Kim Jong Il is dead. While there will be many questions asked about what happens next, the most important one is this: what should the US do with this opportunity? And it is important to view this as an opportunity.
First, consider what is happening inside North Korea right now, and probably for at least several months and perhaps the next several years: there is a very real power struggle going on. Kim Jong Un is now the new titular head of state, though there was reportedly an arrangement in which his aunt and uncle would act as regents for some period of time. Like much in North Korea, much of this is both speculative, and, because of the nature of power in such an extreme dictatorship, whatever the situation was the minute before Kim Jong Il’s death, it has probably changed since his death two days ago.
It is important to remember that while Kim Jong Il lived, despite what many people had reported, there was virtually no chance of regime change by other members of the government. There would be no revolt or palace coup, no seizure of power by a ‘praetorian guard’ or a close and trusted advisor. This was because of how Kim Il Song (Kim Jong Il’s father) and Kim Jong Il had constructed the real power structure in North Korea. Everything flowed through first the father, and after the early 1980s increasingly through the son. Beginning some time in the 1980s Kim Jong Il was personally responsible for the promotion of every officer in the armed forces to the rank of colonel and above. They were appointed by him, they served at his pleasure. And they were rewarded by him. The standard of living enjoyed by generals and ministers and other senior functionaries all was controlled by Kim. The houses they lived in, the food they ate, the clothing they and their families wore, the furniture, cars, alcohol, etc., etc., etc., all came directly from Kim. Loyalty to Kim was the price of admission, and promotion was conditional on ever more loyalty.
That Kim Jong Il, with a GDP of just $20 billion, and a population of 21 million – living on perhaps 1500 calories per day per person – was able to keep his own country under control, while managing to keep the US, the ROK, Japan, China and Russia – the three largest economies in the world, the other two in the top 10, with combined GDPs nearly 1,000 times greater than North Korea and with combined populations almost 100 times North Korea’s - all off balance and all wanting to entice him into continued ‘6 Power’ talks is a testimony to how well organized and how capable he was. (It is necessary to note that Kim Jong Il was also completely evil. But he was as bright and capable as anyone on the international scene.)
Kim Jong Il knew he wasn’t well, and like his father, attempted to set up one of his sons to replace him. His father (born on the day the Titanic sank) lived into his 80s. If Kim Jong Il had done so, he would have provided his son Kim Jong Un more than 14 years of ‘apprenticeship’ before he came to power. Fortunately or unfortunately, that is not the case. Now, he – Kim Jong Un - will have to work out his own understanding of power, without the benefit of his father’s (evil but accurate) insights.
What is likely to happen?
While there is reason to be concerned, the situation is manageable. Kim Jong Un will face a number of factions within the government. It is likely that the bulk of the army will remain completely loyal. The army leadership has been selected for their loyalty, lack of adventurous spirit, and willingness to follow. Despite various comments by many who should know better, the bulk of the army leadership does not want to attack south. They know that doing so would be the last act of the nation of North Korea, and that they would all likely die violent deaths. When you are living in the fairly luxurious accommodations, that is hardly an enticing choice. So, they will attempt to establish control over Kim Jong Un, make him one of theirs, and continue things as they have been – living one day and one week at a time, managing a decrepit, nuclear-armed state.
Some in the army may be tempted to seize control, and throw the Kim family out of power. The justification would be that the younger Kim is unfit to rule and that the nation needs new directions and new goals. Doubtless the population believes this. Scenes of hundreds of thousands of North Koreans weeping mean little to nothing. The North Korean people have been trained for three generations (or more, if you include the occupation by Japan from late in the 19th century until the end of World War II) to provide when asked the answer the central government wants. Standing around weeping after the announcement of his death doesn’t mean they are stupid, they are just doing what they need to do to survive. Nevertheless, coups by the army would likely fall one way: seize Kim Jong Un, displace the current regents, and rule through Kim Jong Un as a mouthpiece. This keeps the current power structure in place, and provides a smoke screen as the new leaders engage in their own ‘house-cleaning’ and their own internal struggle to establish who exactly is top man. Less likely they would publicly displace Kim Jong Un and the regents and establish an entirely new government. If this happens, it would be an indication that some real risk takers are running the new government.
There may also be an attempt by others in the government – but outside the army – to seize power in what would have to be a strictly ‘palace coup,’ This would almost certainly involve using Kim Jong Un as their puppet in order to keep the army at arms length.
In all three cases, we could expect to see a number of senior figures suddenly retiring. The fewer ‘retirements’ we see, the more likely it is that Kim Jong Un and the regents are running the show.
What will the Chinese Do?
The situation on the Korean Peninsula is one that presents mainly headaches and few benefits to Beijing. While China for many years said that they wanted a united peninsula, by the mid 1980s it became fairly obvious that the only real possibility for a united peninsula was one controlled by the Republic of Korea. That would mean a real democracy on China’s border, and one with a close alliance with the US. That is something China does not want. Add to that the historic perspective that every time over the past 2000 years that the Korean peninsula has been united China has had to fight a bloody war over it, and the Chinese position on Korea became more nuanced. In short, pushing a resolution of the Korea problem into the distant future became a real option for China.
Accordingly, when the Soviet Union collapsed, China stepped in to provide fuel, rice and monetary support to North Korea to keep it barely viable. China was, however, never interested in making North Korea comfortable enough that it might try something truly ‘adventurous.’ Minor provocations that would lead to more frenzied peace talks were one thing, enough food and fuel to plan real military operations quite another.
Now, with the death of Kim Jong Il, China finds itself with an untried leader on this potentially dangerous piece of ground. From China’s perspective, what it must not do is lead to a greater US presence in East Asia. China’s interests will be to keep things quiet and stable, and keep everyone looking elsewhere. Direct and concerted US focus on the Koreas will only stir a confrontation China does not want right now. (If this is not so, then the Chinese leadership is considerably less competent then they appear, and considerably less competent than Kim Jong Il was.) China will move to provide support to Kim Jong Un, and to establish itself as the clear ‘power broker’ in support of Kim. Kim Jong Un will find them an inviting ally who will guarantee his smooth transition to power. The Chinese may be tempted to move Chinese troops into North Korea to ensure greater stability. Doing so would be a clear sign the Chinese view Kim Jong Un as incapable of leading and that it is necessary to establish a vassal state. The political costs to the Chinese would be large.
What Should the US Do?
All of which begs a simple question: what should the US – in concert with its allies in Seoul (and to a lesser extent Tokyo - though Japan’s role in any action must be kept well hidden) – do with the new regime in Pyongyang?
The answer is this: we need to make a dramatic offer to Kim Jong Un to guarantee the safety of his nation and the well-being of his people. Kim Jong Un has a chance to start with a clean slate. It is unlikely that he knows that. But the US could tell him so. Secret contact would need to be made that makes it clear that the US and the ROK are placing the sins and evils of the Kim Il Song and Kim Jong Il regimes behind them, and then make an offer to Kim Jong Un that we (the US and the ROK) can begin immediate aid to the North, tied to a gradual demilitarization of North Korea, and a transition to a federated Korean Peninsula. The specifics of such a federation are almost irrelevant. What Kim Jong Un needs to realize is that he has a brief window – perhaps less than a year – during which the west would be politically able to deal with him as a legitimate ruler, vice a continuation of the criminal regimes of his father and grandfather. In his turn, Kim would need to take real actions to defuse the powder-keg that is North Korea. But such actions could be worked out among north and south Koreans – as Koreans – with the US providing guarantees. Opening of borders, provisions of food and building materials for infrastructure (power, water, roads), and the construction of better housing, with labor provided by north Korean army units (which need not be immediately decommissioned, just separated from their weapons and fighting positions), would be initial steps to transition soldiers from army units into the productive sectors of a new economy. Certainly the Koreans on both sides of the DMZ would be able to develop such a transition plan if given adequate opportunity.
It has been said by various ROK economists that rebuilding North Korea to the point that the north, as part of a unified Korea, was not an economic drag on the south (consider east Germany’s economic drag on unified Germany), would require an investment of at least 200% of the GDP of the ROK. That equates to roughly $2 – 2.5 trillion. Working out a gradual transition over a period of 10 years or so makes that a manageable figure. A dramatic political collapse, followed by economic integration of the failed state with the ROK would almost certainly cause an economic nightmare in the ROK, and one that would likely spread to China and Japan.
If we miss this chance, the situation in North Korea will in all likelihood go through several ‘flair-ups’ and provocations, and then within a year or two settle into a gradual state of continued decay. If Kim Jong Un develops into as talented a leader and manager as his father, he may be able to maintain that slow, gradual decay and prevent the political and economic catastrophe that we should all be hoping to avoid. Meanwhile the 20 million citizens of North Korea will continue to suffer. If he fails to develop as his father did, we will face real turmoil and collapse, or the rise of an even more dangerous and capable dictator.
We have a strange but unique opportunity to change all that – if we are willing to use it. Like Assad in Syria, we have a chance to start again. We missed that chance in 2000 in Syria. Let’s not miss the chance this time, to dramatically change – and improve – the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
