More than 100 years ago
Chancellor of Germany Otto Von Bismarck, remarked that there was nothing in the
Balkans ‘worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier.’ The same is now being said by some
about Eastern Europe.
We begin with this: Tsar Putin
intends to expand the Russian empire.
This is not an idea new to him.
Expansion of the empire has been a Russian imperative since Tsar Ivan
(the Terrible) recognized that the cities of Moscow and Kiev – heart of his new
empire – were not readily defensible.
They were and are surrounded by grasslands, with no major features –
canyons, deep and fast rivers, mountains, or seas – that provided any natural
bulwark. The only defense was and is depth – increase the distance an enemy
must to travel to reach Moscow.
And so was born the imperative
for space, something now bread into the Russian culture by more than 400 years
of both expansion (their own) and attack (from Tatars, Swedes, French,
Ottomans, Germans, etc.) From Peter
the Great through Stalin to Putin, Russians understand and prize that space,
those buffer zones.
And so, very simply, Putin
intends to get Ukraine back.
We can argue whether Ukraine is
really ‘little Russia’ or Belarus is ‘white Russia.’ But it doesn’t matter what we call it or how we label the
people who live there. Putin wants
them, and their land, back under Russia’s flag. And he will occupy Ukraine, and later other lands, unless
and until he is stopped. Frankly,
it is almost a fait accompli that he will get Eastern Ukraine; for them it is
arguably already too late.
This is why we are now facing a
grave danger. First, let us accept
that in the near term – the next 5 years at a minimum – only the US has the
overall military means to stop Russia.
Europe on its own does not have several of the major elements needed to
present a viable blocking force, one that would serve to preempt warfare before
it began, whether the intelligence assets, the command and control, the
logistics, or the quantity of smart ordnance necessary to present a viable
counter-force. Russia understands that as well as the members of NATO. Without
vigorous US participation any NATO blocking force would only serve as a trip
wire for further escalation, not as a credible opposition that would signal
real intent to deter.
But in the US two major political
‘camps’ are now, interestingly, aligned against the notion of US
involvement. On the left is the
President, the leadership of the Democratic Party, and the establishment left. They want to withdraw the US from
overseas involvement and spend the wealth of the US on various entitlement
programs. In their opinion the US
has no justification in getting involved in these various crises, particularly
one between Russia and the Ukraine or Eastern Europe. They eschew the concept of American exceptionalism and
regard US actions in many cases as no different then Russia’s or anyone
else. (Except, of course, when
they don’t; the left’s willingness to be arbitrary in this regard is remarkable.) In any case, as the left sees things,
words may be exchanged, but no meaningful use of force is contemplated by the
White House.
Further, and perhaps more
importantly, they undermine the significance of US nuclear forces and the
importance, on many levels, of friendly and allied nations ‘living under the US
nuclear umbrella.’
On the other hand, many
libertarians hold that the US should focus on the US, that if Europe wants to
be safe from Russia, then Europe needs to take the necessary actions – they
have a combined economy as large as the US, and more people – and that it is
preposterous for the US to stand in their defense when they will not. Their view, like that of Bismarck, is
that it is simply not worth the life of a single American. To put it in the terminology of foreign
policy, it is not a vital US national interest.
There are several counter
arguments. The simplest is that we
are members of NATO, and the treaty which created and governs NATO (of which
the US was and is the driving force) contains this (Article V – in part): ‘an
attack against one … shall be considered an attack against all.’
Beyond the call to honor our
treaty obligations, and thus maintain our credibility, is the call that
Europe’s peace and security IS a vital US national interest, that preserving
peace among our trading partners and allies, and moving to prevent war (or
conquest) is clearly a US concern.
Both of these arguments have
merit, but also can be challenged, and any intelligent debate on US national
interests can question as to exactly when the US should honor the treaty or
decline to do so, as it is always the case that every nation must first act in
its own interest, and that might mean not honoring a treaty. (Rational
discussion and the making of cogent strategies requires that such questions at least
be honestly asked and answered, even when it is readily apparent that honoring
treaties in and of itself is a vital national interest.)
But there are more fundamental
issues at stake; Russia is expanding, China is expanding, and there is an ugly
trend in other corners of the planet that suggest the last several decades of
relative peace (believe it or not) are drawing to a close. We may let Russia have its way in the
Ukraine, but if we do, they will move against Moldova after that, then the
Baltic States, and then perhaps Finland.
Certainly, Georgia will be on the list, then Azerbaijan and
Armenia. Then what? Romania and Bulgaria? Turkey? And then: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech
Republic? When will it be in the
US national interest to stop this expansion?
Further, there are now reports
from Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine that Jews are being told to register, a
horrible mirror of an 80-year-old evil. As the situation moves closer to war we
can expect that there will be efforts to generate a ‘scape-goat.’ Will the Jewish minority be once again
terrorized for their religion?
The concerns are greater than the
issues laid out above. For example, as has percolated out recently in an
article by Seymour Hersh re the current administration’s planning against
Syria, there was a growing momentum in 2012 to pound Syria into rubble. In and of itself such actions might not
be a bad idea, the Assad regime are criminal thugs. Heavy applications of force
under the right circumstances can be the correct operational response. But in
this case it smacks of something else, it smacks of petulance. And this administration has all the
earmarks of petulant leadership, the passive-aggressive response to any
difficult situation, the pontification that is supposed to bring immediate
agreement, the anger when it doesn’t, and then, at some point, the heavy-handed
response.
The problem with petulance of
course, is that, in the international arena petulance often leads to escalating
tensions. And when weapons are
displayed, a hard-nosed practitioner of real politik like Putin will not
respond to White House bullying in the same manner as a small business or a
non-profit organization with one-billionth the assets of the federal
government. Instead, what
sometimes happens is that the situation takes a turn that is both unexpected by
the players, and usually violent.
This kind of thing has been
war-gamed in the past. And the
results were never satisfactory.
In the 1970s and 1980s war games were held that tested how rational and
cautious were various decision-makers, with samplings of both uniformed and
civilian personnel. In far too
many cases civilians, particularly those who held a low opinion of the
military, routinely failed at first to respond to provocations, often allowing
themselves to be forced into difficult positions, then allowed situations to
escalate with little control, and tried to use nuclear weapons to restore
order. And that never worked.
In short, unprofessional
decision-making, rashness and passive-aggressive leadership invariably led to
uncontrolled escalation, and a host of unintended and negative consequences.
Arguably that is where we were
headed in Syria (and perhaps still are). And it may well be where we are headed
with regard to Eastern Europe and Ukraine. Delay, garbled ‘signals’ between Washington and Moscow,
words without actions, etc., and Putin will come to believe that he has nothing
meaningful to fear from Washington.
And then he will take a step that the White House suddenly fears has
gone too far and they will over-react, precipitating a much greater crisis.
There is one final issue with a
failure to act to, at least in some way, protect Ukraine, and it is of the
greatest concern; such a failure to act will send one real signal to every
thinking leader around the world: nuclear weapons count. When the Soviet Union fractured,
Ukraine was left with 176 ICBMs and more than 1,900 nuclear warheads. Ukraine turned those warheads over to
Russia in 1994 under the terms of the Budapest Memorandum, because under the
memorandum the US and UK pledged to ensure Ukraine’s security. It goes without saying that the only
meaningful threat to Ukraine’s security then or now was Russia.
The lesson is obvious: Ukraine
would face a different security threat from Russia today if it had retained
those nuclear weapons. North Korea
recognizes this, so does Iran. So do many others, and the list is not one
packed with believers in democracy and the rights of man.
Putin is not a bully, the analogy
is inapt. Putin is an amoral,
power hungry practitioner of hardball politics. He also, in his own twisted way, loves Russia (don’t get
dewy eyed, Hitler loved Germany.) Behind him he has groomed a handful of
deputies. If Putin goes, he will
be replaced by a very similar figure.
The expansion will continue.
China, which is watching this very closely, struggles to rebuild the
maritime reaches of the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasty and casts a
covetous eye on the South China Sea, Singapore and points south. This is ‘real politik,’ nothing
more. And they both will take
their cue from what happens in the next 12 months or so.
We have a very clear choice – act
now or later. Act now and we stand
a chance of defusing this problem.
And of telling the world that nuclear weapons are not necessary for
guaranteeing your security. The
longer we wait, the greater the likelihood that this situation spins out of
control (and the greater the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation in the
long run). And then a question of
the security of Eastern Europe will become a question of the security of the
United States.