Friday, October 9, 2026

 October 9th, 2026


Politics - Witkoff, Kushner, Budanov, Umerov to meet

- TPS to expire October 19th?


Combat Ops - Small changes on Ground

- Russian gains in Kostiantinivka

- Strikes continue


Weather


Kharkiv

71 and partly cloudy, gusting over 20. Partly cloudy Saturday and Sunday, sunny on Monday, then more clouds. Daily lows around 50, daily highs near 70. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Melitopol

72 and clear, gusting over 20. Partly cloudy to sunny through the Monday. Daily lows in the low 50s, daily highs in the low 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Kyiv

55 and light rain, gusting over 20. Partly to mostly cloudy through Wednesday, rain showers Sunday and Monday. Daily lows in the upper 40s to 50, daily highs in the 60s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.



Politics


Ambassador Witkoff and Mr. Kushner are to meet today with Ukrainian negotiators in Florida to discuss ”new ideas.”

The two men met with President Trump yesterday, as they have been working on a series of proposals since their visits to Moscow and Kyiv on September 5th and 6th respectively.

Also attending yesterday were SecTreasury Bessent and Deputy National Security Advisor Needham.

The Ukrainian team that will be in Florida today includes Chief of Staff Budanov, Foreign Intelligence Director Umerov,  an adviser, Mr. Kyslytsia and parliament member Mr. Arakhamia.

National Security advisors from Britain, France and Germany have also been invited.


Last night SecState Rubio, in Portugal, commented on the talks:

"We'd love to see a negotiated settlement to this war that is permanent, enduring, and fair. And that's what we're committed to continuing to do.”

"That escalation {in the war] could wind up being a sabotage campaign in neighboring countries that are members of NATO… could quickly turn what is a war between two countries into a much broader and far more dangerous regional conflict.This war needs to end in a negotiated settlement. The sooner, the better. The United States stands ready to facilitate that. We have tried. We will continue to try. But we're also not going to invest in pointless processes if we can't make progress.”


Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for more than 101,000 Ukrainians currently in the US is set to expire on October 19th.

TPS was first granted just after the invasion in 2022 and was extended in January 2025. That extension expires a week from next Monday. The President can extend it again, or let it expire, or do nothing - in which case it automatically extends for 6 months.



Ground Operations


Probes and infiltrations contain but there has been little change.

Ukrainian forces appear to have made some small gains in the area just east of Slovyansk, with small gains at several spots from the Donets River south to Malynivka (a distance of about 9 miles) over the last several days. At the same time there have been several small Russian gains in the area and the various Russian and Ukrainian positions are a checkerboard of small elements across a number of small villages, tree lines and small woods.

Ukraine’s General Staff reporting suggests Russian forces have moved some extra drone units into the area east and north-east of Slovyansk, in response to Ukrainian gains as part of Operation Vivaldi.

Russian infiltration efforts continue southward from the Slovyansk area to the Pokrovsk area, as do Ukrainian counter-attacks. Imagery confirmed Russian gains in north-western Kostiantinivka, with Russian forces having pushed across Yemelianova street, the last cross-street in the city, suggesting the Russians have more control of the city than the various blogger maps indicate. Ukrainian elements remain in the center of the city, and therefore the Russians can’t claim the city has fallen, but Russian forces now appear to have de facto control of the city (or what is left of it). It will probably still take several months to fully control and clear the city, but it would seem this battle has been effectively won by the Russians.

Further west, imagery confirmed a Russian element had infiltrated into the southern end of Dobropillia, but that city remains under Ukrainian control.

Further south, fighting continues along the Mokri Yaly River and Russian sources are reporting that Ukrainian forces have pushed into the fields immediately south of Komar. 

This area is (or was) manicured farmland. As the leaves fall, what little foliage and concealment present will end and this will become very difficult terrain to cross, which will further slow infiltrations and counter-attacks by both sides. Ukrainian forces currently hold the local high ground (just some low bluffs) which could give them an edge in the near term.

Across the south a Russian element may have gained some ground about 5 miles west of Hulyaipole, toward the town of Hirke, but Ukrainian forces hold the town.

Further west, Russian forces probed into Novoandriivka (3 miles west of Orikhiv), and appear to be holding their position.



Air and Maritime Operations


Both sides continue the long-range drone / cruise missile strikes. 

Both sides also continue the drone sniping across the front lines into the immediate rear (the vast majority less than 5 miles out). These attacks can involve from a handful to scores of FPV drones per day into any given village.

Ukrainian Forces


On October 8th Ukrainian forces struck the Gazprom Oil Refinery in Salavat, and the Omsk Oil Refinery in Omsk City.

Ukrainian forces also struck a data center in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast .

During the last 24 hours Ukrainian forces also truck the chemical plant in Redkino (75 miles north-west of Moscow), and a space infrastructure support facility in Nizhny Novgorod (about 180 miles east of Moscow).


During the period of October 7th-October 8th Ukrainian forces struck the Oil Refinery complex in Omsk, the Industrial facility and data center in Sasovo, (200 mile south-east of Moscow), and the Oil refinery in Salavat (700 mile east of Moscow).

On the 6th they struck oil facilities near Perm and Samara.

Commercial imagery also confirmed damage to the Samara oil faculty from a strike on October 2nd, and the Astrakhan gas plant on October 4th.


Russian Forces


During the period of October 8th-October 9th Russian forces launched at least 136 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF shot down, or defeated with EW, 114 drones. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Pavlohrad and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Targets struck included power grid, logistics centers, data centers and road and rail related targets. Ukrenergo reports multiple power outages.

Civilian casualties included at least 2 killed and 11 wounded.


During the period of October 7th-October 8th Russian forces launched at least 

142 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF shot down, or defeated with EW, 126 drones. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Targets struck included power grid, logistics centers and road and rail related targets. A power outage was again reported in Kyiv.

Civilian casualties included at least 45 killed and 44 wounded.



Economic Reporting


         Feb22  Jun8 Jul9          Aug7 Sep8 Oct8 Oct9

Brent      94.71   93.82 77.93 81.75 98.19 105.80 103.30

WTI     92.10   90.59 73.11 76.66 93.28 92.99 91.18

NG       3.97      3.14   3.12   2.64 2.95 3.16 3.15

Wheat     8.52           5.82   6.06   6.35   7.46 6.86 6.82

Ruble     85           73.10 76.31 82.61 86.21 85.20 85.24

Hryvnia 28.6 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.63 44.93 44.91

Urals 91.66 86.33 57.80 79.19 89.44 123.93 129.17

ESPO 94.52 95.51 73.53 78.79 98.44 108.70 112.78

Sokol 99.31 89.90 71.56 77.42 94.09 109.20 109.75


Ukraine’s consumer prices rose 2.1% in September and a total of 10% in the last 12 months.

The National Bank of Ukraine raised its prime rate to 16% on September 17th.

Western elements continually note that Russia’s economy is failing, but the Russian inflation rate is 6.3%, the Russian prime rate is 14%.

Russia’s unemployment rate hovers at 2.2% (and is noted as being two low for mobilization by EU commentators), Ukraine’s unemployment rate is not official provided but has been estimated to be at least 9.8% while an August 2026 survey of Ukrainians suggested the rate was 16.2%.



Thoughts


Speaking out of school, my guess is that the situation in Ukraine is substantially worse than the reporting would suggest.

The economics - the numbers - continue to worsen. Ukraine’s currency is, for all intents, only held in place by the EU. Still, it passed 45 to the dollar earlier this week (lowest ever) and is forecast to drop to 48 to the dollar by the end of the 2027.

The inflation numbers, prime rate, and unemployment numbers above are not good. 

Everyone is well aware that winter is coming and Ukraine needs Patriot missiles, And then there is the issue of casualties. For most of the past year the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, and the Office of the President have been releasing a steady stream of numbers on Russian casualties. For more than 12 months those numbers have reflected that Russian casualties have been above 30,000 per month, and those numbers have, for the most part steadily climbed, every month higher than the last, and when added up total to substantially more than 400,000 casualties in 12 months. These are sometimes described as casualties that need to be replaced, that is, killed in action (KIAs) plus wounded who will not return to the battlefield or active duty. Sometimes, they are described simply as KIAs.

In the last three or four months the reports have all been above 40,000 per month, again each month more than the last. Now there is a report out that the Russians are suffering 10,000 KIAs per week, and more than 40,000 in the last 4 weeks. 

These numbers may be correct. If they are, then the war will end soon, as the Russian forces - of whom only 710,000 are nominally committed to the war, can not replace 400,000+ troops per year, and 40,000 dead in a month would mean at least another 25,000 wounded who would not return to duty.

But these numbers may also be part of the same program that saw credentialed analysts report on Russian forces being circled, of the fronts in the south-east and the south and the center having collapsed in succession, and suggesting that the Russian army had been tactually and operationally routed - none of which happened. 

So, why the disinformation? To hold the nation and the EU support together.

If I am wrong, and I hope I am, and if these losses are real, the Russian effort will collapse in the next several months. If not, I suspect that Kyiv is trying to keep morale up, and EU support up, by continually padding the numbers. And this says nothing of the Ukrainian casualties that they wish to keep well under wraps.


v/r pete



Thursday, October 8, 2026

 October 8th, 2026


Politics - Denmarks’ PET warns of Russian Sabotage 

- ROK recalls Ambassador Park


Combat Ops - No substantive changes on the ground

- Strikes continue

Weather


Kharkiv

63 and mostly cloudy. Partly cloudy through the next week, except some sun on Friday. Daily lows around 50, daily highs near 70. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Melitopol

62 and clear. Cycling between partly cloudy to sunny through the Monday. Daily lows in the low 50s, daily highs in the low 70s. Winds southerly, 5-10kts.


Kyiv

65 and partly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy through Tuesday, rain showers Friday, Sunday and Monday. Daily lows in the upper 40s to 50, daily highs in the 60s. Winds southerly, 10-15kts.



Politics


Denmark’s intelligence service (PET - Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (Police Intelligence Service) reported that that Russia has attempted acts of sabotage against Danish companies that provide support to Ukraine.

"What we saw in the spring was a lot of planning, but very little carried out; what we saw in early summer is that they started to carry out a lot more.” 

"If we zoom in a little bit on Denmark, what we're seeing, and the reason we came out with our public statements a few weeks back, is that we're now also seeing that there is active planning and they're trying to carry out sabotage in Denmark.”

Russia has concluded that previous efforts "did not have the effect of deterring the Western (military alliance) NATO ‌from supporting Ukraine…[now] trying to hit targets that have a direct impact on the front line. That means weapons production.”

The PET official noted that many of the people the Russians are using are untrained locals, to include homeless and the addicted, they are recruited through social media and vetted by assigning them on simple tasks.

”It could be anyone just looking for quick money. If the first person isn't successful, they'll throw another one at the problem until they succeed.”

Denmark’s PET warned several weeks ago that they expect Russia to increase the number of attacks on NATO and the West, noting that there is a “low but growing risk” of a military confrontation.

“A limited military attack would be a desperate move on Russia’s part and, like the intensified hybrid attacks, could potentially take place in the coming months…The aim is not to take over the country, but to divide NATO.”


The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has recalled its ambassador to Kyiv (Ambassador Park Ki Chang) in response to what they perceive as the inadequate response to the ROK protest of the handling of the transfer of North Korean POWs to Seoul.



Ground Operations 


Recon probes and small unit infiltrations continue along most of the line; of note, there is more commentary about the expanded use of recon drones - suggesting that both sides recognize the opportunities presented by reduced concealment (the leaves off the trees) to strike at enemy elements.

Fighting contains north-east of Lyman and there are reports of hard fighting on the west bank of  the Zherebets River, and it appears to be concentrated between the towns of Zarichne and Yampolivka, and there is also fighting reported south of Zarichne.

Just to the south, 10 miles south-east of Slovyansk (and about 10 miles east of Kramatorks), imagery confirms that Russian forces have pressed in Malynivka, a small town in the middle of farmland, which equals a little bit of the Russians “straightening the lines” in this area and closing up some small, would-be salients.

Imagery confirmed Ukrainian forces have reached Komar, along the Mokry Yaly River, about 809 miles north of Velyka Novosilka. This puts Ukrainain forces within a mile or so of prepared Russian defensive lines.



Air and Maritime Operations


Both sides continue the long-range drone / cruise missile strikes. 

Both sides also continue the drone sniping across the front lines into the immediate rear (the vast majority less than 5 miles out). These attacks can involve from a handful to scores of FPV drones per day into any given village.

Ukrainian Forces


During the period of October 7th-October 8th Ukrainian forces struck the Oil Refinery complex in Omsk, the Industrial facility and data center in Sasovo, (200 mile south-east of Moscow), and the Oil refinery in Salavat (700 mile east of Moscow).

On the 6th they struck oil facilities near Perm and Samara.

Commercial imagery also confirmed damage to the Samara oil faculty from a strike on October 2nd, and the Astrakhan gas plant on October 4th.


During the period October 5th-October 6th Ukrainian forces continued the strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, with strikes on the Volodyarskaya facility near Moscow.

During this period Russian forces claimed that Ukrainian forces launched nearly 1,000 strike drones into Russian airspace and Russian forces claimed they shot down more than 900 drones.

Civilian casualties included at least 2 killed and 9 wounded.

One span of Chonhar bridge onto northern Crimea has collapsed.

Imagery confirmed that during the night of October 3rd-October 4th Ukraine assets destroyed a SU-34 and SU-25 at Khanskaya Airbase, Adygea.

Ukrainian drone units are using drones to provide food and medicines to the residents of Oleshky, Kherson oblast (east of the Dnepr River).


The oil tanker AFRMAX RIO (Liberian flag, 810 feet, 107,000 DWT), is still burning about 15 miles south-west of Sochi, eastern Black Sea.

Russian Forces


During the period of October 7th-October 8th Russian forces launched at least 

142 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF shot down, or defeated with EW, 126 drones. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Targets struck included power grid, logistics centers and road and rail related targets. A power outage was agin reported in Kyiv.

Civilian casualties included at least 45 killed and 44 wounded.


Among the civilian casualties, 30 dead and 18 wounded are the result of a Russian oldie bomb strike in Kramatorsk that hit near two parked busses. Glide bombs fly to a fixed set of coordinates, so they technically don’t hit a possible moving target, such as a bus. What they can do is strike a site where the busses (or some other moving object, such as a train when stopped in a station) can be expected to be at a given time.

A United Nations count for the January - August timeframe shows 15,280 civilians killed or wounded, a 55% increase for the same period last year.


During the period of October 6th-October 7th Russian forces launched at least

several ballistic missiles, 6 x Zircon missiles, 48 x Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, and 130 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF shot down, or defeated with EW, 5 missiles, 39 cruise missiles, and 117 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Targets struck included power grid, logistics centers and road and rail related targets. A power outage was reported in Kyiv.

Civilian casualties included 20+ killed and 80+ wounded.



Economic Reporting


         Feb22  Jun8 Jul9          Aug7 Sep8 Oct7 Oct8

Brent      94.71   93.82 77.93 81.75 98.19 102.00 105.80

WTI     92.10   90.59 73.11 76.66 93.28 89.79 92.99

NG       3.97      3.14          3.12   2.64  2.95 3.24 3.16

Wheat     8.52           5.82   6.06   6.35   7.46 6.90 6.86

Ruble     85           73.10 76.31 82.61 86.21 85.50 85.20

Hryvnia 28.6 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.63 44.84 44.93

Urals 91.66 86.33 57.80 79.19 89.44 121.38 123.93

ESPO 94.52 95.51 73.53 78.79 98.44 107.61 108.70

Sokol 99.31 89.90 71.56 77.42 94.09 106.79 109.20



Thoughts


I try not to criticize other analysts who are all trying to figure out what is really happening. But I will make one comment cornering a conclusion that the Russian summer offensive has been pushed back and that the Russian plan to conduct a wide sweep of the fortress belt has been defeated.

First, I never really saw anything that could be comfortably labeled a “summer offensive” (more on that in a minute). There was an increase in number of units in the section of the line from just north of Slovyansk to Pokrovsk, and on occasion an increase in the number of daily infiltrations, and there was an increase in the number of FPV drones flown daily, but the overall tactics remained the same and the number of forces committed to the fight on any given day did not dramatically surge.

Further, while the Russians were pushing on the north and south end of the fortress belt, and just to the outside of the fortress belt, they also continued to press on the center of the belt, a general advance, at a slow pace, with similar commitments of forces. There was no movement of some heavy forces north and south of the belt as you would expect for a wide flanking movement to “encircle” the belt, nor was there ever any effort to push forward maneuver elements to conduct such a flanking movement. Nor is the Russian army set up to conduct such operations; this is an army built for attrition warfare.

It would almost seem as if this were a line of analysis designed to support the conclusion that, because the “Russian summer offensive” didn’t succeed, it failed and therefore the Ukrainian forces have won the summer “season,” and regained the initiative. 

So, I went back and checked my notes beginning on January 1st and looked for references to spring offenses and summer offenses. All of them are from the Ukrainian General Staff suggesting or predicting, beginning fairly early in the year (January).

At the beginning of April it was decided that there was a spring offensive that begin on March 18th. Later, it was deemed that the summer offensive had begun but there was no official start date.

The offensive - or both offensives - were supposed to focus on Pokrovsk and the fortress belt. At some point it was determined that the Russians were going to reestablish maneuver warfare and conduct two huge pincer movements and sweep around the fortress belt from the north and south and envelope them. 

As the Russians continued to conduct small element infiltrations and the number of even company sized movements for the whole year probably does not exceed 25, this seems odd.

There were several troop movements - administrative movements of regiments - out of the Sumy area, out of the Kupyansk area, into Pokrovsk, into Kherson. But these were usually 1 or 2 or perhaps 3 regiments at a time. And the total number of Russian regiments and brigades in the entire theater may have climbed by a half dozen, but there was never any great surge. 

And, while tactical reporting routinely noted rises and falls in the number of probes and infiltrations, there was never any day when it was noted that suddenly “the number of attacks doubled” or some such thing.

Said differently, I never saw a “spring offensive” worth the title, nor a “summer offensive.”

Perhaps I lack the imagination, but I just don’t see an “offensive” having started, or the positioning of Russian forces to conduct a large-scale flanking maneuver, and so I don’t see that much has changed. The grind continues… This is the Somme with cell phones and drones… and I'm afraid the Russians understand that.


v/r pete