September 25th, 2026
Politics - No Comment from the Kremlin on Trump - Zelenskyy
- Witkoff and Kushner to talk to Russians
Combat Ops - No significant changes
- Fight south-west of Orikhiv
- Strikes continue
- Metal Industry - see Thoughts
Weather
Local rain showers and low clouds have been reported along much of the front lines and small unit commanders are reporting reduced optempo in response to the reduced effectiveness of reconnaissance drones and slower movement off road.
Kharkiv
59 and mostly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy to cloudy for the next 5 days, more rain on Sunday. Daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds easterly to north-easterly, 5-10kts.
Melitopol
62 and clear. Mostly cloudy for the next 5 days, rain showers Monday. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the upper 60s to low 70s. Winds from the north-east, 10-15kts.
Kyiv
57 and partly cloudy. Partly cloudy for the next week. Daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the mid to upper 60s. Winds southerly, 5-10kts.
Politics
In the wake of President Trump’s and President Zelenskyy’s meeting in New York, and Trump’s 3 initial steps to address the war (energy infrastructure ceasefire, reopen grain corridor, trilateral meetings) there is nothing more than the earlier statement by Kremlin spokesman Peskov’s statement that the ideas will need to be studied, nor was there further comment as to whether President Putin will travel to the G20 meeting in December (December 14-15, in Florida).
The G20 would be an obvious opportunity to have a trilateral talk.
Zelenskyy did note that Ambassador Witkoff and Mr. Kushner intend to take several weeks to consult with Russia as to the format and setting for the next set of negotiations.
“They will be in contact with the Russians; they will be in contact with various partners to discuss possible formats.”
Ground Operations
Little change on the ground. Russian reports of significant gains continue, particularly north-east of Kharkiv (in the north-east corner of the oblast) but these reports appear to be substantial exaggerations of recon probes and infiltrations into several towns in this area, and no more than that.
Nevertheless, the areas of Russian infiltrations continues to slowly grow, and the irregular “checkerboard” gray area in this area likewise continues to slowly grow.
A good deal of Russian infiltrations were reported and confirmed in imagery along most of the front lines but, again, there were no changes to the areas of real control.
Of note, Russian forces in the Orikhiv area continue to press toward Orikhiv from the south-east and south-west, but there has been no confirmed changes in the line.
There has, however, been reporting of fighting taking place at a sand-quarry between Novoandylivka (located just a few miles south of Orikhiv) and Novoandriivka (located about 3 miles south-west of Orikhiv).
The sand quarry is located perhaps a miles outside Orikhiv to the south-west, perhaps a half miles south of the T0812 roadway. Ukrainian loss of the sand pit would place the road under easy direct fire and complicate support for Novoandriivka just as the autumn weather (rain) makes off-road travel more difficult (and hence support to the town more dependent on the use of the roads). Ukrainian forces need to hold the sand pit; Russian forces, conversely, will want to take the pit, and this will (if it hasn’t already) degenerate into another hard, small unit fight, dominated by a great many FPV drones and artillery fire. The Russian advantage will be in the use of heavy glide bombs to dislodge Ukrainian positions.
Air and Maritime Operations
Both sides continue the long-range drone / cruise missile strikes.
Both sides also continue the drone sniping across the front lines into the immediate rear (the vast majority less than 5 miles out).
Ukrainian Forces
Ukrainian forces struck energy and industrial infrastructure in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai, in Voronezh, and Perm.
Commercial imagery of the August strike on the Tobolskneftekhim petrochemical plant in Tobolsk, shows damage to the central gas fractionation unit, and the plant has suspended operations.
Weapons production related facilities were also hit:
The Iskra plant in Ulyanovsk was hit, manufactures parts for the Kh-59 cruise missile and the Yefremov synthetic rubber plant inTula.
Russian Forces
Russian strikes cumulative damage on the Ukrainian steel industry continues to climb. On Wednesday Oleksander Vodoviz, Chief of Staff for the CEO of METINVEST Group (the largest steel manufacturer in Ukraine), commented that during a recent week in September Ukraine did not produce a single ton of steel, the first time in 100 years.
During the night of September 23rd-September 24th Russian forces launched at least 295 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down 267 drones.
Damage was reported in Donetsk, Kyiv, Odessa, Sumy, Volyn, Zaporizhzhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Targets included the power grid, warehouses, industrial facilities and logistics related targets.
RuAF tacair struck at least 2 towns with glide bombs.
Civilian casualties included at least 7 killed and 55 wounded.
Of note, Russian strikes into the Kyiv area were strung-out throughout the day, continuing the tactic of keeping the citizenry on edge and tiring out the air defense teams.
During the evening of September 24th, per President Zelenskyy, there was an additional attack on Kyiv that consisted of “approximately 50 missiles,” in three waves, later clarified to mean ballistic missiles, and Zelenskyy stated that the UAF had shot down “60%” (or 30 missiles.) The 20 missiles that struck killed 2 and wounded 4.
During the night of September 23rd-September 24th Russian forces launched several Iskander ballistic missiles, several Zircon missiles, multiple Banderol loitering munitions, and at least 282 strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down 3 ballistic missiles, 4 zircon missiles, 1 Banderol munition, and 219 drones.
Damage was reported in Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Rivne, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. Targets included the power grid, warehouses, industrial facilities and logistics related targets.
RuAF tacair struck at least 2 towns with glide bombs.
Civilian casualties included at least 8 killed and 22 wounded.
Economic Reporting
Feb22 Jun8 Jul9 Aug7 Sep4 Sep8 Sep24 Sep25
Brent 94.71 93.82 77.93 81.75 93.69 98.19 107.20 106.20
WTI 92.10 90.59 73.11 76.66 89.17 93.28 95.80 93.99
NG 3.97 3.14 3.12 2.64 2.95 2.95 3.16 3.12
Wheat 8.52 5.82 6.06 6.35 7.45 7.46 7.06 6.90
Ruble 85 73.10 76.31 82.61 86.38 86.21 85.00 84.15
Hryvnia 28.6 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.52 44.63 44.95 44.69
Urals 91.66 86.33 57.80 79.19 86.70 89.44 109.69 113.61
ESPO 94.52 95.51 73.53 78.79 94.52 98.44 105.58 125.03
Sokol 99.31 89.90 71.56 77.42 88.94 94.09 105.28 106.16
Thoughts
The report from METINVEST that the Ukrainian steel industry had not produced any steel in a week is worrisome. Blast furnaces cannot be readily turned off, they need to run, at least within certain limits. Once shut down and allowed to cool below a certain point, they need to be cooled and rebuilt, an expensive process and a lengthy one - in excess of a year assuming all materials are available.
I dug around on line and after sifting through what I could find, it would appear that the steel industry is on the edge of ruin. A sample of key facilities:
Zaporizhstal reported damaged blast furnaces, coking facilities, and power/rail infrastructure, and production was indefinitely stopped in the past week.
ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine’s largest steel mill, went off line in mid August after a missile strike (2 furnaces destroyed).
Kamet Steel (5 furnaces destroyed) halted operations mid September and declared “force majeure” on some contracts.
Metinvest's Oleksandr Vodoviz (Chief of staff for the CEO), on Wednesday:
"We tried to restart at Zaporizhstal: we started up a furnace, it operated for 10 hours and then there was another strike. [“strike” meaning that the furnace failed] To give you an idea, starting up a furnace costs from $50 million, while the furnace itself costs $500 million. Repairing it somehow requires enormous funds.”
He later added:
“We haven’t calculated it yet, but as an example I told you that one furnace is 500 million dollars if you build it practically from scratch, and all five of our furnaces are destroyed. At Arcelor, two are destroyed. That’s billions of dollars.”
Starting a furnace that is in operating condition costs - per the search I ran, even after an emergency shutdown for some reason, and some partial relining of the furnace, will run perhaps $15 million - not $50 million.
Point is, these furnaces are already badly damaged and the situation is not improving. Russian strike assets will, presumably assess those sites that are not yet fully shut down and hit them in the near term. As Vodoviz said earlier this week, Ukraine’s metals industry has ceased to exist.
Early in the war pundits suggested Russia wanted to seize various Ukrainian industrial faculties, but they are well past that now; the metals industry is pretty much gone, the port facilities are being reduced, the power grid is very badly mangled, road and rail networks are being pulled apart. They have not yet tried to drop the major bridges over the Dnepr, except in Kherson and one bridge in Zaporizhzhia - all in all, a true war of attrition.
There continues to be a good deal of Russian reporting of significant advances and the encircling of Ukrainian units, reports that can be easily shown to be false, and which are shown to be false by multiple Russian bloggers, who roundly criticize the reports as well as the Russians who believe them.
This has been going on so long now that it is worth asking who the audience is.
Even pro-Russian audiences who do the least digging will see that the “story lines” are clearly false, just as are the regular reports from other Western sources about this or that Russian front having collapsed, etc. The point is that propaganda, to be effective over time, has to contain a fair portion of the truth, or make claims that cannot be easily disproven. Much of this propaganda strays well beyond that and it raises the issue of whether there is some other purpose behind these “stories.”
Certainly, it is not clear that, if Putin were considering a much larger mobilization, he would proceed with stories of wild successes on the ground. It would seem that he would want to build up a story of certain Ukrainian successes (as a result perhaps of increased EU aid) and therefore there was a need for Russia to do more, thus justifying a mobilization or some other escalation.
At times it almost seems that some of the more extreme claims are published just to irritate some of the figures in the West who read all these reports.
v/r pete
