes on the various data centers (27 data centers struck since September 20th) is, in some way abetting the setup of this network.

Kyiv is a city of 3 million, a metropolitan population of 3.5 million and is split fairly evenly in half, connected by 5 major bridges and several smaller bridges. So, while the damage to the bridges appears to be minimal (so far), even 1 small strike on a bridge is going to close the bridge at least for a short period of time and cause a tremendous amount of heart ache in the city. And, repeated strikes, without a chance to repair any damage, might result in cumulative, severe, damage.

President Zelensky noted yesterday that Russian long range strikes for the period September 27 - October 4th included 1,900 strike drones (800 jet-powered), 25 missiles of various types, though most were ballistic), and 1,700 glide bombs.

I again note that the glide bomb strikes continue to sustain a rate of over 200 per day.

In response to Russian jet-powered drones, Ukraine is increasing production of jet-powered drone interceptors. Per President Zelenskyy’s postings, current the intercept rate of propeller-driven drones is about 85%, the current intercept of jet-powered drones is 50%. 

The UAF is deploying 12 x .50cal anti-drone turrets inside Kyiv (the city) and another 8 at spots around the oblast (outside the city).

Zelenskyy again commented that the F-16’s 20MM cannon remains the most effective system against the jet-powered drones. 

Zelenskyy also noted that Russia is believed to already have an inventory of 700 ballistic missiles and are producing 130 per month.

Economic Reporting

         Feb22  Jun8 Jul9          Aug7 Sep8 Oct2 Oct5

Brent      94.71   93.82 77.93 81.75 98.19 99.77 102.00

WTI     92.10   90.59 73.11 76.66 93.28 89.66 90.49

NG       3.97       3.14 3.12           2.64 2.95 2.96 3.05

Wheat     8.52  5.82   6.06   6.35   7.46 6.87 6.93

Ruble     85           73.10 76.31 82.61 86.21 83.54 84.85

Hryvnia 28.6 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.63 44.99 45.05

Urals 91.66 86.33 57.80 79.19 89.44 105.55 114.76

ESPO 94.52 95.51 73.53 78.79 98.44 101.45 N/A

Sokol 99.31 89.90 71.56 77.42 94.09 107.25 107.24

The Hryvnia has traded above 45 to the dollar for the first time. This followed the news that the projected inflation rate for 2027 has been increased to 8.9% and the hryvnia expected to be trading above 48 to the dollar by the end of 2027.

From 1991 (Independence) through 2008, the Hryvnia traded below 5 to the dollar, and from 2008 through 2014 traded below 8.3 to the dollar, then jumped above 20 to the dollar late in 2014, and inched up to 28 to the dollar between early 2015 and spring of 2022 (after the war started). It then jumped over 35 to the dollar and stayed there until November 2023; it has been slowly inching up since then.

Russian grain shipments through the Black Sea for the three month period July - September has fallen to 5.6 million metric tons, down from 11.3 million tons last year for the same period. Meanwhiles, shipments out of the Baltic have increased 465% since September 1st, and shipments by train to China have increased from 2.3 million tons in 2024, to 5.8 million tons in 2025 and are on pact to reach 9 million tons this year.

Thoughts

The war continues and the fighting continues to evolve. Ukrainian forces reaching the Zherebets River north-east of Lyman is of note; whether they have the forces to exploit it remains to be seen, particularly at this point in the year. They’re likely to make raids across the river but sustaining forces in the rain and mud of the autumn may be quite difficult.

Meanwhile the Russian gains north-east of Orikhiv are also of note, and again, there is the issue of whether it can be sustained as the weather turns cold and wet.

Of the two, the Ukrainian gain to the Zherebets has the most tactical impact and the Russians will need to flow forces to plug that hole - and there are reportedly 4 - 6 additional regiments moving into the area for that purpose alone. We’ll see if they get their in time.

As for the town of Omelnyk - a town of less than 200 when the war began, and now, based on images on line, fairly badly mauled - if, indeed the Russians have reached the town, this squeezes Orikhiv and brings the southern front into focus. Taking the town would allow Russians to attack Orikhiv from the north-east and west and threaten the GLOCs just as the weather forces movement back onto the roads. If Orikhiv is further squeezed, Ukrainian forces will need to pull logistics support back further and weaken their hold on the southern line. Said differently, this could have a significant operational impact; Ukrainian forces they need to hold Orikhiv and holding Orikhiv means they need to hold Omelnyk.

v/r pete

End Game Ukraine

October 4th, 2026

Overall, some 323.75 sq. km gained, in one spot the enemy pushed back 7.56 km.

I was asked an interesting question the other day from one of my correspondents: what is the end game and is there a strategy to get there? That’s a very hard question.

The answer, of course, begins with another hard question: what is Ukraine trying to achieve, what is the goal?

It’s easy to say “Independent Ukraine.” All well and good but how do you define Ukraine? Is Ukraine the country inside the 1991 borders, including, obviously, Crimea? Or Ukraine less Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk blasts? Or something else? Clearly, in their hearts, Ukrainians want the first answer: Ukraine as defined in 1991. 

There are, as I see it, three possible goals for the Ukraine - West coalition; there are obviously a whole host of other possible goals, but most are dangerous or foolish:

1) Survival of the nation of Ukraine

2) The bleeding of Russia

3) Holding off the end of the war until a concrete and readily executable answer makes itself known

In looking at these, we need to remember that the problem is framed on all sides by Ukrainian demographics and the Ukrainian economy. The population is shrinking and any solution has to account for the capacity to survive with a population of less than 20 million (current population is 32 million, population in 2022 was 43 million, population in 1991 was 52 million; population projected for 2055 is “less than 15 million”), and an economy smaller than the current - badly mauled - GDP. Economically, the country exists because the West is paying for it. The potential real GDP will, in all likelihood not be able to support a comprehensive defense of the entire country, so a follow-on alliance, and a quite extensive one, will be required to survive as an independent nation. If that isn't in the cards, then the war is already lost.

As for possible goals…

The first goal has two versions: A) the survival of Ukraine as it was defined in 1991, to include all of eastern Ukraine and Crimea. That case is, for all intents and purposes, impossible without a tremendous investment - outside investment, from Europe and the US; Europe could not do it alone in its current condition, it is not "healthy" enough economically, politically or militarily. 

Or

B) the survival of a lesser Ukraine. This would (or should) mean the survival of an Ukraine that is defendable. This means the de facto ceding of some portion of eastern Ukraine. The question is: "What portion?" My answer to that is that you have to take a very hard look at the terrain and identify - as the Russians already have in the parts they occupy, the defendable terrain, and build real defenses and fall back in on those lines. Failure to do so will simply slow down the long term collapse. Russia might stop fighting, but they would probably restart. It needs to be made "too hard.” That line may well be the Dnepr River, but whatever it is, there needs to be the hard decision to build the necessary defenses based on that line.

And, any "defendable" Ukraine has to work within the construct of a Ukraine with a population of, perhaps, 20 million (or less), which means a professional military of perhaps 250,000, universal conscription, very highly automated and robotic, and... very expensive. That means, one supported by the West. At this point this seems to be the only possible future for a survivable Ukraine, even though a de facto smaller Ukraine.

The second goal is Machiavellian in the extreme, and dangerous. This path really translates into "fight 'till the last Ukrainian." To want to do this is to say “I don't care how many Ukrainians die, or are displaced or forced to flee their country, as long as Russians die.” It is horribly amoral. And, it runs two very real risks: attrition finally breaks Ukraine and then there is no Ukraine - and Russia occupies all of it, or, the real risk that at a certain point Russia says "enough," and uses other means - to include nuclear weapons - to end the war. Either way, this is a dangerously escalatory plan.

And despite what some may say about Russian casualties, Ukraine's casualty numbers are of the same raw magnitude, and the damaging of Russia is causing far worse proportional damage to Ukraine.

The third goal - which is perhaps really where we are, as Europe does not have a cohesive strategy - is to hold on and wait for the "deus ex machina" solution. This “strategy” also runs the risk of the war eventually escalating out of control, even as Europe slowly bleeds its own weapons stockpiles and continues to struggle with its own political survival. This can easily be called "Hope as a plan," and is, perhaps the most dangerous because it really has no definable end except an amorphous Ukraine survival, because we won't define which Ukraine survives, or explain the acceptance of the likely destroyed Ukraine that will remain in the wake of the war, and how that partial, badly damaged Ukraine will, in fact, survive in the long term.

There are, of course, other possible options: for example, Europe could always man-up, cobble together an army of 500,000 or more, push air forces and air defense forces forward into Ukraine, and fight the Russians alongside the Ukrainians. This is, in the end, the only way to fight and win the conventional - that is, non-nuclear - war. This would, of course, be massively escalatory and would be viewed by the Kremlin as a de facto invasion of Russia, with all the attendant risks (like nuclear exchange).

Meanwhile, there are a steady stream of upbeat stories of Ukrainian forces gaining on the ground, Ukrainian technology striking at the Russian army, Ukrainian improvisation again and again beating the Russians. 

But there is an important caveat here: don’t confuse short-termed tactical success (and propaganda) with strategic outcomes. Tactics and technology win battles, but they don't win wars. See "Vietnam," or "Hannibal's Invasion of Italy," or a thousand wars in between. Include Iraq and Afghanistan and Somalia.

Daily reports talk about infiltrations and probes, and tell a story that isn’t clear: Have the Russians forces have actually moved forward into village X? Are counter attacks here and here really successful? Do the Russians not control town Y?  And the Ukrainians may or may not control town Z? Then it’s noted that Ukrainian forces have, in the last 6 months, recovered 145.67 square kilometers of terrain, and in the last 4 weeks retook another 113.37 sq. km. 

Are we sure it’s not 113.36? Maybe it’s 113.38 sq. km. As one of my boss’s used to say: we’re measuring with a micrometer and cutting with a chain saw. In fact, on any given day the front line is a “zone” that is several miles wide (at least) and neither side can readily move in it without getting “sniped” by FPV drones. Who controls what is a nebulous idea. It really is a “no mans land.”

In 2022 the Russians began this war with a monstrous strategic mistake based on a massively flawed assessment of what the Ukrainians would do if attacked. Remarkably - sadly - the Russians managed to recover from that mistake and began to refight the war. By the end of 2022 they instituted a war of attrition, a war not really designed to take land, but rather designed primarily to grind down Ukraine, to inflict casualties and destroy the country. That’s what they’re doing. There’s been some small, painfully slow taking of land, but in the end, that’s not the daily goal, the goal is to grind down Ukraine.

The casualty figures that are published on Russian losses (40,000+ per month) are both inflated, and conflated - killed, wounded, missing - all rolled together. What are they really? Hard to say, though Mediazone, the one meticulous open source number with merit, would place it in the neighborhood of perhaps 400,000 Russians killed in the entire war, currently running perhaps at 6-7,000 per month. And a similar number of severely wounded troops who will not return to duty. Add on top of that perhaps 15,000 other wounded per month. But here is the important point: Ukrainian casualties are of the same order of magnitude. 

And while the strikes on Russian oil industry have gained notoriety in the news, Ukraine is being economically destroyed at a much higher rate. 

Recent reporting on Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi, which began at the start of the year, notes that it regained land north and east of the town of Lyman between mid August and the end of September, perhaps 125 sq km in a month of fighting, all in all a very small slice of land. The insistence is that the land is of tactical significance. Perhaps. 

Or, perhaps what we have is this huge struggle going on and people are focused on tiny slices of land because there is nothing else. One source says Russian net gains for the first 9 months of 2026 equals 663 sq. km., one says Russia had a net loss of 108 sq. km., another says Russia had a net loss of 80.81 sq. km. To put this in perspective, Washington DC covers 158 sq km. In 9 months.

This is not winning, this is attrition warfare, attrition against an enemy with 5 times the population of Ukraine. Fighting for 9 months for pieces of farmland that add up to the size of Washington DC. That is at the heart of the discussion.

About those other numbers at the very top of the essay? A little perspective: those are from the Somme and Verdun, respectively.