The Enemy of My Enemy is My ... ?

In a recent news story from Libya (by the Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Or) one of the leaders of the rebel movement – Abdel Hakim al Hasidi – has stated that he fought against the US led Coalition in Iraq and that other extremists and terrorists (my words, not his) that fought against the Coalition in Iraq are now fighting with him (and presumably the US?) in Libya.

This interesting bit of news is further buttressed by a statement from Chad’s President - Idriss Deby Itno - that members of Al Qaeda broke into an armory in Chad and stole man-portable surface to air missiles and headed to Libya to fight against Colonel Qaddafi.

Welcome to war, where nothing turns out quite the way you planned – or hoped.

The President has said that we have established a ‘No Fly’ zone (which is over the entire northern half of the country – more than I thought would be done, but actually not much more difficult, given our capabilities, but it will be harder to justify for any extended period of time) and are attacking Libyan forces in order to help the Libyan civilians. Or something like that. I heard someone quote a decidedly Pentagonese phrase that the goal was to ‘set the conditions to be able to provide aid...’ (If that is the case, we already succeeded; in fact, we succeeded before we started. In short, if that is the stated objective, we can stop whenever we are tired and the story has been sapped for all possible positive spin, declare success, and leave.)

Meanwhile, we are now ‘in bed’ with the rebels who, it turns out, may not be exactly savory characters. They may in fact not wish us terribly well. But we are now officially on their side. When you start dropping bombs and launching missiles and firing cannons at someone’s enemy, you are as officially as it can get on that someone’s side. The President and his staff are all lawyers: aiding and abetting is one thing, but if you are pulling the trigger of the biggest weapon in the room, you aren’t an ‘accomplice,’ you are part of the gang.

Where does that leave us? Do we want Mr. Abdel Hakim to succeed? If he does, are we going to recognize his government? If his government then launches attacks on the west, are we going to attack him? That, by the way, is well beyond any ‘adventurism’ thought of by President Reagan or President Bush (41) or President Bush (43). That kind of activity would put the US into the role of playing the Mid-East as a board game, sort of like Johnson and Nixon tried in Vietnam: put in a leader, take him out when you don’t like him, continue…

It has been noted – repeatedly – that President Obama did not engage in any discussion with Congress before beginning these operations over Libya. Some have said his actions are in violation of the Constitution (they aren’t) or the War Powers Act (they aren’t – he has 90 days to act before Congress can enter the picture – assuming the War Powers Act is Constitutional). But the reason discussion with Congress would be of value – would have been of value – is that facts like this might have come to light.

If the US really saw a national interest in Libya that outweighed the possibility that the US would be setting the groundwork for a pro-Al Qaeda government to possibly come to power in an oil-exporting nation, then a discussion with Congress would ostensibly have highlighted that interest. That did not happen.

We now face the following possible results: The operation fails to dislodge Colonel Qaddafi – he emerges as having ‘beaten’ the US and the West - and he is stronger then ever, and the US reputation in the Mid-East is seriously weakened; the operation dislodges Colonel Qaddafi and the rebel movement, led by Abdel Hakim, takes power and we have an anti-west, radical, terror supporting government replaced by an anti-west, more radical, terror supporting, pro Al Qaeda government; the third option is that the operation serendipitously results in a stalemate, followed by both Colonel Qaddafi’s government collapsing as well as the rebel forces, and both are replaced by a popular, secular, pro-west government.

There is a fourth option, if the above doesn’t sound like a good ‘investment,’ and that is we go in, knock down Colonel Qaddafi’s regime, and set up a stable, secular, pro-West regime right now. That will involve real leadership, hard choices, and, oh yeah, putting 25-30,000 combat troops (4 - 5 BCTs or RCTs) plus support forces ashore to take care of Libya’s military, restore order and re-establish civil processes. As there hasn’t been massive damage to infrastructure yet, it should only take 2 - 3 years. If we’re lucky.

But, there is little likelihood that this path will be chosen – for good or ill. In short, long-term success is now in the realm of the third option above, which falls into the realm of hope.

Churchill noted that once a war started no matter how well planned you are to some extent along for the ride. As Churchill knew all too well, only by a great deal of action and ‘investment’ is it possible in any war to reach a result that looks even a little bit like what you wanted when you started.

Or we can hope.

And, as a brilliant, and grizzled, old Marine told me many years ago, ‘Hope is not a plan.’

Libya and Limited War

In 1870 the Chancellor of Germany convinced the Kaiser (William I) to invade France, (after using a number of political maneuvers to bring the French to declare war first) the aim being to seize a slice of terrain (Alsace Lorraine) that had been in dispute with the French for decades. The plan was to move fast, before the French could mobilize, seize the terrain and then present the French with a real problem: do they launch a major assault to push the German army out of the seized terrain at the risk of destroying their own army and brining down the government, or do they negotiate a settlement that would almost certainly leave the Germans in possession of Alsace, but would leave the government intact? Bismark was confident that once war was begun the German army would be able to move quickly into the targeted area and that the French would find retaking the terrain more cost then it was worth and would opt for a peace treaty.

Unfortunately, as the Chancellor knew, limited wars are vary difficult to fight, if only because it is so hard to 1) define the limits and 2) it is always difficult to control what the enemy will do. In this particular case the French King – Emperor Napoleon III – rushed to the head of his army in the region and was captured in the battle around the city of Sedan. What had started as a limited assault designed to catch the French unawares and force Napoleon III to negotiate a peace very nearly turned into a catastrophe as the French declared a new republic and immediately began a full-scale mobilization to recover what they perceived – in the capture of Alsace Lorraine (and Napoleon III) – as a fundamental assault on the honor of France. (It is worth noting that the war resulted in the German army finally  assaulting Paris (Bismark in essence lost control of the army) and a treaty that ceded the desired land to Germany – and so it stood until 1914.)

The point in all this is that countries enter into what they believe are limited wars without first checking with their enemies to make sure everyone is ‘in agreement as to the rules of the knife fight.’

The President insists that this war in Libya is not intended to remove Colonel Qaddafi. Colonel Qaddafi doesn’t see it that way. Nor does it appear that our allies – the French and British – see it quite the same way. In any case, Colonel Qaddafi is unlikely to play this game the way we want him to. He wants to survive and remain in power (that is why, seven years ago, he surrendered his chemical weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to the US, it wasn’t about being nice, it was about staying in power.) If we insist that he stops shooting at his own people, maybe he will. How long are we prepared to wait? If he stops shooting his own people, how long must he stop before we ‘go home?’ If he stops, will we then insist on something else? Will the UN Security Council ‘ratchet up’ the requirements? How far do they want to go? How long are we prepared to supply forces?

Just a bit of calculus: to keep a ship off the coast of Libya for a year will require 3 ships (actually 3.4 – but why quibble?) Keeping an amphibious task - with 3 Aegis guided missile ships means committing 3 amphibious groups and 9 Aegis ships to this mission. This calculus is the same whether you are French, British or Klingon. How long is this mission likely to last? If history is to be a guide, it could be a while: we have had a carrier group in the Persian Gulf with only one or two short breaks for 21 straight years, we have had a battle group in either the North Arabian Sea or Persian Gulf – with no gaps - since the summer of 1979 – 32 years. Simply put, once we have identified a national security interest, it will be difficult to ignore it.

Of course, as has been implied in the last 24 hours, we might just walk away next week; take a ‘back seat’ to French or British leadership. If the Colonel then resumes killing his people and we do nothing more, then the question should be asked why did we commit the acts of violence that we just completed over the past few days?

The United Kingdom and France have interests in Libya that are perhaps more immediate then the US. Perhaps they are clear on their interests and there is in fact a real plan in place to replace the Colonel and there is also already an understanding with this or that rebel group to form an interim government and the steps that will follow after that to form a new government. That remains to be seen. For the record, I will be quite pleased to see the Colonel removed from the world stage, but that hardly constitutes a viable national goal.

One other thing: if it was justifiable to act against Colonel Qaddafi for the violence he perpetrated against his people, then it was justifiable to act against Saddam Hussein, and the issue of whether he had Weapons of Mass Destruction is completely irrelevant. Of course, the invasion of Iraq had a clear goal: eliminate Saddam and end the violence. That WAS stated upfront. The question now is whether this new war of the century will have a real goal.

Nuclear Power and the Japanese Reactors

The tragedy in Japan is seemingly beyond description. If you are not directly involved with providing aid there seems to be little to do but watch – and pray. And with each passing day it seems that the nuclear power plants are degrading and the danger of a major radiation leak increases.

What to do?

First, it is important not to panic – nothing of value comes with panic. And, the specifics of the mishap in Japan can teach us a great deal about how to prevent a similar event in another reactor, just as what happened at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl helped to improve the safety of other reactors.

We have learned how to build safer reactors. That the reactors that are at risk are older designs – 40 plus year old designs in some cases – is worthy of note. And this probably warrants some real debate in those areas where older reactors lie near earthquake faults or other possible natural disasters. But we need to conduct an orderly debate.

Second, let’s note some obvious risk factors. As with New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina, building on low-lying lands has inherent risks. Building near earthquake faults has similar risks. Electric power can be moved huge distances. Placing power stations – nuclear and non-nuclear - in low-lying areas, or near fault lines or in similar settings means accepting higher risks. Future construction of power stations, chemical plants, etc., needs to take better note of these issues. Government licensing boards need to meet, engage in strong public debate, and arrive at standards that are both achievable and safer.

Old designs need to be updated where possible, or shut down where it is not possible to bring the system into acceptable safety margins. Reactor designs of the last 15 – 20 years, particularly the ones used on US Navy submarines and aircraft carriers, are substantially safer and more reliable then any of the reactors currently at risk in Japan, or arguably anywhere in the world. These designs need to be brought into commercial use.

Third, there is a tag line for anyone that has ever handled a crisis that ‘the first report is always wrong.’ It will take months or even years to sort out what happened with the four reactors that have been damaged. It took years to sort out what happened at Three Mile Island, and despite the initial reports, the reactor never was in a real danger of a ‘meltdown,’ no people got sick, and the amount of real damage to the surrounding area or the environment was negligible. Not that that is what people remember. Horror stories about Three Mile Island still abound, founded almost completely on myth. We need to try and contain the myth.

Fourth, and finally, radiation can cause terrible damage. But this is not a 1950s movie; exposure to radiation at any level does not mean instant death or zombie-like mutations. Medical science in fact knows a good deal about radiation exposure, radiation sickness and the like. More to the point, the risk from radiation is vastly overplayed in the press. How do I know this? Easy. Let’s review some numbers.

Between 1945 and 1961 the US conducted 321 above ground nuclear tests – weapon detonations - inside the continental United States, and another 10 outside the continental US. In all, the US conducted 1054 nuclear tests, 833 underground. The Soviet Union conducted 721 tests – above and below ground (including one in 1960 of more than 50 megatons.) The French, British and Chinese combined conducted another 300 tests, at least 73 of which were above ground. All the above ground tests released radiation into the atmosphere.

To hear people speak of what is going on in Japan right now one would think that the release of radiation into the atmosphere is catastrophic at nearly any level. But, the fact is that the above ground tests over a period of 16 years, with the exception of some personnel exposed at close range, did not cause any substantial health issues. In short, the concentrated radiation released into the atmosphere by more than 500 above ground nuclear tests over a period of 16 years was safely dissipated.

Do we want radiation venting into the atmosphere? No, of course not. But we also want people to understand the simple truth that – apart from those people in the immediate area – the risk is very low. In short, we need to calm down.

To close, we must remember that life is risk. We stand on the precipice every day. In the US alone some 35,000 people die each year on our roads. That means that since the war in Afghanistan began 10 years ago, more than 350,000 people have died on our roads. More to the point, since the reactor issued developed in Japan – 6 days ago, more than 500 people have died on US highways. Further, nearly half of all fatal car accidents take place while someone is making a left hand turn. You might seriously reduce the odds of your having a car accident by eliminating left had turns from your life. Is it worth it? What is the cost (the risk) of a left hand turn worth? Does the simple convenience of being able to make left hand turns outweigh the fact that 15,000 people in the US alone died making left hand turns last year?

This nation needs electric power. There are several paths to get that power: oil powered stations, coal powered, solar powered, wind powered, nuclear powered, natural gas, etc. Each has issues. It is worth noting that coal powered stations, which generate a substantial percentage of our electric power is from coal. Each of these sources has champions, and each has its vigorous opponents. Oil, coal and natural gas will each contribute carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide to the atmosphere; wind and solar can be huge eyesores on the landscape, and are subject to the foibles of weather; nuclear carries the fears of radiation.

But the truth is we need all of them, and we need nuclear perhaps most of all, as there is no other means that can realistically meet our requirements for growth in power generation over the next 30 to 40 years. The President should lead this discussion, we need to ensure our reactors are safe, that we have the best designs and best possible construction, that our maintenance and inspections are first rate. But we do not and we must not let fear grip us and let it stop all progress.

And Now Libya?

What to do about Libya…

There is an old vaudeville line to the effect that if you don’t know where you’re going, any road is ok. Strategy is like that. If you do not have a clear and specific goal, any plan is fine. And while the US military is superb at developing operational level plans and tactical level plans, we have not been very successful at strategic level plans. And there is a reason for that: strategic level plans require strategic level goals: clear, specific, national level goals, which are by their very nature long-term goals, and that means clarity of thought and a finality of decision.

Clarity is needed because strategic goals must be simply stated so that everyone involved knows what the important one, two or three points are, and in what order, so they know, when choices need to be made – and they will need to be made – what to do and what not to do.

And a finality of decision is required, a definitive statement from the top that the debate is over, we have chosen the end-state and we are now all working in that direction. In fact, one might argue that the single most important element of any strategy is to finally and definitively state ‘Our goal is X.’ Successful strategies throughout history – political, military, commercial - depend much more than anything else on working to a specific goal’ the plan may change, mid-points may change, and you still be successful. But certain doom rests in vague and constantly changing goals.

And so there are those who want us to do something about Libya. Certainly we all want Colonel Qaddafi to go away. Certainly, the US could establish a ‘No Fly’ zone over the eastern half of Libya (to be fair, it would not be over the entire eastern half of the nation, as the vast bulk of Libya is empty desert; rather, it would be over the a strip of land and coastal areas perhaps 300 x 300 miles in size.) But then what? What is the real goal? If the goal is to simply eliminate the Colonel and his regime, are we justified in launching 50 or 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles, seeing if they were successful, and if they were, simply walking away, and letting whatever happens next, well, happen?

Ignoring for a second the tenets of international law, and classic morals, both of which adhere to the principle ‘if you break it, you own it,’ is it a good idea for the US storm a nation in the Mid-East, smash the government, and then wash our hands and say ‘We are out of here?’ There may be a good deal of short-term visceral satisfaction to such a plan, but, as with most such plans, they look good in movies, but in real-life they will land you in trouble.

Of greatest concern is that any action to remove a head of state, anywhere, needs to consider what happens next. If we do not intend to take part in the formation of the next government, then we are de facto accepting whatever government comes to power. Do the rebels in eastern Libya constitute a viable regime? Do they believe in any of the tenets of democracy that we hold or are the real leaders of the movement members of some sort of extreme movement – political, religious, or social? While it is difficult to imagine at this point, what if the regime that replaced the Colonel rapidly evolves into an Arabic version of the Terror that gripped Paris after the revolution in 1789? Are we prepared to go back into Libya next year to put down a hyper-violent oligarchy?

As with most strategic planning, the questions quickly become unpleasant and force you to make hard decisions. The best place to start is with this simple question: what are my long-term interests? It would seem to me that before we decide what we ‘should’ do in Libya, the US needs to have a serious debate as to what are its long-term interests and long-term goals.

Unfortunately, there is insufficient time to do so. If we are to act vis-à-vis Libya, and not simply stand on the sidelines and watch, we needed to have this discussion last year. We are left with this option: the President must lead. He can begin this discussion by stating what he believes are the nation’s long-term interests and goals; as a general rule, we elect Presidents to do just that, to give voice to our goals. Then, he can identify clear goals relative to Libya and give to the Department of Defense and the State Department the task of developing a plan to achieve those goals. It is almost a certainty that we have the wherewithal to develop and execute a plan to achieve any goal assigned, assuming adequate assets are available. But, here is the final issue:

If the President chooses to defend the rebels, he has chosen sides. Once he has done that he is – in fact – stating that he, and the US, support the overthrow of the current government of Libya. This is what is known in strategic planning as ‘unlimited war goals.’ At that point the US is ‘all in’ and needs to act accordingly. Furthermore, at that point the US is to some degree both morally and legally culpable for any acts of violence perpetrated by our new allies, and the US is equally responsible for helping recover the country once the Colonel’s government is gone. We would be in a position analogous to where we were in Iraq in 2003, with just as many unknown problems facing us. (For comparison, Libya has a population of roughly 6.5 million and produces 1.8 million barrels of oil per day; Iraq has a population of 31 million and currently produces about 2.1 million barrel of oil per day.)

The situation in Libya is terrible. But let’s make sure we have our eyes open before we make any decisions.