War Powers and Libya

How many cars have two steering wheels? The answer, of course is none, at least of those billion or so driving around on public roads between here and Timbuktu. The reason for that is simple: when one person drives a car it is dangerous enough. But give two people the controls simultaneously and you are certain to have a wreck. The same is true for any organization, in particular a military.

Despite what some (too many) may say of ‘dual-hatting’ and similar ‘modern’ forms of management (and they aren’t modern, just recently rediscovered), the fact is that when things become very serious the chain of command must become focused. If you don’t think so, try to have two surgeons in charge of your open-heart operation. There may be many people, all very professional, working simultaneously and with what appears to be little minute-to-minute oversight, but there is only one person in charge in the operating room at any time.

The same is just as necessary – and just as critical – in a war zone. That is why having Congress debate foreign military involvement is of such value: it allows the government as a whole, and all the agencies, to come together and receive clear guidance. When a President signs a declaration of war (something that hasn’t been done since December of 1941, though President Bush came fairly close with the resolutions Congress passed in both 2001 and in 2003), several things happen:

1) The entire nation is provided with clarity as to what the government is doing - a goal is set

2) The government provides a statement as to our level of commitment - what assets are available

3) The President is now given clear and specific authority to execute – we all know who is in charge.

This is all of interest now for two different reasons. The first is the obscure US involvement in Libya, and the second is that the Department of Defense, in one of the weirdest pieces of irony in recent memory, just officially (for the first time) released the Pentagon Papers on Monday June 13th, the 40th anniversary of their first – and unofficial – release.

What these two have in common is simply this: the shock of the Pentagon Papers was that is displayed for all to see the confused thinking and lack of clear direction that was prevalent throughout the Pentagon and the White House with regard to US goals in Vietnam and South East Asia. Whether it was the White House, the Pentagon and Joint Staff, the theater commander in Hawaii, the commander in Saigon or the CIA, everyone seemed to think that they were ‘really’ running the war, that they knew the real goals, that they had insight into what really needed to be done.

All of which would seem to lead back to the issue of waging war within the construct of the Constitution.

A review of the declarations of war for World War I and World War II make interesting reading, particularly in that they are so short. The language is deliberately sparse in order to prevent any ambiguity or dissimulation.

World War I

WHEREAS, The Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government, which has thus been thrust upon the United States, is hereby formally declared; and

That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

World War II

JOINT RESOLUTION Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial Government of Japan and the Government and the people of the United States and making provisions to prosecute the same.

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Spanish-American War

The Declaration of War for the Spanish American War – a limited war, in as much as we were not trying to bring down the entire Spanish government – is of interest:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, First. That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, A.D. 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

Second. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect.

Approved, April 25, 1898.

Presidents then have followed these declarations with specific guidance. Over the years that guidance has grown in size and complexity, but at the very top of the hierarchy – what the President signs out of his office – the guidance still is usually contained in just a few short pages. In those pages – which would be drafted by his staff and the Department of Defense and State with the Attorney General providing legal input as well – the President would define the geography of the war – the Area Of Responsibility, as well as define who is responsible for what specific actions within the AOR. Good leaders provide clear direction, and the better the leader, the better the direction. On the other hand, poor leaders avoid providing direction, and usually avoid discussions which would focus on the presence or absence of clear directions.

All of which is of interest now in light of the ongoing US and NATO combined operations against the Libyan government.

There is a small chorus that says that President Obama violated the Constitution by ordering US forces to conduct attacks against Libya. The President’s authority to direct US military forces come from Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which simply says that he is the Commander In Chief of the Army, Navy and Militia. The powers of the President, and in particular his war-fighting powers, were left deliberately vague by the Founders for two reasons: first because they knew Washington was going to be the first President and they wanted him to define, and limit, those powers; and second because they understood that some events would require action long before any President could gather Congress together, present them with the pertinent facts, hold a debate and then vote. This was particularly true in an era when Congress did not sit for the whole year, but rather spent the bulk of the year in their home districts and states.

At the same time, the Founders clarified the role of Congress in war-fighting in Article I, Section 8 which states that Congress will provide for the common defense, and later that Congress shall declare war. Sitting at one’s desk that may look fairly neat and clear: Congress declares war, the President is the Commander in Chief. It has rarely been that neat, however, and in particular, in the post-World War II era there has been quite a bit of concern expressed by many that Presidents have overstepped their bounds by putting Marines ashore or deploying ships to this or that trouble spot and acting in US interests (or interfering as others might define it.)

Presidents have, in fact, used US capabilities quite extensively for most of our history and the legacy of Congressional involvement has often been minimal to non-existent. The ability – or inability – to communicate in anything approaching real time certainly changes the nature of the problem, meaning that US actions overseas prior to the laying of the first trans-oceanic telegraphs was of necessity actions taken based on general orders given military commanders weeks to months prior to the actual action. Thus, US involvement in actions such as the Korea Raid in 1871 necessarily took place without Congressional consultation – they took place without Presidential consultation.

It is worth noting that the telegraph – the real dawn of the information age – dramatically changed everything, from the course of events in the War in Crimea in 1855-1856 which was reported essentially in real time in capitals in Europe, to the US Civil War in which Lincoln followed events through daily (and often detailed) telegraphed reports from his commanders, through to President McKinley ordering Admiral Dewey to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila, just hours after the resolution was approved in Congress.

But the point of the Constitution was not to give the President unlimited powers. A reasonable reading of the provisions concerning war and a Navy and an Army strongly suggests that the Founding Fathers believed that the President needed to have the ability to respond to situations as they developed – as Washington did during the Whiskey Rebellion – but that such authority was not open ended. Congress needed to approve in the end because Congress held the purse strings. Congress was, and is, after all, the Legislature, that is, those who create the laws and ‘acts’ which control the actions of the government. The President led the Executive Branch, those who were tasked to execute the laws of the land. Execute the directions provide, not determine those directions. Hence, no President would or should be allowed to conduct an operation without eventually obtaining Congressional approval. But, this control would be applied either directly – a declaration of war, or indirectly – through the approval of a budget that provided funding for the war.

In both cases it was assumed that Congress would insist on being fully informed and would engage in a full and honest debate about whatever military action was taking place.

As for the War Powers Act of 1973, drafted as a direct response to Vietnam and the revelations of leaks such as the Pentagon Papers, President Obama has put the final nail in the coffin on that. While no president since Nixon has agreed with the act, then Senator Obama railed against President Bush for his actions that, in the Senator’s opinion, violated that law. But, with his operations in Libya President Obama has demonstrated by his actions that he sides with his predecessors in viewing the law as un-Constitutional and will not comply with it.

So be it. But whether you believe in the Constitutional validity of the War Powers Act or not, one fact remains: Congress alone has the power to declare war. Congress has usually executed that power passively, allowing Presidents to engage in a wide range of activities, and the Congress has simply ‘gone along’ and funded it. By so doing they have de facto declared their support for the Presidents’ actions just a certainly as if there had been a formal declaration. What is missing is the informed debate and the ostensible product of such a debate: clarity of action.

Irrespective of whether there is a debate or not, a formal declaration or not, when Congress appropriates money to continue various actions, it has declared its support for those actions. Congress can whine and complain about the War Powers Act and about the President exceeding his authorities. But what is crystal clear is that Congress has the power and the responsibility to act to control the behavior of the executive. If it agrees with the behavior, so be it. But Congress still retains the responsibility of funding the executive. If Congress wants to stop US actions in Libya it is fully capable of doing so. If it does not, then it is de facto endorsing those actions. Either way, Congress must choose.

Memorial Day 2011

Memorial Day should be a day when we all stop and think. It is not enough to simply set aside a day, attach a label to it, and then return to the grill. A memorial is nothing more then an object that serves as a focus for our memory. But, whether it is a picture, a folded flag, or simply some obscure artifact with a relationship to someone known only to the holder; a memorial requires that we engage our intellect. Every memorial requires that we both know something about the individuals and events that are the focus of the memorial, and that we spend the time to remember, that we dwell on the memory.

So, on Memorial Day, what we should be remembering?

The most obvious – and partially correct – answer is that we should remember those who died in the service of our country. But, this is only a partial answer. To truly appreciate the sacrifice of all that have died for our country, we need to understand two things: first, we need to understand why these soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen, coast guardsmen, and a fair number of civilians (who are often forgotten) gave up their lives?

There is an old – and true – adage that soldiers in foxholes fight for their buddies. But, while true, that is a bit too simplistic. From time immemorial soldiers have fought and died to protect their buddies, whatever side they were on. The riders of the Mongol hordes that ravaged central Asia fought and died for their comrades. But no one remembers them.

There is a thread that runs through every war the US has fought. And whether or not that war was in fact the product of the convoluted logic of cynical politicians who either willfully or inadvertently misled the nation – and those uniform - the thread remains. That thread is this: America fights for right. Their will be the cynical who will deny this, and cite a long list of examples, probably starting in the 1800s, in an attempt to show that this or that war was nothing more than a power grab, a bit of ‘imperialism,’ an act of pure conquest.

But for the soldiers and sailors, for the men who actually fought the nation’s wars, that has never been the case. Since the birth of this nation, the youth of this nation have left home, picked up their weapons and packs and headed to war out of a conviction that what they were doing was the right, the true, the moral thing to do. Yes, certainly, they joined for adventure, for comradeship, even for the pay. But beneath the youthful bravado there remains this thread, this belief that America did not fight for empire but for freedom and justice. The politicians, and many of the generals, may have been bitter, cynical practitioners of ‘realpolitik,’ but that does not and cannot change the fact that the soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines fought for what they believed was right. We honor and remember them for that belief.

Second, it is important to remember what they gave up. No one ever went off to war without a choice. Even when drafted there is almost always some means to avoid the front lines. The fact is that while everyone talks ‘a good game’ of avoiding the dangerous and difficult side of warfare, in the final analysis few act on those words. Rather, they ‘shoulder their pack’ and move ‘towards the sounds of cannons.’ We, as a nation and a people, must be ever grateful that they do. But we need to be mindful of what those that died gave up, so that we might live our lives. They gave up their freedom and all the enjoyment of everyday life – for life in the service is devoid of a wide range of liberties that we all enjoy; they gave up their careers and dreams; they gave up their families and their loves; and in the end they gave up their lives. Everything that they had or were, everything that they might do or become, offered up so that others may enjoy the blessings of freedom.

This great nation of ours is a land filled with nearly infinite possibilities. We can do anything we set our minds to do. But it requires some sacrifice. No achievement comes without sacrifice. We are all charged with using our lives here on earth to improve the world around us, to make use of the gifts we have been given to make things better. That will require some sacrifice. Those that we remember today have given, as Lincoln said, ‘the last full measure of devotion’ to the idea of America. Let us remember them, remember their sacrifice, and awake tomorrow determined that their sacrifice was worth it, that we too will sacrifice a bit, that we will build a new and greater nation, one that will continue to be that ‘city on a hill.’

May they all Rest In Peace.

Whither Israel (and Palestine)?

Winston Churchill once noted that if he had his druthers, every country on earth would be an island. His point, and history continues to prove him right in places as far apart as Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan, is that a country must have secure borders if it is to avoid war and survive in the long term.

Geography may not dictate the absolute fate of a nation or a people, but it can’t be ignored. There is no place where that is more obvious then in the ongoing struggle surrounding the state of Israel and its ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. The issue of Israel’s borders has come to the front and center of the news lately with President Obama’s call for Israel to return to its pre-1967 war borders as a starting point for negotiations. But the real center of this struggle is precisely the issue Churchill was addressing: security and secure borders. Yet, despite all the discussions and proposals for peace in the Mid-East, discussions about exchanging land for security, the need to establish proper borders, allow access to this or that city or town, and provide for adequate land for farming and housing, it seems that no one recognizes this issue at its most fundamental level, and therefore they have yet to reach the obvious (and painful) conclusion.

In 1947 the UN Special Committee on Palestine recommended the partition of Palestine into two states: a Jewish state and an Arab state. (The Committee also recommended forming an international state around Jerusalem.)

I must assume that in doing so they wished for those two states to be viable. That they actually established states that were not viable as formed must be attributed to the belief that in the wake of the largest and bloodiest war in history there was hope that simply getting the states started would be such a positive event that the further difficulties might be worked out without resort to bloodshed. The other option is that it was a cynical act by many involved who fully expected a war to follow. In either case, a war did follow, and the existing states of the region (Israel and it’s neighbors and their respective borders) look little like the original UN recommendation. There are many reasons for that, but one underlying issue is that the original states were not, from a geopolitical perspective, viable.

Traditionally, states have been said to be real, viable states when they meet the following criteria:

Raison d’etre: a clear reason why, the ‘thing’ that provides a people an identity as French or Italian or Indonesian. When a people who view themselves as first and foremost this or that religion, then a clan, then a family and only later as inhabitants of this or that nation there is a strong reason to be fearful as to the viability of that nation. In the case of both the Israelis and the Palestinians there is a strong national identity.

Economic viability: there is a real capability to provide a life for its citizens. A putative agricultural state could not exist in the middle of the Sahara irrespective of whatever else might be going on.

Political control and organization: there is real control over the territory and an organization to enforce and regulate that control. Governments that claim control while borders have evaporated and competing armed forces roam the countryside are labeled as failed states. States that are not viable geopolitically, that is, have borders that cannot be guaranteed with reasonable levels of effort, will not – and do not – survive.

Recognized and legitimate government: a functioning government that can carry out the day-to-day operations of a government, and is recognized as the legal representative of the people and area. This is not legitimacy in the absolute sense: dictatorships may not have the support of the people, but they do have control and are dealt with by other nations, whether the other nations like it or not.

Where does this leave the Middle East, specifically, Israel and Palestine?

I recently had the opportunity to spend some time talking with several senior military staff planners about the path ahead for Israel. The contention, shared by many, is that Israel’s security can never be assured until there is a state of Palestine, per the original UN recommendation.

That may be true. But a Palestinian state by itself won’t represent a ‘full and final’ answer. Simply put, it isn’t enough to establish a Palestinian state; the state (nation) of Palestine must be viable – as must Israel. A review of the history from a geopolitical perspective shows that making a viable state is more easily said then done. Unless the intention is to simply construct an international welfare state whose security is guaranteed by others, the borders of any Palestinian state need to be defined with an eye to establishing states – Palestine and Israel – that are viable in the long run, without continued international assistance. But, as with the discussion above about viable states, the usual discussion about Palestine fails to address the critical issue of geography.

Standing in direct opposition to the essence of Churchill’s statement is the idea that a state, any state, can be viable when it (as with the various proposals for Palestine) consists of a patchwork of small plots of land surrounded by another state (Israel), a state with whom relations are likely to remain strained far into the future. That the land itself is also poor agricultural land, with limited water, limited natural resources and few ports only serves to highlight how difficult this solution really will be.

The record for non-contiguous states – states imbedded within another state - throughout history is dismal. The situation currently exists in Azerbaijan, with the autonomous region Naxcivan located between Armenia and Turkey, separated from the bulk of Azerbaijan by roughly 20 mountainous miles. Whether the current boundaries in the Caucus Region will long survive is doubtful. Elsewhere the record has been poor. In the 20th century there were two clear cases: East and West Pakistan (now Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively, and Germany post Versailles, with East Prussia separated from Germany proper by the Danzig Corridor; both were settled by wars. In South Africa one could argue that Bophuthatswana was never really independent, and it too no longer exists, after 22 years of nominal independence. The Enclave of Cabinda, a province of Angola, separated from Angola by the 21-mile coastline of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has suffered several attempts at secession, but Angola has held on to it – at substantial cost, in large part because Cabinda produces 700,000 barrels of oil per day. That the Angolans can reach Cabinda easily by sea also helps to sustain the political relationship, but it is a strained situation that is sustained because of the oil – that is, Cabinda’s oil pays for its existence.

In short, an independent, but geographically scattered Palestine is not likely to develop into a viable state. This is true irrespective of whatever else happens in the never-ending peace talks. Let me restate that: unless you provide borders that leave both Palestine and Israel as viable geopolitical entities nothing else that is agreed upon in any of these peace talks will provide any enduring peace. Geopolitical viability and stability are the foundation, the sine qua non, upon which any sustained peace talks must be built. This is not to say that viable borders will assure peace; they will not. But it does mean that without viable borders there can be no sustained security and hence no lasting peace. In as much as the peace talks avoid this fundamental fact, they avoid a meaningful solution and these talks amount to nothing more than political theater.

At the same time, ‘simply’ providing the Palestinians a contiguous block of land doesn’t address all the issues. The simple but essential point is that Israel is already a legitimate state; any solution provided to the Palestinians can’t be at the expense of the Israeli people or the viability of their state. Further, from the perspective of the US, Israel has been a consistent ally for six decades. Any course the US chooses must respect the fact that based both on our long-standing relationship and on the simple premise that we shouldn’t solve one problem by making another one worse; Israel’s viability must come first.

So, what then are the givens to any solution set for Israel and Palestine? First, consider the fundamentals:

1) Israel must be secure: physically and militarily, economically, politically; both in the short term and in a sustained and sustainable manner in the long term

2) Palestinians must be allowed to live in a viable state where they can achieve political recognition and establish a viable standard of living

3) Any solution must ensure that all states remain contiguous, that they are economically and politically viable for populations in excess of 4 million, particularly with adequate power, water, and an opportunity for economic development

4) Once a Palestinian state is defined and independent, the Palestinians must give up the right of return

5) Jerusalem must be addressed

Where does that leave us?

We start by recognizing that in the end Palestine must be one whole, contiguous state with the means for a viable economy, and that Israel must be one, whole contiguous state with a means for a viable economy, and since Israel perceives itself surrounded by enemies, Israel must have borders which it considers secure and able to be defended. This means simply that the current options, all of which include both the Gaze strip and the West Bank as parts of Palestine are not viable.

For any Palestinian state to be economically viable as well as geographically contiguous, it must not consist of the seemingly endless number of small pieces of land scattered around the West Bank. There are any number of possible solutions to this, but only two real options: a Palestinian state could be established centered on Gaza, or a Palestinian state could be established centered on the West Bank. In either case the other area would be ceded either back to Israel in order to insure secure borders, or back to Egypt or Jordan. Of course, either approach would require that the Palestinians in the other location be moved.

Unfortunately, a state that consisted of the West Bank would almost to a certainty not be viable. While other land-locked countries exist, none exist in areas with so few natural resources, or surrounded by, at best unfriendly neutral powers. A nation that consisted of the West Bank alone, and inhabited by 4 million plus people, with little fresh water, few other resources, and access to the rest of the world only through or over either Israel or Jordan hardly looks promising. In fact, it would likely become an international security problem overnight. Changing the shape of the West Bank to include access to the sea would require either Jordan ceding its sole port – Aqaba, an unlikely event, or Israel ceding either a corridor across it’s northern half (and creating a bifurcated nation) or ceding its northern end – an equally unlikely event. Nor would either option solve the question of how to make such a nation – one built on the West Bank - economically viable.

A nation of Palestine jammed into the current Gaza Strip would yield a small, resource poor, extremely crowded strip of land – again a recipe for disaster. However, Gaza does represent some options, as it provides access to the sea, hence access to trade as well as some basic industries – fishing and elements of the maritime industry. If the international community really wished to settle the Palestinian question, additional land might be purchased from Egypt (a portion of the Sinai Peninsula) and Gaza expanded into a new Palestine. At the same time, investments in Gaza might provide the opportunity for various industries to take root – one that can exploit access to trade routes, etc.

As for Jerusalem, the truth is that one country or the other must recognize that in the end two countries can’t have the same capital. Perhaps East Jerusalem can be partitioned to the Palestinian state, and an airfield built in the West Bank contiguous to East Jerusalem in such a manner that Palestinians could fly into East Jerusalem without having to enter Israel. Additionally, the formal seat of the Palestinian government – for ceremonial purposes only - might be maintained in East Jerusalem. But the real Palestinian government, to return to the problem of geography, must be located inside the real nation-state. To do otherwise is to place the seat of government in strategic jeopardy.

It is said that geography is destiny. While this may not be true in every case, the fact remains that the Israelis and Palestinians must deal with an extremely difficult piece of terrain, and to do so successfully will require minimizing all the negatives that that land possesses. The above options will please very few people. But they do address the very real issue of the geography of the area. The options that are currently ‘on the table’ fail to do so; and failure to do so simply complicates the issue. ‘Solutions’ that further complicate this already difficult situation with a nation of a dozen or more isolated pieces will not, and cannot lead to peace.

So, to return to the essence of Churchill’s statement above, Palestine will never be viable until it is a single, contiguous state. The never-ending talks on ‘Peace in the Middle East’ can choose to ignore that fact. But doing so means that any solution they do produce will be temporary, and probably short-lived. Creating a single, contiguous Palestine will not by itself produce lasting peace, but it is a necessary first step.

The White House, Usama bin Laden and Bear Bryant

The legendary Alabama Football Coach Bear Bryant used to advise his young players: “When you get in the end-zone, act like you’ve been there before.”

This is pretty good advice for virtually everyone. It is a lesson that has apparently been lost on the currant White House staff. It is common sense that in a war there are many times when it is best to say very little, that anything said may negatively affect ongoing and future operations, that, to use the phrase from an earlier generation, ‘Lose Lips Sink Ships.’

But during the past 12 days we have been ‘treated’ to a seemingly never-ending stream of press conferences, ‘off the record’ briefs and anonymous releases from high sources that have resulted in a significant amount of details about the raid that resulted in Usama bin Laden’s death, about the men and units that executed the raid, about those that supported the raid, about how the intelligence was acquired that led to the raid and about what was discovered as a result of the raid.

And, in true disingenuous Washington DC fashion some of the same people who have taken part in the verbal orgy have lambasted others for saying too much and ‘placing our soldiers and sailors at risk.’

Meanwhile the level of smug hubris at the White House continues to rise. One would suppose that this is normal, that this is the first time that they have had a real victory and it was a significant one – the death of an evil man who was the enemy of our nation. But, in fact, that is no excuse. This isn’t a high school football game. We are still a nation at war and we still have any number of enemies who would like to see our nation destroyed. ‘Celebrating in the end zone’ is not the correct response. In fact, the entire evolution over the past 12 days has been a travesty. Here’s what should have happened:

1) There should have been no announcement until at least the completion of the initial assessment of the material seized in the raid. That would have taken several days, but would have allowed our forces to perhaps act against certain other al Qaeda cells before they were alerted to UBLs death and the possible compromise of their information.

The entire force that conducted the raid is familiar with operating in secret; this would not have been a problem for them. As for the fact that the Pakistanis would find the remains of a helicopter, so what? We could stall for several days, then simply admit that US forces had been there. There would be no need to reveal why – specifically – they had been there until the material seized had been exploited.

When the information had been exploited or we had other information that showed that al Qaeda knew that UBL was dead and that certain information had been compromised, the President could have made his announcement. For the nation at large the result would have been the same, just delayed a few days.

2) The brief statement should have said simply that US forces had raided the compound and that UBL was dead. There should have been no further details and the President should have said: ‘To protect our forces and our capabilities, there will be no further details released as to the forces involved or the tactics and technology involved.’ Unfortunately, like the freshman who has finally scored for the first, the White House wanted to let everyone know about all the ‘cool’ stuff they knew. So they did. And they continue to do so.

3) No details should have been released as to what was found in the compound. Even apparently harmful details such as lewd photos being found with UBL’s data should have been withheld. Unless there was a carefully orchestrated strategic communications plan in place to exploit this fact, such a release will probably backfire in some as yet unanticipated way.

The people who executed the raid, the people who supported the raiders, the intelligence personnel around the world who worked for more than 5 years to grind through a mountain of data to connect one obscure fact after another, all did a magnificent job. And all acted like they had been there before, celebrating quietly and then going back to work to try and get the next guy. That the White House and the President’s national security team benefited from years of effort, effort that really started just a few months after UBL hoofed it out of Tora Bora in December of 2001, is one of the realities of the American political system, and the President did a good job in giving the okay. And we are all glad that UBL is gone.

But since then the President, the VP, SecDef, SecState, and all the other strap hangars, many of them who have spent a career in classified circles inside the Beltway, have all acted like they never heard of Bear Bryant or his words of wisdom, nor have they apparently ever been ‘in the end zone.’ They continue to dance around in the end zone and in doing so they have not only possibly endangered some of the people who executed the mission, they have also revealed things that shouldn’t have been revealed and told our enemies things they should know.

It is an interesting thing that, with very few exceptions, the better someone is at something, the less they talk about it, the less they ‘dance around in the end zone.’ (It is an interesting footnote that Jim Brown, perhaps the greatest football player to date, never spiked the football when he scored at touchdown. Instead, he would simply hand it to the referee. No dance, no weird gyrations, etc.) It is time the President and the rest of the national security team take a cue from such behavior. If your deeds really are significant, they will speak for themselves. If not, all the prattle will in the end only make you look asinine and will hurt our nation.

As Coach Bryant said, try to act like you’ve been there before.

Was That So Hard? The President's Birth Certificate

When I was a child I sometimes resisted doing things that my mom and dad told me to do, even when I knew not only that it was the right thing to do, but that I also needed to do it. In the end I would do it and I would usually receive from my mom, in a stern but instructive voice, the comment: “Now, was that so hard?”

The President informs us that we – the nation presumably – don’t have time for this ‘silliness,’ that is, the two year long struggle by a number of people to see his birth certificate. Frankly, I was never terribly worked up about the fact that the nation had not seen his birth certificate, but a healthy percentage of the electorate was. What I am confused about is why the President didn’t release the ‘silly’ thing two years ago?

It is worth noting that the issue is hardly ‘silly.’ If perhaps 20% of the electorate question the fundamental legitimacy of the man in the Oval Office, if an officer in the Army has been brought up on charges for failure to obey an order based on his belief that the President was not a legitimate candidate for office, if thousands and thousands of broadcast hours have been consumed by the question, it is no longer silly.

Here’s a hint: if a substantial element of the electorate think something is important – it is. At least, it is important to the extent that the relevant elected official takes the time to explain why it isn’t important. This is something that the President simply refused to do. Instead of simply releasing his birth certificate several years ago, he and his staff dodged the issue, issued substitute documents and generally obfuscated the situation as much as they could. Was it any wonder that some people began to believe that there was more to the story then simple, ‘silly’ stupidity?

But there is another point, and it is far from ‘silly.’ Elected officials are servants of the people, they are not lords over the people. The electorate have every right in the world to ask questions about those who would serve in elected office. Anyone who would run for office but also insist that elements of his or her past are somehow off limits, that the people don’t have the right to see everything, is at the very least engaging in an extreme act of arrogance and disregard for the people. Do we really want to elect to office those who feel that we should vote for them, while they refuse to reveal their complete selves to us? Shouldn’t that preclude you from consideration for office; that is, candidates who won’t release their complete background should simply be rejected by the electorate of both, of all parties?

Beyond that, there is the question of practicality; does any candidate really believe that he can permanently hide some disturbing or embarrassing facet of his early life from those who might want to dig for it? Does anyone think, in this day of the wired nation, that they are going to be able to dodge every possible inquiry? If they do, then there are only two possible answers: they are hardened criminals who have been practicing covering their tracks for years, or they are truly silly. Take your pick.

Instead, they can simply open their files. As John McCain did when he told the press they could look at his medical records, politicians will find it much easier to let everyone see the ‘silly’ files. The truth is, if you don’t try to hide anything the press is going to find little to write about. And, it might even help your image if everyone learns that you drove too fast and crashed your car when you were 24. It would mean that you had had a few learning experiences, and that you had grown. That might make you a better leader. Besides, in the end, as with the President, you will release the information. Why not do it early and get it out of the way?

As my mother would say: Was that so hard?

The Enemy of My Enemy is My ... ?

In a recent news story from Libya (by the Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Or) one of the leaders of the rebel movement – Abdel Hakim al Hasidi – has stated that he fought against the US led Coalition in Iraq and that other extremists and terrorists (my words, not his) that fought against the Coalition in Iraq are now fighting with him (and presumably the US?) in Libya.

This interesting bit of news is further buttressed by a statement from Chad’s President - Idriss Deby Itno - that members of Al Qaeda broke into an armory in Chad and stole man-portable surface to air missiles and headed to Libya to fight against Colonel Qaddafi.

Welcome to war, where nothing turns out quite the way you planned – or hoped.

The President has said that we have established a ‘No Fly’ zone (which is over the entire northern half of the country – more than I thought would be done, but actually not much more difficult, given our capabilities, but it will be harder to justify for any extended period of time) and are attacking Libyan forces in order to help the Libyan civilians. Or something like that. I heard someone quote a decidedly Pentagonese phrase that the goal was to ‘set the conditions to be able to provide aid...’ (If that is the case, we already succeeded; in fact, we succeeded before we started. In short, if that is the stated objective, we can stop whenever we are tired and the story has been sapped for all possible positive spin, declare success, and leave.)

Meanwhile, we are now ‘in bed’ with the rebels who, it turns out, may not be exactly savory characters. They may in fact not wish us terribly well. But we are now officially on their side. When you start dropping bombs and launching missiles and firing cannons at someone’s enemy, you are as officially as it can get on that someone’s side. The President and his staff are all lawyers: aiding and abetting is one thing, but if you are pulling the trigger of the biggest weapon in the room, you aren’t an ‘accomplice,’ you are part of the gang.

Where does that leave us? Do we want Mr. Abdel Hakim to succeed? If he does, are we going to recognize his government? If his government then launches attacks on the west, are we going to attack him? That, by the way, is well beyond any ‘adventurism’ thought of by President Reagan or President Bush (41) or President Bush (43). That kind of activity would put the US into the role of playing the Mid-East as a board game, sort of like Johnson and Nixon tried in Vietnam: put in a leader, take him out when you don’t like him, continue…

It has been noted – repeatedly – that President Obama did not engage in any discussion with Congress before beginning these operations over Libya. Some have said his actions are in violation of the Constitution (they aren’t) or the War Powers Act (they aren’t – he has 90 days to act before Congress can enter the picture – assuming the War Powers Act is Constitutional). But the reason discussion with Congress would be of value – would have been of value – is that facts like this might have come to light.

If the US really saw a national interest in Libya that outweighed the possibility that the US would be setting the groundwork for a pro-Al Qaeda government to possibly come to power in an oil-exporting nation, then a discussion with Congress would ostensibly have highlighted that interest. That did not happen.

We now face the following possible results: The operation fails to dislodge Colonel Qaddafi – he emerges as having ‘beaten’ the US and the West - and he is stronger then ever, and the US reputation in the Mid-East is seriously weakened; the operation dislodges Colonel Qaddafi and the rebel movement, led by Abdel Hakim, takes power and we have an anti-west, radical, terror supporting government replaced by an anti-west, more radical, terror supporting, pro Al Qaeda government; the third option is that the operation serendipitously results in a stalemate, followed by both Colonel Qaddafi’s government collapsing as well as the rebel forces, and both are replaced by a popular, secular, pro-west government.

There is a fourth option, if the above doesn’t sound like a good ‘investment,’ and that is we go in, knock down Colonel Qaddafi’s regime, and set up a stable, secular, pro-West regime right now. That will involve real leadership, hard choices, and, oh yeah, putting 25-30,000 combat troops (4 - 5 BCTs or RCTs) plus support forces ashore to take care of Libya’s military, restore order and re-establish civil processes. As there hasn’t been massive damage to infrastructure yet, it should only take 2 - 3 years. If we’re lucky.

But, there is little likelihood that this path will be chosen – for good or ill. In short, long-term success is now in the realm of the third option above, which falls into the realm of hope.

Churchill noted that once a war started no matter how well planned you are to some extent along for the ride. As Churchill knew all too well, only by a great deal of action and ‘investment’ is it possible in any war to reach a result that looks even a little bit like what you wanted when you started.

Or we can hope.

And, as a brilliant, and grizzled, old Marine told me many years ago, ‘Hope is not a plan.’

Libya and Limited War

In 1870 the Chancellor of Germany convinced the Kaiser (William I) to invade France, (after using a number of political maneuvers to bring the French to declare war first) the aim being to seize a slice of terrain (Alsace Lorraine) that had been in dispute with the French for decades. The plan was to move fast, before the French could mobilize, seize the terrain and then present the French with a real problem: do they launch a major assault to push the German army out of the seized terrain at the risk of destroying their own army and brining down the government, or do they negotiate a settlement that would almost certainly leave the Germans in possession of Alsace, but would leave the government intact? Bismark was confident that once war was begun the German army would be able to move quickly into the targeted area and that the French would find retaking the terrain more cost then it was worth and would opt for a peace treaty.

Unfortunately, as the Chancellor knew, limited wars are vary difficult to fight, if only because it is so hard to 1) define the limits and 2) it is always difficult to control what the enemy will do. In this particular case the French King – Emperor Napoleon III – rushed to the head of his army in the region and was captured in the battle around the city of Sedan. What had started as a limited assault designed to catch the French unawares and force Napoleon III to negotiate a peace very nearly turned into a catastrophe as the French declared a new republic and immediately began a full-scale mobilization to recover what they perceived – in the capture of Alsace Lorraine (and Napoleon III) – as a fundamental assault on the honor of France. (It is worth noting that the war resulted in the German army finally  assaulting Paris (Bismark in essence lost control of the army) and a treaty that ceded the desired land to Germany – and so it stood until 1914.)

The point in all this is that countries enter into what they believe are limited wars without first checking with their enemies to make sure everyone is ‘in agreement as to the rules of the knife fight.’

The President insists that this war in Libya is not intended to remove Colonel Qaddafi. Colonel Qaddafi doesn’t see it that way. Nor does it appear that our allies – the French and British – see it quite the same way. In any case, Colonel Qaddafi is unlikely to play this game the way we want him to. He wants to survive and remain in power (that is why, seven years ago, he surrendered his chemical weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to the US, it wasn’t about being nice, it was about staying in power.) If we insist that he stops shooting at his own people, maybe he will. How long are we prepared to wait? If he stops shooting his own people, how long must he stop before we ‘go home?’ If he stops, will we then insist on something else? Will the UN Security Council ‘ratchet up’ the requirements? How far do they want to go? How long are we prepared to supply forces?

Just a bit of calculus: to keep a ship off the coast of Libya for a year will require 3 ships (actually 3.4 – but why quibble?) Keeping an amphibious task - with 3 Aegis guided missile ships means committing 3 amphibious groups and 9 Aegis ships to this mission. This calculus is the same whether you are French, British or Klingon. How long is this mission likely to last? If history is to be a guide, it could be a while: we have had a carrier group in the Persian Gulf with only one or two short breaks for 21 straight years, we have had a battle group in either the North Arabian Sea or Persian Gulf – with no gaps - since the summer of 1979 – 32 years. Simply put, once we have identified a national security interest, it will be difficult to ignore it.

Of course, as has been implied in the last 24 hours, we might just walk away next week; take a ‘back seat’ to French or British leadership. If the Colonel then resumes killing his people and we do nothing more, then the question should be asked why did we commit the acts of violence that we just completed over the past few days?

The United Kingdom and France have interests in Libya that are perhaps more immediate then the US. Perhaps they are clear on their interests and there is in fact a real plan in place to replace the Colonel and there is also already an understanding with this or that rebel group to form an interim government and the steps that will follow after that to form a new government. That remains to be seen. For the record, I will be quite pleased to see the Colonel removed from the world stage, but that hardly constitutes a viable national goal.

One other thing: if it was justifiable to act against Colonel Qaddafi for the violence he perpetrated against his people, then it was justifiable to act against Saddam Hussein, and the issue of whether he had Weapons of Mass Destruction is completely irrelevant. Of course, the invasion of Iraq had a clear goal: eliminate Saddam and end the violence. That WAS stated upfront. The question now is whether this new war of the century will have a real goal.