January 5th, 2026 A Belated Happy New Year

Politics - Trump doubts attack on Putin

- Little note of Maduro Raid

Combat Ops - Russia has Siversk, but few other changes on front line

- Increased use of glide bombs by Russian Air Force

Weather

Winter has set in, temperatures below freezing, ground is solid, allowing off-road movement. Air temperatures at or below freezing, wind shills well below freezing.

Kharkiv

19 and mostly cloudy. Cloudy all week, daily rain or ice showers through Thursday. Daily highs in the mid to upper 30s, daily lows near freezing, next week much colder. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

29 and light snow. Cloudy all week, daily chance of light snow or rain through Thursday. Daily highs in the low 40s, daily lows in the 30s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

17 and cloudy. Solid overcast and snow likely every day for the next 5 days. Daily highs will be in the upper 20s, daily lows in the mid 20s, wind chill in the low 20s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics

Russia continues to claim that Ukrainian forces made a direct drone attack on President Putin, launching 91 drones at his residence in Novgorod, on December 28th. Ukraine has denied the attack took place. Russia reportedly turned over evidence to US Embassy Moscow personnel, but the substance has not been released and President Trump appears to doubt the claim: on Sunday he countered the Russian argument, suggesting that there was a raid in the area, but it was directed at a nearby target, not Putin’s house.

Moscow, and Beijing, have both spoken out against the US raid to grab Maduro, but the raid does not appear to be have had any substantive impact on the war yet.

That said, there is a possible impact on oil prices, noted below. 

There is also probably some concern about the would-be ally Iran, which is suffering through a damaged economy, a massive drought (caused by 45 years of poor policy decisions in Tehran) and a great deal of social unrest. 

Ground Operations

Ground operations have been marked by few changes in the past two weeks. In part this is the nature of the war, with the prime focus on causing casualties, not taking land; in part this is a result of weather, as the cold weather is just now making the terrain hard enough to allow heavy vehicle movement off of roads. 

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting has continued north of Sumy city over the past two weeks but there has been little substantive change in the front lines in that period. That said, Ukrainian forces are reporting that Russian ops tempo has picked up in the last few days. We should expect to see more small unit (squad or smaller) probes in the coming weeks.

North of Kharkiv Russian forces have made several recon probes south of Vovchansk in the last several days but there is no change in the front lines.

There has been no change in the front lines just north of the Oskil River, just inside Ukraine.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues in and around Kupyansk. Despite most Russian forces having withdrawn from the city proper, Ukrainian forces do not appear to have finished completely clearing the city. The current Ukrainian HQ claim is that there are fewer than two platoons (perhaps just 60 Russian soldiers) remaining in the city. Nearly three weeks ago the Ukrainian estimate was that there were only two platoons (80 troops), but they have not yet been cleared. Of note, it would seem there were never more than 2 battalions in the city and perhaps a good deal less than that, perhaps less than single battalion.

Ukrainian do continue to hold and slowly expand their positions just east of the city, as Russian forces south-east of the city keep trying to push westward from the Pishchane area. Russian forces claim to have taken Podoly, a small town about 3 miles west-north-west of Pishchane, but this has not been confirmed.

What appears to be hard fighting continues both north-east of Borova and in the area of the Nitrius River and Lyman, but there haver been no substantive changes in the front lines in this area.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

Of greatest note here is that Ukrainian forces withdrew from (or were pushed out of - depending on whose report you read) Siversk on December 23rd. Ukrainian forces have since been moved back to a line west of the high ground just west of Siversk. Russian forces moved forward and are now less than 2 miles from the small town of Riznykivka. Just north of Riznykivka and Sviato-Pokrovske there is a bluff, high ground about 150 - 200 feet higher than the terrain to the south. Russian troops appear to control this high ground and are pressing west; Ukrainian forces south (down hill) of the bluff, will be at a tactical disadvantage.

At the same time, there appear to be some small pockets of Ukrainian troops holding positions just north-west and south-west of Siversk, though it isn’t crystal clear.

South-west of Chasiv Yar - north-west of Toretsk, Russian forces pushed north out of Oleksadnro-Kolynove along the H-20 roadway and the terrain south of the Kleban Byk Reservoir appears to have been cleared of the last Ukrainian forces. Overall, Russian forces retain a hold on the south-east corner of Kostiantinivka, but there have been no substantive changes in terrain held inside the city.

The front line west from Toretsk to the area north of Pokrovsk has undergone minor changes, small gains and losses on both sides, but no major changes. Ukrainian forces control portions of Rodynske, as do Russians, but there is no indication that that situation is changing rapidly in either direction.

As for Pokrovsk and the Pokrovsk pocket and Myrnohrad, Ukrainian forces continue to hold portions of both Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and Russian elements continue to probe into those area held by Ukrainian forces, but the fight remains a close, nasty, grind and, as with other fights like this, the fight is likely to be decided by commitment of forces, both manpower and the total firepower committed; as noted below, the Russian use of more and more glide bombs may well be a deciding factor in the fight for some of these cities.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

As with the rest of the front line, there are few substantive changes in southern Ukraine, but Russian forces have made incremental gains in Hulyaipole as well as at several spots along the Haichur River, slowly grinding southwest into the city, while also pressing beyond the Ukrainian defensive lines that parallel the River. 

Russian forces have also made gains south-east of Orikhiv as well as north-west of of Kamyanske, along the Dnepr River.

Air and Maritime Operations

Of note is that Ukrainian reporting indicates that last week Russian forces launched 60+ missiles and 1,000+ strike drones into Ukrainian airspace, but almost 1,100 glide bombs, that is more glide bombs than missiles and drones combined. This is of significance because the impact is, in most cases (the exception is the Iskander ballistic missiles) the glide bombs are far more destructive than the drones or cruise missiles. 

The drones carry at most 110KG - 221 lbs - of explosives, and the cruise missiles carry between several hundred kilos to 500 kilos (500lbs to 1100 lbs) of explosives. The smallest bomb the Russian air forces employs with any regularity is the FAB 500 - 500KG (1100 lb) bomb. They also use 1500 and 3000 kg (3300 and 6600 lb bombs, though not as often.

The issue here is that the Ukrainian defensive positions in the small cities and towns are often built around heavily reinforced sections of apartment buildings, turned into 3 and 4 story high bunkers. These bunkers regularly survive direct hits by 152MM howitzer rounds, battlefield rockets (122MM rockets) and Shahed drones. They do NOT survive hits by FAB 500 bombs. That the Russians have used more than 1,000 glide bombs in less than a week speaks to an effort to reduce and clear hard-points as they attack Ukrainian held towns. 

During the night of January 4th-January 5th, Russian forces launched at least 9 x ballistic missiles (probably S-300 missiles) and 165 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 137 drones; they did not successfully engage any of the ballistic missiles.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Energy infrastructure was again the primary target and there was a blackout in Kyiv oblast.

Civilian casualties include at least 6 killed and 2 civilians injured.

RuAF tacair struck targets in 5 towns.

Russian forces claimed that they shot down 437 Ukrainian drones last night and this morning.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Sep9 Oct8 Nov7 Dec8 Jan5

Brent      94.71    67.03 66.18 63.86 62.94 61.16

WTI     92.10    63.26 62.48 59.94 59.26 57.74

NG       3.97         3.12 3.44 4.33 4.96 3.42

Wheat     8.52          5.22 5.06 5.32 5.38 5.08

Ruble     85          84.03 81.28 80.95 76.52 81.13

Hryvnia 28.6 41.23 41.48 41.89 42.15 42.41

Urals 91.66 60.12 61.15 56.56 54.92 49.22

ESPO 94.52 68.32 66.74 65.18 61.95 52.93

Sokol 99.31 62.97 61.91 60.71 60.62 58.50

The Urals oil spot price (49.22) is the lowest spot price since March of 2023 when it hit 48.06 per barrel.

Of note, Venezuelan oil exports to China are estimated to be roughly 4-5% of China’s total imports, making up more than half of Venezuelan exports over the last 3 years. As of late 2025 it was estimated that Venezuela was shipping a bit more than 600,000 barrels per day of crude and 130,000 barrels per day of fuel oil to China. This is now, ostensibly, ended. Given the problems Iran will have in increasing its exports, this would suggest a bit of a potential wind-fall for Russian oil exports, particularly the ESPO oil. I suppose it might also lead to China reconsidering financing the additional pipeline Russia wants to build.

Thoughts

Keeping allies may be getting tougher for Russia (and China). Maduro has gone, and while some in Caracas are holding fast, they may well find the squeeze a bit much.

At the same time, long-time Russia (and China) ally Cuba is teetering on the edge, as is Iran. Certainly there has to be some effort to the re-assess the balance of power and ask if there is another calculus that need be considered.

It would seem that there might be some small (perhaps obscure is a better word) chance, in light of the Maduro raid, the looming collapse of Cuba, the looming collapse of Iran, and the not terribly healthy economies of both China and Russia, to push Putin to consider there are some people he wants as friends (the US) and others he does not… (China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela), and that might be some incentive to step towards a ceasefire.

I realize I am grasping at straws, but the dynamic of a rising US economy, and a surging US military-political dynamic might push some in the Kremlin to reconsider. Add in the small, but never-the-less worth considering note that two western powers - the UK and France - felt it was safe to follow Trump’s cue and go strike people they didn’t like over the weekend (in Syria). The trend lines seem to be all headed in one direction; certainly something for someone in the Kremlin to think about… 

v/r - pete