May 19th, 2026

Politics - Putin in Beijing

- Russian Strategic Forces Exercise

Combat Ops - Little ground change, drone and missile strikes continue

Weather

Kharkiv

79 and light rain. Thunderstorms tomorrow, then two days of mostly sunny weather, then rain showers and thunderstorms daily through the end of next week. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the upper 70s to low 80s. Winds variable, 5kts.

Melitopol

79 and partly cloudy. Thunderstorms possible tonight and daily through the weekend. Daily lows near 60, daily highs in the upper 70s to low 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

78 with rain showers, gusting over 20. More rain tonight, thunderstorms tomorrow and and possible daily through Saturday. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the low 80s. Winds variable, 10kts.

Politics

President Putin is in Beijing for meetings with President Xi. It is expected that they will both commemorate the 25th anniversary of the 2001 "Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation” and further tighten the relations between the two countries: China needs oil, Russia needs both a customer for her oil and technology and support to keep fighting the war. 

And China is learning a good deal about how the next war might be fought.

Presumably talks will include discussions on building the proposed “Power of Siberia 2” pipeline, a proposed 1,600+ mile long pipeline from the Yamal gas field in northern central Siberia, through Mongolia, into China. In particular, Putin will try to get Chinese funding for the construction of the pipeline.

There is already a pipeline (Power of Siberia 1) that moved 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas into China last year (100 million cubic meters per day). The new pipeline will, when built, move 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year (135 million cubic meters per day).

China cruelty produces about 60% of it’s natural gas, but there is little room for growth; China’s natural gas consumption for 2025 was roughly 435 billion cubic meters (1.2 billion cubic meters per day), and is expected to increase by 5% by the end of 2026, and has been forecast to peak at over 700 billion cubic meters per year by the mid 2030s. China therefore needs to access more sources of natural gas.

Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the Northern and Pacific fleets, with the support of some Belarus forces, are conducting a nuclear force deployment exercise, to run from today through the end of Thursday.

Yesterday Ukraine successfully tested a 250KG (550lb) “smart” glide bomb and will introduce it into daily operations in the near term. Ranges are estimated to be in the “tens of kilometers” range (20 km = 12 miles).

Ukraine has been using US JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) and the JDAM-ER (Extended Range) to strike Russian targets being the Russian line.

Ground Operations

Russian recon probes and small unit (squad minus) infiltrations continue along most of the line, with the most activity concentrated in the center, from Slovyansk to Pokrovsk, but there were few changes in the line in this area. Weather conditions have improved in the last several weeks, allowing better ISR drone operations, which has increased the overall effectiveness of FPV drone strikes, even as the new foliage improves concealment, which decreases ISR and FPV drone effectiveness. 

Both sides continue to increase FPV drone activity across the front lines and work to interdict logistics and personnel movement as they approach the lines. Drones have now become the principal “artillery” weapon, with each side launching thousands of FPV drones every day. The result is that within several miles of the front line the majority of all movements are on foot, further slowing any ground operations.

The only confirmed change in the line was is in the south, at the very western end of the line, near the Dnepr River, where imagery confirmed that Ukrainian forces had pushed back into the center of Stepnohirsk. This appears to be another case of Russian forces pushing into a gap, reaching the next town - Prymorske, then not moving more forces in quickly. In fact, there was some reporting over the past several weeks that Russian forces had withdrawn at least one brigade from that general area of the line and it wasn’t clear that the brigade had been replaced. Ukrainian forces then counter-attacked and pushed the Russian infiltration elements out of Prymorske and have now pushed back into Stepnohirsk.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of May 18th-May 19th Russian forces launched at least 1 x ballistic missile (not further identified) and 209 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 180 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odessa and Sumy oblasts.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure, as well as the grain export piers in Izmail, on the Danube River.

There were at least 4 civilians killed and 21 civilians wounded.

The Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) reported that Ukrainian drones struck a Russian Grachonok class patrol boat (102 ft, 150 ton patrol boat) in the Caspian Sea, just south-east of Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan. The strike has not been independently confirmed.

Ukrainian drones struck the Yaroslavl oil refinery this morning (about 150 miles north-east of Moscow); an independent damage assessment has not been published yet.

In Perm, (700 miles east-north-east of Moscow), after repeated strikes on the oil refinery, it now seems that local priests (Russian Orthodox Church) held prayer services last week to pray for the protection of the city.

A drone entered Estonian airspace Tuesday, shortly after local noon, and was shot down over Lake Vortsjarv, in south-central Estonia.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office apologized and explained that Russian electronic warfare forces Ukrainian drones into the Baltic states deliberately.

During the night of May 17th-May 18th Russian forces launched at least 18 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 8 x Iskander cruise missiles, and 524 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 4 cruise missiles and 503 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad,  Odessa, and Sumy oblasts.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure.

There were at least 33 civilians wounded.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Feb9 Mar9 Apr8 May8 May18 May19

Brent      94.71   68.57 106.40 91.78 100.50 108.90 110.40

WTI     92.10   64.04 103.60 93.53 94.91 104.70 103.30

NG       3.97      3.20 3.37 2.73 2.79 3.04 3.02

Wheat     8.52  5.29 6.25 5.79 6.14 6.56 6.69

Ruble     85          77.40 78.20 78.54 74.26 72.46 71.22

Hryvnia 28.6 43.03 43.93 43.45 43.90 43.96 44.18

Urals 91.66 56.37 90.97 124.85 92.56 101.00 102.47

ESPO 94.52 59.77 84.99 103.27 105.56 108.74 111.48

Sokol 99.31 62.85 101.55 96.88 95.96 105.50 104.09

Several financial web sites noted this morning that the Russian ruble is performing well and value is up more than 10% in the past year, due both to the rise in oil prices as well as Russia negotiating some oil sales in rubles vice dollars, increasing demand for rubles among those buyers.

The US Treasury Department did not extend the exemption for sale of Russian oil, but it appears that does not include oil already at sea.

Thoughts

 

A correction on a report from yesterday: Russian sources turned over 526 vice 528 bodies of Ukrainian soldiers, and Ukraine turned over the bodies of 41 Russian soldiers. This brings the 15 month totals to 19,799 Ukrainian dead returned by Russia, 346 Russian dead returned by Ukraine.

The issue of drone overflight of the Baltics is of note. Ukrainian forces have launched long range drones from western Ukraine, targeted against sites in the St. Petersburg area. The tracks used appear to have been hugging the western border of Belarus, which would make it more difficult for Russian and Belarus air defense assets to engage them due to concerns about violating the airspace of the Baltic states.

The item of note is that Russian (and Ukrainian) electronic warfare capabilities continue to improve, particularly the ability to “intrude” into the various systems - drones and missiles - and steer them off course. As you recall, two years ago the Russians demonstrated the ability to electronically defeat the Excalibur 155MM “smart round” as well as to significantly degrade the accuracy of the HIMARS rockets. Presumably a great deal is being learned by all sides about the next generation of electronic warfare systems.

The rise of directed energy weapons (lasers and destructive microwave systems) and ever more sophisticated electronic warfare, is, I suspect, going to be as much, perhaps more, of a revolution in how battles are fought than will be the maturation of drones.

v/r pete 

 MAY 18th, 2026

Overall, the war continues, and continues to slowly escalate. The Easter ceasefire came and went, and was followed by some of the largest missile and drone strikes of the war - by both sides. Energy infrastructure and the defense industrial base (DIB) continues to be the prime target for Ukrainian strikes, energy and logistics the prime targets for Russian strikes, as well as some Ukrainian DIB facilities; in both cases other types of targets have been struck. Both sides continue to inflict civilian casualties, though, as tragic as those are, the raw numbers are lower than might be expected.

If there is one single point to draw from the past several weeks is that both sides seem more determined than ever to continue the fight. 

Politics

A good deal is made in European press that Putin is on increasingly fragile ground with his population. A Russian, state owned, polling group shows his approval at 67.8% (up a bit more than 1% in the past month) and his trust at 72%, also up 1%. How much faith can be put in a state owned poll is a good question, but there it is.

But, at the same time, other sources, including the independent Levada Center, show support for Putin remains strong (in the 60+% range), some smaller polls show support for Putin in prosecuting the war at 80%. And, while some 60-65% (depending on the poll) want peace, similar numbers also would want to escalate the war if negotiations fail completely. 

On May 15th there was another “exchange” of the dead, with Russia turning over 528 bodies to Ukrainian personnel, while the Ukrainian forces did not turn over any Russian dead. This brings the total numbers since the beginning of 2025 (16 months) to 19,801 Ukrainian fallen returned to Ukraine, and 305 Russian fallen returned to Russia.

There remains no specific explanation for this difference, particularly in this long period of very slow changes in the front lines.

There was also a POW exchange, 250 POWs from each side, part of a 1,000 for 1,000 agreement made on the 9th.

After some press reports insisted that President Trump had agreed that Russia should have all of Donetsk and Luhansk, President Trump stated flatly that there was no such agreement.

Combat Operations

The fighting continues as before, small elements (squad and smaller) probing and infiltrating on foot, and the number of daily FPV drone strikes by both sides continues to climb.

During the past two weeks fighting has continued along the entire front line and both sides have made some gains on the ground. While there continue to be recon probes and small element infiltrations north of Sumy City, there has been no substantive change in the front lines in this area since the beginning of May.

North and north-east of Kharkiv Russian forces did push across the border and take a small patch of farmland just south of Dihtiarne (the north-east corner of Ukraine, north-east of Kharkiv about 60 miles), but there were no other changes in this area.

Russian forces appear to have made minor gains east of Kupyansk, but no changes in the past week.

East of Slovyansk Russian forces appear to have consolidated some small gains made during the first week of the month, and may have straightened their lines in certain areas and closed off small, would-be salients. Overall, Ukrainian forces report levels of Russian activity increasing east of Slovyansk.

Russian forces made a number of small, tactical gains along the line just north of Chasiv Yar, near Kostiantinivka, and further west, as well as north and north-west of Pokrovsk. What is most of note is that Russian forces appear to have a firm hold on the east end of the city of Kostiantinivka, in the “corner” between the T0504 and T0516 roadways.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces appeared to consolidate their positions in the area south-east and south of Verbove, but there were no substantive changes in the front line. 

Further south, Russian forces made some gains north-west and west of Hulyaipole and pushed into terrain west of Myrne during the course of the last week; Russian forces could be as much as 3 miles west of Myrne and are probably probing into Huliaipilske.

Air and Maritime Operations also continued, with larger scale air operations by both sides. Both sides have engaged in very large drone and missile strikes, with Ukrainian forces striking multiple targets in the Moscow area. In the week from May 11th to May 17th Russian strikes included 3,170 strike drones, 74 cruise and ballistic missiles and 1,300 glide bombs. Since May 13th at least 12 civilians have been killed in Kyiv alone.

At the same time, Ukrainian strikes continue against Russian oil infrastructure and the DIB. Last night alone more than 1,000 Ukrainian strike drones were launched into Russian airspace, and while Russian air defenses claimed to have shot down “more than 1,000” drones, damage was reported at several refineries and at least 4 civilians were killed. 

It’s important to note that analyst commentary is stressing the idea of sustained drone and missiles strikes on Russia, and “inflicting more pain” on Russia, noting that these strikes will push Russia to negotiate, that more strikes are the path to peace.

Yet, it seems that more strikes are not pushing Ukrainians so seek peace and it isn’t clear to me why the tactic that hasn’t worked in Ukraine will work in Russia? There is, in fact, some reporting that suggests Russians are more determined to sustain the war now as the number of strikes into Russia increases.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Apr8 May8 May18

Brent      94.71   61.26 68.57 106.40 91.78 100.50 108.90

WTI     92.10   57.10 64.04 103.60 93.53 94.91 104.70

NG       3.97      3.41 3.20 3.37 2.73 2.79 3.04

Wheat     8.52  5.22 5.29 6.25 5.79 6.14 6.56

Ruble     85          80.35 77.40 78.20 78.54 74.26 72.46

Hryvnia 28.6 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.45 43.90 43.96

Urals 91.66 50.40 56.37 90.97 124.85 92.56 101.00

ESPO 94.52 52.28 59.77 84.99 103.27 105.56 108.74

Sokol 99.31 55.57 62.85 101.55 96.88 95.96 105.50

The Treasury Department has allowed the April 17 sanctions waiver on Russian oil shipments to expire. The waiver was put in place in response to the Iran - Strait of Hormuz situation.

Thoughts

 

There is a new estimate of Russian war dead that substantially increases estimates of total Russian KIAs. The new estimate - which really is a count of public records in Russia - raises the Russian KIA count to 352,000. The data is a product of exhaustive record searches by Mediazone, and raises the number of KIA by a third, and is, per Mediazone, probably still not quite complete. 

More importantly, it’s worth noting that the other ratios still apply: for every KIA there is a seriously wounded soldier who will not return to active duty. There are also the known 70,000 desertions, and several thousand POWs. This yields Russian casualties as 352,000 / 352,000 / 70,000 / unknown POWs (no more than 5,000), or 774,000 losses.

There are also approximately 500,000 wounded who return to duty. 

These numbers, though huge, place Russian battlefield casualties on par with Ukrainian casualties, which given the nature of the war and the manner in which both sides are waging it, should be roughly equal.

Looking at Ukrainian enlistments, which should be approaching 2 million since the start of the war, and the stated problem of sustaining an army of 800,000, there is a delta of more than 1 million. Ukrainian desertions have reached 300,000, leaving a delta of 700,000 - or more. If roughly half of those are KIAs and half are severely wounded (will not return to combat), that would result in Ukrainian forces having roughly the same losses as Russia, or slightly higher. This would also be consistent with reports that Ukrainian casualties had passed more than 100,000 amputees as of late last year, a number also consistent with 300,000 - 400,000 KIAs.

v/r pete 

Crisis Ahead

May 17th, 2026

History repeats itself… Heaven alone knows who first said that - I’d wager the Greek historian Herodotus, but there are enough examples to satisfy anyone who wants to look. Of course, technology changes things, but the essence, the patterns through the centuries, are remarkably similar.

A number of years ago William Strauss and Neil Howe wrote a book on the very subject - “The Fourth Turning,” identifying a four-generation cycle that can be seen to repeat itself at least as far back as the 1400. There is, as with any such a discussion, room to argue, but the key point is that there is a 4-phase cycle, each lasting roughly 20 years, though some are shorter, some longer. The first involves emerging from a crisis, a more unified country, the belief in a greater future and the restoration of the society’s culture, the second sees this unity start to shift to an increased inward look, the third generation follows with an unraveling and a rise of collective guilt,  and the 4th generation is one of crisis.

Following the crisis - assuming the society survives - the country returns to the first generation and the cycle begins again.

As a general rule the crises peak in the last few years of the 4th generation. The last US crisis phase was the period from the late 1920s until the end of WWII, followed by a new cycle. We are now approaching the end of the 4th phase of that post-war cycle. Some folks have recently done a good deal of computer modeling on this concept and the models suggest that the peak crisis years are just in front of us: 2027 - 2028.

What might his mean?

Before trying to offer an answer to that question, the modeling suggests that there are two major versions of the crisis; the first is an internal social-economic crisis, the second is an external political crisis. Said differently: we are now facing the very real possibility of a civil war or a foreign war. Or both. Given the US role as the leader of the Western world (western culturally), the cycle includes the possibility of an “internal - economic crisis” in Europe, and among US allies elsewhere who share many aspects of our culture as well as being linked to the US economically. 

What might a civil war look like? In the US we have already seen, in a throwback to the Civil War, efforts by some state governments to nullify federal law and to ignore federal authority. There has been some violence though, thankfully, it has been mostly contained. Perhaps the US has enough resilience and social inertia that it can survive the next several years and emerge intact. I think an argument that we won’t see a civil war such as we saw 165 years ago; rather a low-grade level of violence, rising occasionally to short bursts of inner city violence, burning and looting, integrated with efforts to use various forms of lawfare and legislation to change the nation. These may well be the battles of this civil war, and it may have already begun.

It’s also worth noting, however, that there are countries in Europe that are arguably in substantially worse shape socially than the US: the UK, France, Germany, Spain all are suffering from a great deal of internal strain and may have less resilience and less “social inertia” than the US and it isn’t a foregone conclusion that these countries will survive the next few years. Several European countries appear to be questioning traditional definitions of rights versus state authorities, and the changing understanding of governments role, and this is leading to direct confrontations between the citizenry and the state.

At the same time there is the issue of war, in particular a great power war, a war fought not by proxies but directly between the US and China, or worse, between the US and China - Russia. Such a war has been increasingly discussed and yet many seem to have ignored the reality of large nuclear arsenals on each side; even China now has at least 600 nuclear weapons and is reportedly making 70 nuclear weapons each year.

All of which leaves us where?

First, no one who has not been living under a rock doubts that we are in a period of great stress. Call it the Crisis, call it, as the authors do, “the Fourth Turning,” but we appear to be rapidly reaching a critical moment. We don't really have time to simply sit and study the problem.

Second, a general war between the great powers needs to be prevented. That is simply stated: we must deter such a war and only an overwhelming strength can do so. How do we get there is 1 - 2 years? First, reactivate both some tactical nuclear weapons and some strategic weapons. It must be made crystal clear to both China and Russia that, no matter what, they will not win. We might not either, but they will be destroyed. We aren’t going to start the war, but they must understand we will set the terms for war termination.

Second, light a fire under the nation’s industries. Set immediate deadlines, start building - ships, airplanes, weapons, tens of thousands of weapons, tens of thousands of drones. All the pieces need to be boosted. Cyber, Electronic Warfare, Intelligence, etc. etc.  5% of GDP to deter a great power war is a cheap price. 

Third, we as a nation, and as the Western World, need to come together. End the cynicism in public life. Use this 250th anniversary of our nation to focus on our remarkable legacy - a legacy overwhelmingly good and moral - and resolve to strengthen that legacy. Public figures of all kinds, everyone who considers themselves an “influencer,” need to set that example to all.

We are less than 7 weeks from the 250th anniversary of the founding of this nation and we are looking at the possibility of another Civil War and perhaps another World War. Maybe we all should just repeat the last sentence of Lincoln’s Gettysburg address: he summed it all up magnificently:

It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom – and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.