Libya and Limited War

In 1870 the Chancellor of Germany convinced the Kaiser (William I) to invade France, (after using a number of political maneuvers to bring the French to declare war first) the aim being to seize a slice of terrain (Alsace Lorraine) that had been in dispute with the French for decades. The plan was to move fast, before the French could mobilize, seize the terrain and then present the French with a real problem: do they launch a major assault to push the German army out of the seized terrain at the risk of destroying their own army and brining down the government, or do they negotiate a settlement that would almost certainly leave the Germans in possession of Alsace, but would leave the government intact? Bismark was confident that once war was begun the German army would be able to move quickly into the targeted area and that the French would find retaking the terrain more cost then it was worth and would opt for a peace treaty.

Unfortunately, as the Chancellor knew, limited wars are vary difficult to fight, if only because it is so hard to 1) define the limits and 2) it is always difficult to control what the enemy will do. In this particular case the French King – Emperor Napoleon III – rushed to the head of his army in the region and was captured in the battle around the city of Sedan. What had started as a limited assault designed to catch the French unawares and force Napoleon III to negotiate a peace very nearly turned into a catastrophe as the French declared a new republic and immediately began a full-scale mobilization to recover what they perceived – in the capture of Alsace Lorraine (and Napoleon III) – as a fundamental assault on the honor of France. (It is worth noting that the war resulted in the German army finally  assaulting Paris (Bismark in essence lost control of the army) and a treaty that ceded the desired land to Germany – and so it stood until 1914.)

The point in all this is that countries enter into what they believe are limited wars without first checking with their enemies to make sure everyone is ‘in agreement as to the rules of the knife fight.’

The President insists that this war in Libya is not intended to remove Colonel Qaddafi. Colonel Qaddafi doesn’t see it that way. Nor does it appear that our allies – the French and British – see it quite the same way. In any case, Colonel Qaddafi is unlikely to play this game the way we want him to. He wants to survive and remain in power (that is why, seven years ago, he surrendered his chemical weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to the US, it wasn’t about being nice, it was about staying in power.) If we insist that he stops shooting at his own people, maybe he will. How long are we prepared to wait? If he stops shooting his own people, how long must he stop before we ‘go home?’ If he stops, will we then insist on something else? Will the UN Security Council ‘ratchet up’ the requirements? How far do they want to go? How long are we prepared to supply forces?

Just a bit of calculus: to keep a ship off the coast of Libya for a year will require 3 ships (actually 3.4 – but why quibble?) Keeping an amphibious task - with 3 Aegis guided missile ships means committing 3 amphibious groups and 9 Aegis ships to this mission. This calculus is the same whether you are French, British or Klingon. How long is this mission likely to last? If history is to be a guide, it could be a while: we have had a carrier group in the Persian Gulf with only one or two short breaks for 21 straight years, we have had a battle group in either the North Arabian Sea or Persian Gulf – with no gaps - since the summer of 1979 – 32 years. Simply put, once we have identified a national security interest, it will be difficult to ignore it.

Of course, as has been implied in the last 24 hours, we might just walk away next week; take a ‘back seat’ to French or British leadership. If the Colonel then resumes killing his people and we do nothing more, then the question should be asked why did we commit the acts of violence that we just completed over the past few days?

The United Kingdom and France have interests in Libya that are perhaps more immediate then the US. Perhaps they are clear on their interests and there is in fact a real plan in place to replace the Colonel and there is also already an understanding with this or that rebel group to form an interim government and the steps that will follow after that to form a new government. That remains to be seen. For the record, I will be quite pleased to see the Colonel removed from the world stage, but that hardly constitutes a viable national goal.

One other thing: if it was justifiable to act against Colonel Qaddafi for the violence he perpetrated against his people, then it was justifiable to act against Saddam Hussein, and the issue of whether he had Weapons of Mass Destruction is completely irrelevant. Of course, the invasion of Iraq had a clear goal: eliminate Saddam and end the violence. That WAS stated upfront. The question now is whether this new war of the century will have a real goal.