April 6th, 2026 Orthodox Easter April 12th

Passover ends April 9th

Politics - Nothing Significant

Combat Ops - Strikes on energy and oil - by both sides

- On the ground few changes

 

Weather

Kharkiv

65 and cloudy, gusting over 30. Tonight rain, possible rain showers daily all week. Temperatures fall tonight, daily lows all week will be in the mid 30s, daily highs in the mid 40s. Winds variable, 5kts.

Melitopol

66 and sunny, gusting to 30. Rain tonight, and rain showers on and off all week. Daily lows in the upper 30s, daily highs in the upper 40s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

48 and raining, gusting over 20. More rain tonight, Tuesday and Wednesday, ending Thursday morning (with some snow showers possible). Cloudy all week. Daily lows in the mid to upper 30s, daily highs in the low 40s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.

Politics

The Ukrainian proposed Easter ceasefire (Orthodox Easter) is still being offered but at this point there seems little reason to believe one will occur.

Negotiations remain in limbo.

Combat Operations 

On the ground there continues to be a good deal of grind but not a great deal of change. Both sides posted marginal gains, with Ukrainian forces noting small gains north of Kharkiv and in the Pokrovsk area, Russian forces posting some gains south-west of Hulyaipole.

But, in all cases gains are mostly small elements probing into the enemy lines, and on occasion infiltrating behind enemy lines and seizing a small piece of terrain. And, a good deal of the changes are “see-saw” gains, one side taking a piece of terrain and holding it for a few days, then getting pushed off. 

The Ukrainian counter-offensive between the Vovcha River and Hulyaipole seems to have slowed to a crawl and Ukrainian forces still have not reached (never mind pressing through) the Russian defensive line. That line, which was a Ukrainian defensive line at one point, has been further strengthened by the Russians and it would seem the Ukrainian army does not, at this point, have the ability to penetrate it.

Russian forces continue to simply grind, and continue to push recon probes into Ukrainian held territory. Ukrainian forces also send probes into Russian held terrain, but the numbers are fewer. But in both cases, these forces move into forward positions, often the basements of bombed-out buildings, and continue to hold on. There remains a Russian element inside Kupyansk - apparently in the basement of the bombed out hospital, and they may have been there since mid-December, resupplied by drones, and there appears to be a Ukrainian element inside eastern Pokrovsk.

As far as the Russian Spring Offensive, several commentators continue to insist it began in March, but given the fairly sparse reporting on unit movements, that is hard to prove. Several Russian units (brigades and regiments) have been moved off of sections of the front and moved to the rear, presumably to be reconstituted and sent forward again, but I have only seen one or two definitive reports of new or reconstituted Russian units moved forward, and the total forces moved perhaps on the order of a half dozen brigades.

So, is there a new Russian offensive underway? I’m still not certain, despite what others are saying. I do get the sense that some people, on both sides, want to say an offensive is underway.

Of the pieces of terrain that were taken by either side, the one of note is that the Russians appear to have taken Pryvillia a small village (pre war population of less than 150), about 10 miles due east of Kramatorsk, about 12 miles south-east of Slovyansk, along the M03 roadway. This simply puts Russian drones and artillery in tactical range of Kramatorsk.

Air and Maritime Operations

Over the past three days Russian forces launched some 520 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace the UAF claimed that it defeated, either by hard kill or EW, 434 of those drones. 

Strikes took place across much of Ukraine, and targets against were centers on the power grid. As of this morning nearly 400,000 people were without power in Chernihiv, nearly 17,000 houses were without power in Odessa, and as I write this there was an emergency shutdown of power in Kyiv.

Russian Air Force also continued to keep up the apace with glide bombs, and they have been maintaining an average of close to 50 glide bomb strikes per day, across a dozen or more towns.

Russian drones also struck the Naftogaz facility in Poltava on the 4th and 5th. Naftogaz is a state run corporation and Ukraine’s larges oil and natural gas company, and a fire was reported at the site. 

At the same time, Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian oil infrastructure, as well as the power grid in occupied Ukraine.

Last night Ukrainian forces struck the oil terminal in Novorossiysk and the facility was still burning this morning, though there is no independent assessment of the extent of damage.

Strikes on oil and gas facilities make for dramatic photographs but these sites are very tough and repairs will follow as operators learn how to take care of them. As an example, Russian forces have conducted 401 attacks on Naftogaz assets since the war began, 229 in 2025, and 40 since the beginning of the year.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Apr1 Apr6

Brent      94.71   63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 106.40 102.50 108.80

WTI     92.10   59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 103.60 99.31 110.60

NG       3.97      4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 3.37 2.87 2.84

Wheat      8.52  5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 6.25 6.06 5.94

Ruble     85          80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 78.20 80.60 78.88

Hryvnia 28.6 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.86 43.52

Urals 91.66 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 90.97 123.45 121.17

ESPO 94.52 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 84.99 111.97 117.03

Sokol 99.31 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 101.55 114.29 105.70

Of interest, Jet A fuel prices in Europe are up 11% in the last week, with some 40% of Europe’s Jet A coming from the Mid East.

Thoughts

There is anecdotal reporting of increased Russian attacks both west of Hulyaipole and along the edges of the Ukrainian counter offensive further north, and this is being cast as part of the Russian spring offensive.  But this has not been confirmed.

The key development here appears to be - led by the Ukrainians but with the Russians in close “trail,” the improvement in drone techniques. Ukrainian forces are flying more FPV drones (“First Person Video”) and they are flying them a little bit deeper, effectively turning them into “smart artillery.” The result is everything slows; the Russians continue to conduct recon and probes - all by small elements (normally 3 - 5 troops, who often meet up and form squad (about 10 men) to slightly larger elements (rarely above about 20 troops). But the presence of the drones and improved techniques has made movement for difficult and accordingly very slow.

The Russians were doing this very thing before the Ukrainians, basically all of 2025, because of the very effective command and control (C2) that they had developed using Starlink. Starlink was denied them as of February 1st and they are now only beginning to regain that level of sophisticated C2. While using Starlink, Russian interdiction was clearly more effective than the Ukrainian interdiction; not a great deal, but enough that it was noticeable. Ukrainian forces, who learned by copying the Russians, currently have the edge in this area and it has made Russian movements more difficult. 

The Russians are now working on ways to replicate the C2 they lost in February. It’s likely that they will find a means to do so - either through their own means or with Beijing’s help. Whether that will jump-start the Russian ground operations remains to be seen.

v/r pete 

 April 3rd, 2026

Politics

President Zelenskyy discussed the possibility of an Easter ceasefire (presumably Orthodox Easter - April 12th) on the phone with Ambassador Witkoff, Mr. Kushner, Sen. Graham, and NATO SecGen Rutte and has also discussed it with several European leaders, but it has not appeared to gain any traction with the Kremlin. 

The EU will provide 1.4 billion Euros $1.6 billion) to Ukraine, interest from frozen Russian assets. 

Combat Operations

There has been little change on the ground in the last two days (more in a moment), but missile and drone strikes continue by both sides and Ukraine continues to strike at Russian oil facilities in the Baltic (mainly north of St Petersburg). In Primorsk (about 50 miles north-north-west of St. Petersburg), some 40% of the storage capacity has been damaged. Ukrainian drone strikes strikes have also hit the oil facilities in Ust Luga (near Primorsk).

The Ukrainian MinDef reports that Ukrainian forces shot down 89.9% of all Russian missiles and drones during March. Not to be a naysayer, but air defense guys often make this sort of remark. The issue is that 10% got through (10.1%). As demonstrated at Prince Sultan Air Base, 1 drone getting through can be a problem…

And, while there was another large strike into Ukraine last night and the UAF shot down 515 of 541 strike drones, and 26 of 27 cruise missiles, they intercepted no Iskander ballistic missiles. Nor did they shoot down any of the glide bombs dropped on 19 different towns.

And, as shown in the picture below, Russian operations continue to grind these towns in rubble. The picture below is one of 3 images just released of towns north of Sumy that have been “occupied” by the Russian army Ince last year. This picture (of Andriivka, north of Sumy city) was taken last summer; needless to say, the town has not gotten better since then.

 

Concerning the Russian drone strikes, what is of note is the increased number of strike drones launched during the day. Unless a specific weapon system is using an optical seeker head, this is little technical value. The value - as also witnessed in Iranian drone strieks into neighboring countries during the day, is the psychological value of the drones being seen by the population - and various news agencies.

The one item of interest on the ground is a Russian infiltration into Kostiantinivka from the south - slightly west of due south. This is of note as the real “strong-point” in the Ukrainian defenses in Kostiantinivka is the south-west side of the city (west of the Kryvyi Torets River), which is higher ground but can be approached from high ground south-west of the city. While not dispositive, this also lends credence to suggestions that the Russians are increasing their ops tempo; whether that constitutes a “spring offensive” or not still remains to be seen.

At the same time, Russian forces continue to grind north and north-west from Pokrovsk, which again supports assessments of a spring offensive. 

Elsewhere, there were other marginal gains by both sides, but they were, indeed marginal.

Thoughts

There continues to be commentary in western press that the Russian offensive has begun, and it does appear that the Russian ops tempo is slowly increasing. But the use of the word “offensive” conjures up lighting strikes and rapid envelopments of enemy forces, Guderian in France or Schwarzkopf’s “left hook” in Iraq. None of that is going to happen.

But, what might happen is this: in several key areas there will be a steady increase in activity, more personnel conducting more probes, and more drone strikes and glide bomb strikes as the Russians “increase the rate of grind. I would expect that in the Slovyansk and Kostiantinivka areas. If the opportunity presents itself, the Russians will extend a bit further west and try to envelope these cities, but in a very slow, deliberate manner.

Further west, the Russians will continue to press north and north-west from Pokrovsk.

In the south, the Russians will try to press south-east and west from Hulyaipole.

Elsewhere along the lines, look for continued Russian probes, increased glide-bomb strikes, and the continue Russian effort to straighten lines and fill in small, would-be salients. And, Russian engineers will continue to expand defensive lines, and build new lines further forward as they gain control of terrain. These are slow tactics, but they are relatively low risk tactics.

So, expect very slow progress; this is about inflicting casualties and breaking down Ukrainian positions...

v/r pete 

 April 1st, 2026 Western Church - Holy Week 

Jewish Passover April 1 - April 9

Orthodox Church - Holy Week next week

No Summary Tomorrow 

Politics - Easter Truce offer 

- 100% of Luhansk now controlled by Russia

Combat Ops - Russian Offensive begins, marginal gains

- Drones strike across western Ukraine

 

Weather

Reports of very thick morning fog, particularly in the center of the line, but reported over much of eastern Ukraine, which, of course aids infiltration.

Kharkiv

63 and light rain. Partly to mostly cloudy through the weekend, rain showers Friday morning. Daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the low 60s. Winds variable, 5kts.

Melitopol

56 and cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy through the weekend, rain showers Friday and Saturday. Daily lows in the mid to upper 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s to low 60s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

63 and light rain, gusting to 20. Partly to mostly cloudy all week. Daily lows in the mid 40s, daily highs in the low 60s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.

Politics

President Zelenskyy says that he will ask US negotiators (Ambassador Witkoff and Mr Kushner) to pass to Moscow his proposal for an Easter truce.

“I will definitely ask them to pass it on to the Russian side. We are ready for a ceasefire for the Easter holidays … We are ready for any compromises, except compromises involving our dignity and sovereignty.”

Later, as another night of strike of drones hit Ukraine, Zelenskyy posted:

“We proposed a ceasefire for Easter. In response, we’re getting Shaheds,”

Two days ago Kremlin spokesman Peskov commented on earlier Zelenskyy suggestion for a truce: 

“From Zelenskyy’s statements we’ve read, we haven’t seen any clearly formulated initiatives for an Easter truce. We reiterate: Zelenskyy must take responsibility and make the appropriate decision so that we can achieve peace, not a ceasefire.”

Russia’s MinDef is claiming that Russian forces have occupied all of Luhansk oblast. This is the third time Russia’s MinDef has made that claim (earlier in 2022 and again in 2025). The Ukrainian government has not commented on it.

However, a look at several of the more generally accepted maps of the front lines suggests that Russia does indeed, at least at this point in time, control all of Luhansk.

Ground Operations

There are credible reports of increased Russian troop strength in the general area east of Slvoyansk as well as in the Kostiantinivka area and around Pokrovsk. Some have assessed that this is, in fact, the Russian spring offensive. The reporting - mostly not yet confirmed in imagery - of Russian gains east of Slvoyansk and immediately north of Pokrovsk, would support this, but Ukrainian reports have noted some confusion as thick morning fog is being used by the Russians to mask movements and there is some resulting confusion as to numbers of troops.

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Despite Russian claims of gains due north Sumy city, there were no confirmed changes in lines.

There were no changes to the lines north of Kharkiv or along the order north the Oskil River.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues along most of the line, and imagery confirmed Ukrainian gains in the northern side of the town of Petropavlivka, about 3-4 miles east of Kupyansk.

At the same time, imagery confirmed renewed Russian probes into Kupyansk.

SLOVYANSK - KOSTIANTINIVKA - POKROVSK

Fighting continues in the Slovyansk - Lyman - Siversk area but there were no confirmed changes in the line. That said, there are consistent reports (mainly from German reporters) that Russian forces have pushed north-west in the Nykyforivka area and also just south of the Riznykivka area and that they are now about 10 miles south-east of Slvoyansk. More conservative reporting suggests the Russian may be 12 - 13 miles south-east of Slovyansk, but they aren’t much further than that.

Unconfirmed reporting also suggests the Russians have made small gains pushing into eastern Lyman, as well.

In Kostiantinivka, imagery confirmed more Russian probes into the south-eastern end of the city, but overall, the east side of the city simply remains a patchwork of Ukrainian and Russian elements.

Reporting further west is contradictory, with imagery confirming Ukrainian gains in Udachne (about 9 miles west of Pokrovsk) and imagery also confirming Russian small unit activity north-east of Hryshyne, but other reporting suggesting that the 2 mile by 3 mile pocket just north of Pokrovsk, that has been hotly contested, is now fully in Russian hands.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

There is mixed reporting in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian counter-offensive just south of Verbove again did not seem to show any changes in the line, or may have actually lost a little ground to Russian attacks; that will need more imagery to sort out. Some Ukrainian reporting noted no changes to the lines just west of Hulyaipole, others report that Ukrainian forces may have pushed the line east as much as a half mile.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of March 30th-March 31st Russian forces launched at least 339 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 298 drones.

Damage was reported in Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnitsky, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Ternopil, Sumy, Volyn, Zakarpattia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities; power outages were reported in Ivano-Frankivks oblast.

Civilian casualties included at least 4 killed and 28 wounded

RuAF tacair struck 14 towns.

During the night of March 30th-March 31st Russian forces launched at least 1 x Kinzhal ballistic missile and 289 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 267 drones.

Damage was reported in Khmelnytskyi, Odessa, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. There was no report as to where the ballistic missile struck.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities; power outages were reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Poltava and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Civilian casualties included at least 1 killed and 18 wounded

RuAF tacair struck 15 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Mar31 Apr1

Brent      94.71   63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 106.40 117.50 102.50

WTI     92.10   59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 103.60 103.80 99.31

NG       3.97      4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 3.37 2.86 2.87

Wheat      8.52  5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 6.25 6.09 6.06

Ruble     85          80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 78.20 81.47 80.60

Hryvnia 28.6 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.78 43.86

Urals 91.66 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 90.97 115.98 123.45

ESPO 94.52 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 84.99 115.39 111.97

Sokol 99.31 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 101.55 114.29 114.29

The Urals oil spot price hit a new all time high.

Thoughts

It seems that more and more folks have decided Russia’s spring offensive has begun. As has been noted, this will probably mean several more brigades and regiments committed to certain areas of the line (east of Slovyansk, the Kostiantinivka area, Pokrovsk, Hulyaipole) and plussing up units already on the line with new troops.

(Note, in the Russian army brigades and regiments have different command and control setups, but essentially the same amount of combat power.)

This will not mean a substantive change in how they are fighting, and again, there is no expectation that the Russians will “break through the line” and run at high speed into the Ukrainian rear: Russia’s army simply isn’t set up to fight that way. 

Under the best of circumstances for the Russians, this will simply translate into a higher casualty rate among the Ukrainians.

That said, two other things stand out: first, the best casualty count for Russian forces continues to be Mediazone, and the number of Russian KIAs stands somewhere in the 225,000 - 250,000. That is matched by a similar number of severely wounded, soldiers who will not return to active duty. Add in deserters (probably 50-75,000) and you end up with (high end) 575,000 full losses, troops that need to be replaced.

The Ukrainian numbers we simply don’t know, though last month President Zelenskyy said that Ukrainian KIAs was on the order of 55,000.

This number is clearly not accurate except that they are playing with the definition of “killed in action.” Two years ago a member of the Ukrainian government commented that there were 50,000+ MIAs (missing in action) but privately admitted that they knew the bulk of them were dead. Less than a year later that number was raised to 71,000, but MIAs were being kept listed as MIAs to keep the KIA count low.

And, the number of amputees, as well as the number of current active duty personnel compared to total numbers recruited both suggest Ukrainian casualties include at least 160,000 KIAs, and could be twice that, with a similar number of severely wounded, and desertions now listed as well over 200,000.

Said differently, Ukrainian losses are on the same scale as Russians.

All of which leaves me scratching my head when I look at the propaganda - strategic messaging, and the constant ridicule of the Russian army. We are told again and again by senior Ukrainian army personnel, as well as various western analysts, that the rate of advance of Russian forces has slowed in the last 6 months, that Russian forces are poorly equipped, poorly led, poorly trained, are not advancing at any meaningful rate, morale is awful, and Russian losses are 10 times that of Ukrainian personnel.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian forces are presented, much like the children of Lake Woebegone, as “all above average,” as remarkably innovative and determined, the army of the future, a mix of citizen-soldiers and techies, outfighting the Russians at every step.

If the Russians were this messed up the war would’ve been over 47 months ago. At some point it would seem to me that Ukrainians are going to look up and ask: If the differences are this glaring, why aren’t we winning? Or have we been lied to for most of the last 4 years?

This is not to take anything away from the grunts who slug this out every day in the trenches. But the grunts on both sides are fighting a gruesome war, and it is not clear to me that there is any meaningful course of action that leads to Ukrainian victory. A miracle can always happen, but that’s a lousy plan…

v/r pete