OCTOBER 7th, 2025 2nd ANNIVERSARY OF HAMAS ATTACK ON ISRAEL 

Politics - President Trump comments on Tomahawk cruise missiles 

- Drones, artillery near nuclear power plants

Combat Ops - Marginal gains, both sides

- Air strikes continue on Ukrainian power grid

Economics - Ukrainian GDP adjusted down

- China buying more Russian oil

Weather

The Autumn rains appear to have arrived. This will complicate logistics, and also reduce drone performance and degrade sensors.

Kharkiv

62 and cloudy. Cloudy all week, rain starts Monday and showers possible through next Monday. Daily lows in the low 50s, daily highs in the upper 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

67 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Cloudy through the weekend, rain showers possible daily through the weekend. Daily lows upper 50s, daily highs in the 60s.  Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

55 and cloudy. Cloudy all week, rain showers daily through the weekend. Daily lows upper 40s, daily highs upper 50s. Winds north-easterly, 5-10kts.

Politics 

President Trump commented on the proposal to transfer Tomahawk cruise missiles to Russia (as requested by President Zelenskyy):

"I think I want to find out what they're doing with them. Where are they sending them? I guess I'd have to ask that question. I would ask some questions. I'm not looking to escalate that war."

Russia’s Rosenergoatom (the agency that runs Russia’s nuclear reactors) reported that during he night of October 6th-7th a drone impacted the cooling tower of the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant (VNPP) - located south of the city of Voronezh about 100 miles). Investigation revealed that a Ukrainian drone was jammed by Russian EW and crashed into the cooling tower and exploded, leaving a scorch mark but apparently causing no other damage.

UN’s IAEA reports that “2 artillery rounds” struck about a mile from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) on Monday afternoon. Russia is in the process of transferring the ZNPP to feed into the Russian power grid.

EU Official continue reporting on unidentified drones in EU airspace, most recently near the airfields at Oslo, Munich and Frankfurt, each time causing temporary shutdowns and delays in air activity. Chancellor Merz has commented that Russia is to blame; Russia has, of course, denied it.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Imagery confirmed small Ukrainian gains in the town of Yunakivka (north-east of Sumy city), and Russian reports claimed small Russian gains in Oleksiivka due north of Sumy City). Fighting continued along most of the line of contact.

North of Kharkiv, fighting continues in the general area of Vovchansk, but there were no confirmed changes in the front line.

East of Kharkiv, in the border area north of the Oskil River, imagery has confirmed Russian gains in the small town of Odradne, and the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) reported troops in contact at multiple points stretching from Odradne south to the terrain just west of Stroivka, and from there west to Kolodiazne as Russian force movements around Odradne have created a small pocket, triangular in shape, about 4 - 5 miles on a side, and they are now attacking into the the pocket to try to circle the Ukrainian forces inside.

Also of note, a Russian engineer battalion has moved into this area, suggesting the Russians have begun to build defensive positions in the would-be buffer zone.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Imagery confirmed Russian gains about 7 miles south-east of Kupyansk, in the town of Pishchane; at the same time Russian forces claimed gains inside and in the immediate area of Kupyansk, but these have not confirmed.

Other reporting suggest Russian recon elements have pushed across the P07 roadway that runs westward from Kupyansk and is the major Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) into and out of Kupyansk.

Further south fighting continues in a broad arc east of Borova, as well as in a long line running west from the Torske area out to the Dobrysheve area along the Nitrius River. Over the past 24 hours there have been numerous exchanges and minor shifts in the front lines, suggesting that gruesome grind that has been seen before during the spring and fall wet seasons when fighting takes place at very close range and there is a repeated exchange of positions held as the fighting see-saws back and forth. This continues with the support of FPV drones and artillery fire… 

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

North of Bakhmut, fighting continues north-west, north, and in a close arc to the east of Siversk down to the T0513 roadway that runs into Siversk from the south, and imagery confirms Russian forces have reached the center of Kuzmynivka, a tiny village of fewer that a dozen homes, located on an oxbow in the Bakhmutovka River, about 4 miles south of Siversk.

Given the extended capabilities of Russian fiber-optic FPV drones, and the advent of the rains of autumn to force vehicles onto roads, Russian forces are now in position to interdict the GLOCs and thereby cut logistics support to Siversk.

Russian forces continue to attack west of Chasiv Yar and west of Toretsk, but there were no confirmed changes in the front line in this area. 

West of the T0504 roadway imagery confirmed Russian control over Volodymyrivka and Pankivka, which strengthens the Russian positions on the east side of the August salient.

On the west side of the salient the picture is more confused, with Russian and Ukrainian forces advancing over the same ground that they lost one or two days ago.

At the north end of the salient Ukrainian sources confirmed Russian forces had pushed into Zolotyi Kolodiaz as of the 5th, while further south Ukrainian forces had retaken Vilne, while just to the south of the Ukrainian gains, Russian forces had retaken Ivanivka and Dorozhnie.

A good deal of fighting was reported around Pokrovsk, with the UGS reporting engagements in 18 different towns to the immediate east and west and to the south-west, to the Vovcha River. 

Just to the north and north-east of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian sources confirmed that Russian forces have taken control of Krasni Lyman and Novoekonomichne, with unconfirmed reports of small gains inside the south side of Pokrovsk.

There were no other gains north of the Vovcha River.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

South of the Vovcha River saw both sides make gains in the Stepove area. Imagery confirmed Ukrainian forces have retaken Sichneve, while further south, Russian forces appear to have taken Novovasylivske and Fedorivka.

At the west end of the line, along the Dnepr River, west of Orikhiv, Russian forces continue to probe into Prymorske and Stepnohirsk, but there were no confirmed changes in the line in this area.

More fighting was reported around the Antonovskiy bridge, up river from Kherson. Reporting from both sides seems deliberately vague, so I'm speculating, but it appears that special operations personnel from each side are probing across the river in the area of the bridge, and the various units are regularly engaged in recon and sabotage on the “other side” of the river. But details beyond that are lacking.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of October 6th - October 7th, Russian forces launched 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 152 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 88 Shahed drones. 

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy  Zaporizhzhia oblasts. 

RuAF tacair struck at least 8 Ukrainian towns.

Preliminary reports note 2 killed and 5 wounded civilians.

Ukrainian drones continued strikes against Russian industrial targets, but damage is difficult to assess. Ukrainian drones struck the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, during the night of October 3rd-4th. Ukrainian sources told Reuters that the refining unit that was struck has a capacity of 160,000 barrels per day, representing 40% of the refinery’s total output. The source told Reuters that damage will take 1 month to repair and will mean a reduction of 30% in output (48,000 barrels per day) from that unit for that time period. 

Russian fiber optic FPV drones struck targets in the Kramatorsk area, hitting vehicles on the GLOCs that were 12 miles closest point of approach from Russian controlled terrain. Normally, Russian drone operators are 2 or 3 miles behind the lines (sometimes more), suggesting a 15 mile deep strike with a fiber optic drone.

Russia is currently producing 50,000 fiber optic FPV (first person video) drones per month.

During the night of October 5th - October 6th, Russian forces launched 116 x  Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 83 Shahed drones. 

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Odessa and Sumy oblasts, with struck targets mainly focused on energy infrastructure. A maternity hospital in Sumy was also struck, there was no associated casualty report as the hospital had already been evacuated.

RuAF tacair struck at least 5 Ukrainian towns.

At least 2 civilians were killed and 13 were injured.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun9 July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct6 Oct7

Brent      94.71      66.80 70.44 66.90 67.03 65.23 65.36

WTI     92.10    64.89 68.65 64.29 63.26 61.47 61.63

NG       3.97         3.69 3.35 3.06 3.12 3.37 3.47

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.49 5.18 5.22 5.17 5.10

Ruble     85          79.27 78.47 79.74 84.03 83.18 81.93

Hryvnia 28.6 41.55 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.29 41.35

Urals 91.66 60.84 64.07 63.17 60.12 60.37 61.33

ESPO 94.52 63.97 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.44* 67.29*

Sokol 99.31 61.51 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.41 61.97

*The price for ESPO oil seems to have fallen out of reporting, but there was one report that it was being selling in Shandong at $1.70  above Dubai. That is the price noted above.

China intends to buy Russian (and Iranian) oil and Reuters reports that China is in the process of increasing the capacity of its strategic oil reserves at 11 sites, adding 169 million barrels of storage capacity by the end of 2026, adding 530,000 barrels of oil to their stockpile very day. China's current storage capacity is 2.03 billion barrels. China currently uses about 16.5 million barrels of oil per day, about 12 million of which is imported.

The World Bank dropped its forecast for Ukrainian GDP growth for 2026 to 2% from 5.2%

Ukraine’s real GDP growth for 2025 is now expected to reach 2%

Thoughts

As noted above, the ground fight appears to have slowed again and once more the two armies are locked into this very slow, see-saw fight at close range, with the added lethality of drones and artillery (“World War I with cell phones” if you will). For the Russians, as they chose to fight a war of attrition, this plays to their preferred operational art; for the Ukrainians it means more grind and, in the end, more casualties.

I have to note the grim persistence of the grunts on both sides; they get up each day and go back to this brutal fight. There is a question asked by many as to how long they can endure, and how many casualties the two societies can endure. As to how many casualties the soldiers will endure, history is full of armies enduring even as the face - and suffer - complete destruction, others have collapsed or quit when the leadership commits an egregious act of perfidy; so, forecasting when an army will collapse is purely a guess.

As to how long a society will fight? I recall a lecture I received at the war college years ago, the result of one professors research into that very question: when do nation’s simply give up, what does it require to break a nation’s will? There were cases where some gave up after only a relatively small number of casualties, but the overwhelming majority needed to suffer tremendous numbers of dead before the society turned and said “No more.” What he found was that that usually meant in excess of 1.5% of the entire population had been killed, and often much more; in many cases it was far more than that. History has cases of national suffering 5% or even 10% killed and not quitting.

1.5% of Ukraine’s population is 500,000; 1.5% of Russia’s population is 2.1 million.

Of course, his research proves nothing, as every case is different, but it does give you some sense that this war could last for a long time.

v/r pete  

 

Victory in the East

October 6th, 2025

It’s been said Ukraine could win the war, and that’s correct, they could win. In fact, every war is winnable. It is, as Clausewitz so accurately observed, all a function of will - war is a struggle of will. The side with the stronger will, will win the war (providing that the other side’s will to continue the war fails before they manage to kill everyone on the weaker side). 

This is what gives people hope that Ukraine could win the war; Ukrainian national will is strong. The problem, of course, is that the Russian will to fight - and win - the war appears to be just as strong. Which leads to the question, what would Ukraine need to do to win the war?

The answer comes immediately to mind: break the Russian will. This, of course, is like the vaudeville line on how to make a marble statue of an elephant: Easy, get a big block of marble and chip away everything that doesn’t look like an elephant.

It has been suggested that the answer to breaking Russia’s will is to so embarrass Russia, and Putin, on the battlefield that he sues for peace or is thrown out of power. I suppose that’s a possibility, though I would submit that it’s equally likely that, if embarrassed enough he would escalate, maybe even use battlefield nuclear weapons. Hard to know what someone like Putin would do if embarrassed on the world stage.

As to how do you embarrass Russia and Putin? The accepted answer is a combination of “break the Russian economy” and produce a large scale battlefield victory causing huge losses. In short,  kill a lot of Russians.

The problem here is two-fold. First, breaking the Russian economy - the thesis of strategic bombing first elucidated by General Douhet (and his contemporaries Wever, Trenchard and Mitchell) - may be a great deal more difficult than the projections of Western analysts. Russia’s economy has problems. But, arguably, Germany, France, England et al have worse economic problems. And they also suffer from social stresses that are not present in Russia. And, most nations adapt as they are bombed, they get more resilient. History has shown that most countries last much longer than forecast.

Further, there is the issue of China. It isn’t possible to know what is going on inside Emperor Xi’s mind, but it’s readily conceivable that Xi will not let Russia lose, but would rather see the war drag on, letting Europe and the US commit more assets to the war, assets that can’t be committed elsewhere.

As for losses on the battlefield, and generating enough losses to convince Russia to give up the goal of conquering eastern Ukraine, that would entail producing a massive defeat, that is, killing a lot of Russians.

How many? Well, if you believe the casualty figures produced by Kyiv (and several European intelligence agencies and armies) the Russians have already suffered more than 500,000 KIAs and well more than 1 million wounded. And that hasn’t dimmed Russian support for the war. (Note: as for the argument that no one tells the truth to Russian pollsters, they may not, but they still pay their taxes and do as they are told.)

I don't think Russia has suffered that many casualties - the best estimate I’ve seen (my only information is all material found in free, online material, but these numbers make sense and they are documented) is between 135,000 and 225,000 KIA - and I would tend to lean into the range of perhaps 175,000 KIA. The number of severely wounded (those who will never return to the army) is probably around 200,000, and other wounded about 450,000 - 500,000.

But, of note, Ukrainian casualties are probably about the same - and may be more. And while Russia’s population is 147 million, Ukraine’s is now listed at 38 million by the UN (the IMF says 33.4 million); using that number, Russia has 3.8 times as many people as Ukraine, yet roughly the same number of casualties.

Assuming that Russian will is roughly equivalent to Ukrainian will, the numbers suggest - for those who want to quantify this, that Russians would endure at least 3.8 times as many KIAs and also not give up; that would work out to some 650,000 KIAs. Said differently, if you killed another 500,000 Russian soldiers they would keep fighting. Of course, the Red Army - just the army (which included troops from all of the Soviet Union, not simply Russia) suffered some 8.7 million dead during WWII; Russia has a tradition of massive casualties - and massive suffering.

These numbers of KIAs seem nearly inconceivable to Europe and the US, in as much as everyone compares them to the wars fought by the US - and Russia - post World War II. In fact, total US killed in action since the end of World War II runs to about 105,000 (including Korea and Vietnam). We have had 7,320 combat related deaths since 1990; we have become very capable of fighting while suffering few casualties. 

But, as one really smart Marine RCT commander put it, ‘we’ve been fighting two divisions below our weight class for the last 40 years.’ 

The simple truth is that when great powers fight, you should expect a lot of people will get killed, yours and the enemy. And the war in Ukraine is a great power fight. Russia - with a little help from China and North Korea and Iran, is fighting Ukraine - with a lot of help from the US and Europe. 

Per the Council of Foreign Relations, as of January 2025 the US had provide $195 billion in military assistance and grants to Ukraine, and Europe had provided some $121 billion in aid plus another $131 billion in support to Ukrainian refugees. And additional $43 billion has been provided by non-European nations - a total of something on the order of $490 billion (there are some rounding errors in the total). Ukraine had a GDP of about $160 billion in 2021, so, 3 times its GDP has been spent on the war in one way or another. And more has been spent in the last few months - money not included here - so, close to half a trillion dollars.

Ukraine also receives assistance that comes free of charge, in particular intelligence support from Europe and the US that would cost tens of billion to replicate. 

As for Russia, Russia will spend 8% of GDP on national security this year, which means about $160 billion. Given that a fair percentage of this spending doesn’t go to the war effort but to other forces and other activities, and that this year’s total is larger than the first two years of the war, Russia has spent less on the war than Ukraine - Europe - the US. 

So, where does that leave Ukraine?

Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure will continue and gasoline prices in Russia will probably continue to rise. But, will Russia have enough gasoline to continue to perform basic economic functions and continue the war in Ukraine? Yes.

Who will the Russian people blame for high gasoline prices and gasoline shortages: Putin, or Ukraine and the West? Some will blame Putin, but most will blame Ukraine and the West.

Could Ukraine kill enough Russians to convince Russia to stop fighting and withdraw? No one knows. But the numbers would suggest that this would at least require hundreds of thousands - perhaps millions - more deaths to break Russian will.

And we need to face facts about Putin: he is 1) capable - since the gross error in 2022 of believing the massively wrong assessment that led him to invade with 200,000 men in the hopes of a quick several weeks of fighting, he changed strategies (a tremendous challenge in any war) and has since the start of 2023 turned the war around. These are not the actions of an idiot. 2) He’s ruthless. Russia has taken something on the order of 175,000 - 220,000 killed, and 500,000 - 650,000 wounded. They are not slowing down. He is quite willing, it seems, to keep this up.

So, yes, Ukraine could win the war. But to do so it must significantly escalate the level of violence on the battlefield - let’s say 4 or 5 times as violent as it has been so far, AND significantly damage the Russian economy, perhaps also 4 or 5 times as much damage as it is now suffering. And so, for Ukraine to win, Russia must be convinced, in the face of this increased violence, that the answer to stopping the violence and damage to the economy, to Russia, is not to escalate, or even consider the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, but to surrender.

 OCTOBER 6th, 2025

Politics - Angela Merkel blames Poland for the war

- Czech Election results - Babis wins

- France - PM Lecornu steps down

Combat Ops - Marginal gains, weather may be slowing the fight

Weather

The fall rains appear to have arrived. This will complicate logistics, and also reduce drone performance and degrade sensors.

Kharkiv

54 and cloudy. Cloudy all week, rain starts Thursday, continues in next week. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the 60s until Thursday; after that lows in the 40s and highs in the 50s. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

57 and mostly cloudy. Cloudy all week, rain showers starting Thursday morning, continuing into the weekend. Daily lows upper 50s, daily highs in the upper 60s.  Winds easterly, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

51 and cloudy. Cloudy all week, rain showers daily starting Tuesday night, continuing into next week. Daily lows around 50,  40s, daily highs around 60. Winds north-easterly, 5-10kts.

Politics 

Former German Chancellor Angel Merkel, in an interview with the Hungarian online news firm “Partizan” blamed Poland and the Baltic states for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Her argument is that Poland’s and the Baltic states breaking of diplomatic ties with Russia in 2021, and Poland’s non-support of the Minsk Agreements, pushed Russia to invade in 2022.

While the Minsk Agreements nominally called for withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Merkel has said before that the real purpose was to give Ukraine time - with European support - to rearm, and asserted that if done properly, Russia would not have attacked. 

Andrej Babis and ANO (“Yes”) won 34.5% of the vote and 80 seats into h 200 member parliament. “Together” received 23.4% and “STAN” 11.2%. The Pirate Party received 9%,  Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) 7.8%,  and “the Motorists” 6.8 %.

Turnout was just short of 69%.

Babis was to hold talks with Czech President Petr Pavel and begin to form a new government.

"I have promised Mr President to meet him and show him a solution that will be in line with Czech and European laws. We are helping Ukraine through (the) EU, and (the) EU is helping Ukraine... and this is the way... we will continue to help. … We will definitely lead talks with the SPD and the Motorists and seek a single-party government led by ANO.”

When asked if he would support Ukraine’s admission into the EU, he answered:  “[Ukraine} is not prepared for the EU. We have to end the war first.”

France’s Prime Minister Lecornu has stepped down, after announcing his cabinet. Lecornu became PM on September 6th. He was the 29th PM of the 5th Republic.

Ukraine will begin to receive the new “Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) from the US. This was first announced in late August, before the weapon had entered production. The weapon was just developed in the last 2 years, and is a low cost (about $500,000 per weapon), 250 nm, 35 foot CEP weapon with a 500 lb warhead. The original goal was to produce 1,000 per year, and the first 10 will be delivered to Ukraine this month, and a further 830 weapons by the end of the 2026 fiscal year. Ukraine is scheduled to eventually receive 3,550 ERAMs.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV

Fighting continues north of Sumy City but there were no changes in the front lines.

Fighting continues north of Kharkiv City but there were no changes in the front lines.

Fighting continues north of the Oskil River just inside the Ukrainian border; the Russian MinDef claims that Russian forces have taken control of the town of Odradne, about 8 miles north of the Oskil River, about 2 miles inside Ukraine. Odradne is a small farming village of perhaps 20 - 25 houses.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues in the north end of Kupyansk, and to the west of the city, but there does not appear to be any change in lines in and around the city.

Further south, the only changes over the past several days are just west of the Zherebets River, where Ukrainian forces appear to have made marginal gains just north of Yampil, pushing eastward along the rail line.

Elsewhere in the general area, Reporting now confirms that Russian forces took Shandryholove last week, and have also moved a bit further south and are now just north and north-east of Dobrysheve.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

Fighting continues north of Bakhmut, focused on Siversk, but there were no confirmed changes in the front lines over the last several days. However, blogger reports form several pro-Ukrainian sources have adjusted their maps of the situation around Siversk suggesting that Russian forces are in clear control of terrain immediately north of the city, less than 2 miles to the east of the city, and less than a mile to the south-east of the city.

Fighting continues west and south-west of Chasiv car, and between Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines in this area or in the terrain immediately west of Toretsk.

North and north-east of Pokrovsk fighting continues around the August salient; on the east side imagery confirmed that Russian forces had pushed into the south side of the town of Volodymyrivka. At the same time, Ukrainian forces appear to have been stopped east of Bilytske, though there is one report claiming marginal Ukrainian gains in this area. Nevertheless, it appears that the Russians have strengthened the base of their salient. Meanwhile, at the north end of the salient Russian sources claim that Russian forces pushed north and have taken control of Zolotyi Kolodiaz.

In and around Pokrovsk there are multiple claims of small gains but there were no confirmed changes to the front line around the city. Reporting does note continued recon probes and drone and artillery strikes on Ukrainian GLOCs into the Pokrovsk area.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Fighting continues along much of the line of contact south of the Vovcha River, but there were no confirmed changes in the line.

Ukrainian General Staff reporting of troops in contact outside Verbove (about 20 miles north-east of Hulyaipole), supports the assessment that that town is now controlled by Russian forces.

Fighting was again noted just up river from Kherson, around the Antonovskiy Bridge, but again, no details are provided.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of October 5th - October 6th, Russian forces launched 116 x  Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 83 Shahed drones. 

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson and Sumy oblasts. 

RuAF tacair struck at least 5 Ukrainian towns.

At least 2 civilians were killed and 13 were injured.

During t nheight go October 5th - 6th, Ukrainian drones struck a military facility in Dzerzhnzk, Nizhniy Novgorod, and an oil facility in Feodosia, Crimea, and a power substation near Belgord.

During the night of October 4th - October 5th, Russian forces launched 2 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 42 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 9 x Kalibr cruise missiles, and 496 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 1 Kinzhal missile, 22 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 6 Kalibr cruise missiles, and 439 drones.

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Lviv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. 

At least 5 civilians were killed and 18 injured.

During the night of October 3rd - October 4th, Russian forces launched 3 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 109 x  Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 73 Iskander cruise missiles.  Note that again, all the ballistic missiles reached their targets.

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. 

At least 1 civilian was killed and 30 were injured.

Ukrainian drones struck Russian oil refineries during the night of the October 3rd-4th, hitting the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast. Fires were reported in and near the refinery, but there is no independent damage assessment.

During the night of October 2nd-October 3rd, Russian forces launched 7 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 21 x Iskander cruise missiles, 7 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles  and 381 x  Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 12 Iskander cruise missiles, 5 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 303 Shahed drones. Note, per initial reports, all 7 ballistic missiles reached their targets.

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in  Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. 

RuAF tacair struck at least 5 Ukrainian towns.

At least 6 civilians were injured.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun9 July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct3 Oct6

Brent      94.71      66.80 70.44 66.90 67.03 64.35 65.23

WTI     92.10    64.89 68.65 64.29 63.26 60.68 61.47

NG       3.97         3.69 3.35 3.06 3.12 3.38 3.37

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.49 5.18 5.22 5.16 5.17

Ruble     85          79.27 78.47 79.74 84.03 82.05 83.18

Hryvnia 28.6 41.55 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.28 41.29

Urals 91.66 60.84 64.07 63.17 60.12 59.99 60.37

ESPO 94.52 63.97 71.58 68.63 68.32 NA 66.44*

Sokol 99.31 61.51 64.38 62.57 62.97 60.76 61.41

*The price for ESPO oil seems to have fallen out of reporting, but there was one report that it was being selling in Shandong at $1.70  above Dubai. That is the price noted above.

Thoughts

It may be that the front is in some sort of stalemate, but I think it is the adjustment to the weather. There has been on and off rains for the last week or so, and pictures taken at ground level have show a good deal of mud. Obviously, this will drive vehicles off of fields and onto roads where they will be more easily targeted. So, what was harder, will now get harder. Given the expanded Russian drone use in the past several months, particularly the longer range (in some cases over 30 miles) fiber optic drones, this will negatively impact Ukrainian resupply efforts. But Russian movements will still be slow; there won’t be any “breakthroughs,” though there is always the possibility of gaps in the line due to Ukrainian manpower shortages.

Russian strikes on Ukrainian power grid elements will expand and become once again the major focus. The ability of Russian ballistic missiles to penetrate Patriot defenses will be a problem as the larger elements of the power grid come under attack.

v/r pete