July 9th, 2026 Next Summary July 14th Tomorrow
Politics - Trump approves production of Patriot missiles in Ukraine
Combat Ops - No change on the ground
- Drone and missile strikes continue
Economics - Russia to hald diesel exports
Weather
Kharkiv
70 and cloudy. Rain and isolated thunderstorms through Sunday midday, some clearing Sunday afternoon, more showers next Tuesday. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the low 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.
Melitopol
72 and cloudy, rain showers tonight and tomorrow, followed by 4 days of mostly sunny weather. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the low 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.
Kyiv
70 and mostly cloudy, gusting over 25. Mostly cloudy Friday, followed by three days of scattered thunderstorms and rain showers. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the low 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.
Politics
President Trump on Ukrainian licensing of Patriot missiles:
“We’re going to give a license to you to make Patriots. That’s pretty cool. This way, you can’t complain that we’re not giving ‘em enough.”
As noted several days ago, Patriot missiles take some 30 months to build due to the curing time for the solid propellant. A simpler propellant could, theoretically, be used, but that would affect missile performance. If Ukrainian production came on line tomorrow, the first missile would be available in January 2029.
Trump also commented on increased number and depth of Ukrainian strikes into Russia;
“It’s an escalation, but it’s also an escalation that can help lead to an end.”
Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov responded to Trump’s comment:
“We see certain misconceptions within the White House administration – that by escalating military pressure it can help move to a peace settlement. That is a mistaken view. Further escalation may prolong the special military operation to some extent.”
Peskov later commented that Russia might need to answer these attacks “creating a larger security zone.”
Ground Operations
Fighting continues along the front lines and there are continued claims of gains by both sides - particularly by the Russians, but there are few confirmed changes in the line, and most of those are marginal.
Ukrainian forces did retake ground in the Stepnohirsk area (southern Ukraine, along the Dnepr River), and there is, as usual, changes in the “checkerboard” in and around Kostiantinivka, but overall, there is no confirmed tactically significant change in Kostiantinivka or elsewhere. Both sides continue to conduct artillery strikes into the city on known or suspected enemy positions and the city is being ground down into rubble.
There were also reports of Russian gains due north of Slovyansk about 10 miles, having pushed across the Donets river to the south / west side of the river into the village of Pryshyb, but this has yet to be confirmed. This would be of note if the Russians have made it across the river.
Ukrainian MinDef Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces conducted an extended operation targeting Russian artillery and that in the 4 months of March through June struck more than 7,300 Russian artillery pieces.
There is obviously no independent confirmation of this number, and an artillery piece is not necessarily destroyed if struck by a drone. But of note is that the average daily shelling reports (which can consist of anywhere from a single round to a dozen or more) from the Ukraiain General Staff which were cycling between 2,500 and 3,000 per day in January, continue at those same daily totals, with occasional transients to nearly 4,000.
In fact, there has not been a decided reduction in Russian artillery round usage in the last 4 months, with most reports (open source obviously) noting Russian daily usage cycles in the 10,000 - 15,000 per day, consistent with other reporting noting production of 152MM, 122MM, and 120MM mortar rounds at 4,000 per day each.
Air and Maritime Operations
It’s of note that Ukrainian forces have difficulty in defending their entire country from Russian drone and missile attack, with Ukraine being only 225,000 square miles in size (slightly smaller than Texas). Russia, with an area of more than 6.6 million square miles thus presents 30 times more area to defend, a problem that the Russians have not solved, and the Ukrainians continue to exploit.
Ukrainian Forces
The Ukrainian counter logistics effort in Crimea continues, with power outages noted yesterday across Crimea. One reported noted 18 raions (essentially counties) in Crimea were having power outages, but there are only 10 rains in Crimea. Power outages were also noted in several areas of occupied areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Strikes also continue to pick at Russian radar sites and surface-to-air missile sites.
Drone strikes also continue on Russian merchant ships of the Sea of Azov, smaller ships (normally of several thousand ton displacement) capable of navigating Russia’s rivers and inland waterways.
Reuters reports, from an oil industry source, that the strike on July 5th-6th on the refinery in Omsk, Russia damaged at least one and possibly two distillation units. The facility has 11 units, but apparently only three were operating.
The UAF claimed that it shot down an RuAF SU-35 over eastern Ukraine.
Russian Forces
During the night of July 8th-July 9th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace with at least 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 94 x Strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 72 drones.
Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia oblast. Daily Russian drone strikes on gas stations are now being reported the length of the front line.
Civilian casualties include at least 2 dead and 7 injured.
RuAF aircraft struck at least 3 towns.
During the night of July 7th-July 8th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace with at least 5 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 2 x Kh-31 anti-radiation missiles, and 169 x Strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 139 drones.
Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odessa, Poltava, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Power outages were reported in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. At least one ballistic missile strikes were reported in Odessa, and were noted to have struck elsewhere but sites were not reported.
Civilian casualties include at least 17 injured.
During the night of July 6th-July 7th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace with at least 123 x Strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW, 108 drones.
Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia oblast. Power outages were reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson and Sumy blasts.
Civilian casualties include at least 4 dead and 46 injured.
RuAF aircraft struck at least 3 towns.
Economic Reporting
Feb22 Mar9 Apr8 May8 Jun8 Jul7 Jul9
Brent 94.71 106.40 91.78 100.50 93.82 73.38 77.93
WTI 92.10 103.60 93.53 94.91 90.59 69.86 73.11
NG 3.97 3.37 2.73 2.79 3.14 3.26 3.12
Wheat 8.52 6.25 5.79 6.14 5.82 6.15 6.06
Ruble 85 78.20 78.54 74.26 73.10 76.42 76.31
Hryvnia 28.6 43.93 43.45 43.90 44.64 44.42 44.51
Urals 91.66 90.97 124.85 92.56 86.33 52.49 57.80
ESPO 94.52 84.99 103.27 105.56 95.51 68.89 73.53
Sokol 99.31 101.55 96.88 95.96 89.90 68.06 71.56
News agencies are reporting that yesterday the Kremlin ordered a 100% ban on diesel exports in response to rising domestic fuel prices, a fallout of the Ukrainian strikes on the Russian oil industry.
Thoughts
I continue to sort through the numbers that trickle out of both capitals. Many of the numbers are pure fiction, others appear to have some small slice of accuracy in them, and others, on rare occasions, tell volumes, so bear with me as I try to unravel the tale of the drones.
First, note that there are several different families of drones: long range, larger strike drones with ranges of several hundred miles or more, and payloads of 100lbs or more of high explosive - these are a mix of controlled and some “fire and forget,” some of the latter now using AI to sort out tracks and targets. There are medium range drones with ranges of perhaps 20 - 150 miles and warheads measured in “tens of pounds” of explosives. These also are seeing the use of AI, but many are still under direct control, via Starlink. These first two groups number in the several hundred launched per day by each side, that is 100 to 500 (on occasion more) long range drones and a similar number of medium range drones. It is in the medium range drone area that we find the fiber optic controlled drones, of which the Russians have the edge - courtesy of China, with the latest versions having ranges of 100KM (60 miles). Ukraine is trying to copy these drones but still lags in numbers and range.
Finally, there are the short range drones, which can fly for perhaps 20 minutes and care warheads of normally less than 10 lbs, though payloads are growing. These constitute the overwhelming number of drones.
As of March 2026 Ukraine was producing 11,000 per day, with a goal to increase production to 19,000 per day (7 million per year) by the end of 2026, and a rate of 30,000 per day by the end of 2027.
Russia later claimed it was making 19,000 per day by the end of March, but some independent reports note Russian usage was in the 10,000 - 11,000 per day by the end of May. Gen Syrskyi recently claimed that Ukraine was using FPV drones at a rate of 1.5 to one compared to the Russians. This would place Ukrainian usage in the 15,000 - 16,000 per day range, which, for mid summer, would be consistent with a steadily increasing production schedule that should reach 19,000 per day by the end of the year. The Russians continue to work on increasing their production totals and a number of 12,000 per day is reasonable for July. Stated differently, that works out to 480,000 per month as current Ukrainian usage, and a total of perhaps 2.6 million FPV drones used so far this year. On the Russian side, monthly totals as of July are perhaps in the 360,000 per month range, total used about 2.2 million so far this year.
How many are getting through? Ukrainian sources again give a hint, reporting that they shot down 49,575 Russian drones in June. Russian long range drone attacks average about 2,000 per week or 8,000 per month; presumably that smaller total is in included in that larger number. This would suggest about 42,000 FPV drones were “shot down” in June, meaning some 320,000 got through air defenses. This is where it gets a bit confusing.
Gen Syrskyi, in talking about the Ukrainian drone campaign has reported a total (adding up monthly totals) of almost 1 million targets struck since the beginning of the year. As there are only 710,000 Russian troops in the Ukraine theater, and far fewer than 300,000 “things” of any kind, and the Russians are not replacing 300,000 troops every 6 months, the number can’t mean a real target was struck. Rather, it suggests that over the course of the last 6 months, roughly 1 million drones survived long enough to fly into something (40% survival (or 60% defeat)), that would suggest Russian soft kill capabilities continue to lead Ukrainian and western soft kill capabilities - lots of lessons need to be learned there. At the same time, the Russian number - assuming a generous count of 50,000 shot down per month - translates into as many as 1.8 - 1.9 million drones surviving to hit something - which would mean twice as many Russian drones “survived” crossing into or through no mans land as did Ukrainian drones. More realistically, it suggests that the totals are roughly the same, with perhaps a slight edge to Russian drones.
And as noted above, even if 7,000+ artillery pieces were struck, how many were returned to service isn’t clear, and overall artillery activity remains pretty much unchanged.
Which leads around to the question of casualties.
Where does that leave casualties?
Before discussing each side, there is a significant comment from Gen Syrskyi: we are used to thinking of casualties in ratios of 3 wounded to one killed. But, Syrskyi stated that the ratio is now 1.5 killed to 1 wounded. While he suggested this had to do with the lethality of the drones in the initial strike, it also speaks to the increasing difficulty of getting wounded off of a battlefield; there are no helo CASEVACs operating in Ukraine, even armored vehicles carrying wounded back from the front lines are relentlessly attacked by both sides, and there are countless videos of men waiting a day or more to be evac’d after being wounded; there is no “golden hour” on the Ukraine battlefield.
Again, Mediazone is the only source that has a credible methodology of Russian casualties. Mediazone placed the total Russian KIAs at 352,000 as of December 31st 2025, and casualty rates since appear to have been consistent with casualty rates in the 2nd half of 2025, which appear to be between 6,000 and 7,000 KIA per month. This would yield a grand total current Russian KIAs in the 390,000 range.
What about Ukrainian KIAs? Numbers for Ukrainian casualties are, if anything, more difficult to come by, and there is no Mediazone analog tracking Ukrainian casualties. But, one point that is clear is that Russian FPV drones are as numerous or more numerous behind the front line (on the Ukrainian side) as Ukrainian FPV drones are present on the Russian side. In addition, Russian forces are firing about 3 times as many artillery rounds (152MM, 122MM rockets, 120MM mortars) as the Ukrainian army (12,000 / day versus 3,000 - 4,000 / day). And Russian AF tacair continues to drop some 200+ FAB glide bombs (Russian equivalent of US JDAM-ER) per day, while the UAF drops no more than a handful per day. It defies credulity that there could be a significant difference in casualties given those circumstances.
Thus, an estimate of 6,000+ Ukrainian KIAs per month and an overall total in excess of 300,000 KIA is a reasonable, if horrible number, minus any hard, independent data.
One final note: if (IF - lots of IF), if the Russians are able to “defeat” 60% of Ukrainian drones before they get to any target area, what does that say about the next generation of drones? Will this force drones to be more survivable and hence more expensive?
v/r pete
