January 26th, 2026

Politics - Talks meet again on February 1st

- Power grid struggles

Combat ops - Few changes

- But Myrnohrad pocket is slowly shrinking 

Weather

The cold weather eases just a bit this week, as rain and then snow move in, but returning to very cold weather next week.

Cloud cover over much of the country will degrade commercial satellite imaging, limiting assessment of changes to the front lines.

Kharkiv

14 and partly cloudy, winds gusting over 20. Clouding up tonight and cloudy for the next week. Wednesday through Saturday sleet turning to snow. Very cold Tuesday, with high temperatures in the teens, wind chills below zero. Wednesday through Saturday temperatures hovering around 30, very cold weather returns on Saturday. Winds south-easterly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

18 and cloudy gusting to 25. Cloudy all week, except Wednesday afternoon, rain Turing to snow Friday through Monday. Temperatures in the 20s tomorrow, in the 30s Wednesday through Saturday, then back into the 20s. Winds easterly, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

21 and cloudy, gusting over 30. Freezing rain turning to snow by tomorrow night, then daily snow showers through the weekend. Daily temperatures in the upper 20s to 30, through Thursday, then colder, in the teens on Thursday and Friday, then into single digits through next week; wind chills below zero. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics

US, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators met last week in the UAE and the talks were labeled as “very productive” and “constructive,” and the next session has been scheduled for February 1st. There are no details on what specifically was discussed.

President Zelenskyy commented on the talks after the meeting:

”We also talked about complex political issues that have not yet been resolved. We analyzed the key positions of the parties. We defined the framework for further diplomatic work. We are preparing for new trilateral meetings this week.”

Russian Presidential Spokesman Peskov commented:

"I can't make an assessment yet. It would be a mistake to count on any such high efficiency of the first contacts. This is a very complex substance. Complex issues are on the agenda, it's no secret, and it is our consistent position that the territorial issue, which is part of the Anchorage formula, is of fundamental importance to the Russian side.”

 Zelenskyy also noted that the proposed US security guarantees is “100 percent ready.”

“For us, security guarantees are first and foremost guarantees of security from the United States. The document is 100 percent ready, and we are waiting for our partners to confirm the date and place when we will sign it.”

He also noted Ukraine’s membership in the EU in 2027, calling it an “economic security guarantee.”

He later commented:

"For the first time in a long while, there was again a format involving the Americans and the Russians. They managed to discuss a range of primarily military issues – those concerning steps towards ending the war and real control and monitoring. There are issues that need to be prepared for the next meeting. Preliminary discussions indicated that the teams would meet again on Sunday. It would be good if this meeting could be moved up."

"Ukraine has always been and will remain on the side of peace, and the only reason this war continues is Russia. Real results from diplomacy are needed so that there is no impression that the Russians are also using the negotiation process for a very cynical and brutal purpose – pushing back new pressure measures against Russia that could actually work. And pressure is needed… Partners must not forget this."

Concerning the Ukrainian power grid, particularly in the Kyiv metropolitan area,

As of Sunday night Mayor Klitschko reported that some 1,300 apartment buildings were without heating.

DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private power company, reported early this morning that emergency power is being pushed into more areas of the Kyiv oblast and that the grid was now stable, but emergency outages remain in effect for several district of the city.

President Zelenskyy commented on the situation:

”I held a special coordination call and received briefings on the situation in the regions where the energy situation is the toughest. First and foremost, this concerns Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast, Kharkiv and its oblast, Chernihiv, Sumy, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Kyiv took up the greatest share of attention and discussion time."

"I instructed the Prime Minister of Ukraine, together with the Minister of Finance, to analyze the possibility, including for Kyiv, of urgently procuring everything that is genuinely needed right now for alternative electricity generation and heat supply.”

Ground Operations 

SUMY AND KHAKIV OBLASTS

Fighting continues north of Sumy City but there have been no changes in the lines.

Fighting continues north and north-east of Kharkiv just inside the border. There have been no confirmed Russian gains over the weekend but overall, since the first week of January, Russian forces have made gains both south and east of Vovchansk, as well as in the very north-east tip of Ukraine, where Russian forces have slowly expanded their holding just west of Dehtyarne.

There has been no change to the lines just north of the Oskil River to the Milove area.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues along most of the front line. Russian probes continue in and around Kupyansk. It is not clear if the Ukrainians have dug out the last pocket of Russian troops inside Kupyansk proper. Fighting continues east and south-east of Kupyansk and Russian forces over the past week have gained some ground south-east of Kupyansk, but the extent of those gains remains unclear

Fighting continues along most of the front line south to the Donets River, with small Russian gains north-north-east of Borova. Further south, Russian probes continue into Lyman but there is no change to the front line in this area.

A little further to the south, that is, just west and north-west of Siversk, Russian forces continue high levels of probes and daily attacks, supported by drone and artillery attacks; imagery confirmed Russian gains in Riznykivka during the middle of last week, but there were changes in the front lines over the weekend.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

Fighting continues along most of this front line. Imagery confirmed Russian gains west of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar, east of Kostiantinivka) along the T0504 roadway. Multiple probes continue into and around Kostiantinivka, but there were no changes to the lines.

Further south-west, a good deal of fighting was also reported but there were no confirmed changes either north of the Pokrovsk pocket or within the Pokrovsk - Myrnohrad area. That said, the general gist of a good deal of unconfirmed reporting suggests that the Myrnohrad side of the pocket continues to slowly collapse. The south side of the pocket now appears to be immediately north of the north edge of the town of Svitle, and the west end of the pocket - the north-south front line - lies just east of the eastern edge of Svitle. There are probably small pockets of Ukrainian troops inside Myrnohrad, but they are probably surrounded.

Russian forces appear to hold most of Pokrovsk, but Ukrainian troops still hold parts of north and north-west Pokrovsk.

Fighting also continues on the south and south-east edges of Novopavlivka, but there is no confirmed change to the front lines. Reporting does suggest however, that the would-be pocket south-east of Filliia has now been largely closed by Russian forces.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

South of the Vovcha River fighting continues along the Vovcha river line and just west of the Haichru River, but there were no confirmed changes in the line in that area.

Fighting continues in and around Hulyaipole, and reporting suggests northern Hulyaipole is now controlled by Russian forces, but this has not been confirmed; there were no confirmed changes to the front lines.

Imagery confirmed Ukrainian gains on the south side of Mala Tokmachka (south-east of Orikhiv), with Russian forces still attacking from the east.

Troops in contact were again reported near the Antonvosky bridge. There are very few details on any of this action and in all likelihood it consists of small teams from both sides conducting recon and harassment raids across the river; and the continual “exchange” of control of islands in the river: one side sets up an observation post, the other side keeps attacking and eventually forces the other side off. Repeat… 

Air and Maritime Operations 

President Zelenskyy reported that Russian forces launched more than 1,700 strike drones, 1,380 glide bombs and 69 missiles into Ukrainian during the period from January 18th through January 25th.

DTEK reports that their power generation capacity is only 30-40% of its nominal installed capacity and that they have sustained $64 billion in damage. Ukrainian citizens are now averaging 3 to 4 hours of electricity per day.

During the night of January 25th-January 26th, Russian forces launched at least 138 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 110 drones. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad,  and Sumy oblasts. There is no report yet as to the extent of damage.

Civilian casualties include at least 7 wounded. 

RuAF tacair struck targets in 8 towns.

During the night of January 24th-January 25th, Russian forces launched at least 2 x Ballistic missiles (not further identified) and 102 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 87 drones. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.  Energy infrastructure was again the primary target; there is no report yet as to the extent of new damage. As of Sunday the Mayor noted that 1,676 apartment buildings were without power following the latest strikes.

Civilian casualties include at least 1 dead and 3 wounded. 

RuAF tacair struck targets in 6 towns.

The Ukrainian MinDef reported that on Saturday Russian forces used Shahed drones to attack a Ukrainian airfield, with the link via Starlink vice another drone; this is the second reported use of Starlink to control strike drones, the previous use being on January 15th (this year).

During the night of January 23rd-January 24th, Russian forces launched at least 2 x Zircon hypersonic missiles, 6 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 12 x Kh-22 cruise missiles, 1 x Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 375 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 5 ballistic missiles, 9 Kh-22 cruise missiles, the K—59/69 cruise missile and 357 drones. 

Damage was reported in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Kyiv oblasts.  Energy infrastructure was again the primary target. There was a blackout in Chernihiv, and 800,000 people were without power in the greater Kyiv area, at least 2,000 houses have no heat, 6,000 houses have only limited heat, blackouts also in Dnipro city.

Civilian casualties include at least 1 dead and 31 wounded. 

RuAF tacair struck targets in 9 towns.

During the night of January 22nd-January 23rd, Russian forces launched at least 101 x strike drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 76 drones. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.  Energy infrastructure was again the primary target. There was an initial report this afternoon that Russian forces have struck the thermal power plant in Slovyansk. There is no report yet as to the extent of damage.

Civilian casualties include at least 3 dead and 10 wounded. 

RuAF tacair struck targets in 8 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Sep9 Oct8 Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Jan23 Jan26

Brent      94.71    67.03 66.18 63.86 62.94 61.26 65.78 65.41

WTI     92.10    63.26 62.48 59.94 59.26 57.10 61.02 60.55

NG       3.97        3.12 3.44 4.33 4.96 3.41 5.23 6.11

Wheat     8.52  5.22 5.06 5.32 5.38 5.22 5.21 5.25

Ruble     85          84.03 81.28 80.95 76.52 80.35 75.70 76.46

Hryvnia 28.6 41.23 41.48 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.15 43.00

Urals 91.66 60.12 61.15 56.56 54.92 50.40 54.76 55.51

ESPO 94.52 68.32 66.74 65.18 61.95 52.28 55.47 57.06

Sokol 99.31 62.97 61.91 60.71 60.62 55.57 59.72 61.40

Note the price of natural gas, which is a direct response to increased demand for emergency power - natural gas powered turbine generators - across large areas of the entire northern hemisphere.

Thoughts

Ukrainian and Russian and US negotiators met in the UAE, in what were said to be “very productive” and “constructive.” I recall being told by a State Department fellow many years ago (who was engaged in some negotiations with a US ally), that “productive” meant both sides learned how much the other side hated them, but constructive meant that, after telling each other to engage in a physical impossibility, they had agreed to meet again. So, next meeting February 1st.

The slow collapses of the Myrnohrad pocket serves to again underline the nature of this war: it IS a slow grind, a deliberate war of attrition. Russian forces are pushing forward very slowly, as they inflict casualties. And, yes, they are taking casualties, but clearly at a rate they can accept. The particular way of war the Russians have settled on is one with very low risk of losing. Ukrainian forces can move more quickly but they have yet to demonstrate that they can sustain the high loss rates in personnel, and as a result, they slowly keep giving ground. It appears that Myrnohrad will soon be overrun by Russian forces. Ukrainian forces will have inflicted casualties in the Russians, but probably in roughly the same number as they have suffered. Myrnohrad itself will have been reduced mainly to rubble. The Russians will slowly grind on.

As for claims on both sides that the other side is nearing collapse, that is a mix of propaganda and semantics. Russian forces are not being “devastated” by Ukrainian forces. Casualties mount every day, but the Russians are managing it. Ukraine’s line will not crumble into dust.

If there is an eventual “collapse” of the Ukrainian line, it will be nearly invisible for quite some time. The only collapse will be a situation where the Ukrainian forces have no reserve unit to fill in when a seam is exposed to Russian attack. If such an event occurs, the Russian will not pour through, a la a Panzer attack into France. If there were no army in front of them the Russians would move forward, but expect that pace to be no more than that of a steady walk. Their movements are likely to be very slow and deliberate. Even this past August when Russian recon elements found a large gap north-north-east of Pokrovsk, Russian recon units moved 15 miles over the course of 2 days and then Russian forces never sent more than several battalions to hold the entire salient.

v/r pete 

USS DEFIANT

January 25th, 2026

USS Nimitz has pulled into port for the last time. This gives the US 10 operational aircraft carriers. But not really. One carrier is always getting refueled, a long, and complex process. So, there are really only 9 carriers available. One carrier is based in Japan - thank you Japan. But that doesn't change the simple calculus that because ships need constant maintenance, and new crews need training, it takes 3 ships in the inventory to sustain one at some trouble spot. In fact, because things aren't quite perfect, over a sustained period of time it takes 3 and a bit more to maintain one aircraft carrier on station in, for example, the Gulf of Aden or the North Arabian Sea.

Do we need more carriers? Yes. 11 is a good number, it allows us to honestly sustain 3 forward at any one time, though in a perfect world I would like 15.

What about USS Defiant? I’ll begin by saying I am a fan of battleships. (And aircraft carriers, but that can wait till later.) 

Critics have been quick to point out that the battleships will be quickly sunk. This is true, if they are operated by idiots. This is also true of the argument that hypersonic missiles will sink our aircraft carriers in the first 15 minutes of any war. If the carriers are operated foolishly, they will be sunk quickly. This has always been the case. If you want proof of that, read up on the war in the Pacific between 1941 and 1945. The “Miracle of Midway” saw the entire course of the war change, but not in 15 minutes, just 5, three  IJN carriers lost in just 5 minutes. 

Take a detailed look at the Japanese plan; these were tough, smart aggressive officers, not fools. But they developed an incredibly complex plan, split their forces, and committed their main attack force based on a poor reconnaissance plan, had weak intelligence, not enough support ships - refueling and stores ships, and an overabundance of hubris. The US had better intelligence - substantially better (perhaps the one clear advantage), a simpler, more focused plan, and some superb leadership. 

Which is not to say that the Japanese leadership was bad. In fact, Japanese naval leadership was excellent; some of their leadership was better than ours, some of ours better than theirs. But the differences were small. Everyone knows the results, but the point is worth making: the IJN essentially lost the initiative - the holy grail of warfare - in just 5 minutes on a June morning, and never really got it back. 

The Japanese had already landed in Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomons, and on New Guinea, by the end of May 1942. In just the briefest span of time they lost three carriers (a fourth a day later) had their plans turned around, and seen their overall war fighting strategy stopped hard. In the few minutes they lost the initiative. They would never get it back. After the first week of June 1942 the Japanese were reacting, not acting. There was still a tremendous amount of fighting ahead and the Japanese would hold their own tactically. But the initiative was ours. The lesson here is that a different, more simple plan and they might well have won.

So, yes, the carriers could be lost in 15 minutes. But that isn’t a glaring weakness in the aircraft carrier concept, it is a glaring weakness in a given plan and the leadership that accepts the plan.

But what about USS Defiant? And the aircraft carrier?

To begin, great power navies have, on occasion fought each other. But for the most part they don’t, even under the most extreme circumstances. In the last 200 years major fleet engagements have been rare. During the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars there were a number of large engagements - 1st of June, Dardanelles, Copenhagen, the Nile, Cape St. Vincent, Trafalgar, etc.), but since then there have been only a handful of true large scale naval engagements with capital ships: - Tsushima (Russo Japanese War), Dogger Bank, Jutland, the Falklands (World War I), Taranto, Mers el Kebir, (Bismarck and Tirpitz were both single ship problems, the running down of Graf Spee and Scharnhorst and Gneisneau also were efforts to kill 1 or 2 ships), Coral Sea, Midway, the long series of battles in the fall and winter in the Solomons, the huge multi-engagement melee that was Leyte (which included the last battleship to battleship engagement), and the battle of Okinawa.

The point is that great power navies engaged in a large scale war at sea is rare, and, if you look at the potential loss of life, can be extremely violent. After all, if a ship has a crew of 1,000 and it sinks, depending on exactly how it sinks, virtually everyone can die.

USS Juneau, sunk off Guadalcanal, November 1942, had a crew of 697 when she was struck by a Japanese torpedo; 10 men lived. When Bismarck was sunk, 114 of her crew were rescued; 2,107 went down with the ship. Yamato, with a crew of 3,332, went down with 3,055 men.

So, what do great power navies do when they aren't engaged war at sea with another great power? Strategic presence, maintenance of sea lanes and control of lines of communication. If necessary, power projection ashore. The essence of this is, of course, the actual combat capability of the fleet. To fight and win a “war at sea” is the ultimate “coin of the realm” for a navy, the ability to fight and win a fight at sea against another great power, and then the ability to project power ashore, either by shore bombardment (with guns, aircraft and missiles) and the landing of Marines to raid, and in some cases seize and hold. 

And once you have fought and won any large engagement, the ability to sustain and control the line of communication. 

Which leaves us where?

It leaves us with the need for a “full spectrum” naval force. Does that include aircraft carriers? That depends; do we still need aircraft? Or are aircraft obsolete? If the latter, then no. If the former, then yes. If we need aircraft, we need aircraft carriers. Anyone who wants to understand how this plays out, even in a modern, very specific strike such as Fordow (Iran’s nuclear facilities) needs to take a hard look at the use of E-2s and EF-18Gs and what a modern air control and deep strike campaign looks like. 

We need to build a new airwing that will include much more use of drones and a more comprehensive (probably much much more comprehensive) real time analysis and integration of all sorts of data streams, but that is a function of engineering the answer. All that points to a different, and perhaps very different, airwing on a carrier. But there needs to be an airwing. It might be mostly unmanned, it might include a dozen different kinds of drones, and drones of all sizes, some of them launched from ashore, remaining aloft for days or even weeks, others launched from the carrier, other from smaller ships (which we did for decades with battleships and cruisers), some from other aircraft, and some from small boats or even from SEALs going ashore surreptitiously and adding to the “info-sphere.”

But there will be lots of aircraft. And some of them will be strike aircraft (manned and unmanned) and all that means we need aircraft carriers.

Do we need a battleship?

State it differently: do we need a large ship, with lots of strike capability, sustainability, survivability, and room for command and control? The answer is clearly yes.

The fleet in 5 years and 10 and 15, will see growing numbers of unmanned and autonomous assets, in the air, on the surface, and below the surface. There needs to be command elements afloat to “orchestrate” all these assets, large and small. Small ships are going to be space constrained. And small ships simply are not as survivable as large ships. A look at what it took to sink some of the more modern ships built from the 1930s forward shows that large ships can be very hard to sink. And armor has gotten better and better (think of kevlar and composite armors), we understand compartmentation, fire suppression, and damage control better now than we did 50 years ago or 90 years ago. And size brings additional survivability. A 35,000 ton ship can be made very tough. 

Is it a battleship? The answer is that it would be a capital ship, and a command site, and would be armed with long range strike weapons… calling it a battleship is quite appropriate.

Should it be armed with nuclear weapons? Absolutely. In a fight with a peer - that would be China or Russia - it is necessary that they understand that there are limits; if they use a nuclear weapon in a war at sea there will be US nuclear weapons “nearby” ready for use. That represents a deterrent that we do not have if nuclear weapons are not at sea. And make no mistake, Eisenhower was correct when he said - at a time when the US was spending nearly 10% of GDP on defense - conventional forces alone cannot deter a great power. Nuclear weapons need to be part of the equation.

And other ships? Certainly the Burke DDGs, certainly the frigate based on the USCG Security Cutters. But more.

We need more underway replenishment ships, to sustain the force forward.

We need tenders - “destroyer” tenders to provide maintenance and certain weapon support for surface units (the battleships, the destroyers, the frigates. And more submarine tenders to support the submarines - manned and unmanned.

Unmanned and autonomous ships, aircraft and submarines - many of them. These ships and subs and aircraft do not replace manned ships as much as integrate with and complement them. Missions change and expand, situational awareness improves, at sea lethality increases. War at sea and power projection ashore capabilities will improve.

If we do it right, perfectly, we might never use any of them in a real fight because everyone will be deterred. And a 35,000 ton ship, armed to the teeth with state-of-the-art weaponry, to include perhaps 25 nuclear tipped missiles, and escorted by 4 or 5 guided missile destroyers, a support ship or two, perhaps 2 or 3 amphibious ships and a battalion of Marines, and the knowledge that there are a score or more of unmanned ships just over the horizon, is a heck of a deterrent. And it would be nice to have more options than 9 operational aircraft carriers available at any one time.

Do we need to spend more? Yes. The 5% budget the President Trump has put forward is a step back to reality. Does all this need to be audited? Yes. That is part and parcel of this: we need to spend more but be tight-fisted in the control of that money.

But, we do need to spend more. Consider this: the most anemic defense budget of the Carter Administration, which contributed to his failed re-election bid, was ONLY 4.94% of GDP. We fell below that again in 1991 and haven’t spent that much since. The strategic wilderness that was the 1990s saw the DOD budget fall to just over 3%; following the surge in spending following 2001, we briefly reached 4.9% (Bush’s last budget), but spending has been dropping since then. As has been amply demonstrated by the Russo-Ukraine war and how we soon were dipping dangerously close to our limits on weapon reserves, we have spent decades underfunding the most obvious issues, such as ammunition and missiles, buying new airframes (Navy, Air Force, Marines, Army), maintaining ships, overall readiness, etc., etc. The President’s budget pushes us to 4.8%. It probably needs to inch up past 5% but this is the right direction.

All this sounds very expensive. It is. But deterring a fight is much cheaper than the fight, and failure to win a war at sea to a peer, the loss of sea lanes, the closing of lines of communication, would be an order of magnitude more expensive than the fight itself. Let’s not test that.