February 26th, 2026

Politics - Bodies exchanged

- Ukrainian companies sign contracts for drones

- Norway tightens immigration

Combat Ops - Pokrovsk fell

- Counter Offensive in south still churning

Weather

Kharkiv

34 and cloudy. Mix of clouds and sun: mostly sunny Friday, mostly cloudy Saturday, mostly sunny Sunday, then cloudy all next week. Daily lows inteh 20s, daily highs in the 30s on Friday and Saturday, in the 40s Sunday and Monday. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

35 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Clearing tonight, partly to mostly sunny through Monday. Daily lows will be int hte upper 20 to low 30s, highs in the low 40s. Winds north-easterly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

30 and cloudy. Mostly cloudy for the next week. Temperatures dropping, daily lows in the 20s through Sunday, daily highs in the low 30s, then a little bit warmer, low near 30, highs upper 30s to 40. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Politics

The bodies of 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers were returned to Ukraine today. Ukraine turned over the bodies of 35 Russian soldiers.

The UN High Commission on Human Rights reported that, as of February 24th, Ukrainian civilian casualties total 15,172 killed and 41,378 wounded.

In addition, Ukraine has lost more than half of its electricity generation capacity and more than 1,100 multi-story apartment buildings.

Four Ukrainian companies have signed joint production contracts with 2 Finnish, 1 Latvian, and 1 Danish company to produce UAVs and UGVs; the contract is worth 900 million euros ($940 million). Another Ukrainian company is setting up a drone production facility in the UK, and another company has signed a letter of intent with he French government to support joint French-Ukraine start-ups.

Lithuania is transferring 30 x RBS-70 (5 miles range, Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS)) to Ukraine.

Canada has promised 2 billion Canadian dollars ($1.46 billion) in 2026, plus 66 x Light Armored Vehicles and 389 x “Senator” armored cars.

Estonia will provide 11 million euros ($13 million) to purchase air defense weaponry.

Norway is in the process of tightening immigration laws.

Norway's Justice Minister, Aas-Hansen calls for controlled, sustainable and fair immigration.

"Since autumn 2025 Norway, like many other European countries, has seen an increase in the number of young Ukrainian men arriving in the country. Norway has already taken in the largest number of Ukrainians in the Nordic region. To avoid an excessive influx, stricter control is needed.”

Under the new rules Ukrainian men aged 18-60 will need to apply for asylum, not simply be granted it.

Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion Stenseng added:

"Norway must not take in more people than it can integrate. Resettling refugees is a voluntary task for municipalities. In recent years Norwegian communities have done enormous work and resettled almost 100,000 displaced people from Ukraine. Many municipalities report overstretched local services and a lack of housing.”

These rules will only apply to new applicants, and will not apply to men who are already in Norway, not to men who are already exempt from military duty.

Despite threats from Slovakia’s PM Fico, and Hungary’s PM Orban, electricity continues to flow into Ukraine: since February 1st 1.1 million MWh, 49% from Hungary and 18% from Slovakia.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Imagery confirmed some Russian gains south-east of Sumy city on Tuesday, in the border town of Pokrovka, butt here were no further gains either there or north of Sumy city yesterday.

There were no confirmed Russian gains north of Kharkiv, but there are credible Russian reports of gains south and south-west of Vovchansk, that Russian forces have pushed into the villages of Hrafske, Prylipka, and Vilcha. Prylipka (about 3 miles west-south-west of Vovchansk) was a very small village - perhaps 100 people, Hrafske (about 3.5 miles to the south-west) was a village of 350, and Vilcha was a residential area of Vovchansk (about 1/5 miles south of the city) and had a population of 1,600.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continued in and around Kupyansk, but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines.

Fighting also continues east and north-east of Borova, but there were no confirmed changes to the lines.

BAKHMUT - KOSTIANTINIVKA - POKROVSK

Fighting continues in the Slovyansk - Lyman - Siversk area , and imagery confirmed Russian gains east of Slovyansk, and fighting north and east of Lyman, and south of Dobrysheve. Russian forces also appear to be in control of Nykyforivka, have pressed into and through Lypivka, and are now operating in the area immediately east of Rai Olelksandrivka. Lypivka was not much more than a cluster of 2 or 3 farms, and Rai Oleksandrivka had a population of perhaps several hundred. 

These towns are not of any tactical significance themselves, but there is a Ukrainian defensive line to the south-west that straddles the M03 roadway and pushing up to Rai Oleksandrivka would present the Russians an opportunity to flank the northern end of that line.

A string of imagery from the 21st through the 25th show Russian forces operating north-east, east, and south-east of Kostiantinivka, Russian forces do not control south-east Kostiantinivka but they are conducting operations over most of that area of the city, and pushing north-west across the T0504 roadway and raiding into north-east Kostiantinivka. Ukrainian military reporting also notes Russian activity south oof the city and along the southwest edge of the city. And there have been several reports of Russian Air Force glide bomb strikes against the major roads as they try to close off the ground lines of communication (GLOC) into Kostiantinivka.

Further west, in the area north of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces gained ground east of Bilytske while Russian forces gained ground just to the east, near Nykanorivka. Russian forces are in woods and broken terrain just east of the town (a village of perhaps 200 people), the Ukrainians meanwhile are in the south-east part of the Bilytske, a town built on top of a coal mine, that formerly held a population of 8,600.

Imagery of the last several days shows no Ukrainian activity in Pokrovsk or the towns immediately east of Pokrovsk and the assessment from several major analytic shops is that Pokrovsk fell “at an earlier date.” As has been reported regularly for quite some time, there were small Ukrainian elements in Pokrovsk and the Ukrainian General Staff was reporting troops in contact on the north edge of Pokrovsk just a day or two ago. So, yes, the Russians control Pokrovsk, and yes, it is likely there will be sporadic reports of some sort of fighting inside the perimeter of the city. Of note, as mentioned last week, there has not been any reporting of this sort of thing from inside Myrnohrad for a while, suggesting an aggressive sweep by the Russian army.

It should be noted that while it’s been a couple of days since there was a report of any fighting in Pokrovsk, there may still be isolated Ukraine elements in the north end of the city, and there was at least one RuAF glide bomb strike in into city yesterday, suggesting a dug-in element. But the city has fallen to the Russians.

West and southwest of Pokrovsk there were no confirmed changes in the front lines.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Imagery confirmed that the de facto Ukrainian counteroffensive continues to churn forward and Ukrainian forces continued to push south, with Ukraine’s 110 Mechanized Brigade posting that it had pushed Russian forces out of the town of Verbove and pushed further south to the first tree-line south of the town.

At the same time there are multiple reports of fighting north-west and west of Hulyaipole and imagery confirmed Russian gains west Olenokistiantinivka, about 3 miles north-north-west of Hulyaipole,  just west of the Haichur River.

Fighting continues at the west end of the line, with both sides having confirmed gains in the Stepnohirsk area. 

Ukrainian forces continue to maintain a foothold in central Stepnohirsk, despite Russian forces pressing in from the west and east, holding a piece of terrain that was the north-east corner of the town, about a half mile east to west and a third of a mile north to south. Imagery yesterday showed that they had pressed westward several blocks.

At the same time imagery confirmed that Russian forces had probed into Novoyakolivka, about 6 miles north-east of Stepnohirsk, and about 1.5 miles north of the nearest Russian units, in the small town of Pavlivka.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of February 25th-February 26th Russian forces launched at least 2 x Zircon hypersonic missiles, 11 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 24 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 2 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 420 strike drones in Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, both Zircon missiles, 4 Iskander ballistic missiles, all 26 cruise missiles, and 374 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Targets again included the power grid. 

Civilian casualties include at least 25 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 16 towns.

Ukrainian drones struck the Dorogobuzh chemical plant, which produces fertilizer, in Smolensk (about 200 miles west-south-west of Moscow), and satellite imagery reportedly shows significant damage.

During the night of February 24th-February 25th Russian forces launched at least 115 x strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 95 drones.

Damage reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia  oblasts. Targets again included the power grid. 

Civilian casualties reported include at least 4 killed and 2 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 15 towns.

During the night of February 23rd-February 24th Russian forces launched at least 1 x Zircon hypersonic missile, 1 x Iskander ballistic missile and 133 strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 111 drones.

Damage reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odessa and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Targets again included the power grid. 

Civilian casualties reported include at least 11 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 16 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Oct8 Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Feb24 Feb26

Brent      94.71   66.18 63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 71.86 70.35

WTI     92.10   62.48 59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 66.73 64.94

NG       3.97        3.44 4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 2.94 2.81

Wheat     8.52  5.06 5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 5.75 5.70

Ruble     85          81.28 80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 76.20 76.96

Hryvnia 28.6 41.48 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.22 43.23

Urals 91.66 61.15 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 58.60 56.73

ESPO 94.52 66.74 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 63.11 62.19

Sokol 99.31 61.91 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 66.80 66.12

Thoughts

With the return of the bodies of 1,000 Ukrainian troops, the total number of bodies turned over to Ukraine since the beginning of 2025 is 18,070; the total number of bodies of returned Russian soldiers is 264. 

This is a glaring disparity and cannot be full explained by the idea Russian forces are advancing and Ukrainian forces have been withdrawing. And it is reasonable to assess that this represents just a portion of total Ukrainian KIAs, in as much as some 80% or more of the casualties have been from artillery and drone strikes and would seem to fall as much behind the lines as in no man’s land.

But it also serves to remind us that this is a war of attrition, and the tactical and operational goal is to inflict casualties, not take land.

As for Pokrovsk, Pokrovsk has fallen.

There is considerably less drama here than it might seem. Pokrovsk 2 years ago was one of perhaps 3 Ukrainian logistics and personnel hubs. But, by this time last year much of the city had been badly pummeled and that activity had to be relocated. At that point the tactical and operational mission had been accomplished by the Russian army and the Ukrainian army was fighting for territory.

But analysis that now postulates that this is not of importance, that the Ukrainian line is not going to collapse, mischaracterize the war. But, that mis-characterizes the war; as sadly demonstrated by the turnover of bodies, this remains a war of attrition. 

We still don’t know how many Russians have really been killed, or how many Ukrainians, but it is probable that both have similar numbers, with perhaps 250,000 KIA EACH, and a similar number of severely wounded who will never return to any sort of active duty. But, in both armies about 70% of WIAs return to combat.

And, the issue is Norway is of note, with roughly 30% of those refugees being men

As for the actual fighting one small point about Pokrovsk - and other cities: 

There is no reporting of Ukrainian units in Pokrovsk, but, as has been reported again and again during this war, small elements, platoons (40 men) or smaller, dig in and simply do not budge. Both sides have done this: there are still Russian soldiers (about 30) holding a cluster of several small apartment buildings in central Kupyansk. And one blog reported that two Ukrainian soldiers held a position on the eastern edge of Kostiantinivka that was overrun by the Russians on August 15th. They finally exfilled on 23 December - 130 days after being overrun, during which, they reported, they kept sniping at Russian troops. 

v/r pete 

  

President Obama Saturday Night Live

and the 

Invasion of Ukraine

February 25th, 2026

There was an hysterical skit on Saturday Night Live many moons ago that asked the question: What if Spartacus had a Piper Cub (Kirk Douglas was the guest star). What if?

But here is another What if, one that perhaps should be asked: What if Nazi Germany had had nuclear weapons in 1938? Assume that France and England also have nuclear weapons, (if Germany alone had nuclear weapons we would all be speaking German).

If, in early 1938, all three countries had nuclear weapons, and Germany had insisted on taking Sudetenland, what would have been the correct response from France and England, what would have been the proper response from Neville Chamberlain? Would he now be known as the great appeaser? Or as a wise statesman?

Hitler repeatedly used the imagery of Germany victorious or being destroyed in a world-ending (or at least Europe ending) cataclysm, and in the end he refused to even consider trying to save Berlin or the other cities of Germany.  But it’s often postulated that if France and Britain had mobilized in the summer of 1938, Hitler would not have marched into Czechoslovakia, he would have backed off on his demands and there might not have been a war. (It was Great Britain’s and France’s failure to mobilize on the issue of Czechoslovakia that convinced Hitler he could grab Poland without risk of a general war.) But, if Germany had had nuclear weapons and was threatened by the French and British armies, would he have threatened annihilation if they marched? The armies could not reach the Czech frontier, but they could have annexed pieces of Germany. Hitler certainly would not have allowed that. It certainly is a possibility that Chamberlain would have been thought prudent to have conceded Hitler the point and instead strive for deescalation and “peace in our time.”

Which leads to the obvious case of Ukraine.

Sunday was marked across much of the world as the 4th anniversary of the war in Ukraine. It was not. The anniversary is February 27th, and the year count is 12. On that date, 4 days after the end of the Sochi Olympics, Russian troops - the Little Green Men (so called because they were soldiers wearing uniforms with no markings) - moved on key installations in Crimea and seized control of the peninsula.

The West’s response was slow, soft and, demonstrably ineffective. Some people were placed on sanctions lists and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution. President Obama, speaking before the UN General Assembly 7 months later (24 September 2014) noted:

America and our allies will support the people of Ukraine as they develop their democracy and economy. We will reinforce our NATO allies, and uphold our commitment to collective defense. We will impose a cost on Russia for aggression, and counter falsehoods with the truth. We call upon others to join us on the right side of history – for while small gains can be won at the barrel of a gun, they will ultimately be turned back if enough voices support the freedom of nations and peoples to make their own decisions. But, over the following 8 years, with the exception of what turned out to be only a few minor sanctions, little else was done and Russia wasn’t deterred. Further, the kind of preparations needed to defend Ukraine on or near her borders in the event of future Russian actions, were not made.

Arguably, the seeds were planted in 1994 when President Clinton “assured” Ukrainian sovereignty, apparently without anyone asking “how might we do that?” (To those who will note that we did not “guarantee” sovereignty, only “assured” it, two separate concepts to the esteemed wordsmiths of the State Department, the word used in Ukrainian, Russian and French versions of the memorandum is “guarantee.”)

Surely, someone should have noted that steps needed to be taken then to provide that sovereignty. None were. Some steps were taken after 2014, but they were far from adequate. 

In January 2022, as Russia moved more forces toward the Ukrainian border, President Biden implied that there might be no serious response if it was only "a minor incursion.”

That statement, though quickly retracted, placed in the context of the debacle in Kabul 5 months earlier, as well as continued and growing European dependence on Russian energy, virtually guaranteed that Russia would go.

Some might argue that this is only obvious in hindsight. It’s bad form to quote yourself, but I am going to… This is what I saw from the Great Dismal Swamp, 5,000 miles from Crimea.  On March 6th, 2014, a week after the seizing of Crimea, I wrote:

Tsar Putin intends to expand the Russian empire.  This is not an idea new to him.  Expansion of the empire has been a Russian imperative since Tsar Ivan (the Terrible) recognized that the cities of Moscow and Kiev – heart of his new empire – were not readily defensible.  They were and are surrounded by grasslands, with no major features – canyons, deep and fast rivers, mountains, or seas – that provided any natural bulwark. The only defense was and is depth – increase the distance an enemy must travel to reach Moscow…

This is why we are now facing a grave danger.  First, let us accept that in the near term – the next 5 years at a minimum – only the US has the overall military means to stop Russia.  Europe on its own does not have several of the major elements needed to present a viable blocking force, one that would serve to preempt warfare before it began, whether the intelligence assets, the command and control, the logistics, or the quantity of smart ordnance necessary to present a viable counter-force. Russia understands that as well as the members of NATO. Without vigorous US participation any NATO blocking force would only serve as a trip wire for further escalation, not as a credible opposition that would signal real intent to deter. 

I closed with this:

Putin is not a bully, the analogy is inapt.  Putin is an amoral, power hungry practitioner of hardball politics.  He also, in his own twisted way, loves Russia (don’t get dewy eyed, Hitler loved Germany.) Behind him he has groomed a handful of deputies.  If Putin goes, he will be replaced by a very similar figure.  The expansion will continue. 

My point then (and now) was that the West needed to act to keep the “genie in the bottle.” What’s the genie? Nuclear weapons. 

The problem is simple: if a war escalates, eventually one side is going to start to lose badly. They will come to think of it as existential. And that will lead to using nuclear weapons. So, you need to plus up your weapons - nuclear and non nuclear, so that, as during the Cold War, between the nuclear powers there can be gradual escalation, which means time to talk, which leads to gradual de-escalation. But that didn’t happen.

Where does that leave us?

As I noted a dozen years ago, we need to act, the sooner, the better. 

First, we have to recognize that this is not Europe of 1937-1938; nuclear weapons change everything. Simply, great powers (nuclear powers) dealing with other great powers (other nuclear powers) need to understand that direct confrontations need to be clearly managed. To steal a line from Pascal: we must not confuse the probability of an event (in this case nuclear escalation - which may seem remote) with the consequences ( a nuclear exchange - which would be catastrophic). Cries that “Putin is never going to use nukes” do not help the situation.

Second, we need to face the fact that Ukraine is dying a slow death in front of the world. This is not simply a comment on the painful grind of the war in the east; this is a comment about a country that has gone from 52 million people in 1991 to 43 million in 2021 to 31 million in 2025, and is, per a former Ukrainian minister of economics, on a glide slope to 15 million by 2035. There has been close to $600 billion in infrastructure damage to the country, and it is estimated that they will need 10 million new laborers to rebuild the country All that speaks to the need to end this war.

Third, we need to recognize that the post-Cold War world has, at least in the west, been marked by a true strategic vacuum. Once Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal in 1994 - and the US assured their sovereignty, the least little bit of planning would have pointed to a need for a host of defensive capabilities being provided to that country, and an expansion of US and NATO capabilities, particularly NATO. This would have cost a great deal - Perhaps $15 billion per year or more. Something approaching $500 billion.

That’s $500 billions over 30 years - compared to the $500 billion Europe and the US have already spent on the War, the $600 billion in damage, the 15,000 dead and 40,000 wounded civilians, the 200,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed in action and another 200,000 severely wounded (and similar numbers of Russians). And as a whole, what President Zelenskyy has called, “An entire nation with PTSD.” I think, by comparison, $15 or $20 billion per year would have been pretty cheap.

Fourth, recognize that we need a different answer - and we need it now. Everyone grit your teeth, and just draw a defensive line across Ukraine and build it. Real defenses, plus Patriot missiles, intelligence systems, drones, mines, energy weapons, cyber defenses, the whole shooting match. In depth. It needs to be capable and it’s needed fast - so it will be expensive. But do it. It will mean the de facto ceding of terrain to Russia. But it needs to be done.

Finally, perhaps most importantly, Europe needs to get in the game. Europe should, in fact, be leading this; this is their fight. European nations need to start rebuilding their armies and air forces and navies, and their defense industries. And they need to modernize their nuclear weapons. It will cost a lot of money.

But the other options are simply too expensive.

v/r pete