OCTOBER 20th, 2025 NEXT SUMMARY 28 October 

Politics 

As you all know, President Trump and President Zelenskyy met last Friday in Washington DC, and Trump talked to President Putin by phone. The most significant immediate issue was the announcement by Trump that there would be no transfer of Tomahawk missiles at this point, though, in an interview later, Trump insisted the idea could resurface if there were no movement in peace talks by Putin.

Zelenskyy was apparently in general agreement with what was discussed though few details were released, and despite rumors that there was a brief shouting match in the private portion of the Trump- Zelenskyy meeting.

Trump also mentioned that he is trying to arrange a meeting with Putin in Hungary in the near term.

Zelenskyy said he’ll be prepared to meet with Trump and Putin if he is invited:

"If I am invited to Budapest - if it is an invitation in the format when the three of us meet, or as it is called 'shuttle diplomacy', President Trump will meet with Putin, and President Trump will meet with me - then in one format or another we will agree.”

Today, only 44 months into the war, the EU Council voted to end all purchases of Russian oil and gas by January 1st 2028. Monitoring mechanisms are being developed to prevent cheating.

EU member states must now submit national energy diversification plans, and the EU Council will begin discussions with the European Parliament to finalize the decision - in other words, this is not technically the final decision…

The IAEA announced that Russian and Ukrainian officials agreed on the 18th to a local ceasefire around the ZNPP as Russian workers prepare to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.

Combat Operations

On the ground there were minor changes in most sections of the front line.

There were two noted developments: Russian forces continue a slow grind south in Kupyansk and Ukrainian sources note that Russian forces now control that portion of the city of Kupyansk west of Oskil, and north the intersection of the P07 and P79 roadways, controlling the main GLOC across the Oskil River in this area.

Russian forces south of the Vovcha River pressed west from Verbove and probes appear to have reached at least 3 miles west of that town - and may have reached the small town of Yehorivka on the banks of the Yanchur River. This would mean that they had penetrated the last Ukrainian defensive line in that area, westward to the Dnepr River.

This needs to be watched closely.

Elsewhere, there were minor changes in the line west and south-west of Chasiv Yar, and west of Toretsk, and minor changes along the perimeter of the August salient. Overall Russian positions appear to be holding in the salient, with some minor Russian gains near the base, but here and elsewhere there is the now common “see-saw” manner of fighting for small pieces of terrain, each side gaining control for several days at a time and then losing control.

Recon probes continue into Pokrovsk, and one recon element reportedly reached the railroad station in the north center of the city (and was reportedly eliminated)  but there were no substantive changes around the edges of that city, and, further west, there also were some small gains along the banks of the Dnepr, with Russian forces pushing into southern Stepnohirsk.

In the air, drone and missile strikes continued over the weekend, with 70 to 100 drones and a small number of missiles each day, again striking power grid related infrastructure. Multiple towns experienced power outages and water outages (which usually end in less than a day); as I write this parts of Sumy have no power or water.

Thoughts

The war seems to have settled into the somewhat ugly autumn fight, with cloudy weather, some rain, some fog, and cold all slowing things down on the battlefield. I would expect that, tactically, we will see few changes on the battlefield over the next 4 - 6 weeks, though the situation in Kupyansk may make me regret saying that. There is also the obvious possibility that the manpower issues, particularly on the Ukrainian side, are worse than they appear, and there could be a dramatic brake in a line, but my sense is that the Russian logistics and command and control are not set up to support such an event so that is less likely to occur.

As for the EU, and European consumption of Russian oil and gas, that is took 44 months for them to reach this point is a remarkable indictment against the leadership of most of Europe, and makes it seem incredible that the promises for 5% of GDP spending on national security will be sustained. With a population 3 times that of Russia, and a combined GDP 8 times that of Russia, Europe should be able to defend itself from Russia without breaking a sweat. Yet almost 4 years into the war the EU Council has only gotten this far in separating themselves from Russian energy supplies.

One might argue that the threat to Europe isn’t Russia so much as it is Europe’s lack of commitment to their own security.

v/r pete