March 25th, 2026

Politics - Bodies of fallen soldiers exchanged

- Hungary’s PM Orban threatens to cut off gas supply

Combat Ops - Large scale air attack

- Ground war grinds forward

- Russian Spring Offensive

Politics

On February 26th Ukrainian and Russian forces exchanged the bodies of fallen soldiers, with Russian forces turning over 1,000 Ukrainian dead, and Ukrainian forces turning over 35 Russian dead. This is the first exchange since January 29th, and brings the count of bodies turned over in the last 14 months to (per my tally) 18,273 Ukrainian soldiers and 264 Russian soldiers.

While most of this 14 month period Russian forces have been advancing (albeit slowly) and hence able to pick up some of the dead, there have been some Ukrainian gains, particularly in the last 2 months north of Hulyaipole, and this wide divergence in number of bodies has not been explained; even the BBC has finally recognized that the public casualty counts quoted in the Western Press do not make sense given these discrepancies.

Hungary’s PM Orban posted  on Facebook that Hungary will end natural gas supplies to Ukraine if the Druzhba pipeline is not repaired and reopened.

"Gas supplies from Hungary to Ukraine will be gradually suspended, and the volume of gas that remains in Hungary will be stored in Hungary.”

He commented that Hungary has: "successfully defended itself against Ukrainian blackmail" adding that Hungary must "break the oil blockade.”

"Until Ukraine provides oil, it will not receive gas from Hungary… We will protect Hungary's energy security, we will maintain the protected petrol price and the reduced gas price!”

Air Operations 

Russian forces launched the largest air operation of the war on the 23rd and 24th, launching 948 strike drones as well as 7 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 18 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 5 x Iskander cruise missiles, and 4 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The UAF shot down 797 drones and 25 cruise missiles. 11 oblasts reported damage and there were at least 4 civilians killed in the attacks.

Damage was reported to energy, and transport infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zaporizhia oblasts. And more than 150,000 people were without power in Chernihiv.

Ukrainian drones struck the Russian power grid in the Belgorod area and left nearly 500,000 without power.

Ground Operations 

It has been a bit more than two weeks since the last report and a review of the maps shows that Ukrainian forces continue to gain small amounts of terrain in the south-east, in an area centered about 15 miles south-west of Pokrovsk, and a second one about 15 miles northeast of Hulyaipole. There have also been some smaller gains south-west and south-east of Kostiantinivka, and small gains north-east of Slovyansk. Overall, the Ukrainian General Staff reports that since the beginning of the year Ukrainian forces have retaken some "400 sq. Km” of land (about 155 sq. miles) of terrain. 

All other things being equal, that’s good for the Ukrainians and shows an ability to take the initiative on the battlefield, at least in certain areas. What is not known is the number of casualties incurred by both sides nor the expenditure in weapons to take this terrain.

Once again, the Ukrainians have shown themselves to be more agile tactically, capable of exploiting a “seam" between two Russian units and penetrating into Russian territory. Russian forces on the other hand almost seem to not care, grinding forward with little regard for what is happening to neighboring units.

It’s also not clear that the Ukrainian forces have penetrated the Russian defensive positions. Note that the Russians have built a series of defensive lines, each consisting of bunkers, fighting positions, tank and vehicles barriers and trenches and mine fields. As their forces move forward, engineers then come in and build new defense lines. There are also less developed defensive lines that usually are just behind the forward line of troops. These are more easily penetrated. But the fully constructed defense barriers have proven very difficult to penetrate and my guess right now is that the Ukrainian forces have not penetrated these fully built defensive lines in either area where they are engaged in counter-offensives.

All told, Russian forces have made small gains west and south-west of Hulyaipole, have continued to slowly expand their positions west and north-west of Pokrovsk, are engaged in the now-familiar “see-saw” struggle for terrain in eastern and south-eastern Kostiantinivka, and continue to grind forward in the area east of Slovyansk. North of the Slovyansk area, all the way to Sumy oblast, there has been virtually no change in the line, with just very minor give and take. 

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Mar10 Mar25

Brent      94.71   63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 106.40 92.17 110.20

WTI     92.10   59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 103.60 89.13 88.48

NG       3.97      4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 3.37 3.13 2.92

Wheat      8.52  5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 6.25 5.99 5.90

Ruble     85          80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 78.20 78.61 81.00

Hryvnia 28.6 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.86 43.87

Urals 91.66 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 90.97 100.67 98.99

ESPO 94.52 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 84.99 97.96 96.29

Sokol 99.31 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 101.55 91.81 107.32

Thoughts

Before commenting about combat operations, it’s worth taking a look at the oil prices: operations were necessary to terminate the Iranian nuclear weapons program and provide safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz, but Russia is benefiting from the higher energy prices.

It should be noted that, while I am looking at this war from a “100,000 foot perch” and there is little change, still, on the ground, in the mud, this remains a brutal fight with hundreds of squad and rifle-team sized elements engaged every day, FPV drones constantly on the prowl, artillery ready to strike. And in the towns Russian glide bombs continue to strike reinforced fighting positions.

But what strikes me after staring at the maps for the last several weeks, and then comparing them from mid-February to today, is that the Russian grind continues. It isn’t elegant, but it still grinds forward. The long-term trend is in the Russian favor, no matter how you look at it. What we don’t know is the casualty count. 

It’s of note that the Ukrainian offensive south-east of Verbove (15 miles or so north of Hulyaipole) began on February 3rd. On February 26th there was a body exchange and Ukrainian forces turned over 35 Russian bodies. 

Several days ago the UGS claimed that the Ukrainian army had inflicted 1,710 casualties (killed and wounded) on March 17th, labeling it the worst day of the war for the Russian army. Perhaps. 1,710 total casualties would suggest more than 300 KIA. But the number of dead transferred certainly raises questions as to the accuracy of that sort of reporting. It will be interesting to see how many Russian dead are returned at the next body exchange.

Meanwhile, despite some very well publicized reports on Russian casualties, the best count places the Russian KIAs at roughly 205,000 - 220,000. There is an equal number of those wounded who will never return to duty. Rounding up, call it 450,000 “KIA or Severely Wounded.”

The official Ukrainian KIA count, per President Zelenskyy, is 55,000. Using the number of bodies returned in the last 14 months as an average would suggest the Ukrainian KIA count is above 65,000, assuming that something near 100% of KIAs are being picked up by Russian forces, which would also suggest that no Ukrainian soldiers are killed on the Ukrainian side of the front line, an unreasonable assumption, especially given that 80% or more of all casualties are from artillery and drones.

And there have been times when the Ukrainian government releases extreme Russian casualty claims to mask bad news on the Ukrainian side, which would obviously include high casualty counts, perhaps from the limited counter-offensive they have been pursuing since early February. Where that leaves the actual Ukrainian casualty count I don’t know, but when added together with the reports of numbers of amputations, and other reporting, my guess is that the Ukrainian casualty count (KIAs and several wounded) is roughly the same as the Russian casualty count.

Finally, there is now anecdotal reporting that the “Russian Spring Offensive” has begun. Use of that phrase again requires some caveats: for the Russians, this remains a true war of attrition: the overarching goal is to cause casualties, and then, and only then, take ground. So, if (“IF”) the offensive has begun, it will mean more units pushed forward on the line, more drones, more artillery, more glide bombs. But there will be no deep, knife-like thrust, no great flanking movements, no mad dash across open terrain. And even if the Ukrainian line were suddenly stripped of a unit, the Russian army simply isn’t organized to conduct some Rommel-like dash into the Ukrainian rear. The grind continues.

v/r pete 

On the Edge

March 15th, 2026

It’s not too much of an exaggeration to say that the world has stumbled too close to the edge, that we teeter on the abyss. A war that the West - and its various intelligence agencies failed to understand or appreciate, grinds into its 5th year in eastern Ukraine, and Russia’s “close friend” China continues to rattle its saber around Taiwan (they just completed a series of maneuvers around the island), and Chinese aggression in the South China Sea continues, in particular directed at the Philippines. 

And, China and Russia have two close allies: North Korea - already a nuclear state - and Iran.

Interestingly, of the four nations, it’s the one that is most commonly ridiculed, and its leadership labeled as “crazy," North Korea, that is perhaps the most stable, the most “sane.” North Korea, and the Kim dynasty, may have nuclear weapons but they also understand that there is a very real limit to their actions and, because the Kim dynasty wishes above all else to survive, to continue in place, they are careful to remain inside those boundaries.

But it’s the 4th member of this unpleasant alliance, Iran, that represents the most immediate danger. Russia may continue the war in Ukraine, but the slow grind of the army, and the Russian way of war, ensures that there will be no breakout, and the fact that Russia has nuclear weapons is counter-balanced by decades of understanding of the deterrence value of US and French and British nuclear weapons in Europe. Things may be ugly in Europe, but there seems to be a reasonable assessment that they won’t get out of control.

Similarly, China - and Emperor Xi - want to press for control of both Taiwan and the South China Sea - and later South East Asia, but given all the machinations currently underway in China, and as Xi and the CCP watch President Trump and his various operations around the world over the past 9 or 10 months, it’s clear that the calculus in Beijing needs to be reexamined. As Gordon Chang said just the other day, "In Beijing these days, just about everyone knows China's arrogant leader was wrong about the long-term direction of the United States."

This is a key point, for there’s no more important an issue for the US and Europe and the free nations of Eastern Asia, in the medium to long term, than the containment of China, while at the same time preventing a “great power on great power” war.

But what about short and medium term worries? This leads to Iran. 

Iran is China’s great proxy. Russia is China’s ally and the war in Ukraine ties down western forces and complicates western defense spending. But it’s the wild card that Iran represents that is - or was - China’s “Joker.”

Iran actually represented 4 major “cards” for China. First, and most obviously, China was buying 1.3 million barrels of oil per day from Iran. For a country that imports 75% of its oil (China imports 12.5 million barrels per day (it consumes about 16.5 million barrels per day)), this was important. That Iran had more capacity was perhaps even more important: up until 2 weeks ago China “knew” it could buy more oil from Iran in years to come. 

Secondly, Iran represents - or represented - a real threat to the oil fields and refineries of its neighbors - Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Iranian conventional ballistic missiles could easily strike those fields and cause damage that would take years to replace. Iran could also strike the many desalination plants that these countries truly need to survive. 

Thirdly, Iran, as a Shia state, is the “third rail" of the Islamic world, the chasm that splits Islam into two virtually irreconcilable camps. That one of the camps - Shiite Islam - embodies a theological perspective that welcomes a cataclysmic apocalypse makes it an implacable foe to the rest of Islam, as well as to Israel and the idea of a Jewish state. 

All of that was marginally manageable as long as Iran did not have the “reach” to damage other nations. The development of long range ballistic missiles changed all that, bringing key targets into Iranian strike range. Adding nuclear weapons to the mix would multiply that threat by several orders of magnitude. In addition, the mere presence of those conventional ballistic missiles, and some very capable cruise missiles, protected by modern surface-to-air missiles and the added complicity of being able to use this interwoven series of capabilities to close the Strait of Hormuz via cruise missiles and mines, represented - and represents - a threat that cannot be accepted by the rest of the world.

Denying Iran the capability to mine the strait or attack ships with missiles (ballistic and cruise missiles), as well as attack Arab refineries, Arab oil fields and Arab desalinization plants became not simply a “nice to have,” but a requirement for virtually the entire world, with the notable exception of China and Russia. It also becomes a necessity to not only deny this capability, both in deployed assets and the capability to produce these missiles, but to ensure that such a capability is never rebuilt. 

Add to this the possibility of an Iran with a nuclear weapon and we - the sane 3/4ths of the world - needed to declaw Iran and we need to continue this operation (which is only 2 weeks old) to guarantee that Iran has, in fact, been disarmed.

It’s worth noting that the IAEA reported about 11 months ago that Iran already had enough enriched uranium, that it was just two months away from some further enriching and weapon production. And the story of AQ Khan, the father of the Pakistani bomb, revealed a number of years ago that Iran had, and has, a functional atomic weapon design. It was only lacking the final enrichment process (from 60% to 80+% enriched fuel) before it could begin to make weapons. This was the capability that was denied - for a time - last summer. They must never be allowed to get that close again. 

Finally, sending the right signal to China - that it will not be allowed to support and incite a mad proxy - is vital. Continuing the strikes into Iran as long as is necessary to destroy that regime is the most critical component of the signal.

 March 10th, 2026 NEXT SUMMARY NEXT WEEK

Politics - Negotiations postponed

- Hungarian situation continues to brew

Combat Ops - Some few small Ukrainian gains

Economics - Oil prices mostly down a bit

Weather

Spring seems to have arrived, the thaw will continue; mud season has arrived.

Kharkiv

56 and sunny, gusting to 20. Sunny all week. Daily lows in the 30s, daily highs in the upper 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

57 and sunny. Sunny all week. Daily lows in the low 30s, daily highs in the upper 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

55 and sunny. Mostly sunny all week. Daily lows for the next week in the low 30s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds south-westerly, 5-10kts.

Politics

President Zelenskyy posted yesterday that the US has asked to postpone the scheduled trilateral negotiations session set for later this week due to the current situation in the Mid East.

Russian news agency Interfax reported that President Putin sent a congratulatory note to Mojtaba Khamanei on his selection as Supreme Leader, noting that he will need "great courage and dedication.”

"I am confident that you will honorably continue the work of your father and unite the Iranian people in the face of severe trials. Russia has been and will remain a reliable partner of the Islamic Republic. I wish you success in solving the difficult tasks before you, as well as good health and strength of spirit.”

President Trump spoke to Putin by phone yesterday. President Trump noted that they discussed the war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East.

"Yes, I had a very good call with President Putin. We had a lot of people on the line from our side, from his side. We were talking about Ukraine, which is just a never-ending fight and when, look, there's tremendous hatred between President Putin and President Zelenskyy. They can't seem to get it together.”

Overall, Trump called the conversation “positive.” Then he added that they talked about the Middle East.

"We obviously talked then about the Middle East and he wants to be helpful. I said you could be more helpful by getting the Ukraine Russia war over with, that would be more helpful. But we had a very good talk and he wants to be very constructive.”

The funds seized by Hungarian authorities from couriers for the Ukrainian Oschadbank have not been returned. Hungarian Transport Minister Lázár has stated they will not be returned until the Druzhba pipeline is again operational and oil is flowing.

"We know that Ukrainians are very nervous … if they are blackmailing us, we cannot be so stupid as to let it go. We did not do what we did by accident, we will not return their money. The money will remain here for now, we are waiting for the opening of the oil pipeline and for new Ukrainian cash supplies through Hungary.” 

Yesterday a decree, signed by PM Orban, was released that states that Hungarian authorities have been unable to establish ownership of the cash and gold.

At the same time, Hungary’s National Assembly (their legislature) voted 142 for, 28 against, with 4 abstentions, on a bill opposing Ukrainian entry into the European Union (there are 199 total members in the assembly).

The same bill also called for no more money or weapons to be sent to Ukraine. 

Ground Operations

Overall, there was little change in the lines along the entire front, despite a steady amount of activity, both in probes and in drone and artillery strikes. (Russian forces also continue to support ground operations with air strikes with glide bombs). While Russian forces appear to maintain the initiative in most area, Ukrainian forces have pushed back and there have been some gains at the western end of the line (along the Dnepr River) as well as in the fighting in the southeast, around Hulyaipole and north of Hulyaipole.

South-east of Kupyansk imagery confirmed Ukrainian troops in the town of Podoly, but it isn't clear whether the Russians actually controlled the town or had simply had probes in the town as well.

Fighting continues in the east end of Kostianitnivka and just east of that town and has evolved into another checkerboard fight, with Ukrainian and Russian elements interlaced across the east end of the town and in terrain perhaps 2 miles east of the city.

In Hulyaipole there is an interesting development: a Ukrainian element appears to have moved quickly up the T0814 roadway and seized a block of houses in the western end of the city. They are now at the end of a 4 mile long, 1 road wide salient. Ukrainian forces now need to reinforce or this element will be quickly squeezed.

Ukrainian forces are also reportedly counter-attacking in the Prymorske area and have, at a minimum, halted Russian movements, with some reports suggesting they have pushed Russians back from Prymorske, though there are other conflicting and contradictory reports.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of March 8th-March 9th Russian forces launched at least 137 x  strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 122 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities.

Civilian casualties include at least 6 killed and 42 wounded..

RuAF tacair struck 21 towns.

Ukrainian forces claimed they struck the Acron chemical plant in Veliky Novgorod (about 75 miles south-south-east of St. Petersburg) on the 9th, and images show a fire in the vicinity of the plant. The plant produces fertilizer.

During the night of March 8th-March 9th Russian forces launched at least 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 197 x  strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 161 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Poltava, and Zaporizhia  oblasts; the two ballistic missiles struck power grid targets in Odessa.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities, the NAFTOGAZ production facility in Poltava was struck again.

Civilian casualties not reported.

RuAF tacair struck 18 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Oct8 Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Mar10

Brent      94.71   66.18 63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 106.40 92.17

WTI     92.10   62.48 59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 103.60 89.13

NG       3.97       3.44 4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 3.37 3.13

Wheat      8.52  5.06 5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 6.25 5.99

Ruble     85          81.28 80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 78.20 78.61

Hryvnia 28.6 41.48 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.86

Urals 91.66 61.15 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 90.97 100.67

ESPO 94.52 66.74 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 84.99 97.96

Sokol 99.31 61.91 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 101.55 91.81

Thoughts

The fighting in Kostiantinivka is of note; depending on how you interpret it, each side is doing better or worse than expected. The city was hailed by Ukrainians as a real fortress, with the implication that the Russians would find it impossible to storm. The Russians have proceeded to regularly send small probes into the city and probes have reached more than half the city, though they hold very little. Now it appears to me that, east of the main roadway, the fight is taking on what has become the regular confused ground situation regularly seen over the last 2 years as the Russians grind down each city and town.

Ukrainian sources note that Ukrainians still hold some ground in eastern Kostiantinivkla, but miss the point that they were supposed to hold all of it.

That said, it’s the high ground on the south-west side of the River (the west side of the city) that is the real ”hard nut to crack,” and Russian forces have not begun to probe that area. 

At the same time, further south, the small Ukrainian counter-offensive - about 15 miles north of Hulyaipole, continues to hold terrain. And Ukrainian officers - regimental commanders - are now suggesting that it was a counter-offensive, not simply some sort of ad hoc break through.

That said, they also noted that they fully expect a Russian Spring Offensive, probably in the Pokrovsk - Kostiantinivka area, and note that the small counter-offensive was successful because they pierced a section of the line where the Russians had not yet built a new, forward defensive line. They noted that the Russians are now building new defensive lines in the Pokrovsk area.

As I guessed, it appears the limited counter offensive slowed to a crawl as they came within range of the first prepared Russian defensive lines - about 8 miles deep into Russian held terrain.

I think we might learn something about the actual depth of Russian strategic reserves in the next 4 months. If the Russians can grind down the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the south, AND grind down the east end of Kostiantinivka, AND finish the consolidation of Pokrovsk, then Russian reserves are sound. If they don’t manage all three simultaneously, then it’s a different problem and they’ll be susceptible to pressure.

As for the Ukrainians, they may want to hold the ground gained in this limited counter-offensive, or withdraw to more defensible lines in this area and shift forces to meet the Russian spring offensive. That will be a decision based on the extent of Ukrainian strategic reserve.

v/r pete 

757-582-9182 - text my puppy's name

peter@obrienconsultinginc.com