As we watch Hosni Mubarak’s regime unravel, the image of the riots in Tehran and the collapse of the Shah’s government more than 30 years ago once again comes to mind. While the recent events in Tunisia were dramatic, they were both more spontaneous and of less importance to the US. What is worrisome about Egypt is the seeming presence of a plan, the orderly, un-armed rioters, the police and army who seemed to be playing a role in a well written play, appearing and disappearing, for the most part showing remarkable restraint.
It leads us to ask the question: if there were a plan, who were the planners? If Mubarak is being forced from office, who is behind the forcing?
While the obvious villains are the Muslim Brotherhood, it is probably not quite that simple. Are they involved? Certainly. But there must also have been orchestration from within, from the Egyptian Army, from the national police, and from key senior politicians who have yet to surface. Is Muhammed El Baradei involved in the scheme? Probably, though he may also be a pawn. Will a new government bring the Muslim Brotherhood into a power-sharing arrangement? Possible.
What is also possible is that this entire crisis was orchestrated by elements in the army that were concerned that Mubarak’s planned transition of power placed their power base at risk. The option therefore was to force him out through a ‘people power’ revolution. The plan probably entailed using the Muslim Brotherhood, wittingly or unwittingly. If they – the planners - are clever, the Brotherhood will be given some apparent elements of power in the new regime but no real authority. Mubarak and his erstwhile heir Gamal will be out of the way, a transition to a new regime will have been affected, and the Muslim Brotherhood will be neutralized, at least for a few years. There is of course a risk that someone misplays it and the plotters lose control. But the Egyptian army has been the de facto power base of the government for 68 years and they are not likely to give up that position.
What will all this mean to US interests? That, of course, is the ‘$64,000 question.’ Two key issues are central to those interests: the Camp David Accord, and the Suez Canal. The first, the Camp David Accord, has provided more than 30 years of peace between Egypt and Israel and has been the foundation for the belief that a negotiated settlement is possible. Anything that threatened that agreement would have dire consequences, stretching well beyond Egypt and across the entire Mid-East.
The second issue is the Suez Canal, a spot recognized as one of the few key strategic spots on the planet (convincingly argued as such by Mahan in 1900). The Suez Canal is a waterway of importance not simply to the West, but to the entire world. While more than 2 million barrels of oil move through the canal every day headed for Europe and the US, tens of thousands of tons of grains and foods move south through the canal, feeding the people of Arabia and East Africa. Interruption of food transport or even a brief price hike in food caused by concerns over access to the canal could cause more political damage to countries in that region then the hike in oil prices will cause either political or economic damage in the West. (Spikes in food prices were key to the unrest that brought about the regime change in Tunisia last month.) That kind of instability could threaten other governments and lead to even more regional unrest.
What is certain is that, despite the use of the word ‘democracy,’ we are not going to see anything like a Western democracy spring up along the Nile. We are likely to see another Army backed dictator, wrapped in the guise of someone bringing power to the people; less likely, we may see the rise of a radical Islamic democracy, similar in many ways (though different as well) to the one in Iran – though Sunni not Shia; least likely we may see an interim bureaucracy/kleptocracy rise to power during a ‘behind-the scenes’ power struggle.
Nevertheless, two points need to be kept in mind:
1) We could not have changed this outcome. Could we have applied pressure to Mubarak over the last 30 years to change the nature of regime? Certainly. And we did – both positive and negative pressure. But that pressure always had to take a back seat to other needs, in particular overall regional stability and the security of US interests. It is no good to say ‘yes, but in the long run that policy works against US interests in the long run’ simply because we would never get to the long run if we had been forced out of Egypt 5, 10, 15 or 20 years ago. Presidents must play with ‘the cards they are dealt’ and Egypt has been one of those cards since World War II.
2) We cannot dictate who comes to power next. There are various ways that the US can try to apply pressure – openly or quietly, diplomatically, using both carrots and sticks. But in the end the internal machinations of the various factions – to include the Army and the Muslim Brotherhood – will decide who rules in Egypt.
So, what can we do? We can and must send a clear signal that we support the people of Egypt in their desire to move toward a real democracy. We need to continue to send the signal that we support true democracy and the rise of real freedoms, not pseudo democracy providing a cloak in which to wrap an oppressive regime, as is currently the case in Iran. And we need to take every opportunity to support pro-Western, pro-liberal democracy movements in the Mid-East and around the world. At the same time we need to remember that US interests come first. If that means we need to support governments that behave in ways we don’t necessarily like, then that is what we need to do. Egypt may soon find itself under another de facto dictator straight out of the Egyptian army. If he guarantees the Camp David Accord and the security of the Suez Canal, and isn’t engaged in over-the-top suppression of his people’s rights, then we need to grit our teeth, quietly apply pressure where we can, and move on.
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