Much like Captain Renault, the Prefect of Police in ‘CASABLANCA,’ I am shocked! that Iran has more nuclear facilities then it admitted, that is it quibbling with the international community over what it is really doing, and it is apparently pursuing the refinement of highly enriched Uranium en route to assembling a nuclear bomb.* I would hope that my ‘shock’ is shared by people around the globe, particularly the vast majority of the leaders of the nations of the world.**
The question now is what does the world do about it? As it turns out, there are only a few paths we can pursue.
1) We can hope the problem simply goes away; the Iranians will wake up and realize that they really shouldn’t pursue nuclear weapons and will stop their program. This is truly naïve. And for the leadership of the nations of the world, hope is not a plan. As private citizens you and I can hope; as leaders, they are responsible for acting, and acting intelligently; and should be held accountable when they don’t.
2) We can apply pressure, through political and economic means. But, making someone change their goals, regardless of the amount and type of pressure that is applied, whether carrots or sticks (or both), requires that the pressure applied results in a change in their mental calculus. Everyone makes decisions based on their own perceptions of the value of each option. Those values may be easily defined: money, for example; or more difficult to define, perceptions of self worth, morals, religious values, etc. In some cases it may even be, for all practical purposes, impossible to change someone’s perceptions. Such is the case of a suicide bomber who is convinced that blowing himself up will result in an instant trip to heaven and eternal paradise.
In Iran, there are several major groups to whom pressure may be applied; each has their own motivations. President Ahmadinejad clearly believes that having a nuclear weapon provides several positive values to Iran, with, I assume, no real negatives. (Remember, we are talking about his perceptions.) A nuclear weapons arsenal, even a small one, will in his estimate provide Iran with a deterrent capability that guarantees a much higher level of security from attack. Further, he would point out that the countries that have nuclear arsenals have not been ostracized by the rest of the world. He is correct on that point, though all the countries with nuclear arsenals, except North Korea, developed their weapons in the shadow of the polarized world of the Cold War and that fact is central to how those countries were accepted into the community of nations after their arsenals were made public.
It would seem that Ahmadinejad believes that a force of nuclear weapons would give Iran, and by extension the Mid East, credibility on the world stage that it lacks and sorely needs, in opposition to Israel, which has a nuclear weapons force.
It needs to be added that Ahmadinejad is by all reports a devout ‘Twelver,’ someone who believes that when the 12th Imam appears, much like the Second Coming in the Christian world, their will be a final great struggle and the world will be set right. For such an individual, the idea of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon force and the possibility of a cataclysmic war is not necessarily something to be avoided. If that is the case (a big IF), then applying pressure to Ahmadinejad is going to be difficult, as there appears to be little that the US or the West or the UN Security Council has to offer him – whether carrot or stick – that would move him away from a desire to build a nuclear arsenal.
The second major player in Iran, and, in fact the more important player, is the Ayatollah Khameini. The Ayatollah is both the religious leader of Iran as well as the real political power in the country. Little of note takes place without his approval. It is certain that the Ayatollah desires a nuclear capability. It is almost certain that he has let Ahmadinejad act like a braying donkey because it deflects attention from the Ayatollah and allows him to work both local politics and international diplomacy from several angles simultaneously. No position that Ahmadinejad has taken has not been approved – explicitly or implicitly – by the Ayatollah. What that means is that finding some way to ‘work around’ Ahmadinejad would not materially change anything.
In effect, the only reasonable conclusion to the intellectual conflict the West (in particular the US) has with the Iranian government is that the conflict will remain until either the West gives up or the Ayatollah (and any possible successors) is displaced from governing.
There is often talk about making contacts with member of the military, and by appealing to their patriotism and love of country, convincing them to overthrow the current regime and set the stage for democratic reform. While the army remains a major segment of the government, the real power in the army is held by figures who have been appointed to those positions because the Ayatollah and his deputies determined that these men could be trusted.
Furthermore, Iran has two separate militaries (a tactic common to a number of countries). In addition to the regular armed forces, there is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a group that reports through a separate chain of command that leads directly to the religious leaders of the country. Any possible coup by the regular military would face a very real counter-coup effort from the IRGC.
The final major player in Iran is that block of the population that believes it is time for a change. Does this group constitute a majority? The last elections seemed to suggest as much. However, when the results of the elections were changed by the government and the West failed to at least provide moral support to the demonstrators, the West lost any opportunity for change in the near-term. The overwhelming majority of the Iranian population is below the age of 30, did not live under the Shah, hardly remembers the Iran – Iraq war, and wishes for more open relations with the US and the West. Nevertheless, the West has failed to make support for their effort an element of any meaningful foreign policy effort and there is little likelihood that this avenue of approach is of any value in the near term.
So, if we were to apply political pressure, the only meaningful target at this point would be the Ayatollah, and there seems to be little of note that we could offer him, positive or negative, that would be of interest.
This leaves the use of economic pressure. Alone, the US has little direct economic play with Iran. Any further unilateral tightening of economic restrictions by the US is likely to have no meaningful impact. Any effort to simply get the members of the UN Security Council to pass a Resolution barring most trade with Iran will fail, as Russia and China have both said (and made it clear in deed) they will not approve further sanctions.
The leaves the US with only a few tools; the US could, for example, declare the Iranian government as supporters of terrorists and then, using existing legal powers, seize any funds that we can in the international marketplace. This would have some impact, but, given that the Iranians have already spent years working around US sanctions, it is likely that they would survive this kind of effort without a great deal additional hardship.
One possible option is a ‘third-party embargo,’ in which the US states that it will not trade with anyone who trades with Iran. Third party embargoes are rare, because they are so extreme. But they offer some hope of success, at least when the US is involved, simply because we are the largest economy in the world and the largest importer and exporter in the world. If the US were truly serious about the embargo, Iran could be economically squeezed very quickly.
The objection, of course, is that Iran exports several million barrels of oil per day and any such embargo would cause a dramatic spike in oil prices. Accordingly, no one wants to use this tool.
More limited embargoes however, have proven to be ineffective, which leaves the US little room to effectively maneuver. (Embargoes are difficult even under extreme –wartime – conditions. During World War II Nazi Germany tried and failed to blockade the United Kingdom, a country of 95,000 square miles, using unlimited submarine warfare. Iran, a country of 650,000 square miles (hence substantially more natural resources), and not an island nation, would be substantially more difficult to embargo, even if we were to consider unlimited submarine warfare, which we, of course, are not going to consider.)
3) We can accept Iran possessing a nuclear arsenal and develop a new world view that accepts that new reality.
This seems to be where the West is headed. We know they have the technology (atomic bombs have been around for more than 60 years, the technology isn’t the issue, the highly enriched uranium is the issue), and now we appear to be nearing acceptance that they can’t be stopped. This will involve some necessary political theater or posturing: ‘if the West were going to stop this it would have had to have acted earlier’ (blaming previous world leaders); ‘We have talked to the Iranian leadership and we believe they understand the gravity of the situation and we have made it clear that we will not tolerate any irresponsible behavior’ (hoping that the Iranian leadership won’t do anything during the next 5 to 10 years until the current world leadership is retired); and pursuing ‘confidence building measures’ (policy experts engage in prolonged discussions, and some agreements are signed in which everyone promises to be more ‘open’ to each other in the future).
There might also be multiple rounds of negotiations and even some very specific and public trade restrictions (ones that would look good but have no real impact). But, the fact is that we – the international community – have already showed our hand and there is little reason for Iran to believe that we are suddenly going to develop spines.
Further, none of this changes the fact that they will have nuclear weapons. It will just make us feel better over cocktails.
Which leaves us with one final option:
4) We can attack them.
This isn’t as easy as it seems – if it seems easy at all. Simply put, are you sure you know where all the facilities are? Or how many weapons they have? And where are those weapons? What is the plan if you miss? These are some basic questions you always ask whenever you are conducting a strike on an important target, and I have absolutely no idea what intelligence is available to the decision-makers in Washington or other capital cities. The difference is that we are talking about nuclear weapons. The margin of error is much lower. Given the track-record of intelligence over the past 5, 10 or 20 years, prudence would dictate a higher degree of certainty in regards to any intelligence if we are going to pursue surgical strikes.
The unintended consequences would also be substantial: the impact on US/European – Mid-East relations, the long term political and economic impact on Iran, US bilateral relations with a wide range of partners in the Mid-East and elsewhere, the impact on Israel, the impact on the oil markets and the world economy, etc.
And then there is the political fallout: Is the leadership in Washington (or London and Paris) prepared for the political firestorm that will follow an attack on Iran? Will they be able to offer proof that the Iranians had nuclear weapons? Will they be able to deal with the response from the far-left and the West haters that the West retains nuclear weapons while ‘denying them’ to the Muslim world? Will they be able to struggle through their own moral ambiguity to arrive at a defense for the Western world acting despite the ensuing cries of outrage from a host of duplicitous world leaders?
Which leads to the final thought: will the West wait and delay long enough that Israel, knowing full-well that they are high on the likely target list for any Iranian nuclear weapon, will act on its own to destroy the Iranian nuclear weapon program, giving the Western leaders both the solution that they want and a convenient ‘whipping boy’ on whom to vent their spleen?
A Solution
In the end, this is an issue about the leaders of the Western world recognizing that they are different and that they need to act accordingly. For the last three generations the Western world, led by the US, has acted as has no other civilization in history, not as conquerors but as liberators. There have been mistakes, to be sure, but the motives and intentions have been to better and free mankind. Despite huge advantages over much of the world, we have not exploited those advantages. Despite a huge military disparity, we have used our capabilities to seek to improve the lot of nearly everyone on this planet. We need to recognize that there is a difference between us and others, and that while we have been conscientious guardians of dangerous technology, many others would not be, except for the fact that we retain a technological advantage. The leaders of the West need to recognize that we are different, accept that difference, and accept the responsibility that comes with that difference.
Allowing Iran, and the current Iranian regime, to build nuclear weapons is not an acceptable answer. The fact is that while policy wonks talk of risk, the real issue is the consequences. What are the consequences of failing to stop Iran? Certainly it means there will be more war in the war in the Mid East. Almost as certain is that it will involve nuclear weapons.
The West needs to act, and accept that there will be huge costs no matter what course we take, which is what happens when you wait too long to act. Iran must be forced to give up its nuclear weapon program. A definitive date must be given, the nearer the better. A third party embargo should be initiated by the US immediately to underline our determination. The international community must be told that there is going to be a definitive solution and that they must be prepared for it. After that date, the weapon program would be dismantled, either by the Iranians under close international scrutiny and supervision, or by the West, militarily, and irrespective of concerns about collateral damage. There should be no compromise.
Is this likely? It would seem at this point that it is not. But, the alternative is to stand and watch as first the Iranians, and later others, develop nuclear weapons and build nuclear arsenals. Eventually, perhaps in five years, certainly within 25 years, those weapons will be used, either by the regimes that built them or by others who have acquired the weapons. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, will die. The consequences of failing to stop this program – now - will be greater than the consequences of striking and destroying the program, no matter how great those are. And if the US and the West fail to act, within a generation there will be a nuclear detonation and the world will ‘wonder’ what might have been done to prevent the catastrophe.
* For those who have never watched Casablanca, Inspector Renault (played to perfection by Claude Raines) is a completely amoral policeman who, to please his NAZI minders who want Rick’s Café closed, announces that he is ‘shocked’ to find out that there is gambling going on in the back room. As he announces this, the croupier shows up and hands the Inspector some money with the quiet comment ‘Sir, your winnings.’
** There are only a couple of options: either the leaders of the world are truly shocked and surprised that the Iranians were not fully disclosing their nuclear program, in which case they – the leaders - are incompetent boobs; or they suspected that there were additional secret facilities (and more will be revealed in the future) and they chose to ignore that fact in the expectation that either someone else will address it (hope as a plan) or it will simply not matter to their country (whether that makes them naïve or appeasers is the subject of another discussion.)
