Deterrence, WMD and Syria

In the days since Syrian use of Chemical agents one of the terms of art that has been ‘thrown about’ is deterrence.  It is suggested by some that the US must act against Syria, that is it part of our deterrent posture vis-à-vis future use of other WMD (weapons of mass destruction), and that to fail to act against Syria will embolden others, such as Iran.

There is some truth in each of these statements, but, as with many of the discussions surrounding WMD, foreign policy and deterrence, what is left out is as important and perhaps more important than what is said.

To better understand deterrence we need to remember that deterrence takes place in the mind of the country – or more specifically, the leadership of the country we wish to deter.  This is critical.  We often (perhaps too often) hear politicians and generals talk about deterrence in terms of specific weapon systems, that this or that capability is needed to preserve ‘our deterrence.’  But the weapon systems are only one facet of the entire deterrence ‘equation.’  Deterrence (here defined in the specific terms of US national security, for ease of language, but the same concepts can be applied elsewhere) takes place when another country understands that for them to do certain things – use WMD, and specifically to use WMD against the US and its allies – is to guarantee a response from the US.

Two points are critical: that there is a guaranteed response, and by its very nature the response will be significant enough that it will deprive them of some capability that they hold dear.  Deterrence is, therefore, not about threats, and not about ‘warning shots,’ it is about the conviction in the mind of the other party that certain actions WILL result in action by the US.  What is equally important is that the other party be both certain that the action will result in a serious loss to them and that they not be certain as to what precisely will be the US the action (and their loss).

In the history of deterrence in the modern age the practitioners and students of deterrence identified several concepts that are relevant to help bound the problems associated with deterrence.  But these were based on a recognition that deterrence of the Soviet Union – which was the problem which defined the modern concept of deterrence – was a problem set in which two nations – the US and the Soviet Union – were led by (more or less) rational actors who understood the risk posed by the escalation of any situation.  This tended to put boundaries on their possible actions, or their responses to any given actions of the other country.  Concepts such as escalation ladders, and the use rational use of irrationality, and de-escalation, were developed in detail to provide clarity into what was possible, and how evaluate upon which ‘rung’ a crisis stood.  This was necessary in order to ensure that we not only understood the situation, but could also take the appropriate steps to control and de-escalate the situation.

(It is also important to understand that while deterrence demands clarity at the strategic level, it also requires some ambiguity, particularly at the tactical level.  Thus, those we wish to deter must clearly understand that there is a hard cost to certain actions, that the cost will exceed benefit – no matter how much they benefit, but the specifics will not become clear until after the shooting begins.  Obviously, this is not an easy line to ‘walk,’ and once that line is defined, the leadership in the White House needs to be very careful and clear before they make any changes to the line, because re-defining the line is a long, drawn out and difficult process.)

Central to control and de-escalation was and is an understanding of and a planning for wars that arise out of crisis, specifically a very tense crisis with a WMD capable country.  Yet, despite what it may seem, the US has generally avoided this kind of planning.  In the early days of the nuclear age – the 1950s and 1960s – there was a tendency to define all crises in terms of all or nothing, that either we do nothing or if a war starts it will lead to a full-blown nuclear engagement.  President Kennedy termed this the “holocaust or surrender” choice.  The point of the planners in stating things in these terms was to – obviously – avoid both.  But in so doing it tended to restrict the maneuvering room available to the President.

Today we are faced with a similar though mirror-image of this problem.  Executive branch and military planners seem to believe that there is no serious risk of the massive confrontation, no risk of uncontrolled escalation, and hence no real worry about the situation evolving into “holocaust or surrender.”  We find ourselves planning all crises from the middle rungs of the escalation ladder, with no serious fear that we may find ourselves forced to ‘climb further up the ladder’ (to borrow a concept from Herman Kahn in his work ‘On Escalation’ (see chapter 8)).

Thus the President and his senior staff lieutenants appear to believe that they can conduct operations against Syria not only with no meaningful tactical risk – that is, no risk to the launch platforms (the destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers or bombers) – but also no strategic risk at all, that nothing ‘over there’ could possibly develop in such a way that it might lead to a threat to the US.

Given the seemingly amateur, undeveloped strategic thinking that has been on display vis-à-vis Syria over the past several weeks, as well as the equally un-evolved thinking on other foreign policy concerns (one can only wonder what the White House really thinks about possible strategic options against Iran), it is reasonable to conclude at this point that the White House has done no real thinking as to what it might do if the strategic situation eroded quickly and the US were faced with a rapidly escalating crisis that involved WMD and a threat to the US and its allies.

Where does that leave the US?  First, the White House needs to understand that a certain level they already failed.  If the President actually meant to prevent the use of chemical warfare systems in his various comments about those weapons since March 2011 (as opposed to the remarks being simply cynical, politically motivated remarks directed at the US electorate), then he failed to deter Syrians; the chemical weapons have been used several times since his remarks.  Even if the weapons were used by other than the Syrian army acting under Assad’s orders, the White House still failed.  If US deterrence was strong and credible, Assad would have recognized it as such and taken steps to ensure that under no circumstances would those weapons ‘see the light of day.’  That did not happen, hence a failure in deterrence.

What can we do now?  Is it possible to get the deterrence status back to the ‘first rung of the ladder?’  Yes, but it will be difficult and take quite a while.  As for Assad and Syria, the first thing that has to take place is a demonstration that the White House understands who it is trying to deter, and that would need to include a private conversation with Assad, by someone he is likely to believe.  There is also probably a need to do something physical, something rash, something that might be perceived by Assad as irrational, but which would be understood by the Russians as ‘rationally irrational.’  But again, President Obama may have a very difficult time doing so, as he has no credibility with the Russian leadership.  And that can result in misinterpretation and instead of – in the wake of such an action – moving down to the first ‘rung of the ladder,’ we might very well find ourselves moving up the ladder.

So, the situation with Syria has become one of walking on eggshells.  Not getting involved does, in fact, send a signal to Iran that the US either has no stomach for confrontation, or perhaps worse, doesn’t understand what it – the US – just did at the strategic level by failing to act.  If the US takes some military action but the damage is such that the US response fails to deprive Assad of something of great value to him as dictator, then the action will demonstrate that the US does not understand deterrence and we will again have failed.  If the US overthrows Assad but fails to secure a Syria that supports US interests, we might restore US deterrent credibility but at the cost of a strategic defeat.  Only if the US action clearly sends a signal to Iran and North Korea, and to a lesser extent Russia and China, that the US not only will punish the users of WMD but also that the US understands the requirements of deterrence, while also depriving Assad of real capabilities that he values; only by walking that ‘tightrope,’ can the President properly respond to Syrian actions and restore some US deterrent credibility.

Is any action possible that would do that?  Probably not at this point.  The one possibility would be sustained combat operations with the intention of bringing down the Assad regime tied to support of one or another faction that would replace the Assad regime with a secular government.  But no such government would be possible without either a truly massive level of support from the US – probably significantly exceeding US support to Iraq over the past decade, or making the new government a de facto vassal state of Turkey.  And in Turkey we are seeing the gradual evolution of that government into an Islamist government from a secular one.  None of these are really viable options, and sustained combat operations against Syria might well leave the US facing Russian and even Chinese forces in the eastern Mediterranean.  All with a US deterrent posture that is significantly less developed then it must be.

And so, the White House – the President – now must attempt to rebuild the US deterrent posture.  As for the President, I would begin by quoting this advice from Dean Acheson to newly elected President John Kennedy, when Kennedy asked him what limits he should place on the use of nuclear weapons.  Acheson responded to the effect that, after doing his own research, he needed to sit down by himself and decide precisely what were his thresholds, and then having decided what they were, he must tell absolutely no one - ever.  That becomes the first step.

The second step is that the President needs to lead a discussion as to US goals: where is the US headed, and what do we want the world to look like when we get there.  After those grand national goals are clear, he must delegate the responsibility of developing the various elements of grand strategy to achieve those goals, the political, military, economic, scientific, industrial, societal and diplomatic strategies that are subsets of the grand strategy.  Some will not even be part of the US government, and in all of them there must be debate among the citizenry.  But the President is responsible for leading the discussion.

From these it will become possible to clearly identify US interests and therefore the boundaries, the limits we must defend – conceptual and real.  From those we can begin to build a real deterrence posture.  Because right now we arguably do not have one.

I am afraid, however, that none of this is going to happen. 

The fact is that deterrence – particularly vis-à-vis the US - is linked to everything else that the US does.  Every US action – every - is investigated and dissected by those abroad – friend and foe alike.  In fact, often – very often – US actions which were undertaken with no thought or intention of affecting any countries oversees or any US interests, are interpreted through the most bizarre ‘kaleidoscope’ by both our friend and foes, as they try to understand what the US is really trying to do.  Many in Washington inexplicably don’t seem to either understand this or appreciate it.  But the US is ‘the 800 pound gorilla,’ whether we like it or not.  Even if the gorilla is asleep, it best to keep an eye on him; when he is awake, even when happy he can make others nearby very worried.

Thus, consistency becomes a very valuable commodity; both to the US and to our friends and allies; to our allies for the most obvious reasons, and to us because it allows the US to be clear with those it would wish to deter.  Deterrence in fact, demands consistency.  Emerson noted that: “A Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.”  This has often been the response by pseudo-intellectuals whenever there has been a call for consistency in policy.  But Emerson didn’t say ‘Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,’ he said ‘A foolish consistency…’  Some consistency is foolish, but when we wish to send clear, serious, unambiguous signals to others, we must – at least in the beginning - be clear, serious and unambiguous.