Monday, March 30, 2026

 March 30th, 2026


Politics - The world has lost interest


Combat Ops - Very little change on the ground

- Drone strikes continue


Economics - Oil prices


Weather


Kharkiv

62 and partly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy all week, rain showers possible Wednesday, Thursday and again on Saturday. Daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the low 60s. Winds variable, 5kts.


Melitopol

62 and mostly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy all next week rain showers possible Friday and Saturday. Daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the low to mid 60s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Kyiv

62 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Partly to mostly cloudy all week, rain showers possible on Wednesday. Daily lows in the mid to upper 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s to low 60s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.



Politics


Nothing to report - which is in itself, something to report; the rest of the world has, sadly, lost interest in the fight in Ukraine. Reading the various sites that have followed the war, they have all cut back on the reports and focused on Iran. 


Ground Operations


Overall, fighting was reported along most of the line of contact but there have been very few confirmed changes in the line anywhere during the past 4 days (virtually nothing on the 26th, 27th and 28th). The only confirmed changes were marginal over the weekend: Ukrainian gains just south-east of the town of Pryluky (about 6-7 miles north-west of Hulyaipole), and small Russian gains near Oleksandrivka. Elsewhere, particularly in the eastern end of Kostiantinivka, there have been small gains by each side, which, when stared at for a while, devolve into adjustments of the patch-work patterns of Russian and Ukrainian elements in that area, and the brutal, see-saw battles that take place, “trading" small patches of terrain.


Ukrainian observers are suggesting that the Russian spring offensive has begin in the Kostiantinivka area, and in the general area east of Slovyansk.

This is difficult to prove or disprove without a detailed count on not only the Russian units there, but also which ones have been plussed up with new troops, or shifted into or out of the attack. While there are some sites that claim to have that, pulling at the data suggests mainly that they are making assumptions with little to back it up; simply said, that granularity, across the entire front, simply isn’t available in open sources. So, this will take several days to a week to sort out if, and if so, where, the Russian spring offensive has begun.

One point that has surfaced several times is the question of the sprung foliage, and the suggestion that Russian forces will wait for better coverage in the tree-lines before they resume more aggressive attacks - or begin any spring offensive.

At the same time, the Ukrainian counter-offensive has not gained any new ground in the last 4 days.



Air and Maritime Operations


President Zelenskyy posted that during the week of March 22nd - March 29th Russian forces launched 40 missiles, 3,000 drones and 1,450 glide bombs into Ukrainian air space.


During the night of March 29th-March 30th Russian forces launched at least 1 x Iskander ballistic missile and 164 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 150 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts. There was no report as to where the ballistic missile struck.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities.

No civilian casualties reported yet.

RuAF tacair struck 21 towns.


Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and DIB sites during the night of March 28-March 29th, again hitting the 1st-Luga oil terminal outside of St Petersburg, as well as the Tolyatti Azot chemical plant (maker of ammonia based fertilizers) in Samara (about 500 miles south-east of Moscow).


During the night of March 28th-March 29th Russian forces launched at least 1 x Kinzhal ballistic missile, and 442 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 380 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa, and Sumy oblasts.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities.

Civilian casualties include at least 4 killed and 23 wounded.

RuAF dropped at least 5 x FAB 250 bombs on Kramatorsk, and struck 9 other towns as well.


During the night of March 27th-March 28th Russian forces launched at least 273 x  strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 252 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Poltava oblasts; the missile impacted in Kharkiv. Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities.

Civilian casualties include at least 1 killed and 10 wounded.

No report on RuAF tacair activity, but imagery confirmed that the RuAF dropped a FAB-3000 (6,600lb glide bomb) on a target in Kostiantinivka.


During the night of March 26th-March 27th Russian forces launched at least 1 x ballistic missile (not further identified) and 103 x  strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 93 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts; the missile impacted in Kharkiv.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities. Power outages were reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odessa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Civilian casualties include at least 2 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 12 towns.



Economic Reporting


Feb22  Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Mar27 Mar30

Brent      94.71   63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 106.40 110.20 115.60

WTI     92.10   59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 103.60 97.18 102.70

NG       3.97      4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 3.37 3.06 2.87

Wheat      8.52  5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 6.25 6.04 6.07

Ruble     85          80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 78.20 81.59 81.20

Hryvnia 28.6 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.76 43.86

Urals 91.66 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 90.97 105.91 109.69

ESPO 94.52 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 84.99 99.51 113.32

Sokol 99.31 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 101.55 110.30 114.76


It’s worth remembering that the price actually paid for oil is not the bids that are reflected above, these represent just starting points for the various contracts that follow. Nevertheless, the highest price Urals oil ever traded at prior to this March was in the first months of the war, when prices spiked, and Urals oil reached $98 per barrel.



Thoughts


Overall, the fight remains a very slow grind, as has been the case for most of March, as the two armies deal with the changes in season and the mud and the issue of foliage and the opportunity to wait a week or two and then move under some cover when the leaves finally arrive.

As to whether the Russians have begun a spring offensive, I suspect that will sort itself out quickly. Everyone expects the Russians will conduct an offensive but it won’t be much of one in the sense of grand movements, just a plussing up of forces in certain areas and an increase in the attrition rates on both sides. 

There has been Ukrainian reporting that Putin will announce a general mobilization, but there is no other reporting suggesting that.


I was looking at a series of maps yesterday, showing the changing front lines during the past 2 years - and there are a host of folks who point out that the Russian holdings are growing at a very slow rate and that “at this rate, it will be 83 years before they conquer all of Ukraine.”

This of course misses the point that the Ukrainians and the Russians are taking roughly equal numbers of casualties and that by 2035 - without a war - Ukraine is projected to decrease in population by 50%…

But what really struck me is the grinding, almost boring, determination of the Russians. It’s like watching a really disciplined boxer who just keeps throwing jabs. His hands are held high, his elbows are in, his jaw is well tucked in, and he throws jabs and advances slowly, balanced, nothing fancy. The other guy dances around, bobs and weaves, has really fancy footwork, wonderful combinations, but the jabs keep him back, and occasionally a jab lands. And you know that, if the fight lasts long enough, it will end with the boring boxer standing over the other guy, who will be flat on his back in the middle of the ring. Not pretty, not elegant, not fun to watch, but it only ends one way.

Ukraine, fighting for itself and Europe, backed by 450 million people (3 times Russia’s population), with a collective GDP of $25 trillion (10 times that of Russia), and with an army of roughly 1 million (Russia has 700,000 committed to the war), is still losing, with casualties of roughly the same numbers as Russia, and a very slow, steady loss of terrain… 


v/r pete 

Sunday, March 29, 2026


Tehran, David Hume and The Who

March 29th, 2026


The war continues and anyone who thinks it should be over by now hasn’t been keeping up on their studies. 

If there’s any complaint it would be with anyone who wrote in the net assessment that air strikes might break a bunch of gear in the first 4 to 6 weeks and then the government would collapse and the populace would rise up and overthrow the regime.

Politicians believe that sort of thing, politicians are creatures of hope; but since Ramses went after the Hittites, wars haven’t gone quite the way the planners suggest,

That said, this war absolutely needed to be conducted, though arguably 20 years ago. Iran must never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon and should never have been allowed to develop ballistic missiles. 

And, despite hyperventilating in the press, the war has been proceeding well, with US and Israeli forces having struck, reportedly 10,000 aim points. Keep going.

And, the number of casualties is astoundingly low. One human rights organization claims that some 5,900 total people have been killed, to include some 600 civilians (as of a few days ago). John Donne would insist that every soul counts, and they do. But the civilian casualties, sad as they might be, are still incredibly light. One civilian killed for every 10 aim points is a testimony to careful targeting and accurate weapon delivery.

There’ve been losses on the US-Israel-Arab side, as to be expected. These too have been remarkably light, thankfully. But we need to continually remind ourselves of the reason for all this, and necessity to continue (and what the world would be like if otherwise): the need to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, 

It’s also worth noting that the so very “obsolete” and terribly “easy to hit” aircraft carriers remain untouched by enemy fire while, remarkably, the stationary airfields have not dodged any missiles and have taken several hits, some quite expensive. Even with, reportedly, Russian and Chinese intelligence assistance, the carriers remain untouched; in fact all USN ships remain untouched. Could it be that mobil targets are harder to hit than stationary ones? Who’d a thunk?

But the fat lady still hasn't sung. Why not? Because getting a government to roll over is tough (and mobile targets are hard to find). The “drop bombs on the following facilities and the Iranian people will rise up and overthrow the government” idea borders on wishful thinking. It arguably falls into the category of “hope” - again the terrain of politicians. But, hope is not a plan. 

And even if a government collapses, do we have enough control to ensure the folks we want grab power? In such a scenario all you can do is guarantee what you’ll do, not what anyone else will do, certainly not what the population of country “X” will do.

David Hume, the Scottish philosopher, noted that people are loyal to a government as long as it functions and provides minimum services. But for any individual, or society as a whole, that’s an unknown; what will anyone consider to be the minimums? To stand on the outside and look in and forecast when a majority of the people of a given country will decide the government is no longer providing the minimums and therefore rise up against it, that is a nearly impossible task, and the intelligence communities around the world, for decades, have found it nearly impossible to accurately forecast that point in time and space. 

Further, even if the people rise up against the sitting government, with what will they replace it?

During 38 years of the Shah’s rule, despite later claims of tens of thousands killed, the Shah’s forces killed perhaps 3,000 in various riots. Not a wonderful statistic, but it’s of note that at the same time the Shah’s regime engaged in a great deal of modernization. Then they were forced out and in the 47 years of the rule of the two Ayatollahs the Iranian Islamic government was an order of magnitude more violent than the Shah - at least. In riots in 1988 Khomeini’s regime reportedly killed more rioters than all the violent deaths under the Shah. Last year’s riots alone resulted in more than 10,000 deaths, some estimates place the count as high as 60,000. 

As Peter Townsend observed: Meet the New Boss, same as the old boss.

And right now we have no idea who will rule Iran if the current government is replaced. We might get someone better, or we might get someone just as violent.

So, if we are to prevent the next regime from building a nuclear weapon, we need to eliminate that capability right now; we must not leave them any capability to rebuilt their forces, to close the Strait of Hormuz, or to restart their nuclear weapons program.

That is where we sit.

And no matter who’s in charge in Iran in 6 months, we need to make sure they have no “toys” nor the ability to make “toys.” Because we don’t know who will be in charge in 6 months, we need to sustain the ability to deny them any capability if they start to rebuild. Using the idiom of dealing with terrorist groups, we must be ready and able and willing to “mow the grass.” 

That is the only acceptable end state. So, we continue to strike targets until all their weapons are destroyed and all their production capabilities are destroyed. The Iranian people will have an opportunity, but it is their opportunity. They just need to understand that if they start “growing grass,” we will be back to “mow.”

Friday, March 27, 2026

 March 27th, 2026


Politics - Zelenskyy comments on negotiations 


Combat Ops - Both sides showing small gains on the ground

- Ukrainian strikes continue on Russian oil infrastructure 

- Russian strikes continue


Weather


Kharkiv

46 and cloudy. Cloudy for the next week, rain showers possible next Tuesday. Daily lows in the mid 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s to low 60s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Melitopol

56 and partly cloudy. Some sun on Saturday, then mostly cloudy for the next week. Daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the 60. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Kyiv

61 and partly cloudy, gusting over 20. Partly cloudy Saturday morning, then a week of mostly cloudy weather. Daily lows for the next week in the mid 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.



Politics


President Zelenskyy commented on negotiations in an interview with Reuters: 

"Ukrainians are serious about negotiations. We believe that we need to talk, preferably at the level of leaders, we are ready for this.”

Commenting on the Russian insistence on control of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Zelenskyy referred to the slow Russian progress on the ground:

"And it is not a fact that they will capture it. They can bury from 300,000 to a million of their soldiers there. They don't value human life, but they realize that it's money…That's why they are looking for such a dialog with the Americans. "Tell Ukrainians there is nothing to fight for." We are well aware of this Russian rhetoric: "There is nothing to fight for. Six thousand square kilometers.” We are explaining to our partners, and in my opinion, absolutely reasonably, why this is not the case.”


Zelenskyy has commented on the US being ready to provide security guarantees but that the US position is that Ukraine should cede the Donbas to Russia in exchange for those guarantees, as well as an $800 billion reconstruction program.



Ground Operations


SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS


Fighting continues north and east of Sumy city but there were no confirmed changes to the lines.

Imagery confirmed Ukrainian gains in southern Vovchansk (north-east of Kharkiv city), a roughly 2 kilometer long, half kilometer wide salient north of Vilcha, pushing into southern Vovchansk. 

Ukrainian forces appear to have used the rail line approaching from the south-east as the center of the salient, the rail line being well shielded by dense trees on both sides. As with other long, narrow salients, the issue now will be to push forces into the salient and expand it. The terrain outside the salient is open farmland, which will make holding this salient difficult.

Further east, Russian forces are claiming control of the town of Shevyakivka, the first town north of Chuhunkivka and the T2104 roadway and border crossing. Shevyakivka is a very small farming village, with perhaps a dozen homes, about a half mile west of the Russian border. The Russian claim has not been confirmed.


NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER


Fighting continues along much of this line; imagery confirmed Russian recon elements again probing into central Kupyansk, and a Ukrainian military spokesman commented that a Russian element continues to occupy the hospital in the center of Kupyansk. Elsewhere scattered around Kupyansk, the Ukrainian General Staff estimates total Russian troop strength in Kupyansk as "platoon size [40] or smaller."


SLOVYANSK - KOSTIANTINIVKA - POKROVSK


Fighting continues in the Slvoyansk - Lyman - Siversk area, north of Bakhmut. Imagery confirmed that Russian forces have taken Kalenyky (a small village of perhaps 30 - 40 houses) just north of the Sukha River, about 8 miles west of Siversk. 

Russian sources claimed that they had taken control of this town last week, as well as the terrain east of the town (between the town and Siversk); imagery now confirms that report. Imagery from yesterday shows Russian forces operating west of Kalenyky, and the logical push would be west and then south-west, following the main road and the river to the town of Rai Oleksandrivka, a town of about 3,800 before the war, about 2.5 miles further west from Kalenyky. Note too that Rai Oleksandrivka is roughly two miles north-west from Russian forces in the Nykyforivka and Lypivka area, allowing Russian forces to set up a pincer movement on the town. All this would also be consistent with the Russian efforts to close would-be salients and straighten lines, and would place Russian forces east of Slovyansk just 12 miles from the center of that city.

It is of note that Ukrainian drone operators are working to increase the number of daily strikes before spring brings leaves to the trees and makes spotting Russian soldiers on foot that much more difficult.

Fighting continues in eastern Kostiantinivka and just east of the city and multiple reports support the assessment that the area has devolved into a nasty patchwork of pockets of Russian and Ukrainian troops. By all accounts these elements are, as noted above, often only a handful of troops, and the patchwork now seems to cover all of Kostiantinivka east of the T0504 roadway, and a good deal of “east side" of the city (east of the T0515 roadway. Imagery has confirmed Russian forces occupying a building in the center of the city and fighting appears to be taking place in the railroad station in the city center.

Fighting continues further west, north of Pokrovsk, as well as just west of Pokrovsk, and Russian forces, again straightening lines, have pushed into the open terrain due west of that city. All of Hryshyne now appears to be under Russian control.

Further to the south-west there are Russian claims of gains north and north-west of Udachne, but the reporting is not clear and there is anecdotal evidence suggesting the possibility that Ukrainian forces have held ground or even retaken some of this terrain. This will require some clear imagery to sort out.


SOUTHERN UKRAINE


In the area of the Ukrainian “February Counter-offensive,” south of Verbove (15 miles north of Hulyaipole),  fighting continues and imagery confirms what was previously estimated, that Ukrainian forces have retaken Berezove, about 4 miles east of Verbove. Berezove is a small town (pre-war population of less than 500), located in the middle of open farmland, but with a string of small reservoirs and ponds forming an east-west line just south of the town.

Just under 2 miles east of Berezove is the small town (300 people) of Ternove, and Russian forces are now said to be attacking into that town.

Fighting continues west and south-west of Hulyaipole, but there were no confirmed changes in the line.

Further west, along the Dnipr, Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces out positions along the Konka River and retaken parts of northern Prymorske. This is an important fight, as Russian forces are still on the edge of artillery range for the center of Zaporizhzhia city, a city of 700,000. Bringing the city into artillery range and forcing even a partial evacuation would be serious problem for Kyiv.



Air and Maritime Operations


During the night of March 26th-March 27th Russian forces launched at least 1 x ballistic missile (not further identified) and 103 x  strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 93 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts; the missile impacted in Kharkiv.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities. Power outages were reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odessa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Civilian casualties include at least 2 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 12 towns.


During the night of March 25th-March 26th Russian forces launched at least 153 x  strike drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 130 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Odessa and  Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Targets again included the power grid and transportation facilities. Power outages were reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odessa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Civilian casualties include at least 15 wounded.

RuAF tacair struck 20 towns.


Fires continue to burn at the oil terminal in Primorsk (50 miles north-west of St Petersburg), but loading has resumed.

Ukrainian forces struck the Kirishi oil refinery on the 26th, and there are reports of damage to a processing unit and 2 storage tanks.

Ukrainian drones struck the fertilizer plant in Cherepovets, Vologda Oblast, about 200 miles north of Moscow. The plant is Europe’s largest producer of phosphate fertilizers. 



Economic Reporting


Feb22  Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Mar26 Mar27

Brent      94.71   63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 106.40 106.70 110.20

WTI     92.10   59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 103.60 93.87 97.18

NG       3.97      4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 3.37 2.98 3.06

Wheat      8.52  5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 6.25 5.95 6.04

Ruble     85          80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 78.20 82.20 81.59

Hryvnia 28.6 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.86 43.76

Urals 91.66 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 90.97 96.31 105.91

ESPO 94.52 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 84.99 105.26 99.51

Sokol 99.31 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 101.55 108.47 110.30



Thoughts


Something to watch in the weeks ahead: it has been noted in the least several months, and President Zelenskyy repeated it in his daily comments last night, that the Russian strikes have begun to target the Ukrainian water infrastructure.

Ukraine is a predominantly flat country with hundreds of ponds and reservoirs created by an equal number of small dams. In the first months of the war Ukrainian forces destroyed many small dams in the area north and northeast of Kyiv, as well as in the Sumy and Kharkiv area to force Russian forces onto hard roads, complicate logistics and simplify targeting. Russian forces have since responded tactically by targeting smaller dams to eliminate some water obstacles; these strikes continue, and could cause water shortages in smaller towns in eastern Ukraine.

It was only during the past winter that Russian targeting of the centralized water systems in Kyiv area apartments became part of the general Russian target set. The Kyiv water system has for years prior to the war been noted to have problems, and much of the system is still Soviet era infrastructure and has yet to be improved to Western standards. It has been estimated that rebuilding the system - a 14 year program - would require $1 trillion in investments. 

In a different  direction, the tenacity of these small troop elements in various towns and cities, is remarkable. Both Ukrainian and Russian elements, often just two or three soldiers, hold positions for months after a town or city has been taken by the other side, presumably being resupplied only by small packages delivered by drones.  


v/r pete