MAY 18th, 2026

Overall, the war continues, and continues to slowly escalate. The Easter ceasefire came and went, and was followed by some of the largest missile and drone strikes of the war - by both sides. Energy infrastructure and the defense industrial base (DIB) continues to be the prime target for Ukrainian strikes, energy and logistics the prime targets for Russian strikes, as well as some Ukrainian DIB facilities; in both cases other types of targets have been struck. Both sides continue to inflict civilian casualties, though, as tragic as those are, the raw numbers are lower than might be expected.

If there is one single point to draw from the past several weeks is that both sides seem more determined than ever to continue the fight. 

Politics

A good deal is made in European press that Putin is on increasingly fragile ground with his population. A Russian, state owned, polling group shows his approval at 67.8% (up a bit more than 1% in the past month) and his trust at 72%, also up 1%. How much faith can be put in a state owned poll is a good question, but there it is.

But, at the same time, other sources, including the independent Levada Center, show support for Putin remains strong (in the 60+% range), some smaller polls show support for Putin in prosecuting the war at 80%. And, while some 60-65% (depending on the poll) want peace, similar numbers also would want to escalate the war if negotiations fail completely. 

On May 15th there was another “exchange” of the dead, with Russia turning over 528 bodies to Ukrainian personnel, while the Ukrainian forces did not turn over any Russian dead. This brings the total numbers since the beginning of 2025 (16 months) to 19,801 Ukrainian fallen returned to Ukraine, and 305 Russian fallen returned to Russia.

There remains no specific explanation for this difference, particularly in this long period of very slow changes in the front lines.

There was also a POW exchange, 250 POWs from each side, part of a 1,000 for 1,000 agreement made on the 9th.

After some press reports insisted that President Trump had agreed that Russia should have all of Donetsk and Luhansk, President Trump stated flatly that there was no such agreement.

Combat Operations

The fighting continues as before, small elements (squad and smaller) probing and infiltrating on foot, and the number of daily FPV drone strikes by both sides continues to climb.

During the past two weeks fighting has continued along the entire front line and both sides have made some gains on the ground. While there continue to be recon probes and small element infiltrations north of Sumy City, there has been no substantive change in the front lines in this area since the beginning of May.

North and north-east of Kharkiv Russian forces did push across the border and take a small patch of farmland just south of Dihtiarne (the north-east corner of Ukraine, north-east of Kharkiv about 60 miles), but there were no other changes in this area.

Russian forces appear to have made minor gains east of Kupyansk, but no changes in the past week.

East of Slovyansk Russian forces appear to have consolidated some small gains made during the first week of the month, and may have straightened their lines in certain areas and closed off small, would-be salients. Overall, Ukrainian forces report levels of Russian activity increasing east of Slovyansk.

Russian forces made a number of small, tactical gains along the line just north of Chasiv Yar, near Kostiantinivka, and further west, as well as north and north-west of Pokrovsk. What is most of note is that Russian forces appear to have a firm hold on the east end of the city of Kostiantinivka, in the “corner” between the T0504 and T0516 roadways.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces appeared to consolidate their positions in the area south-east and south of Verbove, but there were no substantive changes in the front line. 

Further south, Russian forces made some gains north-west and west of Hulyaipole and pushed into terrain west of Myrne during the course of the last week; Russian forces could be as much as 3 miles west of Myrne and are probably probing into Huliaipilske.

Air and Maritime Operations also continued, with larger scale air operations by both sides. Both sides have engaged in very large drone and missile strikes, with Ukrainian forces striking multiple targets in the Moscow area. In the week from May 11th to May 17th Russian strikes included 3,170 strike drones, 74 cruise and ballistic missiles and 1,300 glide bombs. Since May 13th at least 12 civilians have been killed in Kyiv alone.

At the same time, Ukrainian strikes continue against Russian oil infrastructure and the DIB. Last night alone more than 1,000 Ukrainian strike drones were launched into Russian airspace, and while Russian air defenses claimed to have shot down “more than 1,000” drones, damage was reported at several refineries and at least 4 civilians were killed. 

It’s important to note that analyst commentary is stressing the idea of sustained drone and missiles strikes on Russia, and “inflicting more pain” on Russia, noting that these strikes will push Russia to negotiate, that more strikes are the path to peace.

Yet, it seems that more strikes are not pushing Ukrainians so seek peace and it isn’t clear to me why the tactic that hasn’t worked in Ukraine will work in Russia? There is, in fact, some reporting that suggests Russians are more determined to sustain the war now as the number of strikes into Russia increases.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Apr8 May8 May18

Brent      94.71   61.26 68.57 106.40 91.78 100.50 108.90

WTI     92.10   57.10 64.04 103.60 93.53 94.91 104.70

NG       3.97      3.41 3.20 3.37 2.73 2.79 3.04

Wheat     8.52  5.22 5.29 6.25 5.79 6.14 6.56

Ruble     85          80.35 77.40 78.20 78.54 74.26 72.46

Hryvnia 28.6 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.45 43.90 43.96

Urals 91.66 50.40 56.37 90.97 124.85 92.56 101.00

ESPO 94.52 52.28 59.77 84.99 103.27 105.56 108.74

Sokol 99.31 55.57 62.85 101.55 96.88 95.96 105.50

The Treasury Department has allowed the April 17 sanctions waiver on Russian oil shipments to expire. The waiver was put in place in response to the Iran - Strait of Hormuz situation.

Thoughts

 

There is a new estimate of Russian war dead that substantially increases estimates of total Russian KIAs. The new estimate - which really is a count of public records in Russia - raises the Russian KIA count to 352,000. The data is a product of exhaustive record searches by Mediazone, and raises the number of KIA by a third, and is, per Mediazone, probably still not quite complete. 

More importantly, it’s worth noting that the other ratios still apply: for every KIA there is a seriously wounded soldier who will not return to active duty. There are also the known 70,000 desertions, and several thousand POWs. This yields Russian casualties as 352,000 / 352,000 / 70,000 / unknown POWs (no more than 5,000), or 774,000 losses.

There are also approximately 500,000 wounded who return to duty. 

These numbers, though huge, place Russian battlefield casualties on par with Ukrainian casualties, which given the nature of the war and the manner in which both sides are waging it, should be roughly equal.

Looking at Ukrainian enlistments, which should be approaching 2 million since the start of the war, and the stated problem of sustaining an army of 800,000, there is a delta of more than 1 million. Ukrainian desertions have reached 300,000, leaving a delta of 700,000 - or more. If roughly half of those are KIAs and half are severely wounded (will not return to combat), that would result in Ukrainian forces having roughly the same losses as Russia, or slightly higher. This would also be consistent with reports that Ukrainian casualties had passed more than 100,000 amputees as of late last year, a number also consistent with 300,000 - 400,000 KIAs.

v/r pete 

Crisis Ahead

May 17th, 2026

History repeats itself… Heaven alone knows who first said that - I’d wager the Greek historian Herodotus, but there are enough examples to satisfy anyone who wants to look. Of course, technology changes things, but the essence, the patterns through the centuries, are remarkably similar.

A number of years ago William Strauss and Neil Howe wrote a book on the very subject - “The Fourth Turning,” identifying a four-generation cycle that can be seen to repeat itself at least as far back as the 1400. There is, as with any such a discussion, room to argue, but the key point is that there is a 4-phase cycle, each lasting roughly 20 years, though some are shorter, some longer. The first involves emerging from a crisis, a more unified country, the belief in a greater future and the restoration of the society’s culture, the second sees this unity start to shift to an increased inward look, the third generation follows with an unraveling and a rise of collective guilt,  and the 4th generation is one of crisis.

Following the crisis - assuming the society survives - the country returns to the first generation and the cycle begins again.

As a general rule the crises peak in the last few years of the 4th generation. The last US crisis phase was the period from the late 1920s until the end of WWII, followed by a new cycle. We are now approaching the end of the 4th phase of that post-war cycle. Some folks have recently done a good deal of computer modeling on this concept and the models suggest that the peak crisis years are just in front of us: 2027 - 2028.

What might his mean?

Before trying to offer an answer to that question, the modeling suggests that there are two major versions of the crisis; the first is an internal social-economic crisis, the second is an external political crisis. Said differently: we are now facing the very real possibility of a civil war or a foreign war. Or both. Given the US role as the leader of the Western world (western culturally), the cycle includes the possibility of an “internal - economic crisis” in Europe, and among US allies elsewhere who share many aspects of our culture as well as being linked to the US economically. 

What might a civil war look like? In the US we have already seen, in a throwback to the Civil War, efforts by some state governments to nullify federal law and to ignore federal authority. There has been some violence though, thankfully, it has been mostly contained. Perhaps the US has enough resilience and social inertia that it can survive the next several years and emerge intact. I think an argument that we won’t see a civil war such as we saw 165 years ago; rather a low-grade level of violence, rising occasionally to short bursts of inner city violence, burning and looting, integrated with efforts to use various forms of lawfare and legislation to change the nation. These may well be the battles of this civil war, and it may have already begun.

It’s also worth noting, however, that there are countries in Europe that are arguably in substantially worse shape socially than the US: the UK, France, Germany, Spain all are suffering from a great deal of internal strain and may have less resilience and less “social inertia” than the US and it isn’t a foregone conclusion that these countries will survive the next few years. Several European countries appear to be questioning traditional definitions of rights versus state authorities, and the changing understanding of governments role, and this is leading to direct confrontations between the citizenry and the state.

At the same time there is the issue of war, in particular a great power war, a war fought not by proxies but directly between the US and China, or worse, between the US and China - Russia. Such a war has been increasingly discussed and yet many seem to have ignored the reality of large nuclear arsenals on each side; even China now has at least 600 nuclear weapons and is reportedly making 70 nuclear weapons each year.

All of which leaves us where?

First, no one who has not been living under a rock doubts that we are in a period of great stress. Call it the Crisis, call it, as the authors do, “the Fourth Turning,” but we appear to be rapidly reaching a critical moment. We don't really have time to simply sit and study the problem.

Second, a general war between the great powers needs to be prevented. That is simply stated: we must deter such a war and only an overwhelming strength can do so. How do we get there is 1 - 2 years? First, reactivate both some tactical nuclear weapons and some strategic weapons. It must be made crystal clear to both China and Russia that, no matter what, they will not win. We might not either, but they will be destroyed. We aren’t going to start the war, but they must understand we will set the terms for war termination.

Second, light a fire under the nation’s industries. Set immediate deadlines, start building - ships, airplanes, weapons, tens of thousands of weapons, tens of thousands of drones. All the pieces need to be boosted. Cyber, Electronic Warfare, Intelligence, etc. etc.  5% of GDP to deter a great power war is a cheap price. 

Third, we as a nation, and as the Western World, need to come together. End the cynicism in public life. Use this 250th anniversary of our nation to focus on our remarkable legacy - a legacy overwhelmingly good and moral - and resolve to strengthen that legacy. Public figures of all kinds, everyone who considers themselves an “influencer,” need to set that example to all.

We are less than 7 weeks from the 250th anniversary of the founding of this nation and we are looking at the possibility of another Civil War and perhaps another World War. Maybe we all should just repeat the last sentence of Lincoln’s Gettysburg address: he summed it all up magnificently:

It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom – and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

 May 8th, 2026 V.E. DAY

NEXT SUMMARY MAY 19th

Politics - Russian Ceasefire for 24 hours

- SecState Rubio: US wants to mediate a peace

Combat Ops - Very little movement, many drone strikes across front lines 

- Ukrainian drones strike refineries in Yaroslavl and Perm

Weather

Kharkiv

79 and sunny, gusting to 20. Mostly cloudy for the next week, rain showers daily beginning Monday. Daily lows in the upper 50s, daily highs in the upper 70s. Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

75 and sunny, gusting to 20. Partly to mostly cloudy for the next week, scattered showers starting Monday. Daily lows in the upper 40s to low 50s, daily highs in the mid 70s. Winds southerly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

80 and partly cloudy, gusting over 20. Showers possible tonight, rain probable daily through Thursday (a break possible on Monday). Cooler, daily lows in the upper 40s to low 50s, highs in the low 60s. Winds westerly, 10kts.

Politics

The unilateral Russian ceasefire will go into effect at midnight tonight (Moscow time - 4PM EDT) and end 24 hours later (Midnight on the 9th  4PM EDT Saturday.

The Russian Ministry of Defense again issued a series of threats of retaliation against Kyiv if there are strikes into Moscow, and called on Ukraine to cease hostilities for that period.

Kyiv has stated that it “…see(s) no reason to observe the ceasefire.”

The Kremlin has revoked press credentials for a number of foreign press representatives who were to cover the parade. These include: Der Spiegel, ARD, ZDF, Sky News, Agence France-Presse, Rai, and NHK.

A Kremlin spokesman commented:

"The format of the parade coverage has been changed due to the current situation. Therefore, foreign media outlets that had already been granted accreditation are no longer permitted.”

Der Spiegel commented:

“Only Russian media are permitted.”

SecState Rubio commented on the peace process, acknowledging that there not yet “a fruitful outcome” but 

“… it has not led to a fruitful outcome for a variety of reasons”

"We remain prepared to play that role [mediator] if it can be productive. We don't want to waste our time and invest time and energy on an effort that's not moving forward. But if we see an opportunity to act as a mediator that brings both sides closer to a peace deal, we'd like to see it… both sides are paying very heavy prices for it, both economic and obviously at a human level".

"We're prepared to play whatever role we can to bring it to a peaceful diplomatic resolution; unfortunately … those efforts have stagnated, but we always stand ready if those circumstances change.”

A Russian Opposition group, the Dossier Center (located in London, founded by the Russian opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky) has published a brief, out of the office of Putin’s Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko, which it claims shows “the most plausible scenario” for the end of the war. 

That scenario involves the US signing separate peace agreements with Ukraine and Russia, Russia controls Donetsk and Luhansk in their entirety’s nd the front lines are frozen across the south in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. The US will then lift sanctions against Russia, Ukraine would be neutral (presumably not a member of NATO), and Russia would receive a symbolic de-nazification of Ukraine. Zelenskyy would remain president.

Whether these slides are real or some sort of propaganda effort or Information Warfare effort remains to be seen.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

No significant changes noted.

EAST OF THE OSKIL RIVER

Fighting - and Russian assaults - are reported along the entire front lines but there were no confirmed changes in the line.

SLOVYANSK - KOSTIANTINIVKA - POKROVSK

Russian reporting claimed that Russian forces took the small town of Pryshyb (pre-war population of 443), about 6 miles north-west of Lyman, and about 10 miles north of Slovyansk. There is nothing particularly significant about the town itself except that it is on the south side of the Donets River, which is of note. If the report is accurate,  Russian forces would have a “toe-hold” across the river in this area. I would expect Ukrainian forces to move aggressively against the Russian forces here if this report is correct.

Multiple reports of recon probes and infiltration by Russian forces into Kostiantinivka, and the checkerboard continues to slowly grow around the eastern end of the city, and arguably the “gray zone” or no man’s land contains to slowly grow.

One interesting note, Ukrainian sources talking about the Kramatorsk area report a drop in infiltration attempts and an increase in the use of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) planting mines while also increasing the use of drones to strike ground lines of logistics supporting the city’s defenders.

Ukrainian reporting notes an increase in the number of Russian elements attacking in the general Pokrovsk area and notes that Russian attacks are taking place around the clock, with no real let-up at night.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Fighting continuers west and north-west of Orikhiv, but there are no confirmed changes to the line.

South-east of Orikhiv Ukrainian forces appear to be holding in the town of Bilohirya, with Ukrainian forces on the north side of the small Konka River, Russian forces holding on the south side. 

Further east, Russian probes that had pushed into central Prymorske have been pushed out and the line now seems to lie just north of Stepnohirsk and across the south end of Prymorske; Ukrainian counter-attacks appear to be on the increase and it would seem that Ukrainian forces currently have the initiative in the Orikhiv area and points west to the Dnepr River.

Air and Maritime Operations

Last night Ukrainian drones struck the refinery in Yaroslavl, about 150 miles north-east of Moscow. Extent of the damage is unknown, but fires were reported.

There is no new assessment on the damage to the Perm refinery, which was struck again last night - the third strike on the refinery. An assessment published early on the 7th said that the facility was operating at 70% capacity (roughly 250,000 barrels per day).

During the night of May 6th-May 7th Russian forces launched at least 67 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 56 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure.

There were no reports of civilian casualties.

RuAF tacair struck 6 towns.

During the night of May 6th-May 7th Russian forces launched at least 1 x ballistic missile (not identified) and 102 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 92 drones. 1 ballistic missile was successfully engaged over Dnipropetrovsk city. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure.

There were at least 6 civilians wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 3 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Apr8 May7 May8

Brent      94.71   61.26 68.57 106.40 91.78 97.41 100.50

WTI     92.10   57.10 64.04 103.60 93.53 91.32 94.91

NG       3.97      3.41 3.20 3.37 2.73 2.78 2.79

Wheat     8.52  5.22 5.29 6.25 5.79 6.10 6.14

Ruble     85          80.35 77.40 78.20 78.54 74.53 74.26

Hryvnia 28.6 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.45 43.86 43.90

Urals 91.66 50.40 56.37 90.97 124.85 98.46 92.56

ESPO 94.52 52.28 59.77 84.99 103.27 107.27 105.56

Sokol 99.31 55.57 62.85 101.55 96.88 97.42 95.96

Thoughts

 

While Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure has made the news, reporting suggests an increase in the number of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian tactical positions immediately behind the front lines. The extent of these strikes is difficult to gauge as the number reported is still small in absolute terms: with strikes on one or two tactical vehicles, antennas, command posts or a gathering of troops reported every day. 

These strikes are always small: a single vehicle, an antenna, a gathering of a squad or a slice of platoon. And, the language is always absolute but at the same time not definitive: a “facility was struck and is now on fire.” At the same time Ukrainian reporting notes increased Russian drone strikes across the front lines into the Ukrainian rear. 

What doesn’t match are the numbers: reporting covers only a handful of incidents, but then overall numbers are related that suggest tidal waves of drones. Both sides report that they are using thousands of FPV drones per day; Gen. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian tactical drones struck 150,000 targets in March alone, while using 11,000 FPV drones per day. Russian reporting suggests FPV drone usage of a similar scale - thousands per day.

And yet Ukrainian reporting singles out that they “stopped a mechanized assault" as a key event of the day, and then it is revealed that the assault consisted of a single infantry fighting vehicle and 12 guys on all terrain vehicles.

At the same time, the “objective” coverage is often framed in hyperbolic terms: the facility was “destroyed,” yet later independent imagery shows much of a facility undamaged.

All together it suggests that there is a very difficult time assessing what the real outcomes are of these attacks and so the answer is to judge everything based on the “input” - as much for propaganda effect as anything else, and then simply extrapolate: in March 330,000 FPV drone sorties were flown, 150,000 targets were attacked and destroyed, 35,000 Russians were killed, all this a 10% increase over February. Russian numbers aren’t quite as over the top, but perhaps only because they aren’t published as much.

Yet, the front line really is stagnant. And my best estimate is that each side is suffering something on the order of 150 - 200 KIAs per day, and a similar number of severally wounded per day. 

v/r pete