June 30th, 2025

Summaries will be intermittent over the next several weeks.

Politics - Ukraine (and Poland, Baltic States, and Finland) to withdraw from Ottawa Convention on Land Mines

Combat Ops - Large scale drone and missile strikes continue 

- Little change on the ground

Weather

Kharkiv

72 and sunny, gusting to 30. Cloudy Tuesday rain on Wednesday, then 5 days of mostly sunny weather. Daily lows in the upper 50s, daily highs near 70. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

77 and partly cloudy, gusting over 25. Mostly sunny all week, daily lows in the 60s, daily highs in the 80s. Winds north-westerly, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

69 and rain, gusting to 25. Partly cloudy to sunny for the week, daily lows in the 50s, highs in the 70s. Winds north-westerly, 10-15kts.

Politics and Diplomacy

Ukraine will withdraw froth Ottawa Convention (officially, The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction), which bans the use of land mines. Russia (and China, and the US, India, Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan, among others) is not a signatory of the treaty.

Long, hostile borders (such as Ukraine - Russia, or North Korea - South Korea) are substantially more secure with the use of landmines - anti-vehicle mixed with anti-personnel).

Poland and the Baltic states, as well as Finland, have also voiced intentions to withdraw from the convention.

Ground Operations

There has been no substantive change in the front lines over the past several days, though there have been several cases of small pieces of terrain recovered by Ukraine and small pieces of terrain taken by the Russians in the see-saw battles noted before as one side will advance one or two hedge rows or tree lines, or take a block of a town, and then the other side counters and retakes the same piece of terrain.

Overall, Russian forces retain the initiative and appear to be focusing their effort on the terrain from Bakhmut south, past Toretsk and Pokrovsk, down to just past the Vouch River. However, this effort has not resulted in the commitment of the preponderance of their forces on a narrow front. Rather, this is the key focus even as a slow, steady grind continues along most of the front lines.

The Russian tactics continue, as noted before: small team - 2 to 5 riflemen at a time, working slowly forward; when several teams assemble, enough to provide some small amount of defensive support, they move forward, find a Ukrainian position, and call in artillery and drone strikes, then withdraw. The primary goal is to attrit Ukrainian forces, and only when that is done to then move forward and take the terrain; the prime focus remains generating Ukrainian casualties.

Some media attention has been given to Russian use of motorcycles to move troops forward quickly, running up from the rear until just out of Ukrainian sniper range, dumping the bikes, then working forward in the tree-lines. Movement of troops forward in armored vehicles is readily spotted, movement on bikes is faster, with a much smaller signature. But the point of the tactic remains the same - get 15 - 20 guys forward where they can spot Ukrainian dispositions, while also providing some defensive support to the spotters who are talking to the artillery and drone teams.

Air Operations

During the night of  June 29th-June 30th Russian forces launched at least 107 x Shahed drones.  The UAF claimed it shot down 64 drones, and 10 drones were also “lost” (brought down by EW).

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kharkiv oblasts. 

Casualties include at least 4 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 12 towns.

During the night of  June 28th-June 29th Russian forces launched at least 7 x Iskander Ballistic missiles, 4 x Khinzhal ballistic missiles, 41 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 5 x Kalibr cruise missiles, 3 x S-300 ballistic missiles, and 447 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 221 drones, 1 Iskander ballistic missile, 33 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 4 Kalibr cruise missiles. In addition, 1 Kh-101 and 225 drones were also “lost” (brought down by EW).

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Odessa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Two Khinzhal missiles struck Dnipro City in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and a ballistic missile strike (of unknown type) was reported in Sumy City.

Casualties include at least 4 killed and 17 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 5 towns.

It is of note, though there is no specific explanation, that Ukraine was able to only shoot down 1 of 7 Iskander ballistic missiles and none of the 4 Khinzhal ballistic missiles. Why this is so isn’t clear. But, it could well be that the Russians have improved their tracking of Patriot batteries and are using these weapons “where the Patriots aren’t.” And if the UAF moves the Patriot batteries they will be “chasing” the Russian strikes, and always playing “catch-up.”

27- 28th

During the night of  June 27th-June 28th Russian forces launched 23 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 21 drones and 1 drones was also “lost” (brought down by EW).

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk and Odessa oblasts.

Casualties include at least 3 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 10 towns.

During the night of  June 26th-June 27th Russian forces launched at least 2 x Khinzhal ballistic missiles, 6 x Kalibr cruise missiles, and 363 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 211 drones and 6 cruise missiles, and 148 drones were also “lost” (brought down by EW).

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Two Khinzhal missiles struck Dnipro City in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and a ballistic missile strike (of unknown type) was reported in Sumy City.

Casualties include at least 4 killed and 17 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 5 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 Jun9 Jun27 Jun30

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 66.80 68.10 67.55

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 64.89 65.61 65.32

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15    3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.69 3.60 3.58

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17     5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.49 5.42 5.38

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 79.27 78.73 78.56

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.55 41.73 41.80

Urals 56.56    68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 60.84 63.77 63.31

ESPO 71.50 70 48.90 63.97 69.73 69.77

Sokol 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 61.51 62.84 62.54

Thoughts

While the Russians are probing and engaged in artillery and drone fire essentially the length of the line of contact, the focus appears to remain in the general area of Pokrovsk to Chasiv Yar. 

There seems to be room for advancing if the opportunity presents itself, but recent gains between Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, and Torestk to the Kleban Byk Reservoir, and north and west of the T0504 roadway, and the relatively quickly grind forward south of the reservoir suggests this pocket could be closed within several weeks to a month and Russian forces might then press northward, pushing up west of Kostiantinivka.

At the same time, Russian forces continue to work west along the Vovcha River (both north and south of the river, and this also presents an opportunity to continue to fight over terrain that is not crossed with a great many hard defensive positions, providing an opportunity to move deliberately north, west of Pokrovsk. This would be in concert with forces just west of Toretsk, who would also move north, west of Kostiantinivka. If they have enough ready troops (the question being one of whether they commit their strategic reserves), they could push north in two large salients and eventually circle both Pokrovsk and Kostinantinivka, cut the ground lines of communication (GLOC), and let them whither. 

Ukrainian forces, on the other hand, must keep the GLOCs open and hold those two cities, dig in and turn them into fortresses. As anticipated, it could be along summer.

v/r pete  

 

All Lives Matter - Finally

June 29th, 2025

For anyone who has followed the wars of the world for the last few decades, one has stood out, both for its level of violence, and for the way it seemed no one cared.

In fact, for the last three decades this one war has stood out as the best example of how the foreign policy elites - of the US, Europe and East Asia - were more interested in power politics and posturing than anything else. A long and bloody war was overlooked with what might easily be called a studied callousness. How long? Almost 30 years. How bloody? In all its various forms the war resulted in more than 6 million killed. To put that in perspective, that’s more deaths than in all the other wars fought in the last 30 years around the world - combined. 

The US has suffered about 1.4 million killed in action since 1775; so, four times as many deaths as in all US history. Of course, that’s a bit inaccurate: many - most - of the deaths in Rwanda and the Congo were not, strictly speaking “in combat” in the sense of one armed force fighting another; rather they were what one source refers to as “one sided violence.”

The roots of the war stretch back more than a century, arguably several centuries, several centuries marked by a continuing struggle for power and for land, and resulting in a number of short and violent wars, insurrections, riots and the bloody occupation of much of the region by Belgium (after Germany had briefly occupied it), followed by several massacres. All of which seemed to culminate in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, in which somewhere around 600,000 (though some estimates run as high as 1.2 million) Tutsi were killed, mainly by machete-wielding Hutus, accompanied by the rape of more than 500,000 women. 

Tutsis then fled Rwanda into the Congo (then called Zaire) and violence and political instability came with them.

Several different groups generated armies and rose up and tried to take power, Zaire’s dictator Mobutu Sese Seko was overthrown in the First Congo War of 1996-97 - a war that was fueled by the influx of more than a million refugees from Rwanda, and Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC). 

Laurent Kabila became President of the DROC, with aid from Uganda and Rwanda. A second war followed (1998 - 2003), as Kabila and his allies began to struggle with each other for greater power. Armies and insurgencies from 2 dozen African countries joined the war, fighting for various reasons, many of them less than noble, in an extremely bloody war, resulting in more than 5 million dead.

It is important to note that the war was funded in large part by the sale of certain ores, in particular: tin, tungsten, tantalum, gold, and cobalt, money that should have helped the country, rather than destroy it.

I have barely touched on the history of the war, and left out all sorts of elements; I would encourage everyone to spend a few minutes reading about the horrible mess that is the entire region and how it has been basically exploited and ignored for most of the last 30 years.

And yet, just a few months ago the President and SecState Rubio decided to try to wrestle this mess to the ground, to untie this international Gordian knot, and this past week, senior representatives of Rwanda and the Congo, in the Oval Office, signed an agreement, co-signed by Trump, calling for "disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration" of the various armies and guerrilla groups in the eastern Congo.

It’s worth noting that a UN peacekeeping mission has been in place since 1999. This is not meant to criticize the troops who make up the Peacekeeping forces or their officers. But the idea that the UN can put a force in place and accomplish nothing, neither prevent a war, nor stop one once it has started, (note: there was a UN Peacekeeping force in place in Rwanda during the 1994 massacre) should give pause when we consider these various international organizations.

Trump and Rubio have, in 5 months, have come up with something. There is a great deal more work to do, this will not be trouble free, but it is a first step. They deserve a tip of the hat and the thanks of anyone who has ever looked at the level of violence taking place in sub-Saharan Africa. There is a start… Finally.

 June 27th, 2025

Politics - Putin says NATO agreement show’s bloc’s aggression 

- Zaluzhnyi vs Zelenskyy poll results, Zaluzhnyi ahead

Combat Ops - More Russian gains, Gen Syrskyi says Russian offensive stopped

- More than 300 drones strike

- Lithium deposit overrun

Weather

Kharkiv

76 and sunny, gusting to 35. Thunderstorms Saturday and Sunday, sunny to partly cloudy next week. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the low 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

80 and sunny, gusting over 20. Thunderstorms Saturday and Sunday, mostly sunny next week. Daily lows in the low 60s, daily highs in the low 80s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

70 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Rain tonight, rain tomorrow, mostly cloudy Sunday, Monday clearing but windy. Daily lows in the upper 50s, daily highs in the low 70s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.

Politics and Diplomacy

President Putin commented on the NATO plan to increase defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, asserting that NATO’s increased spending shows the bloc’s aggression.

But, he noted that Russia is ready for another round of talks… 

A recent poll suggests that Ambassador Zaluzhnyi (retired General) leads in a race against President Zelenskyy.

In a poll of 2,000 Ukrainian citizens, conducted between June 6th and 11th, voters were asked who they would vote for. The two largest vote getters were: 21.8% - Zaluzhnyi, 19.6% - Zelenskyy.

When then asked who they would vote for in a runoff, just between those two, Zaluzhnyi received 41.4% and Zelenskyy received 27% (25.7% would vote for neither (presumably would not vote)).

Prime Minster Orban of Hungary speaking about Ukraine’s entry into the EU and NATO ;

"Ukraine, through no fault of its own, is an undefined entity and that we do not even know what Ukraine is today and what the length of its borders is… Ukraine's membership in the EU would mean destroying ourselves. In the shortest possible time, we would be at war with Russia, and we would bring it into the territory of the EU, including Hungary.”

"We also see that they need help, but we want to help in a way that does not destroy ourselves. Ukraine's membership in the EU would mean that we would destroy ourselves. We would instantly be drawn into a war with Russia and bring it to the territory of the EU, and therefore to the territory of Hungary.”

President Trump met with President Zelenskyy during the NATO Summit and Zelenskyy later commented that he assured Trump that he supports the US perspectives on a ceasefire. They talked about air defense issues, and as noted yesterday, Trump commented that the US is looking into selling more Patriot missiles to Ukraine, joint drone production, Electronic Warfare equipment, and the US and Europe working to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses.

Ground Operations 

SUMY and KHARKIV OBLASTS

Gen. Syrskyi commented yesterday that the front line in Sumy oblast (about 10 miles north of Sumy City) has stabilized, and that Ukrainian forces have repelled the Russian summer offensive  “as of this week,” and that Ukrainian counter-attacks have pinned down “50,000 Russian” troops in the Sumy - Kharkiv border areas.

At the same time imagery confirmed that Russian forces have regained control of Andriivka (which the Ukrainians took back from the Russians over the weekend), and unconfirmed reports suggest that Russian forces made gains near Yablunivka, extending small gains made over the past week.

Fighting was reported at five separate sites north of Kharkiv but there were no changes in the front lines. 

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues along the entire line of contact but there were no confirmed gains. West of Terny, in the vicinity of  Ridkodub area, Russian forces counter-attacked Ukrainian forces that had pushed into the area over the past few days; unconfirmed reports claim that they retook some of the land that the Ukrainians had regained just two days ago; the situation remains confused and may take several days to sort out.

BAKHMUT TO TORETSK TO DONETSK CITY

Fighting continues north and west of Bakhmut but there were no changes to the front lines.

North of Toretsk Russian forces continue to make incremental gains - confirmed in imagery) in the vicinity of Dyliivka (the northern-most Dyliivka, the southern one is now firmly in Russian hands.)

West of Toretsk imagery also confirmed Russian forces made gains around Yablunivka, moving into the west side of that town, while also pushing north and have probably entered the southern edge of Oleksandro Kalynove

Fighting continues east and west and south-west of Pokrovsk, but there were no confirmed changes in the front lines, though multiple claims of gains by Russian forces, particularly to the south west.

South-west of Pokrovsk Russian forces north of the Vovcha River remain east of the border of Dnipropetrovsk (south of the Vovcha River, Donetsk Oblast extends westward another 14 miles, the border following the Vovcha River). The Russian line now runs from Horikhove due south to the western end of Oleksivka and then west into Zelenyi Kut. From Horikhove north the front line veers west to the oblast border (about a mile) and then follows the border north to the southern edge of the town of Muravka, just short of the Solana River. Fighting is reported in or near essentially every town along that line, with small pieces of terrain - advances to the next tree line or wind break - being “exchanged” on a regular basis.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

South of the Vovcha River Russian forces have pushed west and appear to be engaged with Ukrainian forces on the edge of the small village of Zirka, the last village east of the Mokri Yaly River not controlled by Russian forces. Further south Russian forces continue to press westward on the Komar to Novopil line and appear to have gained ground just north of Shevchenko, but this has not been confirmed.

Multiple sources have also confirmed that Russian forces now control the town of Shevchenko itself (4 miles south-west of Vesele); the site is estimated to contain 1.2 million tons of recoverable lithium. Lithium is currently selling at $61,000 per ton, so the nominal value of this deposit is a bit more than $70 billion.

Unconfirmed reports suggest Russian forces pushing north have pushed into the center of the town of Malynivka (about  7 to 8 miles east of Hulyaipole). The town, which had a population of about 850 before the war, lies in the center of a good deal of farmland and is accessed only through a network of secondary - mostly dirt - roads.

Ukrainian forces report that Russian forces continue to conduct recon across the Dnepr River into Kherson as well as raids on the islands in the lower Dnepr River. 

Air Operations

During the night of  June 26th-June 27th Russian forces launched at least 2 x Khinzhal ballistic missiles, 6 x Kalibr cruise missiles, and 363 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 211 drones and 6 cruise missiles, and 148 drones were also “lost” (brought down by EW).

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Two Khinzhal missiles struck Dnipro City in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and a ballistic missile strike (of unknown type) was reported in Sumy City.

Casualties include at least 4 killed and 17 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 5 towns.

During the night of  June 25th-June 26th Russian forces launched 41 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 8 drones, and 16 drones were also “lost” (brought down by EW).

Damage was reported in Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts.

RuAF tacair struck 21 towns.

Ukrainian reports note wider Russian use of “mother drones”  carrying multiple FPV drones.

The French daily Le Monde reports that Russia launched 3,000 Shahed drones so far this month, and that is it producing all of its Shaheds:

"Russia can afford these continuous volleys because it has significantly increased its production capacity. Originally imported from Iran, this kamikaze drone no longer has much in common with Iran, as it is now produced in the Russian Federation. Unprecedentedly, it is assembled by African hands, mainly from Uganda, Mali, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Botswana, Zimbabwe.”

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 Jun9 Jun26 Jun27

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 66.80 67.74 68.10

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 64.89 65.06 65.61

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15    3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.69 3.38 3.60

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17     5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.49 5.44 5.42

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 79.27 78.67 78.73

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.55 41.56 41.73

Urals 56.56    68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 60.84 64.26 63.77

ESPO 71.50 70 48.90 63.97 69.68 69.73

Sokol 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 61.51 62.76 62.84

Thoughts

Syrskyi’s comment of 50,000 troops “pinned down” is a bit of an exaggeration, as there were perhaps half that number is border guard forces in the Kursk and Belgorod oblasts (the border guard increased in size early in the war) and they will be there no matter what. As for whether the Russians really were, or are, conducting a summer offensive, there is an argument that the real offensive is between Bakhmut and Pokrovsk.

Meanwhile, Syrskyi ordered the building of defensive lines in Sumy oblast, which is necessary, though he appears to be playing catch-up.

As for a Russian summer offensive, the ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS - a CIA equivalent) reports that North Korea is receiving technical support from Russia in exchange for ammunition and missiles and, reportedly, they are discussing a large deployment of forces onto Ukrainian soil to support an offensive to begin in the July - August time frame.

If, in fact they were going to support an offensive in July, troops would need to be moving already. Of course, they could also be considered as the strategic reserve, moving to Russia in July, and, after some more training, rotating into the offensive as Russian units rotate out, or moving to less active positions on the front line to let Russian units be shifted to the offensive. 

Or it could be that North Korea is looking for some sort of concessions from the ROK and the US.

Or this could all merely be conjecture on the part of the ROK NIS, based on weak intelligence.

That said, it certainly is likely that the idea of more NK troops providing support has been discussed by the Russians and North Koreans. And the idea solves several problems for each side: It gives North Korea a means to keep troops busy as well as getting them some very real experience; NK gains for technology and oil (and probably food) and some currency.

Russia gains ammunition, missiles and most importantly, soldiers. From the beginning, Russia’s one concern has been sustaining its manpower pool as it fights a war of attrition. As noted 3 years ago, if Putin can solve his manpower problems, he wins.

v/r pete