Shut Down - Please!

Shut Down!  Please!

Here’s the thing: they say the government is on the verge of shutting down.  I’m aware that there are all sorts of nuances to this, but at most what will happen is that there will be a delay in a few payments, but beyond that, this is a tempest in a teapot.  Washington will play their asinine games, and the nation will grind forward.

Here’s some important things to remember: we have gone 5 years without the President and the Senate passing a comprehensive budget – which is a violation of the law.

Since May the federal debt has – officially – not increased.  Meanwhile, we have accumulated roughly $200 billion in more debt; how’s that for bookkeeping?

Raising the debt limit is next; the President has stated that ‘raising the debt doesn’t mean that we are going to raise more debt.’  But it does if we follow His Spending plans.

We have nearly doubled our national debt in the last 5 years, and the current spending plan, under the guidance of the President, will continue running up an additional $500 billion in debt every year for the next 10 years – assuming economic forecasts are as favorable as they hope – and they never have been.

Federally mandated unfunded annuities have grown from $130 Trillion (with a T) in 2008 to over $210 Trillion in the last five years.

They say that the first step in any kind of recovery is recognition that there is a problem.  The government, and in particular this President and his minions, do not believe there is a problem.  I suspect that a shutdown will not yield any real change.  But we need to wake up – we aren’t ‘in up to our necks,’ we are in deep water, by analogy we are in water thousands of feet deep and we keep taking on more weight (debt).  We need to recognize that we are headed towards a catastrophe.

  

Right to Protect

 

Another mass shooting, and as night follows the day, another litany of calls for stricter gun control.  It was by any measure an horrific event, and the perpetrator – insane or not - committed what can only be called an evil act. But before we rush off to draft new laws, perhaps we need to look at a few facts.

1) The statistics concerning overall crime are clear; anyone interested in the effects of private firearm ownership on crime rates should read John Lott’s “More Guns, Less Crime.”  It is a dry book, but the statistical analysis has not been meaningfully challenged by anyone on any side of the argument; Lott established a strong statistical correlation between higher firearm ownership rates and lower crime rates, demonstrating that for every 1% increase in firearm ownership, there is at least a 1% reduction in overall crime rates.

2) In the last 30 years there have been 78 shootings in the United States that had four or more victims and was not a drug – gang related event.  Those 78 shootings resulted in 547 dead.  During that 30-year period there were 559,000 murders in the US – among 310 million people; less than 1/10^th of 1% of the murders were mass shootings. And while the US murder rate is higher than Europe’s, the violent crime rate in Europe is substantially higher than that in the US.

3) Violent crime in the US has fallen steadily over the last several decades.  The Justice Department states that between 1993 and 2011 firearm related murders dropped 39%, and non-fatal firearm related crimes dropped 69%.

4) In all but one of the ‘mass shooting’ events, the shootings took place in ‘Gun Free Zones,’ meaning that not one of those being attacked was able to defend himself.  For those who don’t know (to include a formerly elected official in Colorado), US military bases are perhaps the strictest gun free zones in the US. At the same time there are repeated reports every month of attempted violent crimes that are stopped by armed citizens; in short, when people are given the opportunity to defend themselves, they will.

5) While various politicians lauded the Washington DC police response, the truth is that about the best response time you can expect (unless there is a policeman serendipitously nearby) is three minutes from call receipt to response – and that in a dense urban area.  Average responses are longer.  Where I live it runs about 15 minutes.  This is not to criticize the police; but the police can’t be everywhere at once, they certainly aren’t mind readers, and they don’t know when and where a psychopath is going to strike.  And while the police may get there in 4 or 5 minutes, the odds are that the shooting has already taken place.  (The average violent crime lasts 3 minutes, start to finish.)

6) Courts have traditionally noted that the police – any police – are not here to protect you individually; they are here to ‘protect and serve’ the community.  They are here to find bad guys and arrest them.  The concept that somehow we can figure out how to get police to a shooting before bad guys kills someone is foolish – it can’t be done.

7) In this case the man used a shotgun, a weapon that hasn’t been outlawed even throughout Europe (and the weapon he took from the security personnel).  Even the Soviet Union allowed shotguns.  Restricting specific types of firearms solves nothing.

Which leaves us with this: 

A) The odds of getting into one of these situations is incredibly small – thank God

B) If you do find yourself in a mass shootings, it is almost a certainty that you are in a ‘no gun zone’

C) Given B, and assuming you are a law-abiding citizen, you will be unarmed

D) If you do find yourself inside a mass shooting, or for that matter in any violent crime, the police will almost to a certainty not arrive in time to help you

 

So, before we draft any more laws, how about we answer this question: Should you have the right to defend yourself?  Because no one else is going to.

Efficient and Effective?

A while ago I was at Arlington National Cemetery for the burial of a friend.  As usual, whenever I go to Arlington I also make sure I take the time to visit my mom and dad’s grave, as well as the graves of several other friends (and now the sons of several friends).  I also make it a point to visit some of the graves I don’t know, that is, I wander a little bit through the cemetery.  The cemetery is filled with true heroes, about whom we can rightly – in the words of George Patton – thank God that they lived.

One particular section is filled with thousands of unknown soldiers, all from the Civil War, men who fought and died in that great struggle, but were buried without any chance to learn their names.  There were more than a few people who were wandering through that section, stopping, saying a prayer, in some cases putting a flower down at the gravesite for these unknown souls.

But, luckily, they were chased away. 

Huh?  What?

Yes.  The rule at the cemetery is that if you have a pass to visit a family member’s grave, you are supposed to only visit that grave.  This is to prevent crowding and traffic jams, etc.  So, there are uniformed police who wander around and threaten to give you a ticket if you don’t leave.

Give me a break.

I have been to Arlington a lot.  I have never seen anyone park their car where it might truly block a road, I have never seen anyone not notice an approaching funeral cortege and having noticed not get out of the way.  Perhaps it has happened.  But I suspect it doesn’t happen often.  And there is the point that the Soldiers and Sailors and Airmen and Marines buried in the cemetery have earned the right to have a few guests now and then, even if they have no families.

This all came back to me the other day when I read that the hospital administrators at Walter Reed are closing a café used by folks going through rehab, leaving them to hike across the facility – in some cases as far as a half mile – in order to eat during weekends.  I understand that there are budgetary concerns everywhere, but really?  We can’t afford to keep a café open so these folks and their families can get a bite to eat?

What these two seemingly disparate incidents have in common is that they highlight how government bureaucracies really work.  Even in two cases as seemingly obvious as the national cemetery, where we bury our honored dead, or our largest hospital, where we are treating our wounded, in the end the real rule is that bureaucracies will be served, not the people, and that even a little power will corrupt.

Will the café issue be reversed?  I suspect it will be when it reaches the commanding officer.  Maybe not; maybe he doesn’t have the authority.  Thing of it is, this kind of thing should never happen.  But it will, again and again.  And this in a place where we would all think is the one place where you would never see such things. 

So, tell me, how is the bureaucracy acting in cases like: your health care?  Copying all your ‘electrivia’ (your e-mails, your cell phone, your texts, etc.)?  Safeguarding your rights?  Protecting your personal information?  Do you really trust the bureaucrats to make the right decisions?

How about the decisions the bureaucracy makes in regard to giving people clearances and access, such as with the man who murdered 12 people at the Navy Yard early this month?  It might be that this man represents a very small error rate.  On the other hand it might be that 99% of the people the government investigates and then grants access are good people – there is nothing to find – so whether the investigation is adequate or not becomes, practically speaking, irrelevant; those people will never be any cause for concern. Unfortunately, it also becomes, in practical terms, impossible to know how capable and complete are these background investigations. 

So, ask yourself this: which federal bureaucracies would serve as good examples of efficient and effective organizations?

Please send me your answers.

Washington Navy Yard Shooting

There has been another large scale shooting, this time at the Washington Navy Yard.  A number of people I know well work there, to include my brother.  I guess I am fortunate in some strange, eerie way that no one I know was injured, though that hardly feels like the right word.  But others are not so fortunate.  And with 12 dead there are scores of families - the immediate families and their relatives and friends - who now are suffering.  

There is little to say about this that is good.  And that is why I am particularly incensed with the comment made by some politician praising the DC police who responded 'quickly and efficiently,' or some such thing.  They responded in time to find 12 people dead.  And what is particularly frustrating is that this shooting took place on a Navy base, pieces of terrain in the US that have probably the lowest number of firearms per square foot or per capita of any in this nation.

Once again we are shown that the police, no matter how hard they try, do not get there in time if an evil SOB wants to kill people.  Washington DC is, despite the comical efforts of the Supreme Court, still a city effectively devoid of any legal firearms, and US military facilities are, if anything, even less tolerant of weapons.  And so, no one is able to protect themselves if a gunman comes onto the base.

I am sure we will now go through a host of security gyrations, with more spot checks, and more security at the front gates of bases.  Politicians will pontificate.  But the simple facts remain: 12 people are dead.  No law would have prevented this man from getting a weapon. The people inside were not able, and will not be allowed in the future, to defend themselves.  The police will not be able to respond in time to stop someone who is armed.

Deterrence, WMD and Syria

In the days since Syrian use of Chemical agents one of the terms of art that has been ‘thrown about’ is deterrence.  It is suggested by some that the US must act against Syria, that is it part of our deterrent posture vis-à-vis future use of other WMD (weapons of mass destruction), and that to fail to act against Syria will embolden others, such as Iran.

There is some truth in each of these statements, but, as with many of the discussions surrounding WMD, foreign policy and deterrence, what is left out is as important and perhaps more important than what is said.

To better understand deterrence we need to remember that deterrence takes place in the mind of the country – or more specifically, the leadership of the country we wish to deter.  This is critical.  We often (perhaps too often) hear politicians and generals talk about deterrence in terms of specific weapon systems, that this or that capability is needed to preserve ‘our deterrence.’  But the weapon systems are only one facet of the entire deterrence ‘equation.’  Deterrence (here defined in the specific terms of US national security, for ease of language, but the same concepts can be applied elsewhere) takes place when another country understands that for them to do certain things – use WMD, and specifically to use WMD against the US and its allies – is to guarantee a response from the US.

Two points are critical: that there is a guaranteed response, and by its very nature the response will be significant enough that it will deprive them of some capability that they hold dear.  Deterrence is, therefore, not about threats, and not about ‘warning shots,’ it is about the conviction in the mind of the other party that certain actions WILL result in action by the US.  What is equally important is that the other party be both certain that the action will result in a serious loss to them and that they not be certain as to what precisely will be the US the action (and their loss).

In the history of deterrence in the modern age the practitioners and students of deterrence identified several concepts that are relevant to help bound the problems associated with deterrence.  But these were based on a recognition that deterrence of the Soviet Union – which was the problem which defined the modern concept of deterrence – was a problem set in which two nations – the US and the Soviet Union – were led by (more or less) rational actors who understood the risk posed by the escalation of any situation.  This tended to put boundaries on their possible actions, or their responses to any given actions of the other country.  Concepts such as escalation ladders, and the use rational use of irrationality, and de-escalation, were developed in detail to provide clarity into what was possible, and how evaluate upon which ‘rung’ a crisis stood.  This was necessary in order to ensure that we not only understood the situation, but could also take the appropriate steps to control and de-escalate the situation.

(It is also important to understand that while deterrence demands clarity at the strategic level, it also requires some ambiguity, particularly at the tactical level.  Thus, those we wish to deter must clearly understand that there is a hard cost to certain actions, that the cost will exceed benefit – no matter how much they benefit, but the specifics will not become clear until after the shooting begins.  Obviously, this is not an easy line to ‘walk,’ and once that line is defined, the leadership in the White House needs to be very careful and clear before they make any changes to the line, because re-defining the line is a long, drawn out and difficult process.)

Central to control and de-escalation was and is an understanding of and a planning for wars that arise out of crisis, specifically a very tense crisis with a WMD capable country.  Yet, despite what it may seem, the US has generally avoided this kind of planning.  In the early days of the nuclear age – the 1950s and 1960s – there was a tendency to define all crises in terms of all or nothing, that either we do nothing or if a war starts it will lead to a full-blown nuclear engagement.  President Kennedy termed this the “holocaust or surrender” choice.  The point of the planners in stating things in these terms was to – obviously – avoid both.  But in so doing it tended to restrict the maneuvering room available to the President.

Today we are faced with a similar though mirror-image of this problem.  Executive branch and military planners seem to believe that there is no serious risk of the massive confrontation, no risk of uncontrolled escalation, and hence no real worry about the situation evolving into “holocaust or surrender.”  We find ourselves planning all crises from the middle rungs of the escalation ladder, with no serious fear that we may find ourselves forced to ‘climb further up the ladder’ (to borrow a concept from Herman Kahn in his work ‘On Escalation’ (see chapter 8)).

Thus the President and his senior staff lieutenants appear to believe that they can conduct operations against Syria not only with no meaningful tactical risk – that is, no risk to the launch platforms (the destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers or bombers) – but also no strategic risk at all, that nothing ‘over there’ could possibly develop in such a way that it might lead to a threat to the US.

Given the seemingly amateur, undeveloped strategic thinking that has been on display vis-à-vis Syria over the past several weeks, as well as the equally un-evolved thinking on other foreign policy concerns (one can only wonder what the White House really thinks about possible strategic options against Iran), it is reasonable to conclude at this point that the White House has done no real thinking as to what it might do if the strategic situation eroded quickly and the US were faced with a rapidly escalating crisis that involved WMD and a threat to the US and its allies.

Where does that leave the US?  First, the White House needs to understand that a certain level they already failed.  If the President actually meant to prevent the use of chemical warfare systems in his various comments about those weapons since March 2011 (as opposed to the remarks being simply cynical, politically motivated remarks directed at the US electorate), then he failed to deter Syrians; the chemical weapons have been used several times since his remarks.  Even if the weapons were used by other than the Syrian army acting under Assad’s orders, the White House still failed.  If US deterrence was strong and credible, Assad would have recognized it as such and taken steps to ensure that under no circumstances would those weapons ‘see the light of day.’  That did not happen, hence a failure in deterrence.

What can we do now?  Is it possible to get the deterrence status back to the ‘first rung of the ladder?’  Yes, but it will be difficult and take quite a while.  As for Assad and Syria, the first thing that has to take place is a demonstration that the White House understands who it is trying to deter, and that would need to include a private conversation with Assad, by someone he is likely to believe.  There is also probably a need to do something physical, something rash, something that might be perceived by Assad as irrational, but which would be understood by the Russians as ‘rationally irrational.’  But again, President Obama may have a very difficult time doing so, as he has no credibility with the Russian leadership.  And that can result in misinterpretation and instead of – in the wake of such an action – moving down to the first ‘rung of the ladder,’ we might very well find ourselves moving up the ladder.

So, the situation with Syria has become one of walking on eggshells.  Not getting involved does, in fact, send a signal to Iran that the US either has no stomach for confrontation, or perhaps worse, doesn’t understand what it – the US – just did at the strategic level by failing to act.  If the US takes some military action but the damage is such that the US response fails to deprive Assad of something of great value to him as dictator, then the action will demonstrate that the US does not understand deterrence and we will again have failed.  If the US overthrows Assad but fails to secure a Syria that supports US interests, we might restore US deterrent credibility but at the cost of a strategic defeat.  Only if the US action clearly sends a signal to Iran and North Korea, and to a lesser extent Russia and China, that the US not only will punish the users of WMD but also that the US understands the requirements of deterrence, while also depriving Assad of real capabilities that he values; only by walking that ‘tightrope,’ can the President properly respond to Syrian actions and restore some US deterrent credibility.

Is any action possible that would do that?  Probably not at this point.  The one possibility would be sustained combat operations with the intention of bringing down the Assad regime tied to support of one or another faction that would replace the Assad regime with a secular government.  But no such government would be possible without either a truly massive level of support from the US – probably significantly exceeding US support to Iraq over the past decade, or making the new government a de facto vassal state of Turkey.  And in Turkey we are seeing the gradual evolution of that government into an Islamist government from a secular one.  None of these are really viable options, and sustained combat operations against Syria might well leave the US facing Russian and even Chinese forces in the eastern Mediterranean.  All with a US deterrent posture that is significantly less developed then it must be.

And so, the White House – the President – now must attempt to rebuild the US deterrent posture.  As for the President, I would begin by quoting this advice from Dean Acheson to newly elected President John Kennedy, when Kennedy asked him what limits he should place on the use of nuclear weapons.  Acheson responded to the effect that, after doing his own research, he needed to sit down by himself and decide precisely what were his thresholds, and then having decided what they were, he must tell absolutely no one - ever.  That becomes the first step.

The second step is that the President needs to lead a discussion as to US goals: where is the US headed, and what do we want the world to look like when we get there.  After those grand national goals are clear, he must delegate the responsibility of developing the various elements of grand strategy to achieve those goals, the political, military, economic, scientific, industrial, societal and diplomatic strategies that are subsets of the grand strategy.  Some will not even be part of the US government, and in all of them there must be debate among the citizenry.  But the President is responsible for leading the discussion.

From these it will become possible to clearly identify US interests and therefore the boundaries, the limits we must defend – conceptual and real.  From those we can begin to build a real deterrence posture.  Because right now we arguably do not have one.

I am afraid, however, that none of this is going to happen. 

The fact is that deterrence – particularly vis-à-vis the US - is linked to everything else that the US does.  Every US action – every - is investigated and dissected by those abroad – friend and foe alike.  In fact, often – very often – US actions which were undertaken with no thought or intention of affecting any countries oversees or any US interests, are interpreted through the most bizarre ‘kaleidoscope’ by both our friend and foes, as they try to understand what the US is really trying to do.  Many in Washington inexplicably don’t seem to either understand this or appreciate it.  But the US is ‘the 800 pound gorilla,’ whether we like it or not.  Even if the gorilla is asleep, it best to keep an eye on him; when he is awake, even when happy he can make others nearby very worried.

Thus, consistency becomes a very valuable commodity; both to the US and to our friends and allies; to our allies for the most obvious reasons, and to us because it allows the US to be clear with those it would wish to deter.  Deterrence in fact, demands consistency.  Emerson noted that: “A Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.”  This has often been the response by pseudo-intellectuals whenever there has been a call for consistency in policy.  But Emerson didn’t say ‘Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,’ he said ‘A foolish consistency…’  Some consistency is foolish, but when we wish to send clear, serious, unambiguous signals to others, we must – at least in the beginning - be clear, serious and unambiguous.

Syria

 Let's review the Syrian situation: a nation of 21 million people and 71,400 square miles (the size of Virginia and West Virginia, with twice the population), ruled by Bashir Assad, who has ruled since 2000, when he succeeded his father Hafez Assad, who seized power in a 1970 coup.   Bashir has strong backing from the Russians (as his father had from the Soviets) and the Chinese, and has good relations with Iran.  While a strict secularist, he supports Hezbollah and Hamas in their activities against Israel.  (His father did the same; while pushing Palestinians into Lebanon and fomenting a prolonged civil war in that country that killed tens of thousands and left Lebanon a devastated and prolonged tragedy.)  The Assads are vicious, socialist dictators.

Syria has been engaged in a civil war since March of 2011, and more than 100,000 have died.  The major insurgent groups (Free Syrian Army, Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, Syrian Islamic Front, and the Al Nusra Front, among others) involve a wide array clans and tribes (Alawites, Druze, Kurds, etc., etc.) and originally included several groups that were pro-west.  The pro-West groups have lost ground and the major rebel groups right now are associated with - though not controlled by - the Muslim Brotherhood or Al Qaeda - though there are other rebel factions as well.

Iran is heavily invested in support to Assad. Turkey - which has a long border with Syria - is supporting several of the rebel groups, even as its leader - Prime Minister Recep Erdogan - drifts toward Islamic fundamentalism and authoritarianism.

Generally speaking, there are only two major versions of how the civil war will end: Assad will win - in which case he is going to be appreciative to those who supported him: Russia, Iran and China.  Or, Assad and his regime will lose - in which case he would probably be replaced by one or another group of Islamic radicals.  If Islamic radicals replace him there is a fairly good chance that they will not be able to hold the country together.  One of three things would then happen: the nation would settle into a prolonged factional war, with no one group achieving any real measure of control; Turkey (which is moving toward Islamic radicalism) would eventually move in and either take direct control or set up a puppet regime; Iran would move in and set up a puppet regime.

This is the situation the President has decided the US should confront.

Let's be clear: the use of chemical weapons - particularly on his own people, and even more to the point on civilians - is evil.  Assad - and I am confident he did this - should be held accountable.  Assad is evil; in a better world he would be hung from a tall oak tree.

But the world we live in doesn't necessarily provide that option.  The President, perhaps in an unguarded moment, warned of action if Syria 'crossed a red line;' the Syrians did.  Given the above situation (which is, in fact, the simplified version), what does the President hope to accomplish?

At the most basic level an attack by cruise missiles - even 500 or so, plus perhaps some other ordnance - bombs and missiles from heavy bombers or our allies, will destroy some key facilities - some radar sites, command buildings, perhaps some missile sites or airplanes, as well as some training and maintenance and storage facilities.  Chemical weapons sites would probably not be targeted: not only is there risk associated with targeting chemical weapons (you may end up releasing chemicals into the atmosphere), odds are that during the last few days, having informed the world of what we are thinking, the weapons have been moved.

If, as some have suggested, the President is preparing for a sustained bombing campaign, one that is aimed at destroying much of the Syrian military and undermining the Assad regime, then the President should be prepared to back a specific rebel group.  Failure to do so will leave a broken Syria as a prize to be grabbed by the strongest rebel group, and currently the strongest groups are not friendly to the US, US interests or to US allies in the region.  Of course, backing a particular rebel group means that US involvement runs the very real risk of becoming open ended.

Is there any reasonable chance of killing Assad in a bombing campaign?  Not really - even if we wanted to - which the President earlier asserted we do not (though as I write this that certainly might have changed).  But it is worth remembering that with 150,000 US troops in a fully occupied Iraq, and a sizeable reward offered to boot, it still took us 6 months to find Saddam.  There might be a ‘serendipitous’ event, but it shouldn’t be anything anyone counts on. 

On the other hand, the US needs to plan for his death, and his replacement by others who might be more capable, or more clever in brokering some sort of deal with certain rebel groups.  What is the plan if such an event takes place?  Are we prepared to abandon the rebel group we decided to back, if a better option comes along?

Returning to the issue of the strikes, what will a series of attacks accomplish?  We might destabilize Assad, and that might lead to his downfall.  But, consider this: what if, after 50 or 60 or 70 days of bombing Assad is still in power and doesn’t seem to be wavering?  Do we keep bombing?  How long?  What is more probable is that the Syrian government has already moved everything of any value at all into dense urban settings, making weapon options very difficult.  And after several weeks we will find that targeting is getting ever more difficult as the large, ‘obvious’ targets are destroyed.  Target selection will become more difficult, not because of weapon limitations but because of humanitarian and legal considerations.  Also, what if we cause a release of gas?

At that point it will tempting to put assets on the ground who can provide up close reconnaissance and target designation.  (Ideally, targeteers would probably want such folks on the ground right now, but you can’t have everything you want.)  We can then become even more accurate in our targeting of Syrian military assets.  But none of this ensures that we will kill Assad or cause his regime to collapse.  And, we should be prepared for re-supply efforts Iran, and probably from Russia.  (One of the bizarre twists in this is that if we attack Assad and he survives he will end up with a better military because he will probably get everything replaced with the latest generation of equipment from Russia.) And, if we attack Assad and he survives: is he likely to be contrite?  Or will he stand up in front of the world and says: 'You tried, but I'm still here.' He would be energized, and US political standing might be damaged some more.

And if Assad’s regime collapses? Then what?  Perhaps a radical Islamic group takes over?  Are we prepared to back ‘our’ rebel group and prevent the other rebel group from coming to power?  What if the Islamist rebel group has majority support?

And what are the long-term impacts?  What will be the political consequences in a year, 2 years, and 10 years?  If Assad is replaced by an extreme Islamist group, one that has the strong backing of Iran, what is the next step – the sequel – to this plan?  If Assad starts teetering and the Iranians send Iranian forces to support him, are prepared to engage the Iranians?

Nations should act in accordance with national interest and long-term goals.  But there has been precious little discussion of either.  The use of chemical weapons is despicable, but is a response warranted without regard to the consequences, to the second and third order effects, to the long-term impact on US interests?

The President is seemingly prepared to engage in unilateral military action to cover what might be an inadvertent and amateurish policy declaration but that hardly constitutes a casus belli.  What the nation needs is a cogent discussion on US interests and long-term US goals.  And that requires some real leadership.  But we are seeing little of that come out of Washington.  Instead, what we get out of the President is a statement that ‘my credibility isn’t on the line, Congress and America’s credibility is on the line.’  (Interesting that the President of the United States can parse the situation in such a way that the credibility of the US might be affected without affecting the credibility of the President of the US…)

And despite the initial hullabaloo, last week the President decided that the Syrian crisis could wait; that Congress should perhaps be involved in the decision to go to war – despite the fact that it is accepted by virtually everyone that the President does have the authority to engage US forces, though he must then comply with the Constitution and the War Powers Act if forces are to remain engaged more than 30 days.  Now, both houses of Congress are engaged in the debate; that is a good thing.  After we get past issues of bravado and assertions that action is necessary to protect US credibility, the House and Senate need to ask substantive questions to the President and his minions:

What do you intend to accomplish?  Words are important here; the President et al must not talk about hopes and desires, but about those things they can force to happen.  Then they must spell out how they will force them to happen.  And, they must detail to Congress how much it will cost – in a worst-case scenario – to achieve those aims.

Assuming Congress agrees in the abstract that the aims of the President are worth further consideration, how will we know, after the initial strikes, whether we have achieved those goals?  And, if the initial strikes fail to achieve their goals, what is the next step?  (The draft proposal is focused on further use of chemical weapons; short of destroying all WMD, how can we prevent future use?)

How might this operation go in a different direction then the one planned?  And what might be the long-term consequences?  What is the plan if long-term consequences are as negative as some have forecasted, such as Assad being replaced by a strongly pro Al Qaeda regime?

6000 years of history have shown that nothing goes as expected (never mind planned) once a war starts.  Rather, wars have a way of getting out of control - quickly, moving in odd directions, and lasting far longer than expected.  US troops remain in Kosovo 15 years after that operation; the Clinton White House said it would last 3 or 4 weeks.  60 years after the ceasefire, US forces remain in Korea.  US forces are deployed around the world in various stability operations that have lasted decades.  What are we prepared to do in regard to Syria?  At the least we should expect that this operation will also ‘go sideways.’  Are we ready for that additional cost in manpower, material, weapons, and money?

The President is making the case that some things are of such grave concern that they warrant refocusing assets no matter the cost.  He is stating that some things are so important that they trump all – or at least most – other activities.  In short, he is stating that we must ‘get our priorities right.’  If that is the case, the corollary is that the federal government needs to be lean, and focused on those things that place the nation at risk.  The Congress should take this as a signal to take a hard look at not only the military but the entire federal government and start significant reductions and realignments in spending so that the nation has the capital and other assets it needs so that the President can adequately respond to emerging threats in a dangerous world. 

The President, Congress and the Pentagon need to stop making budgets and then fitting strategies into those budgets, and instead engage in a serious discussion about US goals, and the necessary plans to achieve those goals, and the force structure needed to execute those plans and then build accordingly.  The President has said we need to be able to act unilaterally: that represents a policy shift of truly massive proportions and signals a need for an A to Z review of US national security capabilities and forces.

Finally, Congress needs to ask how we got here; how a series of poor strategic decisions over the past 5 years, to include ignoring the Syrian civil war for 18 months, led us to the current situation.  We need to understand how that happened so that perhaps this particular set of mistakes won’t happen again.

It is critical that we get these – and other questions – fully answered.  More than two centuries ago Frederick the Great, the King of Prussia, a great general and a great political theoretician and writer, noted that ‘errors in tactics can be corrected in the next battle, but errors in strategy can only be corrected in the next war.’  The President wishes to commit the US to a war with Syria.  We had best be crystal clear as to goals and strategy before we enter that war or we will find, as Frederick noted, that we will be able to fix our mistake only at great cost in time, national treasure and lives.