September 22nd, 2026 Autumnal Equinox

Politics - Trump In New York for the UNGA

- Duma final count: Putin gets 355 of 450 seats 

Combat Ops - More gains on the ground by both sides

- Strikes continue 

Economics - Ukraine economic damage

Weather

Kharkiv

63 and mostly cloudy. Heavy rain tomorrow and cloudy through the rest of the weekend into the weekend. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

67 and cloudy. Heavy rain tomorrow, mostly cloudy through the weekend except Friday, which will be partly sunny. Daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the upper 60s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

56 and partly cloudy. Rain tomorrow, then partly cloudy through the weekend. Daily lows around 50, daily highs around 60. Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Politics

President Trump chatted with reporters as he entered the UN building this morning and was asked if he had a message for President Putin. President Trump answered:

"Settle the war!" 

President Zelenskyy, also in New York for the UN General Assembly, will meet with President Trump while in New York, but, as I write this, the time of the meeting has not been released.

Zelenskyy spoke with Trump on Sunday, and has said that he is willing to engage in a ceasefire on energy infrastructure and is ready to work on an end to the war.

SecState Rubio commented on the idea of an energy ceasefire, considers it a “great idea…[a] ceasefire in which Ukraine’s infrastructure is not being targeted, Russian energy supplies are not being targeted as well.”

President of Lithuania Gitanas Nauseda, in New York for the UNGA, commented on a recent statement by President Trump:

“I have just received confirmation that the new rotation of U.S. troops is already on its way to Lithuania. We are grateful to @POTUS Donald Trump and the U.S. administration for this decision, which is important not only for Lithuania, but also for the security of the entire region.”

Shortly thereafter, Estonian Foreign Minister Tsahkna commented on the sustained US presence in Estonia:

"This is a strong signal of Allied unity and important element of deterrence and defence on NATO’s eastern flank.”

The final count in the Duma elections gives United Russia (Putin’s party) 355 of 450 seats, up from 315 in the current Duma. Considered of note is that 49 of the United Russia seats are now held by veterans, strengthening support of the war.

Ground Operations

Imagery confirmed small Russian gains south of Vovchansk (north-east of Kharkiv)

Ukrainian gains were noted about 6 miles north of Kupyansk, around the town of Zapadne, just west of the Oskil River. It should be noted that the source of this reporting show substantially smaller gains for Ukrainian forces in the region around Lyman, 50 miles further south, and again reinforces the difficulties in establishing a clear picture of the front line.

Imagery confirmed small Ukrainian gains north of Lyman, but the fact of the reports of Ukrainian attacks also confirm that Russian forces remain in the area and have not been pushed back as far as some reports claim. Clarifying who actual controls what terrain in this area remains problematic.

Ukrainian forces report that both sides are slowing the tempo of operations in the general area of Kupyansk and, while there are various reasons claimed, the issue appears to be the weather - the season: the first rains, and the loss of leaf coverage make off-road movement slower, and make movement forward (reduced concealment) more difficult. At the same time, rain and low clouds will reduce reconnaissance drone effectiveness and abet some movement.

Russian drones and artillery strikes continue into Slovyansk, Kramatorsk and Druzhivka, and glide bomb strikes were reported in the Kramatorsk and Druzhivka area. Of note, Russian glide bomb strikes have been reported on multiple bridges in the area, key GLOC targets as the autumn rains begin, ending the easy crossing of various rivers using fords rather than bridges.

While there is no reported change around Orikhiv, Russian forces continue to press on Orikhiv from the east and west; this is going to be a long fight, but Ukraine must hold this city. Loss of Orikhiv would destabilize the entire southern front.

Air and Maritime Operations

Both sides continue the long-range drone / cruise missile strikes. 

Both sides also continue the drone sniping across the front lines into the immediate rear (the vast majority less than 5 miles out).

Russian forces have launched more than 7,700 jet-powered long range strike drones into Ukrainian air space since they started using them earlier this year. Of those, 1,900 have been launched in the first 3 weeks of September. Ukrainian air defenses had achieved a better than 90% success rate in engaging the propeller-driven strike drones, but have, so far, only achieved a 60% success rate against the jet-powered drones.

Russia continues to expand production of its Geran (Russian made Shahed strike drones); current production is roughly 36,000 per year, but the expansion would add 28,000 more per year - a total of 64,000 per year by 2029.

Commercial satellite imagery shows a construction of a 450,000 square foot underground plant under construction at Alabuga, 125 east of Kazan, about 550 miles east of Moscow.

Ukrainian Forces

During the last 24 hours Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Samarra.

Russian Forces

During the night of September 21st-September 22nd Russian forces launched Iskander ballistic missiles, Zircon missiles and Kalibr missiles, 8 x Banderol loitering munitions and 212 x strike drones and into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down 1 cruise missile, 8 Banderol munitions, and 177 drones.

Damage was reported in Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Odessa, Poltava oblasts. Targets included the power grid, warehouses, industrial facilities and logistics related targets. Power outages were reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.

RuAF tacair struck at least 6 towns with glide bombs.

Civilian casualties included at least 6 killed and 19 wounded.

6 border towns in Sumy Oblast were struck with Russian artillery fire.

During the night of September 20th-September 21st Russian forces launched more than 172 x strike drones as well as an unspecified number of Banderol loitering munitions into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down 147 drones and 1 Banderol.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Sumy, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Targets included the power grid, warehouses, industrial facilities and logistics related targets. 

RuAF tacair struck at least 5 towns with glide bombs.

 Economic Reporting

         Feb22  Jun8 Jul9         Aug7 Sep4 Sep8 Sep21 Sep22

Brent      94.71   93.82 77.93 81.75 93.69 98.19 99.49 100.00

WTI     92.10   90.59 73.11 76.66 89.17 93.28 95.10 91.32

NG       3.97       3.14 3.12          2.64  2.95  2.95 2.84 2.96

Wheat     8.52           5.82   6.06 6.35          7.45   7.46 7.28 7.21

Ruble     85         73.10 76.31 82.61 86.38 86.21 83.75 84.25

Hryvnia 28.6 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.52 44.63 44.72 44.78

Urals 91.66 86.33 57.80 79.19 86.70 89.44 115.44 107.50

ESPO 94.52 95.51 73.53 78.79 94.52 98.44 126.03 123.40

Sokol 99.31 89.90 71.56 77.42 88.94 94.09 103.83 103.83

The Financial Times reports that the cumulative affect of Russian attacks has resulted in the destruction of half of Ukraine’s warehouses, and virtually all of the country’s steel production.

Oleksandr Vodoviz, Chief of Staff for the CEO of Metinvest (a consortium that owns and operates steel plants in Ukraine Italy, Bulgaria, the UK and the US), commented on the Financial Times report: 

"They knew everything about the plant; they knew exactly where to strike... We don't yet know how long the repairs will take: days, weeks, months, or years.”

Vodoviz noted that, essentially, Ukraine no longer has a metallurgical industry.

And Anton Zhemerdieiev, commercial director of "TAS Agro," a holding company that controls more than 250,000 acres of farmland, notes that farmers are now being forced to store wheat int heir own silos as there is nowhere to ship the wheat and no way to get the wheat out of the country.

"Right now, it feels as if everything is closed off on all sides… Port terminals are closed, and the Danube route is also largely blocked.”

Thoughts

The Duma elections, and the additional number of veterans in the Duma, will, presumably, assure Putin of continued support for the war. Meanwhile, the strikes on each country’s energy infrastructure continue. Diesel prices in the US now sit at around $6.25. The highest spike before this month was June 2022 when it briefly spike to 5.75. 

Prices in Moscow - still subsidized (though sales are rationed) - are around 74 rubles per liter, which translates in $3.70 per gallon. Gasoline prices sit around $3.35 per gallon). As I noted, there is rationing, with various companies selling 40 or 50 or 60 liters (10.5, 13, 15.8 gallons) per vehicle.

The Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries have caused considerable damage but Russia had a good deal of excess capacity and Ukrainian strikes have caused a great deal of damage to storage tanks, pumping stations and port facilities, but it isn’t clear how much damage to the processing plants themselves, particularly given the excess capacity residing at each refinery; getting a clear picture of damage and repair times remains difficult.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to damage Ukraine’s power grid, as well as other industries, as noted above. 

As noted yesterday, both countries seem to be in a “race to the bottom,” but Ukraine doesn’t appear to have as far to go.

v/r pete

 

SUMMARY SEPTEMBER 21st, 2026

Politics  - Duma Election - Putin’s party wins…

- Trump Zelensky to meet in New York at UNGA

Combat Ops - Drone and Missile Strikes continue 

- Ukrainian gains on the ground

Politics 

In Russia’s first parliamentary election since 2021, Putin's party has won. With 95% of the vote counted, Putin’s “United Russia” party has won 57.85% of the vote, with the Communist Party finishing 2nd with 13.87% of the vote. Other parties noted were: LDPR 8.65%, New People 7.52%, A Just Russia 5.08% and other  5.33%.

Voter turnout was 59.32%

Results were pretty much as predicted. 

It should be noted that there has been a good deal of conjecture that there’s going to be a large-scale mobilization after the Duma elections finish, with one claim suggesting that Russian army leadership wants 800,000 more troops. How exactly Russia could quickly train 800,000 troops (normal call-up is on the order of 300,000 troops) isn’t clear, but a call-up of an additional 500,000 troops would present a training and supply and logistics problem for the Russian army and a host of tactical targets for the Ukrainian drone and missile forces.

President Trump will meet with President Zelenskyy in the 21st run New York as they both traveled to the city for the UN General Assembly. Zelenskyy commented that “There is diplomatic momentum.”

Meanwhile, Presidential Advisor Kushner noted last week that the three sides are “getting closer,” and noted that there is general agreement on all issues except territorial ones.

The House passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 16th, and President Trump signed the act into law on the 18th.

Among other things, the law gives the President authority to impose tariffs of up to 100%  on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.

The State Department has approved the sale of $2.68 billion of air defense weapons and systems to Ukraine.

The sale includes S-300 Clone missiles and GAM-67 missiles, both of which are a bit of misnomers. The “S-300 Clone” is a new missile that can be launched from a Russian built S-300 launcher, and used for both in a surface-to-air and surface-to-surface mode.

The GAM-67 was a designator for a system developed in the 1970s, but this is a new, “medium range” missile, also designed to be used on Russian launchers, with a surface-to-surface anti-radiation capability (targets radars).  

Ukraine’s Energy Minister Shmyhal reports that Ukraine is in the process of building or repairing 10 GW of electric power capacity, while also upgrading their grid to work better with Europe’s grid. He did not provide a time line, but there is nearly universal recognition that Ukrainian civilians are going to face a difficult winter.

Ground Operations

Overall, the last 10 days have seen some real changes on the ground, but in some sense it is both “more and less.”

Ukrainian forces operating north-east of Slovyansk have, since perhaps the last week of August (with both sides, it is never clear when an operation began, and after the fact the dates are usually moved around, adjusted for maximum political and propaganda effect) Ukrainian forces operating south-east of Borova have been attacking Russian positions in the box north of the Donets River, west of the Zherebets River, and east of the Nitrius River (some Russian forces were actually west of the Nitrius as well). Overall, this is about 12 x 12 miles in size. Including the terrain just west of the Nitrius, Ukrainian forces have now cleared much of the roughly 100 square miles of terrain and are nearing the west bank of the Zherebets River.

At the same time, some Ukrainian reports are clearly contradicting other Ukrainian reports, and there appears to remain several pockets of Russian troops inside the former salient.

The Ukrainian attack included “flooding” the box with FPV drones as well as electronic warfare systems (jammers) to deny Russian drones as much as possible. In addition, they took advantage of what has been noted in the past: the Ukrainians are more adept at rapid movements and exploration of seams between enemy units.

That said, it is best not to read too much into this. 

The Russian army is deliberately slow in response, it prevents making errors of commission. This means the Ukrainian forces can find a gap and push into it and exploit it. But these gains are relatively small and when they run up against the developed Russian defensive positions they are stopped.

Also, reading between the lines, it appears that the Ukrainian forces took serious losses from the Russian fiber optic drones which are, obviously, not readily jammed.

This Russian position - salient - was sitting just north-east of Slovyansk and as such represented a real threat to that city. Russian forces pushing in from the north and east, while also pushing into the Kramatorsk from due east and through Kostiantinivka and Druzhivka in the south, placed the fortress belt at risk. Relieving the pressure on the north of Slovyansk helps to stiffen that defense.

But it mischaracterizes the war to suggest that the Russian forces were engaged in a wide flanking movement on the fortress belt, a la Guderian sweeping through Luxembourg and flanking the Maginot line. The Russian army isn’t built for that. This is a war of attrition and the Russian army is built for, and fights, a slow, deliberate, bloody attrition fight.

Elsewhere, fighting continues along most of the line. And there are several areas where fighting is well above the normal intensity, though still difficult to quantify. 

North-east of Kharkiv - in the north-east “corner” of Ukraine, Russian forces are pushing in from the east and from the north, in an attempt to cut off that section of the country. Reporting is not definitive but there appears to be a Ukrainian brigade (with perhaps 2,000 troops) in the area. Reports are again contradictory, with claims ranging from “all 2,000 have been encircled” to “500 Ukrainian troops in the pocket, 1,500 behind them, and their GLOC in and out of the pocket firmly in Ukrainian control.”

This last claim is probably closest to the truth right now, and Ukrainian forces, aided by, reportedly, heavy (heavier than normal) FPV drone use, are containing the Russians. Russian commitment of additional assets into the area would seem to be the key consideration. If they do so, the Ukrainian forces have few reserves to flow into that region and that would lead to another slow grind and gradual withdrawal.

However, there is no indication, given current force lay-down, that there would be a collapse, leaving a Ukrainian element trapped in the pocket. Rather, this is likely to be another long, slow squeeze, and commitment of additional forces by one side or the other being the deciding factor.

In and around Kostiantinivka the painfully slow Russian grind continues, and Russian forces now appear to have penetrated - probes and squad sized infiltration elements - nearly all of that city and Russian forces probably have real control of more than half of that city.

On the southern front, Russian forces continue to infiltrate into the eastern and western edges of Orikhiv, while also attempting to cut the major GLOCs into that city. Ukrainian forces report that additional Russian forces are flowing into the southern front, but that has not been confirmed.

Air and Maritime Operations

Both sides continue daily long range missile and drone strikes against energy infrastructure and logistics infrastructure targets. 

Without getting into a daily counter for the last 2 weeks, averages are running perhaps 150 - 200 drones and cruise missiles per day, with occasionally 500 or more drones and missiles fired into the enemy cities. Both sides are taking a good deal of damage, though it is difficult to escape the assessment that, as one analysts noted, it is a race to the bottom and Ukraine’s ocean isn’t as deep. 

It is also of note that Russian forces are increasingly using jet powered long-range drones and, as these are more difficult to shoot down, more get through.

In addition, Russian production of ballistic missiles continues to slowly inch up, reportedly to 100 per month as of this month, and the Patriot system is the only one that has shown a reliable capability against ballistic missiles.

 Economic Reporting

         Feb22  May8 Jun8 Jul9 Aug7 Sep4 Sep8 Sep21

Brent      94.71   100.50 93.82 77.93 81.75 93.69 98.19 99.49

WTI     92.10   94.91 90.59 73.11 76.66 89.17 93.28 95.10

NG       3.97      2.79           3.14 3.12           2.64  2.95 2.95 2.84

Wheat     8.52            6.14   5.82          6.06 6.35          7.45 7.46 7.28

Ruble     85         74.26 73.10 76.31 82.61 86.38 86.21 83.75

Hryvnia 28.6        43.90 44.64 44.51 44.73 44.52 44.63 44.72

Urals 91.66 92.56 86.33 57.80 79.19 86.70 89.44 115.44

ESPO 94.52 105.56 95.51 73.53 78.79 94.52 98.44 126.03

Sokol 99.31 95.96 89.90 71.56 77.42 88.94 94.09 103.83

Thoughts

Last week there was another body exchanged with Russian forces turning over 252 bodies and Ukrainian forces Turing over 23 Russian bodies. This brings the total since January 2025 to 20,813 Ukrainian bodies returned by Russia, and 424 Russian bodies returned by Ukraine.

Initially, the disparity in bodies returned was ascribed to the fact that Russians were advancing and therefore picking up bodies as they fell, but there were no Russian bodies falling offering an opportunity for Ukrainians to pick them up.

But, since March Ukraine has been making some advances, yet there are very few bodies being picked up. There is no explanation given.

Meanwhile, a new report is out from the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) on Russian casualties. The UGS claim is that Russia has suffered some 1.5 million casualties, and they note that this 1% of the Russian population.

No Ukrainian casualty numbers are reported; the Ukrainian government does not give casualty figures, though it has admitted that there were 51,000 KIAs as of early last year.

Simply put, given the nature of the war, the two sides using nearly identical technology, and nearly identical tactics, in very slow moving lines, it is difficult to conceive how casualty counts could be widely different- the UGS claims 8 to 1.

As it is, there is one independent group - Mediazone - that has a well established methodology for estimating Russian casualties and their numbers have been tracked closely to various figures that have leaked out from time to time though Russian courses. Said differently, I trust their numbers. Mediazone places the Russian KIA count - bottom - at 258,000. There is clearly an error rate to that, which could place it as high as 40% higher, or 350,000 KIA.

So, how many total casualties?

Medical personnel on both sides have commented that perhaps twice that many are wounded (though this number has recently been questioned by senior officers on the UGS), but that 70% of WIA return to full duty with 30 days (and 30% are assumed to not return to active duty). Additionally, casualty counts also include missing, prisoners and deserters. The missing and prisoner numbers are relatively low, perhaps 10,000 per side. The desertion numbers are known.

All compiled together yields the following numbers for Russia:

KIA / Severely Wounded / Other WIA / Missing + POW / Deserters

350,000 / 200,000 / 500,000 / 10,000 / 100,000 = 1,160,000

It is worth noting that most estimates for Ukrainian KIA, outside of Kyiv provided numbers, are in the range of 200,000 - 300,000 KIA (some are higher), which would give the following numbers (best case and the 2nd case), note that the desertion figure is known):

Best case:

200,000 / 140,000 / 360,000 / 10,000 / 300,000 = 1,010,000

2nd case:

300,000 / 180,000 / 420,000 / 10,000 / 300,000 = 1,210,000

These numbers represents 3 - 4% of the Ukrainian population.

v/r pete