October 26th, 2026     Next Summary October 29th

Politics - Ceasefire for Oleshky tomorrow

- Trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi early November 

- Starlink Operational

Combat Ops - Air strikes continue

- Little change on the ground 

Weather

Kharkiv

50 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Mostly cloudy all week. Daily lows high 30s to low 40s, daily highs in the mid 50s. Winds easterly, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

54 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Mostly cloud all week, rain on Wednesday. Daily lows in the high 40s, daily highs in the mid 60s. Winds easterly, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

49 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Mostly cloudy all week. Daily lows in the mid to upper 30s, daily highs in the low to mid 50s. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Politics

On the 23rd the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the army will recognize a ceasefire starting at 03:00 Kyiv time on October 27 to allow  humanitarian operations to reach Oleshky, on the east side of the Dnepr River, in the occupied portion of Kherson Oblast.

Russian Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov made a similar announcement.

President Zelenskyy says that Ukraine has been waiting for SecWar’s release for transfer of Patriot missiles and NASAMS missiles.

The Pentagon has unofficially expressed concern over the level of US stockpiles (please see my thoughts, below)

The Kremlin announced that trilateral talks will begin in Abu Dhabi during the first half of November. Kremlin spokesman Peskov noted that:

“Nothing can be ruled out in advance. But the talks we are discussing, which are scheduled for the first half of November in Abu Dhabi, will be held in a trilateral format…Indeed, the president [Putin] has outlined the key issue of the negotiations and it concerns security issues for the two countries—Russia and Ukraine—but only after a peaceful settlement has been achieved.”

The White House commented that:

“The president [Trump} wants this war settled so the senseless killing ends. The president and his team remain committed to continuing to play a constructive role in ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, and he remains optimistic that we’ll ultimately get a peace deal done.”

Kremlin spokesman Peskov, talking about resumption of talks in November, noted that this may involve “territorial compromises.”

“All these issues may, in one way or another, become topics for discussion during attempts at a peaceful settlement,” but he didn’t give any details, suggesting that releasing details before the discussion would have a negative impact on a “potential peace process.”

Meanwhile, an unnamed source in the Ukrainian administration said that Kyiv wants the talks to begin as soon as possible.

“In December, every week will be important. When you don’t have electricity, water, or heat, every day counts.” 

The source also noted that EU representatives will be present in Abu Dhabi, though the Russians have not been receptive to that idea.

“But our side will bring them, and they’ll be briefing in Abu Dhabi in real time. The problem for the Europeans is that they don’t have a designated representative, which means all these envoys can only act as signal receivers.” 

Another unidentified source added that there would be new team members and that:

“At the first meeting, the new delegations will get their bearings. At the second, substantive work will begin. And by the third, there may already be some concrete decisions…We need to paint a picture of what this part of the world will look like, how Ukraine will be defended, what cooperation with NATO will look like, or whatever else may come up. Within our country, trust in Trump is only 6% higher than trust in Putin. Simply put, no one here will do anything based on Trump’s assurances.”

The Verkhovna Rada extended martial law and general mobilization fro the 21st time since February 2022. The current maritally would’ve terminated October 31, but has been extended 90 days, until January 29, 2027. 

The UN Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has decided that Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure constitutes a war crime. 

“The frequency, intensity and geographic range of systematic waves of attacks with hundreds of drones and missiles at a time have increased over the years and inflicted significant damage to Ukraine’s energy sector…Russian authorities have made official declarations concerning further attacks and referred to a plan to carry them out. The commission concluded that they committed war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects.” 

Starlink appears to be operating as before the crisis. President Zelenskyy noted:

“Starlink and Starshield operations have been restored to the speeds we had before the restrictions. The speeds are now where they need to be.”

Starlink founder Mr. Musk commented that Starlink (not to be confused with Starshield) is a civilian commercial service, and that its use “for offensive drone strikes to kill people has never been allowed, nor should it be.”

“Ukraine military violated Starlink terms of service and used it for offensive drone strikes to kill people. That loophole was closed last week.” He also noted that if Starlink were to be turned off, “the Ukrainian front line would collapse immediately.”

“This is NOT a threat, it is simply a statement of fact.”

Air and Maritime Operations

Ukrainian Forces

Over the weekend Ukrainian forces continued strikes on the Russian energy and industrial infrastructure, including the Tolyattikauchuk petrochemical plant (about 400 miles south-east of Moscow), and a chemical plant in Omsk (1,300 miles east of Moscow).

Strikes also caused suspension of flight operations at all 4 of Moscow’s airfields on the 23rd.

A strike also hit a munitions plant in Oryol (200 miles south-west of Moscow).

During the night of October 22nd-October 23rd Ukrainian missiles and drones struck a chemical plant in Perm (about 700 miles north-east of Moscow) and a Russian federal government tax data center in Nizhny Novgorod (about 225 miles north-east of Moscow).

Russian Forces

During the period from October 25th-October 26th Russian forces launched at least 1 x Kh-31p missile (an anti-radiation missile), 3 x Kh-59/69 missiles and 140 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 3 Kh-59 missiles and 112 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odessa, Pavlohrad, Ternopil, Vinnytsia, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Targets included power grid and associated infrastructure, as well as logistics related sites. The use of the Kh-31p (and no report of it having been defeated) would suggest a strike on a radar.

Civilian casualties included at least 2 dead and 17 wounded.

During the period from October 24th-October 25th Russian forces launched at least 153 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv,  Poltava, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, and Zarkarpattia oblasts. Targets included power grid and associated infrastructure, as well as logistics related sites.

Russian strike drones (unknown number) hit the Zaporizhzhia Cable-Stayed Bridge in Zaporizhzhia City. This bridge was also struck early in October.

Civilian casualties included at least 3 dead and 19 wounded.

During the period from October 23rd-October 24th Russian forces launched at least 126 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 101 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv,  and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Targets included power grid and associated infrastructure, as well as logistics related sites. A power outage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk.

Civilian casualties included at least 1 dead and 10 wounded.

During the period from October 22nd-October 23rd Russian forces launched at least 176 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 140 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr  oblasts. Targets included power grid and associated infrastructure, as well as logistics related sites. A power outage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk.

Civilian casualties included at least 4 dead and 26 wounded.

Ground Operations

Russian infiltrations continue.

Both sides continue to try to consolidate their positions along most of the line of contact. Over the last 4 or 5 days Ukraine forces made some incremental gains east of Novopavlivka (just north of the Vovcha River), and east of Olexsandrivka (in the vicinity of Komar and Fedorivka, along the Mokri Yaly River. Ukrainian gains have been on a fairly wide front (about 10 miles in both cases.

Russian forces from the Kostiantinivka area westward, past Pokrovsk, also contours to make incremental gains. Russian gains have been on relatively narrow fronts in several areas (4 or 5 points, each several miles wide), creating de facto salients. Ukrainian forces can be expected to dig and try to create a long, irregular and difficult front for the Russians, Russians can be expected to try to close each salient, inflict casualties and straighten lines. All this while the weather slowly deteriorates.

These operations continue to be small (multiple squad level events, rarely a full platoon), moving along the tree lines (posadkas) in rifle-team sized elements, a great deal of FPV drone activity and artillery fire, particularly, Russian artillery fire. Virtually all of the movement along the lines, except in rare cases such as several assaults during Operation Vivaldi, are on foot. One Ukrainian brigade noted that the largest assault in its sector during all of 2026 consisted of motorcycles and civilian vehicles racing to the front and claimed inflicting 55 casualties to stop the Russian attack, suggesting 2 platoons or at most a company sized force of infantry. 

Economic Reporting

         Feb22  Jul9         Aug7 Sep8 Oct8 Oct23 Oct26

Brent      94.71   77.93 81.75 98.19 105.80 116.10 116.20

WTI     92.10   73.11 76.66 93.28 92.99 102.60 102.20

NG       3.97        3.12   2.64 2.95   3.16 2.71 2.63

Wheat     8.52           6.06   6.35   7.46 6.86 6.28 6.17

Ruble     85         76.31 82.61 86.21 85.20 80.78 80.74

Hryvnia 28.6 44.51 44.73 44.63 44.93 45.38 45.67

Urals 91.66 57.80 79.19 89.44 123.93 106.24 115.07

ESPO 94.52 73.53 78.79 98.44 108.70 143.17 124.72

Sokol 99.31 71.56 77.42 94.09 109.20 119.82 119.42

ESPO Forward, 26 October - 134.32.

Thoughts

Concerning the issue of Patriot and NASAMS missile deliveries to Ukraine, the issue is the level of US stockpiles. Official levels are closely held by the War Department, but there has been a a good deal of digging and there are numbers out there that seem reasonable. 

At the start of 2026 the US had approximately (per CSIS) 2,330 Patriot PAC 3 missiles (the ones optimized to address tactical ballistic missiles). As of today, due to usage versus Iranian missiles, that inventory reportedly stands at somewhere between 759 and 827 missiles. 

In addition, there are some 400 Patriot Pac 2 missiles.

Reportedly, the 2,330 number was 25% of the number needed per War Department Oplans, based on a leak in July 2025, suggesting a target stockpile of roughly 9,000 missiles. 

Current production is on the order of 650 per year (50 - 55 per month). Lockheed is in the process of increasing production to 2,000 per year, but won’t reach that production goal for at least 2 years. 

As for NASAMS, which is the use of AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile) and ASRAAM (Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile) fitted with small boosters and launched from the ground, these missiles are also used by multiple air forces (US and allies) and everyone’s inventory is low. Hence, the War Department’s unease about letting go of any missiles; simply put there are no extras.

As for the UN finding that the attacks on the power grid constitute a war crime, that may feel good, but I do wonder how that will help to end the war. How can there be an internationally agreed to ceasefire or later peace agreement if the Russian government’s leadership are accused of war crimes?

v/r pete     

Almost Right

and 

100% Wrong

October 25th, 2026

File under “Blind Squirrel Finds Acorn.”

A few years after Desert Storm I was sitting in a lecture hall listening to someone (I don’t remember whom, but it was definitely a "brilliant expert”) tell us how dominant battle space awareness, and precision engagement and focused logistics had irrevocably changed warfare. And he commented on drones (UAVs) that were just emerging and he had a half dozen other “hot” concepts and these would make future wars nearly bloodless and fast and focused. Enemy weapon systems would be negated and overrun in a fraction of the time of earlier wars and this would lead to short, intense warfare and the side that had the technologic edge would find itself to be essentially unbeatable; wars would be short and decisive.

This perspective, or something close to it, seems to have driven a good deal of assessments, assumptions and planning in the roughly 3 decades since. And while politicians have been drawn into thinking along these lines, the simple fact is that very few politicians in the US, or in the EU, have any real experience in warfare or, perhaps more importantly, in thinking deeply about it. They have, instead, left it to the generals.

I remember the briefing if only because I sat there listening and thought “he is 180 degrees off.” It occurred to me that once all these neat new ideas settled in, particularly as, so it was argued, some of the technology would make these systems very cheap, that this would all proliferate, groups that formerly were no worry at all would acquire operational capabilities that were unthinkable a decade earlier, and war would become incredibly difficult and expensive and slow and painful… 

Unfortunately, for whatever reason, many of our generals, and their staff planners, bought the argument and the idea was born of rapid deployments, short, quick actions, in and out, great strategic results for low cost. Worse yet, the special operations community was dragged into this, thrown at what were and are fantastically complicated problems, and asked - expected - to perform miracles. That they did, in fact perform very close to miracles several times is a testimony to the community. That they were expected to do so is also a condemnation of the staff planners in Washington and the 3 and 4-star flag officers to whom those staffs report.

Many years ago - right after World War I, military professionals studied that war and nearly in unison around the globe decided that that sort of war must never be fought again. Aircraft, tanks, commutations - all that sort of thing was going to end stalemates and trenches and they would be replaced with maneuver, lighting movements that swept around defenses, shortening wars from months and years to weeks, or even days. 

Germany’s attack on Poland and later on France seemed to validate this analysis, though there were many pieces that were overlooked. Still, it lead to such moments as Churchill, commenting on Germany’s attack on France (1940), that “certainly he [Hitler} cannot have accomplished in days what the Kaiser could not in 4 years.” 

Or consider Somalia. One of the fascinating things about the fighting in Somalia - the grind of US special operators making raids over the years (per the Internet since January, 2007) to grab this or that Al Shabaab character, is how effective the locals were  and are at negating many of our capabilities that should have given us this sort of “overwhelming” edge. At the heart of it was communications, the ability to post a lookout every place an American might be, and then to call into their “command system” whenever there was any sort of change. Digital communications had changed the game, just not quite the way we thought.

There is a gray and somewhat tedious explanation for all that and it resides in an understanding that technology and tactics - which tend to develop side by side - tend to swing back and forth, from favoring the defense to favoring the offense and back to the defense. 

The challenge now is to find some way to either: a) fully embrace the defense and make an attack on any US asset or interest - to include our allies - truly too difficult to attempt OR, b) find a way to now make the next swing, negate the impact of the drones and the ubiquitous data processor (the smart phone) and, and return warfare to the offensive OR, c) somehow do both.

We need to defend ourselves. Consider how hard it is for Ukraine to defend itself. We have a country of 3.7 million square miles. Ukraine covers 230,000 square miles; unoccupied Ukraine, the part Ukraine is trying to defend, covers perhaps 180,000 square meals. That means the US defense problem in area alone is 20 times that of Ukraine’s. 

We have 343 cities of 100,000 or more people. We have 260 military installations. Some of those overlap, many do not. And we have other critical infrastructure - power plants, large factories, etc. It would not be difficult to come up with a list of 1,000 locations that need to be defended from missiles and drones and sabotage. 

We also need to come up with “TTP” (tactics, techniques and procedures) and technology that allows the US to, essentially, negate the capabilities of drones, and at the same time fight the war we choose, when we choose to do so - defense and offense.

But as we do this, we need to remember several points: 

You pay for hubris. The Pentagon and the big staffs were (and still are I suspect) packed with folks who think they’ve solved every problem they ever faced. Some of them helped plan Iraq and Afghanistan. And Somalia. In each we were able to demonstrate all the buzz words that got folks promoted and contracts signed. None were quick. Each lasted years and years (Somalia isn’t done yet). And as far as being successful? Well, let’s leave that for another time.

Where does that leave us? Perhaps it distills down to two key points, which really are only one point, one that we always seem to forget:

1) War is a struggle of Will. He who has the will, wins.

2) Tactics, techniques, technology, all that stuff, are wonderful to have. And they can win battles for you. But they do not win wars; in particular, technology does not win wars. Or, to reduce it to the key point:

War is a struggle of will. So?

Wars, except in rare - and almost always bizarre - circumstances do not resolve quickly, and anyone who plans a war to only last 180 days, soup to nuts, is dreaming.

Wars are bloody. Lots of people are going to die. May not be your people, depending on how you fight it and whether you have the wealth to spend to prevent your own losses. But if you want to win, plan on killing a lot of people. 

Wars do not go as planned. Ask Hannibal. Or Napoleon. Jefferson Davis or Kaiser Wilhelm.

So, returning to the “brilliant expert” who was pontificating 30 years ago, he was almost right: wars would be changed by all the amazing technology that has appeared over the last 40 years. But he was 100% wrong that it would be mean quick, “neat” wars. The folks who should understand that best are the folks in uniform at the Pentagon. Let’s hope they have finally learned that lesson.