April 27th, 2026 Next Summary on Wednesday

Politics - President Trump comments on negotiations

- Drone strike Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Combat Ops - Lots of activity, small gains on the ground

- Large drones and missile strike Saturday night

- Russian Navy ships again struck import Sevastopol

Weather

Kharkiv

45 and rain showers, gusting to 35. Showers should end tonight, but there is a chance of showers tomorrow afternoon. Partly to mostly cloudy all week. Daily lows in the low 30s, daily highs in the upper 40s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

49, partly cloudy, gusting over 30. Partly to mostly cloudy all week, winds dropping tomorrow morning. Daily lows around 40s, daily highs near 60. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

43, cloudy and windy, gusting over 45.  Mostly cloudy all week, but winds dropping early tomorrow. Daily lows in the low 30s, daily highs in the mid 40s. Winds westerly, 10-20kts.

Politics

Diplomatic efforts remain stalled. President Trump spoke with both President Zelenskyy and President Putin over the weekend, and commented that he had "good conversations” with both and added that:

“We’re working on the Russia situation, Russia and Ukraine, and hopefully we’re going to get it.  I do have conversations with him, and I do have conversations with President Zelenskyy, and good conversations. The hatred between President Putin and President Zelenskyy is ridiculous. It’s crazy. And hate is a bad thing. Hate is a bad thing when you’re trying to settle something, but it’ll happen.”

Zelenskyy insists he is ready to meet Putin anywhere except inside Russia. The Kremlin insists there is no point in meeting until there is some basic agreement for the two men to discuss, resolve final differences and sign.

One man was killed this morning in a drone attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP); the attack has been confirmed by the IAEA. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi issued a statement:

“Strikes on or near nuclear power plants can threaten nuclear safety and must not occur.”

Ground Operations

Overall, Russian operations appear to have increased in tempo along most of the front, and there have been some small changes in line.

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Due north of Sumy City Russian forces pushed back into the town of Kyndrativka on Saturday, and there are multiple reports from the last several days of Russian elements pushing across the border into previously quiet areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. There is now a section of border east of Sumy, perhaps 25 miles long, in which Russian forces have moved across the border and pushed in perhaps a half mile to a mile. While the ostensible reason is a Russian aim to create a buffer zone along the border, the more likely purpose is to attempt to draw Ukrainian forces to shift some assets and weaken portions of the front. However, to date Ukrainian forces response has been with border guard units, not regular army units.

EAST OF THE OSKIL RIVER

Ukrainian sources have confirmed Russian forces active both in Kupyansk and east of that city, with imagery confirming that Russian forces have pushed back into the small town of Petropavlivka, and Ukrainian sources noting increased Russian recon probes back into the city (ruins) of Kuypyansk.

SLOVYANSK - KOSTIANTNIVKA - POKROVSK

A good deal of fighting in the general area east of Slovyansk; the only clear change is Russian forces pushing west across the Donets Canal, just south of the where the canal crosses under by the M03 Roadway. If they can hold and expand that position they would threaten the village of Yurkivka (a village of perhaps 20 houses, just north of the roadway), and from there pressure the Ukrainian positions near Rai Oleksandrivka, not quite 3 miles to the north-east. 

Multiple reports of Russian infiltrations deeper into Kostiantinivka over the last several days, but also several reports of Ukrainian forces pushing back into eastern Kostiantinivka, as the “checkerboard” continues to slowly expand.

The same development has taken place around Pokrovsk, with Russian forces seeming to take over Rodynske, north of Pokrovsk, but multiple reports of Ukrainian elements dug into portions of that town and the terrain just north of Pokrovsk.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Ukrainian forces report that they have pushed back into Vorone (about 20 miles north-east of Hulyaipole), though it wasn’t clear last week that they had lost it. The town has now changed hands 4 times in perhaps 6 months, 3 times in the last 2 months. Ukrainian forces also report that Russian forces have retaken Berzove (about 4 miles south-west of Vorone). 

There has been poor reporting coming out of this area but this fairly rapid back and forth suggests more Russian activity here; if this follows Russian operations from last year, they will commit more forces in the summer and push to retake the terrain they lost in February and March.

Further south, imagery and Ukrainian reporting suggest Russian probes further west from Hulyaipole, perhaps as far as 10 miles to the west along the T0814 roadway, even as several small Ukrainian elements have infiltrated into Russian positions just north-west of Hulyaipole.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of April 26th-April 27th Russian forces launched at least 94 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 74 drones.

Damage was reported in Kharkiv oblast. 

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure. 

There was no civilian casualty report.

RuAF tacair struck 20 towns.

Ukrainian Special Forces claimed to have struck Sevastopol Harbor again on Sunday and again damaged the Alligator class amphib Nikolai Fichelnikov, and the Ropucha class amphib Yamal, both if which had been hit in a strike on April 19th.

Also damaged was the Ivan class intelligence collector Ivan Khurs. Ivan Khurs was struck by a surface drone (USV) in 2023. A MiG-31 located at Belbek airfield (4 miles north of Sevastopol) was also damaged.

During the night of April 25th-April 26th Russian forces launched at least 144 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 124 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa and Zhytomyr oblasts. 

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure, and one drone at least hit a cargo ship loading in Odessa.

There was no civilian casualty report.

RuAF tacair struck 17 towns.

During the night of April 24th-April 25th Russian forces launched at least 12 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 29 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 1 x Iskander cruise missile, 5 x Kalibr cruise missiles, and 619 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 30 cruise missiles and 580 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odessa and Sumy oblasts. 

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure. 

Civilian casualties included at least 6 killed and 47 wounded.

During the night of April 23rd-April 24th Russian forces launched at least 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 107 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 96 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Zhytomyr oblasts. 

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure. Power outages were reported in more than 100 towns Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy,  and Zhytomyr oblasts.

Civilian casualties included at least 2 killed and 5 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 16 towns.

During the 23rd or 24th Ukrainian forces struck Yekaterinburg (more than 800 miles east of Moscow) and Chelyabinsk (about the same distance, about 100 miles south of Yekaterinburg). Pictures shows smoke coming from a steel plant in Chelyabinsk, and damage to an apartment building in Yekaterinburg.

Ukrainian Rail reports that during all of 2025 Russian strikes hit 119 engines, 425 cars, 38 stations and 64 bridges, but in the first three months of 2026 they have already hit 81 engines, 185 cars, 12 stations and 22 bridges.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Apr8 Apr24 Apr27

Brent      94.71   61.26 68.57 106.40 91.78 104.20 105.90

WTI     92.10   57.10 64.04 103.60 93.53 94.56 94.64

NG       3.97      3.41 3.20 3.37 2.73 2.54 2.57

Wheat     8.52  5.22 5.29 6.25 5.79 6.18 6.19

Ruble     85          80.35 77.40 78.20 78.54 75.30 74.92

Hryvnia 28.6 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.45 44.04 44.09

Urals 91.66 50.40 56.37 90.97 124.85 107.49 105.99

ESPO 94.52 52.28 59.77 84.99 103.27 109.35 109.13

Sokol 99.31 55.57 62.85 101.55 96.88 107.34 101.56

Thoughts

The IAEA wording is, as usual, careful, having never accused one side or the other of launching drones or firing artillery into the general area of the ZNPP. The ZNPP was occupied early in the war (March 4th, 2022); the first reported incident of artillery or rockets or drones hitting near the facility was July of 2022, when a rocket landed inside the facility, coincidentally just several weeks after Ukrainian forces began to use the HIMARS battlefield rockets. Note that the facility, not including the large cooling pond, covers an area of 2 x 4 miles, and that no rocket or artillery or drone has ever impacted one of the reactors.

Since that first incident there have been repeated artillery, rocket, mortar strikes, and the occasional drone strike in the general area, with Ukraine accusing the Russians of trying to stage a false flag event and blame the Ukrainians, and Russia has repeatedly accused Ukrainian forces of shelling the facility. Russians have used the facility to park artillery, and there is circumstantial evidence that points to strikes coming from Ukrainian forces, but there the matter sits.

v/r pete 

 Thoughts for the Secretary of the Navy.

First, a tip of the hat to Secretary Phelan; by all accounts he was trying hard, but couldn’t gain traction (more on that in a moment). 

As for Secretary Cao, the best of luck. There are all sorts of folks making all sorts of predictions about the next Secretary, and what the right criteria are. I have bumped into some folks who knew Secretary Cao when he was Capt. Cao, and they say he is a good egg; I hope he gets the nod and fleets up.

That said, I would offer this:

The number one recommendation for a service secretary, for any of the departments, or any ambassadorship for that matter, at any time, no matter the President, is that he or she have the ear of the President. There are all sorts of folks who have the knowledge or technical expertise. The difference is monumental: to be able to reach out to the President or not can mean everything. Several times I saw instances where the Ambassador in country X talked regularly with the President while the Ambassador in the next county over got to talk with an Assistant Secretary of State; the difference was often painful to watch.

So, the first thing is access to the President.

The second thing is knowledge of the Navy. This doesn't need to be encyclopedic, but the Secretary needs to remember the main Navy missions (and they all overlap): strategic presence - access - lines of communication. It’s not about technology and it’s not about war-fighting. Obviously, war at sea and power projection are the coin of the realm. But that is for a whole host of other folks to really dig into. The Secretary needs to understand the main mission and have some vision as to what that mission will look like in 5 to 10 years, because that is his real window.

Third: a good plan now is better than a perfect plan tomorrow. As Annie noted: Tomorrow is always a day away. The Secretary needs to understand, the giant staffs - like NavSea and NavAir - are not your friends. I would hazard a guess that one of the things that happened to Secretary Phelan was that the OPNAV Staff wrapped their tentacles around him and choked him, overpowering him with charts and graphs and dog and pony shows as to why “This” can’t be done, “That” timeline can’t be changed, “Those” ideas really aren’t actionable, that the real way ahead is what “We, the Staff” have planned out “here” and “here” and “here,” we know what tomorrow looks like and it can’t be changed, and you would do best to pay attention only to us, all the rest of these people, especially the folks on the President’s staff, really don’t know what they are talking about.

A case in point is the issue of building the fleet the President wants, to include the Defiant class battleship. (And it is a battleship; insisting that battleships must carry big guns is pedantry. A very large surface combatant intended to function as the flagship of a large task force and possessing long range and deep strike weapon systems in an armored hull, built to fight and win at sea and project power over the shore: that’s a battleship.

And, I’ve heard multiple times now that it will take 6 years just to work out the design. Why?

We know what weapons are going into the hull, what power requirements will be needed, there are all sorts of rules of thumb for power and space and manning and damage control. We also have designs for surface ships in the 30,000 ton range designed as missile platforms that could be used as a starting point for design. And more to the point, we have artificial intelligence software now that has demonstrated in the past year the ability to compress tens of thousands of man-hours of technical work into just a few weeks of work. The Navy could, with the right attitude, turn itself into the cutting edge of ship design and development.

Some lessons from history are instructive:

In the weeks after the invasion of Poland (Fall of 1939) Henry Kaiser put together a team of folks from the US Navy, the Royal Navy, 11 major shipyards, steel manufacturers and a few others, and over the course of a few weeks redesigned the Ocean class merchant ship into what became the Liberty ships - standardizing it and changing it from rivet construction to welding (Rosie was a welder, not a riveter). Over the next 5 years they then constructed 2,710 Liberty ships, each of which required some 400,000 man-hours (women hours) of labor. That works out to some 1.1 billion man-hour of labor - not including the time that went into expanding shipyards and training literally hundreds of thousands of new welders. And that is only a slice of all the ships we built in 5 years. 

In those six years we also built 32 Essex class carriers, more than 100 escort and light carriers, 10 battleships, 2 battlecruisers, 34 cruisers, 291 destroyers, more than 150 submarines, more than 700 small escorts, several thousand smaller combatants and auxiliaries, more than 1,000 large auxiliaries and more than that in various amphibious support craft. And 324,750 aircraft.

And if you want to see what a little effort can produce in the world of high tech, the initial design work for the A-12 / SR-71 began in spring of 1958, and the first aircraft flew in April 1962. 

The first nuclear powered submarine, USS Nautilus was authorized in 1951, launched in January 1954, and deployed in May of 1955.

Are the problems of integration so severe today that even with 80 more years of experience, and all the lessons learned in those 80 years, and the help of hardware and software that would marvel the engineers of the 1940s, we can’t design a ship in less that half a decade? That is nonsense. 

And we are talking about billions and billions of hours of labor to make those ships and aircraft… Newly trained folks, new machines, more jobs AND more automation. Why can’t we add 200 or 300 million (or more) man-hours per year to the ship construction and ship maintenance problem? Say, 1 billion more hours of labor every three years… 

What could we do with 1 billion hours of labor:

4 Ford class carriers (50 million man-hours each)

Plus

100 Burke DDGs (about 4 million man-hours each)

Plus 

50 Virginia class SSN (about 8 million man-hours each)

But no, the endless caterwauling is the truth. 

And it’s impossible to fly

And it’s impossible to go faster than sound

And Man will never go to the Moon

The real truth is that these huge staffs believe in zero sum games. If we ask for more maintenance, then there must be less new construction and vice versa. This needs to stop. And the staffs need to be cut down, they are roadblocks to progress.

Prior to the Civil War the US was the leading ship construction nation in the world. For two periods since then (World War I and World War II) the US regained that title. We can regain that title once again. That is the opportunity Secretary Cao has. I hope he seizes the chance. 

And as for the money, how about reducing the level of graft and corruption across the entire US Government? The Grace commission pointed out 40 years ago what Musk pointed out last year: 15 - 20% of the USG is pure waste. That works out to $1 - 1.5 TRILLION per year… Let’s fix that and use some of that money… 

 April 24th, 2026

Politics - POW exchange

- France and Poland deterrence training 

- EC approves loan

Combat Ops - Ukrainian strike on drone production facility and oil facility

- Russian “Grind” continues

Economics - European economic troubles

Weather

Kharkiv

46, light rain, gusting over 25. Rain should end tonight, but rain again on Sunday. Partly to mostly cloudy next week. Daily lows in the 30s, daily highs in the upper 40s, except Sunday - in the upper 50s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

49, cloudy and windy, gusting over 25. Partly to mostly cloudy through the weekend, rain showers and windy again on Sunday and Monday. Daily lows in the low 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s. Winds variable, 15-20kts.

Kyiv

43, cloudy and windy, gusting over 30.  Mostly cloudy, rain Saturday and Sunday. Daily lows in the mid 30s to lower 40s, daily highs in the upper 40s to mid 50s. After early morning, winds westerly, 20-25kts.

Politics

193 Ukrainian POWs were exchanged for 193 Russian POWs this morning. This follows a 175-for-175 exchange on April 11th.

France and Poland will hold exercises that reportedly will involve the deployment of nuclear strike capable Rafale aircraft to Poland, as part of French nuclear deterrence training, with Poland providing providing strike escort and reconnaissance support.

France’s nuclear strike capability involves their sea launched ballistic missiles, and the ASMP (Air-Sol Moyenne Portée - Medium-Range Air-to-Surface) is a nuclear armed, supersonic cruise missile with a range over 300 miles and a 300KT warhead.

The European Council formally adopted a piece of legislation that provides for the 90 billion Euro ($105 billion), interest free loan to Ukraine.

Note, Ukraine will only need to repay the principle if it receives reparations from Russia.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

As noted yesterday, Russian FPV drone strikes continue across the border into Sumy oblast, and a Ukrainian Army spokesman reported that Russian force had pushed across the border and the village of Myropilske, a village of perhaps 30 houses, about a half mile from the Russia - Ukraine border, about 18 miles due east of Sumy city. The spokesman also noted that Russian forces had moved inside Ukraine 2 - 3 kilometers (about 1-1.5 miles) along a stretch of border from the town of Myropillia, past Myropilske, southward along about 20 miles of the border.

The town of Bohodukhiv (20 miles north-west of Kharkiv city), noted yesterday as one of targets of the Russian FPV drone strikes, was struck by another 50 FPV drones on the 22nd, what appears to be Russian efforts to interdict and complicate logistics support in the border region.

EAST OF THE OSKIL RIVER

Russian recon probes continue in and around Kupyansk, but there were no changes to the front lines here or east of Borova.

SLOVYANSK - KOSTIANTINIVKA - POKROVSK

Russian counter-logistics drone strikes continue across much of the front lines in this area, and Ukrainian military sources note some Russian buildup of forces, but there were no changes to the lines noted north-east of Slovyansk. 

South-east of Slovyansk imagery showed a Russian element had infiltrated into the east end of Rai Oleksandrivka (about 12 miles south-east of Slovyansk). Russian forces appear to be working westward along the road that runs between Kalenyky to the east and Rai Oleksandrivka, and the small river that runs beside the road. 

Ukrainian elements continue to hold a position in south-west Chasiv Yar, while Russian forces continue probes into Kostiantinivka but therefore no changes in the lines around that city.

Russian recon elements remain active north and north-west of Pokrovsk, but there were no confirmed changes in the lines.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

There were no confirmed changes in the front lines across southern Ukraine. Imagery did confirm that Ukrainian elements continue to control Charivne, a small village (about 40 houses) about 12 miles south-west of Hulyaipole, but this also confirms that the western edge of the “gray zone” has pushed westward and is now just east of that town about a mile.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of April 22nd-April 23rd Ukrainian drones struck the Gorky oil pumping station in Neshika, Nizhny Novgorod (about 225 miles east of Moscow), and reported that they damaged three storage tanks; the damage has not been independently confirmed.

Ukrainian drones also struck Novokuibyshev petrochemical plant on the 22nd, about 500 miles south-east of Moscow, a major producer of fertilizer, there is no damage report yet. 

The Ukrainian Navy reported on April 23rd that it intercepted and destroyed a Russian unmanned surface vessel (USV) as it neared Odessa.

A Ukrainian missile strike on the 19th on the Atlant Aero facility in Taganrog (just east of the east end of the Sea of Azov) appears to have destroyed two production facilities and damaged 4 others. The facilities make Molniya drones.

During the night of April 23rd-April 24th Russian forces launched at least 2 x Iskander Ballistic missiles and 107 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 96 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Zhytomyr oblasts. 

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure. Power outages were reported in more than 100 towns Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy,  and Zhytomyr oblasts.

Civilian casualties included at least 2 killed and 5 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 16 towns.

During the night of April 22nd-April 23rd Russian forces launched at least 155 strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 139 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure.

Civilian casualties include at least 3 killed and 10 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 19 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Apr8 Apr23 Apr24

Brent      94.71   61.26 68.57 106.40 91.78 101.40 104.20

WTI     92.10   57.10 64.04 103.60 93.53 92.46 94.56

NG       3.97      3.41 3.20 3.37 2.73 2.68 2.54

Wheat     8.52  5.22 5.29 6.25 5.79 6.10 6.18

Ruble     85          80.35 77.40 78.20 78.54 75.64 75.30

Hryvnia 28.6 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.45 43.95 44.04

Urals 91.66 50.40 56.37 90.97 124.85 104.08 107.49

ESPO 94.52 52.28 59.77 84.99 103.27 106.18 109.35

Sokol 99.31 55.57 62.85 101.55 96.88 105.41 107.34

Sweden’s Prime Minister Kristersson commented that Sweden is developing options to reduce national fuel consumption if the war in Iran continues.

“We are not planning any rationing right now, but we are prepared for it to happen.” 

The Swedish Finance Minister described this as “the worst crisis in a very long time, when it comes to energy.,” and added that “Government rationing is something that you absolutely want to avoid in every situation. That is why we are working on measures that will ensure that we do not get there.”

At the same time, other European countries are facing some economic problems.

Germany’s Economics Minister Reiche has cut Germany’s economic projections for the next two years and now expects only 0.5% growth for 2026 and 0.9% for 2027.

Thoughts

The reports of increased numbers of Russian FPV drones striking across the border and across the front lines, as well as the increased number of probes and infiltrations is probably the visible signs of the Russian “Spring Offensive.” 

There seems to have been some small amount of shifting of forces, but the key issues are the FPV drone strikes to complicate Ukrainian troop movement and logistics support to forward elements, and a steadily increasing number of infiltrations - still each in small teams (2 - 5 troops) - but more of them, particularly focused in the area from Pokrovsk to Slovyansk, and in the general Hulyaipole area. 

What is of note is that the Ukrainian army personnel reporting on the Russian drones are once again presenting them as a problems s they were during the fall and winter. What this suggests (but doesn’t prove) is that the Russians have figured out a way to provide the necessary command and control (C2) for more effective strikes behind the lines against moving targets, the effectiveness they lost when they were denied Starlink at the beginning of February.

v/r pete