Thursday, June 27, 2024

 June 27th, 2024


Overall 


Ground Operations - Marginal Russian gains continue

Air Operations - some strikes 

Politics - Rutte as next NATO SecGen

US Attache in Kiev found dead - no foul play


Weather


Kharkiv

76 and partly cloudy. Sunny for the next 4 days, lows near 60, highs in the mid 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Melitopol

81 and partly cloudy, gusts near 20. Sunny for the next 4 days, lows in the lower 60s, highs near 90. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Kyiv

83 and sunny, gusts over 20. Sunny for the next 4 days, lows in the low 60s, highs in the upper 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Ground Operations 


Overall there has been little substantive change in the picture on the ground. 


North of Kharkiv


Fighting continued north of Kharkiv in the small border towns north and north-east of the city. There has been little movement in the last 2 weeks, and no appreciable change in terrain held in that period. Russian forces still control central and western Volchansk, Ukrainian forces hold eastern Volchansk, fighting continues at the center of the town in the industrial facility.. 

Russian AF assets dropped 11 x FAB 500s on Lyptsi yesterday and there was fighting on several sides of that town, but overall there is little change in terrain held from 2 weeks ago.

However, Russian force presence in the area remains at 4 regiments / brigades and a couple of attached battalions, Ukrainian forces have increased over the last 2 weeks to include  12 x brigades in the area of the Russian incursions, as well as an additional 7 brigades in the area of Sumy. If this was an effort to tie up a part of the Ukrainian army, it succeeded.

Russian air strikes in support of these operations continue, to include multiple RuAF airstrikes and an increase (numbers not available) in attack helicopter activity.


Donets River


Russian forces have continued to grind out small gains along the line over the past two weeks. Of note, Russian forces east of Kupyansk appear to have to overrun a tunnel and bunker structure just east of Synkivka, north-east of Petropavlivka, in the last few days. If accurate, this would allow them to hold onto the terrain immediately north of the bunker and thereby establish better fire control of the east-west road and logistics line in that area.

Further south Russian forces entered the small town of Stelmakhivka, north-west of Svatove, a town on the Zherebets river, which remains a a key tactical objective of the Russian operations north of the Donets River.


 Bakhmut


Russian forces continued small unit infantry attacks across the Bakhmut area and have managed to make marginal gains in the last 2 weeks. Anecdotal reporting suggests that Ukrainian units are tied down and having difficulty rotating to the rear. 

Pro Russian sources report Russian units are clearing buildings in Spirne, suggesting they control that town, but this has not been confirmed.

Fighting continues on the east edge of Chasiv Yar, but Russian forces have not been able to reach and cross the canal.

South of Bakhmut, Russian forces appear to control most if not all of the high ground just west of Klishchivka, but Ukrainian forces continue to hold just west of the town.

Fighting was also reported west of Horlivka, and Russian forces appear to now hold terrain north and south of the town of Shumy, and have advanced near Pivdenne.


Donetsk City


Fighting west of and north-west of Avdiivka shows little change, most significant being further slow grind forward by Russian forces on both sides of the Karlivka reservoir, and slow expansion of the terrain held by the Russians north and immediately north-west of Umanske.


Velyka Novosilka (VN) and Orokhiv 


South of VN Russian forces pushed north from Staromaiorske for marginal gains, and continue to slowly grind into the middle of Urozhaine.


Dnepr River

Ukrainian forces conținue to hold a position in Krynky, Russian forces continue to attack, attrit them, and the Ukrainian forces replace their loses.


Air Operations


Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike against both the Kiev area and southern Ukraine. No count has emerged yet of the total number launched or the number intercepted. Russian sources claimed the strikes were focused primarily on airfields, and included at least 2 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles.

Russian forces did launch an Iskander - M ballistic missile and a Kh-59 cruise missile into southern Ukraine, with the ballistic missile striking a facility in the Odessa area.


Politics and Diplomacy


Ukraine has signed a security agreement with the EU which will provide 5 billion Euros ($5.4 billion) in military assistance to Ukraine through the end of 2024, and further money in 2025.

Aid will include 1 million rounds of 155MM howitzer ammunition, as well as air defense assets.


North Korea is reportedly sending at least one construction brigade from its army to assist in reconstruction in Donetsk oblast. South Korean TV reported that North Korea may send as many as 4 of its 10 construction brigades to assisting the rebuilding.

There is no confirmation of this report.


Ukraine Pravda reported, and it was later confirmed by the US Embassy, that a US diplomat had been found dead in the Hilton Hotel in Kiev.

Other sources later reported that the deceased was on the Defense Attache staff.

His death is being attributed to natural causes.


Former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte was formally selected as the next Secretary General of NATO. He will officially relieve Jens Stoltenberg on 01 October.


Economic Reporting


Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Sep8 Feb8 Apr8 Jun7 Jun14 Jun27

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      90.95   80.93 90.13 80.06 82.86 85.60

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      87.77   75.49 86.13 75.81 78.60 81.22

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15        2.63       1.95 1.83 2.82 2.97 2.77

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      98.11     91.09 92.69 88.77 89.30 85.92

Wheat     8.52        12.94    10.71    6.17        6.00     6.02 5.67 6.40 6.20 5.59

Urals 56.56     74.34    66.28 77.31 67.61 67.61 67.61

ESPO   67.02     80.88     74.85 85.96 74.63 77.95 79.90


Thoughts


Back in the saddle, as it were. Couldn’t be helped, needed to go help a friend.


Breaking from this daily report for nearly two weeks offers a bit of perspective on the situation in Ukraine; two things stand out:

The first is that the ground war is still progressing - at a very slow pace - in Russia’s favor, Russian forces still continue to slowly grind forward, despite the flow of US and EU armaments. Further, the operational discontinuity between the Russian ground war and the rest of the war remains; Ukrainian forces may be hurting Russian forces in the rear, picking at Russian air forces, denying Russian naval forces, etc., and… Russia’s ground forces don’t care; they grind forward. 

It points to a serious problem: Ukraine continues to have a strategy - policy disconnect. Ukraine continues to try to retaliate for Russian attacks on the power grid, on port structures, etc. But that is not affecting the war itself. Ukrainian efforts need to address the ground “game.” They are losing the ground game, and are probably taking substantial casualties doing so.


The second thought is that the Swiss Peace Conference may have sown the seeds of a strategic crisis. The conference called for peace only under the terms of the Zelenskyy plan, which requires Russian forces out of every square inch of Ukrainian territory before negotiations, and for bringing senior members of the Russian government to trial. This is tantamount to a call for the fall of the Russian government, an unlimited war. In practical terms that means a “forever war.” When placed opposite the horrible demographics of Ukraine, this is a policy for which a real strategy is difficult to imagine…

I think there is also a question as to whether actions such as the ICC issuing warrants for senior members of the Russian government helps the situation or simply fosters greater intransigence and a general sense of animosity the average Russian will hold against the west. In short, someone needs to ask whether such actions, in effect, improve Russian morale.

Worth noting that an authoritative, independent estimate of Russian KIAs places that number as currently in the range of 45,000. This would support a wounded estimate of 160,000 - 180,000.

The most conservative Ukrainian casualty count, based on the 31,000 KIA figure President Zelenskyy gave 6 months ago, which was presumably a narrowly defined number (see US casualty figures for Vietnam), would suggest that Ukrainian KIAs are now in the area of 38,000, and in fact, total number of dead (not narrowly defined as “killed in action”) is well above that.

That leaves Ukrainian casualties as the same or higher than Russian casualties; my own estimates place Ukrainian casualties far higher than the official number - more than twice as high.

President Zelenskyy effectively made this point yesterday when he commented that the war must not be allowed to go on, that Ukraine has already suffered too many casualties.

If so, someone should be taking a hard look at their strategy…


v/r pete


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