September 29th, 2026

Politics - Putin increases size of Russian forces

- Arson in Estonia: Russian SVR

Combat Ops - Some more gains in Operation Vivaldi

- Other gains marginal

- Strikes continue

Weather

Kharkiv

55 and clear. Partly cloudy to sunny through the weekend. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

59 and clear, gusting to 20. Mostly sunny on Wednesday, rain showers possible Wednesday early evening, then partly cloudy to clear into the weekend. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the upper 60s. Winds from the north-east, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

65 and clear. Sunny tomorrow, sunny on Thursday, then partly cloudy through the weekend. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.

Politics

President Putin singed off on an increase in Russian uniformed forces, adding 15,500 personnel, increasing Russian forces by 47,860 so far this year; this is the 4th increase this year.

This raises the total authorized strength to 2,441, 630, of which 1,550,500 are authorized uniformed personnel. Earlier additions included 137,000 personnel in August 2022, 169,400 in December 2023, and 180,000 in September 2024.

This total includes 50,000 in the Strategic Rocket Forces, 165,000 in the Aerospace Forces, 140,000 in the Navy, about 500,000 in the regular Army (nominally), 60,000 in Airborne units, and 29,000 in railway and logistics troops, and a small SOF force of several thousand, and 180,000 faces designated as support staff.

There are 710,000 Russian uniformed personnel in Ukraine in or direct support in adjacent Russian terrain.

Ukrainian forces are between 700,000 and 1 million - they do not release the data.

The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has concluded that the fire at the Milrem Robotics factory in Tallinn, during the night off August 14th-15 was arson set by special service personnel of the Russian SVR.

Ground Operations 

Ukrainian forces continue to provide details on Operations Vivaldi, the Ukrainian army counter-offensive north and north-east of Lyman. Overall, the three phases of the operation have led to retaking some 68 square miles (176 square kilometers) of terrain and in the latest phase have led to the retaking of the town of Nove, which was a logistics hub for Russian army operations north of Lyman. 

This now squeezes the Russian salient west of the Zherebets river and places Ukrainian forces (in Nove) 4 miles west of that river.

It’s worth noting that the operation is considered to be part of the overall Ukrainian offensive that began in early February, timed to begin shortly after Russian forces lost access to Starlink terminals and the resultant superior command and control.

The particular operation in the Lyman area began at the end of May with a series of attacks south-east of Borova (on the northern flank of the Russian salient), which lead to the gradual erosion of Russian positions around Ridkodub (a tiny village on the north-west end of the salient) which was retaken in early June, then appears to have been retaken by Russian forces, and then was retaken in late August or early September by Ukrainian forces. Fighting has been going on just to the north and west of Nove since June, with a renewed push to retake the village (population of less than 900 before the war) in August. 

What has captured interest here is the use of robotics to assist the Ukrainian attack, to include the use of various systems (to include automated BTR-80s) to lay mines, delver supplies to forward elements, and simply to roll forward and detonate near Russian hard-points. But that activity is really a subset of very hard combat arms work in this area.

Elsewhere, ground operations, and Russian infiltrations continue but there were marginal changes to the lines across the rest of the front.

Air and Maritime Operations

Both sides continue the long-range drone / cruise missile strikes. 

Both sides also continue the drone sniping across the front lines into the immediate rear (the vast majority less than 5 miles out).

Ukrainian Forces

Ukrainian missile and drone strikes continue and during the last several days. There were no confirmed damage assessments of the strikes, however. 

Russian Forces

During September 28th-September 29th Russian forces launched at least 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 6 x Zircon missiles and 152 x strike drones into Ukraine airspace, last night and early this morning, followed by an additional 112 strike drones this afternoon. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 2 Iskander ballistic missiles, 1 Zircon missiles and 106 drones during the first wave of strikes and 95 strike drones in the second wave.

Damage was reported in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odessa, Sumy, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Strikes continued to target energy and port infrastructure. A power blackout reported in Vinnytsia oblast.

Civilian casualties included at least 3 killed and 22 wounded.

The RuAF struck at least 17 towns with at least 171 glide bombs.

Russian strikes continued over the weekend, and were continuing through today as I wrote this summary, with more than 265 drones and some missiles launched into Ukrainian airspace since last night

Strikes were reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odessa, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Zhytomyr, and civilian casualties included at least 4 killed 99 wounded.

Of note, the Russian strikes on the 27th were - again - strung out through most of the day, with the first strike / air raid siren sounding in Kyiv at 2235 the previous night (on the 26th) and lasting past midnight and strikes following in 4 different period through the day, the all clear being given at 56 minutes past midnight on the 28th; the longest period of no air warning was just 2 hours and 36 minutes long. Effectively, this kept the entire city in shelters and on edge all night and day and kept air defenses forces up, and emergency crews up for nearly 30 hours.

During the week from September 20th through 27th, Russian forces 2,200 long-range strike drones, 38 missiles (predominantly ballistic missiles), and 1650 glide bombs.

Economic Reporting

         Feb22  Jun8 Jul9 Aug7 Sep4 Sep8 Sep28 Sep29

Brent      94.71   93.82 77.93 81.75 93.69 98.19 106.70 103.10

WTI     92.10   90.59 73.11 76.66 89.17 93.28 94.30 90.04

NG       3.97      3.14          3.12   2.64  2.95   2.95 3.08 3.02

Wheat     8.52           5.82   6.06   6.35   7.45   7.46 6.94 6.92

Ruble     85         73.10 76.31 82.61 86.38 86.21 84.41 83.97

Hryvnia 28.6 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.52 44.63 44.92 44.76

Urals 91.66 86.33 57.80 79.19 86.70 89.44 110.54 110.94

ESPO 94.52 95.51 73.53 78.79 94.52 98.44 124.11 110.28

Sokol 99.31 89.90 71.56 77.42 88.94 94.09 105.83 106.56

Thoughts

The slow expansion of the Russian army continues. Meanwhile the Ukrainian army, actually bigger than the Russian army, appears to be having trouble reaching and maintaining the targeted 800,000 man force. As it stands, the two forces inside Ukraine are, on paper, of similar size. The Russian force has a larger ground force ratio (about 325,000 - 350,000 combat arms was the last SWAG I saw, with the Ukrainian ground force around 220,000 - 240,000 (another SWAG). Some estimates place the Russian number above 400,000 and the Ukrainian number at 300,000, but from what I have read, both those numbers are unlikely.

As for the Ukrainian gains, I think it’s of significance that the actions detailed in Operation Vivaldi have been ongoing as part of the sustained Ukrainian counter-offensive, not short duration operations. It’s also been noted that the Ukrainian forces kept the overall gist of the plan out of the public eye for two months, an excellent piece of operational security (OPSEC).

One interesting data point is that in the several weeks of fighting Ukrainian forces note that they inflicted on the order of 3,000 total Russian casualties (KIA and WIA) in the operations around Lyman during Phase 2 and 3 of Operation Vivaldi. This strikes me as credible reporting, vice the fantastical data points that sometimes trickle out, with claims running orders of magnitude higher.

Also worth noting (since he agrees with me…) that Finnish analyst Emil Kastehelmi, who works for the Finnish Blackbird Group, analyzing commercial imagery and open source material, cautions that the recent announcements reflect a series of operations that mostly reflect gains from February and March and that the Ukrainian government has only chosen to announce them now. A number of the gains announced several weeks ago in the south-east, were only announced after they had finished a very slow and painful clearing of small, dug-in Russian elements. The towns had been retaken in March, but clearing wasn’t complete until the end of August.

v/r pete

 September 28th, 2026

Politics - Russian troops and civilians in gas pipeline

- Seoul Diplomatic protest to Kyiv

- Preparations for winter

Combat Ops - Few changes on ground

- Strikes continue

Weather

Recent weather chatter has focused on a strong El Niño this year; the impact of El Nino’s on weather in Ukraine is, apparently a mixed history, sometimes wetter, sometimes drier, sometimes warmer, sometimes colder. Weather forecasters are often fond of doom-forecasting but it appears that the real issue will be exactly how the jet stream sets up and the movement of the Siberian high and cold air flow from the Arctic. In other words, the forecasters don’t know if it will be a harsh winter or not, and exactly how much a strong El Niño will impact the weather in Ukraine.

Kharkiv

66 and mostly cloudy, gusting over 20. Mostly sunny Tuesday and Wednesday, then partly cloudy through the weekend. Daily lows in the upper 40s to low 50s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

69 and cloudy, gusting over 30. Mostly sunny Tuesday and Wednesday, then partly cloudy into the weekend. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the upper 60s to low 70s. Winds from the north-east, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

66 and partly cloudy, gusting over 20. Sunny tomorrow, then partly cloudy through the weekend. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds north-easterly, 5-10kts.

Politics

Ukrainian Armed Forces released drone footage that shows what appear to be several Russian troops (dressed in civilian clothes, but behind Russian lines) leading 9 civilians to, and then having them climb into, a gas pipeline. Among the nine civilians, one is on crutches, several are pushing bicycles, and there are several children. All of the civilians were carrying luggage. The soldiers entered the pipeline with the civilians.

The footage was filmed on the 27th near Kupyansk, and shows the people getting into a section of the Shebelinka-Ostrogozhsk pipeline, near Holubivka (about 4 miles north-east of Kupyansk). Reportedly, the next exit of this section of pipe is in the woods about 6 miles to the north-east. 

In a letter dated September 27th the government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has expressed: 

“…strong regret over Ukraine’s unilateral disclosure and its subsequent false announcement that there had not been a non-disclosure agreement.”

Seoul has demanded an official apology and explanations from the Ukrainian government for discussing the transfer of North Korean POWs to Seoul.

Seoul is accusing Ukraine of violating an agreement to keep confidential the transfer of North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea. The two men wee captured in January 2025.

On September 23rd President Zelenskyy, speaking before the UN, announced the transfer. Apparently, the transfer was, per Seoul, to be kept secret and Kyiv has violated the terms of the agreement. When asked about it earlier, Ukraine then denied it, and Seoul appears quite upset over these denials.

Ukraine insists that there was no agreement as to non-disclosure.

Seoul says that it insisted on secrecy to protect the families of the two men, who remain in North Korea.

President Lee Jae Myung commented on X:

“From the perspective of those who advertised the repatriation to the whole world with enthusiastic fanfare to show off their achievements – regardless of the impact on inter-Korean relations, the loss of life, or the damage to national interests – they likely not only cannot understand our government’s efforts to keep it confidential but may even wonder if there is something wrong with it.”

“I do not know the reasons behind Ukraine’s disclosure in violation of the non-disclosure agreement, but it is deeply regrettable.”

For the last week Russian strikes into the Kyiv area have hit Ukrainian data centers and internet related infrastructure, which will disrupt information flow to Ukrainian citizens, and temporarily leaving more than 100,000 houses with connectivity on the 23rd and 24th.

Prime Minister Koretskyi stated yesterday that Ukraine’s power generation capacity has been improved and backup power has been secured fro critical infrastructure tore as they prepare for winter, but also caution against “false hope.”

“More power generation capacity has been built this year. More critical facilities have been equipped with additional backup power. There is greater protection for critical infrastructure elements. There are more reserves of equipment and spare parts, as well as more repair crews and machinery.”

However, he warned that Russian forces continue to stockpile long range missiles and that there is a shortage of the necessary defensive missile to fully defend the capital and other cities. 

At the same time First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy Shmyhal commented on winter preparations:

“Regarding the city of Kyiv: Kyiv is one of the leaders in the implementation of distributed cogeneration—that is also a fact. Last heating season, we held daily crisis management meetings with Kyiv and the Kyiv Region. I am also convinced that we will navigate this heating season in a highly coordinated manner. Today, we are providing all necessary support to the city of Kyiv, and of the UAH 40 billion allocated—and approved by Parliament—approximately UAH 16 billion comes from the relevant program and is being allocated from the state budget for the needs of the city of Kyiv.”

Shmyhal noted that 50% of the city’s budget (8 billion hyrvnia ($ 181 million) has been allocated for winter preparations, and the emergency evacuation plan continues to be refined.

“In other words, we certainly have all these emergency plans in place and they have been developed.”

Ground ops

There were only marginal changes in the picture on the ground over the weekend.

Overall, the disposition of Russian forces inside Ukraine shows the weight  of effort is focused on terrain from just north-east of Slovyansk to just west of Pokrovsk, and the the Hulyaipole region just south-west of Orikhiv. Russian forces have reinforced north-east of Lyman, west of the Zherebets River and there are now 18 brigades or regiments in that area, but the relatively low number of Russian assaults in that area suggests the bulk of these units are in defensive positions. So, while Russian forces remain engaged along the entire line, these areas seem to be focus of effort.

Both sides had marginal gains in the last several days but in the key sectors of the front there have been no substantive change.

Of some note, north of the Oskil River, along the border north-east of Kharkiv city, Russian forces appear to have consolidated a few miles of the border just north of the town of Bereznyky. In and of itself this isn’t of great note, but the Russians are slowly “chewing” into the border.

Air and Maritime Operations

Both sides continue the long-range drone / cruise missile strikes. 

Both sides also continue the drone sniping across the front lines into the immediate rear (the vast majority less than 5 miles out).

Ukrainian Forces

Ukrainian missile and drone strikes continue and during the last several days they struck Russian oil facilities in Rostov Oblast and Perm Krai.

Ukrainian forces also struck Russian defense industrial base facilities in Ulyanovsk, Tula, and Voronezh oblasts. Facilities struck included the Iskra Research and Production Plant in Ulyanovsk, the Efremov Synthetic Rubber Plant in Efremov, and the Voronezhsintezkauchuk Plant in Voronezh. The Voronezh plant produces elements of the guidance system, as well as fuel for Iskander ballistic missiles and for certain cruise missiles. The extent of the damage at these sires has yet to be reported by independent sources.

Open source reporting on the strike on the oil refinery in Samara last week showed damage to 3 storage tanks, a pumping station and several pipelines. 

I ship was also reported to be on fire off the port of Sochi.

Ukrainian forces also struck energy and industrial infrastructure in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai, in Voronezh, and Perm.

Commercial imagery of the August strike on the Tobolskneftekhim petrochemical plant in Tobolsk, shows damage to the central gas fractionation unit; the plant has suspended operations.

Russian Forces

Russian strikes continued over the weekend, and were continuing through today as I wrote this summary, with more than 265 drones and some missiles launched into Ukrainian airspace since last night

Strikes were reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odessa, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Zhytomyr, and civilian casualties included at least 4 killed 99 wounded.

Of note, the Russian strikes n the 27th were - again - strung out through most of the day, with the first strike / air raid siren sounding in Kyiv at 2235 the previous night (on the 26th) and lasting past midnight and strikes following in 4 different period through the day, the all clear being given at 56 minutes past midnight on the 28th; the longest period of no air warning was just 2 hours and 36 minutes long. Effectively, this kept the entire city in shelters and on edge all night and day and kept air defenses forces up, and emergency crews up for nearly 30 hours. 

Economic Reporting

         Feb22  Jun8 Jul9          Aug7 Sep4 Sep8 Sep25 Sep28

Brent      94.71   93.82 77.93 81.75 93.69 98.19 106.20 106.70

WTI     92.10   90.59 73.11 76.66 89.17 93.28 93.99 94.30

NG       3.97      3.14          3.12   2.64 2.95   2.95 3.12 3.08

Wheat     8.52           5.82   6.06   6.35   7.45   7.46 6.90 6.94

Ruble     85         73.10 76.31 82.61 86.38 86.21 84.15 84.41

Hryvnia 28.6 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.52 44.63 44.69 44.92

Urals 91.66 86.33 57.80 79.19 86.70 89.44 113.61 110.54

ESPO 94.52 95.51 73.53 78.79 94.52 98.44 125.03 124.11

Sokol 99.31 89.90 71.56 77.42 88.94 94.09 106.16 105.83

Thoughts

As for the situation on the ground, it isn’t crystal clear but it appears that the Ukrainian operation north and north-east of Lyman (Operations Vivaldi) has slowed as the Russians have pushed more units into the area.The Ukrainians have demonstrated an improved, integrated command and control capability (C2) that has pulled together a good deal of technology, reconnaissance and weapons, on top of the improved training for junior forces, allowing the element on site to tap into a wider range of assets and control them in real time on battlefield, in many cases this new C2 allowing forward elements to blur or ignore echelons of command as well as the seams between adjacent units and tap into other units with less formal interference.

That said, the rapid gains have ended as the Russians reinforced, and the Russians can now be expected to counter. It is also worth noting that the front line in this area, normally vague, became and remains very vague; Russian forces are holding onto some terrain that was thought cleared last week, and Russian forces are still infiltrating into Ukrainian terrain. This will also slow as autumn moves into the region and sorting out what limits on infiltration are due to the new tactics and what are due to rain and lack of foliage will take some time to sort out.

Ukrainian reporting notes that Ukrainian forces - particularly as part of Operations Vivaldi - are now attacking the logistics support for infiltrated units (and using robots in some cases to mine the roads and attack Russian elements bringing supplies forward), and it appears that Ukrainian forces are reducing the effort of digging out forward Russian elements and instead cutting their supply lines and letting them “die on the vine.” My suspicion is that this is both an attempt to exploit their improved C2 and robot technology as well as a reflection of the reduced number of trained infantryman, the troops needed to clear out dug-in troops.

That said, there is no reliable source of a lay-down of Ukrainian forces, which makes an accurate assessment of their operations that much more difficult.

It is also worth noting that the Ukrainian tactical gains do not necessarily translate into strategic gains. Ukraine’s steel industry is badly mauled, their ports are also mauled, the agricultural sector is suffering due to all the damage in the Odessa area, the power grid has been heavily damaged and is under great strain - no matter what the Prime Minister says (see above), and the military governor of Kherson has, for all intents and purposes called for an evacuation of the oblast. The next real hurdle Ukraine needs to clear is winter. 

v/r pete