In Defense: Ukraine, NATO and the US

More than 100 years ago Chancellor of Germany Otto Von Bismarck, remarked that there was nothing in the Balkans ‘worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier.’  The same is now being said by some about Eastern Europe.

We begin with this: Tsar Putin intends to expand the Russian empire.  This is not an idea new to him.  Expansion of the empire has been a Russian imperative since Tsar Ivan (the Terrible) recognized that the cities of Moscow and Kiev – heart of his new empire – were not readily defensible.  They were and are surrounded by grasslands, with no major features – canyons, deep and fast rivers, mountains, or seas – that provided any natural bulwark. The only defense was and is depth – increase the distance an enemy must to travel to reach Moscow.

And so was born the imperative for space, something now bread into the Russian culture by more than 400 years of both expansion (their own) and attack (from Tatars, Swedes, French, Ottomans, Germans, etc.)  From Peter the Great through Stalin to Putin, Russians understand and prize that space, those buffer zones.

And so, very simply, Putin intends to get Ukraine back.

We can argue whether Ukraine is really ‘little Russia’ or Belarus is ‘white Russia.’  But it doesn’t matter what we call it or how we label the people who live there.  Putin wants them, and their land, back under Russia’s flag.  And he will occupy Ukraine, and later other lands, unless and until he is stopped.  Frankly, it is almost a fait accompli that he will get Eastern Ukraine; for them it is arguably already too late.

This is why we are now facing a grave danger.  First, let us accept that in the near term – the next 5 years at a minimum – only the US has the overall military means to stop Russia.  Europe on its own does not have several of the major elements needed to present a viable blocking force, one that would serve to preempt warfare before it began, whether the intelligence assets, the command and control, the logistics, or the quantity of smart ordnance necessary to present a viable counter-force. Russia understands that as well as the members of NATO. Without vigorous US participation any NATO blocking force would only serve as a trip wire for further escalation, not as a credible opposition that would signal real intent to deter.

But in the US two major political ‘camps’ are now, interestingly, aligned against the notion of US involvement.  On the left is the President, the leadership of the Democratic Party, and the establishment left.  They want to withdraw the US from overseas involvement and spend the wealth of the US on various entitlement programs.  In their opinion the US has no justification in getting involved in these various crises, particularly one between Russia and the Ukraine or Eastern Europe.  They eschew the concept of American exceptionalism and regard US actions in many cases as no different then Russia’s or anyone else.  (Except, of course, when they don’t; the left’s willingness to be arbitrary in this regard is remarkable.)  In any case, as the left sees things, words may be exchanged, but no meaningful use of force is contemplated by the White House.

Further, and perhaps more importantly, they undermine the significance of US nuclear forces and the importance, on many levels, of friendly and allied nations ‘living under the US nuclear umbrella.’

On the other hand, many libertarians hold that the US should focus on the US, that if Europe wants to be safe from Russia, then Europe needs to take the necessary actions – they have a combined economy as large as the US, and more people – and that it is preposterous for the US to stand in their defense when they will not.  Their view, like that of Bismarck, is that it is simply not worth the life of a single American.  To put it in the terminology of foreign policy, it is not a vital US national interest.

There are several counter arguments.  The simplest is that we are members of NATO, and the treaty which created and governs NATO (of which the US was and is the driving force) contains this (Article V – in part): ‘an attack against one … shall be considered an attack against all.’

Beyond the call to honor our treaty obligations, and thus maintain our credibility, is the call that Europe’s peace and security IS a vital US national interest, that preserving peace among our trading partners and allies, and moving to prevent war (or conquest) is clearly a US concern.

Both of these arguments have merit, but also can be challenged, and any intelligent debate on US national interests can question as to exactly when the US should honor the treaty or decline to do so, as it is always the case that every nation must first act in its own interest, and that might mean not honoring a treaty. (Rational discussion and the making of cogent strategies requires that such questions at least be honestly asked and answered, even when it is readily apparent that honoring treaties in and of itself is a vital national interest.)

But there are more fundamental issues at stake; Russia is expanding, China is expanding, and there is an ugly trend in other corners of the planet that suggest the last several decades of relative peace (believe it or not) are drawing to a close.  We may let Russia have its way in the Ukraine, but if we do, they will move against Moldova after that, then the Baltic States, and then perhaps Finland.  Certainly, Georgia will be on the list, then Azerbaijan and Armenia.  Then what?  Romania and Bulgaria?  Turkey?  And then: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic?  When will it be in the US national interest to stop this expansion?

Further, there are now reports from Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine that Jews are being told to register, a horrible mirror of an 80-year-old evil. As the situation moves closer to war we can expect that there will be efforts to generate a ‘scape-goat.’  Will the Jewish minority be once again terrorized for their religion? 

The concerns are greater than the issues laid out above. For example, as has percolated out recently in an article by Seymour Hersh re the current administration’s planning against Syria, there was a growing momentum in 2012 to pound Syria into rubble.  In and of itself such actions might not be a bad idea, the Assad regime are criminal thugs. Heavy applications of force under the right circumstances can be the correct operational response. But in this case it smacks of something else, it smacks of petulance.  And this administration has all the earmarks of petulant leadership, the passive-aggressive response to any difficult situation, the pontification that is supposed to bring immediate agreement, the anger when it doesn’t, and then, at some point, the heavy-handed response.

The problem with petulance of course, is that, in the international arena petulance often leads to escalating tensions.  And when weapons are displayed, a hard-nosed practitioner of real politik like Putin will not respond to White House bullying in the same manner as a small business or a non-profit organization with one-billionth the assets of the federal government.  Instead, what sometimes happens is that the situation takes a turn that is both unexpected by the players, and usually violent.

This kind of thing has been war-gamed in the past.  And the results were never satisfactory.  In the 1970s and 1980s war games were held that tested how rational and cautious were various decision-makers, with samplings of both uniformed and civilian personnel.  In far too many cases civilians, particularly those who held a low opinion of the military, routinely failed at first to respond to provocations, often allowing themselves to be forced into difficult positions, then allowed situations to escalate with little control, and tried to use nuclear weapons to restore order.  And that never worked.

In short, unprofessional decision-making, rashness and passive-aggressive leadership invariably led to uncontrolled escalation, and a host of unintended and negative consequences.

Arguably that is where we were headed in Syria (and perhaps still are). And it may well be where we are headed with regard to Eastern Europe and Ukraine.  Delay, garbled ‘signals’ between Washington and Moscow, words without actions, etc., and Putin will come to believe that he has nothing meaningful to fear from Washington.  And then he will take a step that the White House suddenly fears has gone too far and they will over-react, precipitating a much greater crisis.

There is one final issue with a failure to act to, at least in some way, protect Ukraine, and it is of the greatest concern; such a failure to act will send one real signal to every thinking leader around the world: nuclear weapons count.  When the Soviet Union fractured, Ukraine was left with 176 ICBMs and more than 1,900 nuclear warheads.  Ukraine turned those warheads over to Russia in 1994 under the terms of the Budapest Memorandum, because under the memorandum the US and UK pledged to ensure Ukraine’s security.  It goes without saying that the only meaningful threat to Ukraine’s security then or now was Russia.

The lesson is obvious: Ukraine would face a different security threat from Russia today if it had retained those nuclear weapons.  North Korea recognizes this, so does Iran. So do many others, and the list is not one packed with believers in democracy and the rights of man.

Putin is not a bully, the analogy is inapt.  Putin is an amoral, power hungry practitioner of hardball politics.  He also, in his own twisted way, loves Russia (don’t get dewy eyed, Hitler loved Germany.) Behind him he has groomed a handful of deputies.  If Putin goes, he will be replaced by a very similar figure.  The expansion will continue.  China, which is watching this very closely, struggles to rebuild the maritime reaches of the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasty and casts a covetous eye on the South China Sea, Singapore and points south.  This is ‘real politik,’ nothing more.  And they both will take their cue from what happens in the next 12 months or so.

We have a very clear choice – act now or later.  Act now and we stand a chance of defusing this problem.  And of telling the world that nuclear weapons are not necessary for guaranteeing your security.  The longer we wait, the greater the likelihood that this situation spins out of control (and the greater the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation in the long run).  And then a question of the security of Eastern Europe will become a question of the security of the United States.