Wednesday, March 5, 2025

 March 5th, 2025 Next Report March 21st, 2025


Ground Ops


Overall, weather continues to be warm and mud season will be in full vigor by the end of the week. Obviously, both sides are in the mud, but given the current lay-down of forces and the number of spots along the line where Ukrainian lines of communication are strung out along dirt roads and across manicured farm-land, mud season will probably be more difficult for the Ukrainian troops than the Russians.

Normal combat operation continued along the entire front but there were no significant changes in the front line. Russian forces continue to probe and strike along the length of the line. Expect continued efforts north of the Donets to push west, to reach the Oskil and cross it, though this will be difficult as the thaw continues and the river and its tributaries rise.

The Russians will try to establish complete control over Toretsk in the next week, clearing out the Ukrainian elements in and just south of the town, and poor logistics support (a result of the mud) may assist them in this. Expect continued hard fighting around Pokrovsk, but over the next two weeks the Russians should be able to straighten the line west of Kurakhove (eliminating any small, potential Ukrainian salients), and continue to push north-west from the general Velyka Novosilke area and across the Ukrainian defensive line that runs west from the vicinity of Vesele, on the Mokri Yali river.

Russian forces will continue to probe north near Kamyansk, and raid across the Dnepr.


Politics and Diplomacy 


President Trump ordered a suspension of aid to Ukraine on the 3rd, and, as noted yesterday, US transshipment facilities in Poland were already idle by yesterday afternoon. In addition, Director of the CIA Ratcliffe noted that the suspension included intelligence support. Last night, during his address to Congress, Trump noted that he had received a letter from President Zelenskyy stating his willingness to negotiate, and to sign the minerals agreement. Presumably once the agreement on minerals is signed the suspicion will be lifted. Of note, US Secretary of the Treasury Bessent commented earlier today that the agreement is not “on the table at present.”

Losing US intelligence support would negatively impact both warning of Russian activity as well as the ability to target assets deep inside Russia; getting the intelligence support back will be necessary to maintain the air defense effort.

There are multiple reports from various anonymous officials as to how much Ukraine has on hand, and it appears that for some items - 155MM howitzer ammunition for example, there is sufficient ammunition on hand to last for several months at least, and perhaps into summer.

For some other assets particularly the more capable systems, those numbers may not be as rosy. Patriot missiles in particular are a worry (the number transferred has never been released) but obviously, if the Ukrainian Air Force (which operates the air defense units) were to run out of Patriot missiles, then all Russian ballistic missiles would arrive “unscathed,” and the ability to defeat other systems, while not eliminated would be negatively impacted.

Further, the early warning that allows defensive systems to come on line in timely fashion would be degraded, thereby also negatively affecting the probability of successfully defeating various cruise missiles.


Thoughts


I would imagine that within the next day or two the agreement will be signed, US and Ukrainian offices will agree on some process to address the negotiations, and the weapons and intelligence support will resume.

As National Security Advisor Walz commented: ”I think if we can nail down these negotiations and move towards these negotiations, and in fact, put some confidence-building measures on the table, then the president will take a hard look at lifting this pause.”

There has been commentary that the Ukrainian front is not in any danger of collapse. Technically that is correct. But armies don’t fracture based on loss of ammunition, they fracture based on loss of will. 

The fear is that a sustained suspension would cause a precipitous drop in moral and a desire to simply quit the battlefield. While not common, these events can very rapidly spread and a small loss of will can, if left unchecked, cause and army to disintegrate; that is the real fear.

As for Europe, despite the EU meetings and the talk about an EU defense plus-up of 800 billion Euros ($850 billion) over 4 years, there is little likelihood that the EU would be able to sustain Ukraine on its own. 

Much of the 800 billion Euros will need to be used to simply return current forces to an operational status, and there are other issues, such as comprehensive command and control, the necessary intelligence architecture, sustained heavy logistics, etc., that the EU does not have and could not buy in the necessary depth with the money that will be available.

In short, this can only be done with US support. (It is worth noting that the US intelligence support, for which there is no transfer of payments - it’s essentially free - would cost a mountain of money to recreate.)

At the same time, Ukraine currently has an army with not quite 50 brigades. That army is not adequate to the task of pushing the Russian forces back. In fact, that army is slowly losing ground to the Russian army, which has more than 100 brigades (and regiments - roughly the same amount of combat power) committed to the Ukrainian war. To expand the Ukrainian army to the necessary size to defeat the Russians and drive them out would require nearly doubling the size of the army, which would mean not simply another 40 or 50 brigades - the teeth - but also the huge support elements - the tail, which in this case would be on the order of 500,000 - 600,000. And this huge force needs to be trained and equipped. 

The training alone would take more than a year. And in the meantime the army needs to hold ground. Ukraine perhaps could have done this if the effort to create this army was begun in 2022. But that opportunity is gone. This is what President Trump meant when he said they have no cards to play.


v/r pete 




Tuesday, March 4, 2025

 March 4th, 2025  US Constitution Goes Into Effect, 1789


Politics - Zelenskyy says Yes, back on same page with Trump


Ground Ops - Small Russian gains


Economics - OPEC+ Increases production 


Weather  - Bezdorizhzhia - roadlessness (Russian: Rasputitsa season of bad roads)

Mud season has arrived

Weather


Warm weather during the day will cause fields to thaw, impeding logistics support, force trucks back onto roads, which will affect Ukrainian forces more than Russian. Cloud cover for next few days will also complicate targeting for both sides.


Kharkiv

38 and cloudy, windchill 32, gusting to 20. Solid cloud cover through Thursday afternoon, Friday clear, then partly cloudy on weekend. Daily highs and lows in the 40s through Thursday, then daily lows in the 30s and daily highs in the upper 50s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.


Melitopol

39 and cloudy, windchill 32, gusting over 20. Partly to mostly sunny for the week. Daily lows in the low 30s, daily highs upper 50s to low 60s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.


Kyiv

43 and cloudy, windchill 34, gusting to 40. Cloudy and windy through Thursday night; clear on Friday, then more clouds. Daily lows and highs in the 40s Wednesday and Thursday, then 5 days with daily lows in the low 30s, daily highs in the upper 50s, and may hit 60. Winds westerly, 20+kts.


Politics and Diplomacy - Full Circle 


Following the “frank and informative” discussions in the Oval Office on Friday, President Trump suspended all arms shipments to Ukraine, pending a clarification of intentions from President Zelenskyy. President Trump said that he wanted to determine if President Zelenskyy is going to engage in peace negotiations in good faith.

A little after noon today President Zelenskyy announced he is ready to begin negotiations and would sign the mineral agreement.

Polish Prime Minister Tusk noted earlier today that the US logistics hub at Jesionka (near the Ukraine border) was quiet (no activity), indicating that the suspension had been implemented.

President Zelenskyy then reiterated his desire for peace and stated he is ready to go to the negotiating table, calling for a first step to be the release of POWs and an end to all air activity: missile strikes, bomb strikes, strikes on civilian infrastructure, to include the power grid, and a halt to warfare on the Black Sea.

"We are ready to work fast to end the war, and the first stages could be the release of prisoners and truce in the sky – ban on missiles, long-ranged drones, bombs on energy and other civilian infrastructure – and truce in the sea immediately, if Russia will do the same. Then we want to move very fast through all next stages and to work with the US to agree a strong final deal."

This is essentially the Macron - Starmer proposal, a one-month ceasefire "in the air, on the sea and around the energy infrastructure.”

Zelenskyy continued:

"Regarding the agreement on minerals and security, Ukraine is ready to sign it in any time and in any convenient format. We see this agreement as a step toward greater security and solid security guarantees, and I truly hope it will work effectively.”

At the same time, Vice President Vance said:

"We want the Ukrainians to have a sovereign and independent country. We think the Ukrainian troops have fought very bravely, but we’re at a point here where neither Europe nor the United States nor the Ukrainians can continue this war indefinitely…it’s important that everybody comes to the table.”

”The President is trying to send a very explicit message, the Ukrainians have got to come to the table and start negotiating with President Trump for the mineral deal…

And I think the President is still committed to the mineral deal. I think we’ve heard some positive things, but not yet, of course, a signature from our friends in Ukraine.” 


President Zelenskyy had commented last night that “An agreement to end the war is still very, very far away, and no one has started all these steps yet. The peace that we foresee in the future must be just, honest, and most importantly, sustainable,” then added: “I think our relationship (with the U.S.) will continue, because it’s more than an occasional relationship… I believe that Ukraine has a strong enough partnership with the United States of America” 

President Trump, wen told of that earlier statement, responded:

“This is the worst statement that could have been made by Zelenskyy, and America will not put up with it for much longer!” 

“It is what I was saying, this guy doesn’t want there to be Peace as long as he has America’s backing and, Europe, in the meeting they had with Zelenskyy, stated flatly that they cannot do the job without the U.S. — Probably not a great statement to have been made in terms of a show of strength against Russia. “What are they thinking?”

But, Zelenskyy now appears to be on the same page as Trump. If so, I would suppose it would be announced tonight in President Trump’s State of the Union address.


Ground Operations


KURSK SALIENT


Russian forces advanced along the north and western edges of the salient over the last several days and they continue to slowly squeeze the salient. Russian forces just inside Ukraine, just south-west of the border, are inching south-east towards the main road into the salient, but do nob appear to have gained any meaningful ground. There is only one road that leads from Basivka to the main road running north-east into the salient, the H07 / P200 roadway; that road from Basivka is a 2-lane gravel road. So, the warmer temperatures and the thawing of the ground may make progress toward the H07 much more difficult this week than last week.


NORTH OF KHARKIV


Fighting continued near Vovchansk but there were no confirmed changes in the front lines.


NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER


North of Kupyansk, west of the Oskil River, based on Ukrainian General Staff maps, it would seem that Russian forces are very slowly inching forward and appear to have moved down the P79 roadway from Zapadne and are approaching Kishandrivka (the next town on the road) from the north and the east, but there were no stated, confirmed gains along the lines in the entire area north of the Donets River.

Further south, near Senkove (which had a heavy bridge over the Oskil, but the bridge was destroyed early in the war) , there is an unconfirmed report that the Russians have forded the river and established a lodgment on the west side of the river. It is not clear how, whether there is a pontoon bridge or how they are crossing the river, but if this is correct it would, of course, be significant.


BAKHMUT


North-east of Bakhmut fighting continues but there were no changes to the front line over the weekend.

Russian forces appear to have made some gains inside Chasiv Yar, and appear to have finally pushed across the center of the town and reached the large pond on the west side.

Further south, Russian forces appear to have made gains on the north side of Toretsk and have pushed into the north side of Krymske, while on the south side of town Ukrainian forces continue to hold the large waste hills


DONETSK CITY


Ukrainian forces continue to grind out small gains south-west of Pokrovsk, retaking some of the terrain south of Udachne (8 miles south-west of Pokrovsk), and continue to hold the small salient into the Pishchane from the north-east. Elsewhere along virtually the entire perimeter of the salient Russian forces continued to conduct daily attacks, but registered no confirmed gains.

Further south, fighting continues west and south-west of Andriivka, but there were no confirmed gains. However, it does appear that Russian forces have pushed westward into or near the center of Kostyantynopil.

Russian force operating north-west of Velyka Novosilke, along the Mokri Yaly River, appear to have pushed past Skudne, Burlatske and Pryvilne and are now pressing on that last Ukrainian east-west defensive line across southern Ukraine.


SOUTHERN UKRAINE


Russian forces reportedly continue to make Gaines west of Orikhiv, in the general vicinity of Pyatykhatky and toward Stepove, and south of Mali Shcherbaky, but there were no confirmed positions.


Ukrainian Military Intelligent is now estimating that there are 620,000 Russian troops in the Ukraine plus committed the Kursk battle, a plus-up of 40,000 in the last 3 months, with 200,000 on the front line.

Ukrainian army totals (unofficial - there are no public statements on the Ukrainian army) gives the current Ukrainian army as 880,000 string, with roughly 250,000 on the front line. Ukraine is currently stripping rear units of a total of 50,000 personnel to plus up front line units. The UAF was stripped of 5,000 troops (out of a total force of 40,,000) in January; these troops were also sent to forward army units.

Ukrainian Military Intelligence also reports that Russia recruited 440,000 troops in 2024, 10,000 more than the goal. The original goal was 375,000, but the Kremlin kept increasing THE target as the year went on, and still finished ahead.


Air Operations


Russia continues to conduit strikes into Ukraine using a great many drones - Shahed strike drones (150 - 200 per strike) as well as other, even less expensive drones, to act as decoy and simply to force Ukrainian air defense assets to remain on alert and to keep expanding ordnance. Russian strikes have grown more coordinated and they have also experimented with conducting various types of strikes: flooding a zone, as well as attacking from multiple directions in order to complicate the air defense response.

Russia is also building a newer, larger Shahed with an 80KG (177lbs) warhead, a cruise sped of nearly 300kts, and an endurance of over 5 hours (or a range of 1500 miles).

Russian forces also appear to have improved their targeting over the past year, several times hitting trains as they arrived for offload of supplies, and this past Saturday were able to hit a Ukrainian army training event near Dnipro with an Iskander ballistic missile with cluster bomb warhead, killing 40 and wounding 80. 


Economic Reporting


Feb22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jun7 Dec9 Jan8 Feb7 Feb28 Mar4

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 72.63 76.69 74.89 73.24 70.00

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 68.85 73.94 71.17 69.98 66.97

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 3.17 3.66 3.37 3.87 4.44


Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.59 5.37 5.86 5.61 5.37

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 100.84 105.18 96.88 89.46 89.50

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 41.55 42.33 41.46 41.59 41.40

Urals 56.56    67.61 66.19 71.76 68.32 65.49 65.49

ESPO 77 78.19 ??? 74.74 71.50

Sokol 65.32 72.79 70.92 70.17 67.20


Over the weekend OPEC+ agreed to increase production, and the benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has settled to its lowest price since December 10, 2024.

This is probably the worst news Russia has received in the last 12 months.

Of note, the Saudi Ambassador was at the White House over the weekend.


Thoughts 


Operationally, mud season has arrived and this means at least 3-4 weeks of limited mobility off the roads. While both armies have to fight with the mud, Russian forces have Ukrainian elements in a number of  area with limit4ed access from the west, and the geography will make it much easier to cut of Ukrainian movement of supplies than it will be for Russian forces to exploit the limited mobility. Said otherwise, the geography, and their style of fighting favors the Russians during mud season. 

As for the threat of being cut off, there were a wide range of estimates as to how long the Ukrainian army could last without US assistance, with estimates running from several weeks to 4 months. 

The key however, would not be simply in the supply of ammunition and fuel, etc.,  the key would be how long Ukrainian will held out. As long as the will held out - and holds out, underdog armies can do miraculous things. But if they lose heart, they an collapse with frightening speed.

Ukraine appears to have avoided that path for present, but it should be of concern, particularly when added to the miserable field conditions they will face in the next month or so.

And we should learn some more from President Trump’s address this evening.


v/r pete  



Saturday, March 1, 2025



So, What Now?


If you’ve turned on your TV or read a paper or wandered around on-line today you are aware that there was a bit of a fracas in the Oval Office yesterday just before lunch. The long and short of it is the President Zelenskyy and President Trump banged heads in public. 

People - from both sides - or all sides, as it were - suggest that this was an ambush, that Trump meant to do this. I watched and rewatched the video, beginning to end and, if that is true, these are the best actors on earth, no one else even close. To me it has all the feel of a discussion that went completely off track and a friendly discussion turns into a fight. Everyone has done this, we have all had fights with family or close friends or loved ones, and with coworkers. This is particularly true when there is something that is applying pressure to the system, and all these folks have been under great pressure.

All that said, I’m not sure it does much good to nit-pick who is to blame. More to the point is this central point: Trump is sincere in his desire for peace. He may have other motivations as well, which makes him a real human being, but he is clearly sincere in his desire for peace.

The greater concern is simply this: what happens now?

At the core is the position, held by Trump, and in fact held by all sides, that:

1) Too many people have died

2) Ukraine has a manpower problem that makes it difficult to conceive how they can sustain the war for any extended period of time; they can probably make it another 12 months, but maybe not.

3) The war in any case has already gone on too long and caused far greater damage, both within Ukraine and in its 2nd and 3rd order effects around the world.

4) Ukraine has no meaningful strategy that leads to battlefield success, the overall defeat of the Russian army, and the expulsion of the Russian army from Ukraine 1991.

So, while it’s entertaining to talk about the fracas in the Oval Office, it is grim entertainment. The war has killed, on average, more than 200 soldiers (Russian and Ukrainian) every day for 3 years, maybe a good deal more. The question is, what now?

To answer that question we have an excellent historical parallel:

Consider an embattled US ally determined to lead his people to freedom, very large armies from a dictatorial state, the enemy state and its allies led by men infamous for extremes of violence and treachery (numbers that would put Putin to shame), an extremely complicated military situation on the ground, and a new US President.

The situation was, of course, Korea 1953. The Chinese were determined to win, the USSR was helping, the amount of death and destruction was staggering (I encourage anyone who isn’t familiar with Korea to spend a few minutes on-line looking at the war in Korea. To put it in perspective, the Korean Peninsula is about a third larger than Ukraine east of the Dnepr river, so of similar size. In a war that lasted 3 years, 1 month and 2 days more than 3 million people were killed - perhaps 10 times as many people as have been killed in Ukraine.

Various figures argued that too many people had died to give up, that their deaths demanded the fight continue until, as Gen. MacArthur had promised, the Chinese were driven back over the Yalu River. Then, MacArthur was fired by Truman and replaced by Gen. Matthew Ridgeway. Truman didn't run for re-election, and Eisenhower came in, determined to end the war before it got worse.

President Syngman Rhee, the leader of South Korea, was, to quote Gen Ridgeway, "unalterably opposed to any negotiations at all and said so loudly and often,” and was a "bitter advocate of reunification by force."

It is worth noting that Ridgeway made a point of commenting on one of the mistakes the US avoided: an insistence on “total victory.” Or even a “halt to aggression” before talking peace. (It is also worth noting that Ridgeway liked and respected Rhee and recognized the incredibly difficult position in which he found himself.)

Traces of similar arguments can be heard today, the “sunk cost” argument, too many have died to give up now. For these who invoke World War II, it is important to remind ourselves that the war, which from the Western European perspective was begun over the German seizing of Poland in 1939, ended with Poland virtually enslaved by the Soviet Union. Poland, which lost its independence in 1939, didn't really regain it until 1991, 52 years later.

Gen. Ridgeway, writing his lessons learned after the war, noted that throughout  the war US objectives were subject to constant adjustment, that objectives were always kept within capabilities, and that further, the war was not be allowed to override civilian control of the military; that letting the military shape the outcome of the war free from political interference was “incompatible with our way of life.” That would include, then as now, allowing military objectives to override political reality.

President Eisenhower, in a letter to President Rhee, June 1953, commented that: “We would not be justified in prolonging the war with all the misery that it involves in the hope of achieving, by force, the unification of Korea.”

Rhee, however, was adamant and refused to agree to the terms of the proposed armistice and refused to sign it. It was inconceivable to Rhee that the war be ended after “such wholesale slaughter.” As early as June 1951 Rhee stated the conditions for peace:

1) Chinese army must withdraw north of the Yalu River

2) North Korean Communists disarmed

3) Soviet assistance to the North ended

4) No Settlement that conflicts with sovereignty or territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea

After this Rhee was viewed increasingly as either a patriot or a nuisance, depending on your perspective. But, as the US and Europe increasingly demanded an armistice, Rhee increasingly was viewed as a roadblock.

After Eisenhower was elected he visited Korea and met with the Military commanders and with Rhee, but in fact discussions were of little depth. Reading between  the lines, it was clear changes were afoot.

By June 4th a draft agreement had taken shape; Rhee adamantly refused to sign it, insisting that signing it would doom the Korean people to permanent division. The line they had agreed to was essentially the same line from summer of 1951. Two years of fighting had yielded simply more dead.

What is the point to be drawn for President Zelenskyy?

Gen Ridgeway’s observation that objectives be kept consistent with capabilities is, perhaps the appropriate starting point. The fact that, in the end the US and the UN Command simply went ahead without Rhee and reached a ceasefire agreement without Rhee’s participation is the end point. President Zelenskyy may or may not like the result, but he would find it hard to turn down a ceasefire. And in the middle of all this is the practical work of the US trying to function as a great power that everyone is turning to, hoping the US pulls a rabbit out of its hat at every turn, as Trump is trying to do. That Magic Act is the job of the president - of every president. Accept it, or not. Presidents who are trying hard will try to pull the rabbit out of the hat. Hopefully, they get the right rabbit. But they need to pull a rabbit out of the hat.

Or, as a really smart friend noted this morning, “So, you don’t like being a superpower? Try not being one.”

As the Pirate King observed:

“Many a King on a first class throne,

If he wants call his crown his own,

Must manage somehow to get through

More dirty work than e’er I do.”