Force Structure and the Need for a Strategy Debate

Several articles ago I talked about the chiefs of the US military services calling on their services to articulate new strategies. I suggested that there was a failure on their part that needs to be addressed. Before I proceed further, we need a very brief discussion on the mechanics of how the US actually builds and maintains is armed forces.

Force Structure is a term in the DOD lexicon that means the people (uniformed – active duty and reserve and national guard, as well as civilians, and contractors), gear (ships, aircraft, tanks, submarines, artillery all the way down to mess tents and latrines) and organizations (from huge ‘Combatant Commands’ responsible for all US military operations in the Pacific and East Asia for example, down to an infantry platoon of 40 soldiers) that make up the US military.

The question at hand is how do we, as a nation, arrive at a given force structure?

The simplest answer is that the force structure is what Congress says it is. That is, Congress funds the military (and the rest of the government, obviously) and also passes the laws that say how the money is to be spent. How does Congress arrive at a given force structure? Chiefly, but not completely, based on inputs from the Department of Defense. Congress is always free to adjust literally any facet of the DOD as it feels free. Does it? Not really. While much is often made about Congress meddling in the DOD, whether it be weapon procurement or manpower or organization or mission, the fact is that usually Congress listens to what the DOD and the President say and gives them the vast majority of their desires, usually with some guidance attached.

In the end, within the broad confines of the debate that takes place on Capitol Hill, force structure is determined based on a balance of several major – and usually interrelated - factors: the stated requirements of the combatant commanders to meet their missions as they understand them, the consolidated interpretations of those needs as produced by the Joint Staff and the various military services, and the overall strategic guidance from the President.

The important point is that the combatant commanders have assigned missions, those missions are assigned by the Secretary of Defense acting for the President, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs and the Service Staffs.

The force structure is, therefore, based on an interpretation – by the Combatant Commanders and by the Service Chiefs – of their assigned missions, missions assigned by the President. And, of course, the added filter of how Congress responds to the President’s strategic vision.

So, if there is a fairly well defined force structure, and a fairly well defined procurement and manning plan, there must be a well-defined strategy. A strategy is, after all, nothing more than a plan that bridges the intellectual space between your assets on one hand and your goals on the other. But several chiefs of services have maintained over the past decade or so that their services needed new strategies. Very simply, you cannot argue that we need to buy a new ship or aircraft unless you have a goal and a strategy to reach that goal that justifies that particular ship or aircraft. Since there was never a clear articulation by them as to what exactly were the new goals that they were trying to reach, the conclusion that I have reached is that either a) these men were being foolish and using important words and ideas very loosely, or b) they weren’t at all interested in issues of goals or strategy or the like, but had instead become creatures of programs, who spent all their time trying to justify a specific procurement program.

The problem with this, of course, is that the United States does not have an infinite amount of money. We cannot afford to by weapon systems because they have become the gleam in some admiral or general’s eye. We really do need to pay attention to what it is that we are trying to accomplish and not simply engage in budget battles in Washington to secure the legacy of this or that general or admiral who honchoed through some particular program.

What this nation needs is a vigorous debate on what it is that we – as a nation - are trying to do, and what it is that we are not interested in doing and then move from there to a discussion of how best to accomplish that. Despite what some might think, a great deal of this discussion can safely take place in the public. We can debate these issues without risking the lives of our soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines. But, they must be debated as a whole, from the national perspective down, not from a service perspective up. Nor does this need to be a partisan debate. In fact, during the Cold War, when mistakes might have cost the world a great deal more, this nation had several vigorous debates about strategy and force structure, held them publicly, and key players in that debate sat on both sides of the aisle. It is worth remembering that Carl Vinson, John Stennis and Sam Nunn, all played key roles in the strategy debate, all played important roles in shaping and building the US military, and all were life-long Democrats.

We do not need to buy ships or aircraft because some admiral or general has spent most of the last ten years ‘stumping’ for that particular platform. But we do need a vigorous debate as to what are our major national goals, and what is the overarching strategy to achieve those goals. That debate will allow us to define our force structure and provide the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines with the tools they really need to carry out their missions.

Requiem for a Paper Mill

The Federal Government wants to spend our money. I am not generally in favor of government handouts or government efforts to keep particular businesses in operations for a number of reasons, not least of which is that they have been, since the dawn of recorded history, so terrible at it. Nevertheless, there are times when some good might come of such efforts.

On 22 October International Paper announced that it would close its mill outside Franklin VA in the spring of 2010. The reason is simply that the mill represents an overcapacity in light of the combination of the global recession and the decrease in demand of paper. So, the mill is closing.

In Franklin that means 1100 people will lose their jobs, some as early as November. The simple question is: what can be done about this? Obviously, economics works best when we let the ‘laws’ of economics play out as they are meant to. If demand is down, over-capacity needs to be trimmed. As such, International Paper should have closed the plant, assuming that that plant was the least profitable or had the poorest margins or some other such figure relative to their efforts to remain profitable.

Nevertheless, there is an opportunity here, one that certainly merits at least some consideration, particularly when compared to some of the other projects the US government has funded over the past 9 or 10 months with the hundreds of billions of dollars in stimulus money.

Consider a big ‘what if?’ (But certainly no bigger or more far-fetched than the idea that GM can be made profitable.) And actually, there are two ‘what ifs?’

What you have now is a paper mill and 1100 skilled workers. Instead of shutting it down and losing all that expertise, what if the workers, in concert with the state and federal governments providing certain key support, and using a government loan (the often mentioned stimulus money), were to buy the plant and convert it to a state-of-the-art paper mill, one demonstrating cutting edge paper production technology, as well as greater efficiency and low energy usage, use of recycled paper, and a zero waste foot-print, while increasing productivity per worker? Use this mill as a technology demonstrator to show what paper mills can become in the 21st century.

Nor would this necessarily be at the expense of International Paper: per the government backing, technologies and processes developed at the plant would be made available (at cost, or perhaps below cost, in as much as the advancements would have come from an investment of taxpayers’ dollars) to US paper firms. International Paper and other US paper companies would benefit from the new technology, Franklin would benefit from the new jobs and a plant that would be likely to operate well into and even through the 21st century, and the plant would presumably be then able to pay back the loan. The Federal Government would also – eventually – benefit from the creation of these new and, in the end productive jobs, ones that would return real tax revenues well into the future.

Secondly, as a state-of-the-art paper mill would certainly not require as many workers as the current mill, use the rest of this facility as a site for a technology training/retraining facility. Virginia could lead the way in establishing a job re-training program that anticipates changes in various industries and provides for retraining so that workers can retrain and move into newer but equally productive careers.

Would this be difficult? Yes, but not impossible. The limitation is that it would cost a good deal of money (though nothing like the amount spent on GM, Chrysler or any of the banks to which the government loaned money), and there are elements of the technology that would need to be further developed. But the technology could and would be sought by other paper mills as it became mature. And there is real value in such an endeavor. Let this mill become the leading technology demonstrator for an entire global industry, and let these workers become the lead technologists in the paper industry of the future.

And it would represent an opportunity by the people in Washington, who have literally hundreds of billions of dollars to spend, to spend the money on a project that would represent a real opportunity to establish meaningful capabilities well into the 21st century, ones that would provide real returns on investment to the American people and to the private sector.

Whither Afghanistan?

What is the US interest in Afghanistan? The answer to this question is essential if the President hopes to correctly respond to Gen. McChrystal’s request for more troops. It comes before questions of what will work and what won’t, before questions of whether the last election was fair or not, before questions of which faction or tribe should have what say, before questions as to the eradication of the opium crop.

First, to simplify matters, US presence in Afghanistan should depend on only one thing: is it in US national interest? IF it is, then the US needs to be there, irrespective of who is in power, how that government was formed, or even if there is a government in Kabul.

On the other hand, if the US has no national interest in Afghanistan, then it should leave, and leave immediately. For those who object, who respond that the US would be abandoning a ‘friend,’ or that it would send the wrong signal, as long as the signal is not too serious, it doesn’t matter. And, as for ‘friends,’ countries don’t have friends, they have interests.

What if any are the US interests in Afghanistan?

What is clear is that the US interest in Afghanistan is not part of the ‘Great Game’ as it was played by Great Britain and Russia for nearly 130 years, where geopolitics dictated that control of the center of Asia meant the ability to leverage control over all of Asia; nor is the current US interest the same as it was in the 1980s, when the US played a dangerous and difficult ‘hand’ to stop the Soviet Union, remembering that proxy campaigns were fought in order to avoid direct war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

While some have lamented that the US should not have fought that proxy war as it did, this ‘Monday morning quarterbacking’ loses sight of the fact that the Cold War was often quite warm, and the stakes were exceptionally high. Under such situations trade-offs often had to be made, and trading a then present heavily armed nuclear adversary – the Soviet Union – for the lesser potential future threat from an anarchic Afghanistan was deemed to be worth the risk.

But it is neither the consequences of that proxy war nor the threat of further anarchy in Afghanistan itself that warrants US combat presence. The issue at hand is the very nature of the region. Afghanistan cannot be considered in isolation. To do so is to forget that it sits beside, one might say ‘on top of’ Pakistan. And Pakistan represents the core of the real issue.

That Afghanistan was, and might revert to being, a safe-haven for terrorists is a concern. But the terrorists come and go via, and are supported by factions within, Pakistan. Pakistan is home to more than 150 million, possesses a small but capable nuclear arsenal with the necessary delivery systems, but has a fragile political and economic system. It is this reality that makes US presence in Afghanistan a vital interest to the US.

Simply put, to fail in Afghanistan is to set off a series of what ifs: if the US departs Afghanistan, do the Taliban return and reestablish control over the country? If the Taliban take control of Afghanistan, and invite al Qaeda and associated parties back into the country, will they be able to further destabilize Pakistan, as well as some of the other neighbors – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, et al? If Pakistan begins to teeter, can we stop the collapse? And if Pakistan collapses, can we guarantee to our own satisfaction the security of that nation’s nuclear arsenal? Even if we can guarantee the security of the nuclear arsenal, what would be the impact on the region of anarchy in Pakistan, or the possible fractioning of that country, yielding several new states, one or more of which might be backers of extreme Islamic movements? What would be the necessary response from India – the world’s most populous democracy and one with whom the US needs closer relations? (And also a nuclear power.) How would US withdrawal from Afghanistan affect Iranian perceptions of US intent and would it embolden them further in their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons?

Admittedly, there are many ‘what ifs’ in the above. But while the risk is arguably small, perhaps not 1 in 1000, of all of the above taking place, the consequences of that happening are massive. That the loss of control of Pakistani nuclear weapons would lead to the detonation of one or more of those weapons is nearly a certainty. If we do not settle the question in our favor in Afghanistan (and hence in Pakistan) are we prepared to accept the associated risk? And if we do accept the risk, are we prepared to deal with the consequences? And what of the rest of the region, of Iran, of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the like?

As for anyone else in the world dealing with the consequences, the simple question is who? If a nuclear weapon is detonated anywhere, by anyone, the entire world will look to the US for the response. If Pakistan fractures, who will be called to provide both aid and security? If unrest spreads into other states, to whom would the world turn for leadership and action?

The Afghani-Pakistan region has always been a bit dangerous and unstable. Today, as a result of growing populations, weak economies, and weak political institutions, seasoned with nuclear weapons and radical Islamists, it is even more so.

Where does that leave the US?

Our choice is binary. We can either accept that we must remain actively engaged in the region, placing our people and assets in the region in an effort to bring greater stability, or we can decide that it is not in our national interest, and that whatever happens, happens - Que sera, sera.

If we decide that the region’s stability is in our national interest, then we need to commit the necessary assets to ensure: control of the Afghani country-side; ensure presence and stability – social and political – among and between the various tribes of Afghanistan, and establish control over the border region. We need enough forces working with the Pakistani Army to assist them in their efforts to establish control over their side of the border and the tribe dominated regions of both the border region and south-west Pakistan. And we need to do this whether the government in Kabul is deemed legitimate or not. If we believe Afghanistan is in our national interest we need to act now, not later, we need to move forces in before winter arrives (it will arrive soon in the high passes) and keep them in place where we can exploit our advantages – logistical, tactical and technical – throughout the winter and into the spring.

What we should not do is delay in our decision, which achieves little in our interest. Certainly, it is always good to work out one’s strategic direction. But that should have been worked out late last winter when the new administration came into Washington. That they did not do their jobs is now abundantly clear. But that is now water under the bridge.

We are now down to three questions: 1) Do we stay or go? 2) If we stay, what is the right approach - strategy – to achieve our goals in the region? 3) If we go, how fast can we get our forces out of there? The first question can be fully discussed in a matter of a weekend. Then the President needs to make a decision and run with it. Once that is done, the following two questions can be worked out. In the interim, if the answer is stay, send the troops in and give the operational commander what forces he wants while the long-term strategy is worked out. If the strategy then changes, adjust the force flow at that point. Such expenses in manpower, effort and material are minor in the long haul. If the decision is to leave, leave now, and begin to commit planning assets to develop a response for the consequence management following a break-up of Pakistan, chaos in central Asia, and the subsequent detonation of a nuclear weapon. And then pray that doesn’t happen.

Some Thoughts for the Next Governor of Virginia

To the next governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia:

While much has been written about spurring the economy, helping small business, growing jobs, repairing the roads, etc., little of substance has appeared in the news. Accordingly, the following is offered to the next governor in the hopes that whoever is in fact our next governor may adopt some of these ideas and thereby improve the economy and the overall wellbeing of our commonwealth in the long term. (And other governors can feel free to borrow these ideas as well.) All of these are possible and affordable, if there is the right level of will, effort, and leadership.

Show Real Fiscal Restraint – Spend down to revenue not up to your wish list. On day one pledge that you will spend no more than 95% of 2009 revenues, with 5% held over as a cushion for crises and disasters. Promise that spending will only grow as fast as the economy of Virginia grows. Strongly consider a balanced budget amendment to the constitution of the commonwealth – one that includes a maximum tax rate as well.

Grow Jobs – New jobs are predominantly created by small businesses. If anyone wants to create new jobs they must provide a real incentive to small business. The simplest means to do that is to eliminate corporate taxes. Tax revenue from corporations represents less than 2% of total revenue in Virginia. (That number is representative of most states.) Allowing businesses to keep that revenue would both create more than 20,000 jobs and provide an incentive for more corporations to move into Virginia. And the new jobs and new corporations would generate more revenue that would provide additional tax revenue.

Attract New Talent – New Patents and Copyrights are the foundations of many new businesses and jobs. Let’s attract that creative talent. Pass a law that permanently exempts all income from a patent or a copyright from income tax. This would draw those with new ideas to move to Virginia and would create additional jobs. The law would apply for any citizen, or anyone who has moved to Virginia and intends to make Virginia his or her home. (This would also be a great idea for the US as a whole, attracting the most creative minds in the world to become US citizen.)

Improve Transportation Infrastructure – On your first day in office call a meeting of all mayors, city councils, delegates, etc., and establish a bipartisan oversight committee with membership drawn from all those offices. Hire a small group of trained planners – my recommendation is some retired military folks who have engaged in planning before* - and have them draw up a series of options that address both current concerns and provide a plan that takes Virginia forward for the next 30 to 50 years. Then the plans would be submitted to the committee for simple up/down votes and then submitted to the House of Delegates for approval or not. But something has to be done to the road networks and the rail lines, etc., and the plan needs to look out into the future and have various options that flow logically. What we have now is a disaster that is only going to get worse.

Develop the Next Generation – Education. The most important step that you can take to set the stage for the next several generations is by improving education in Virginia. And the simplest means to do that is to ensure that Virginia has the highest standards in reading, writing, mathematics, science and history of any state in the nation. Set high standards and insist that they be met. The children can meet those standards, if we insist upon it.

Develop Clean Power – As with the road network, Virginia will need abundant energy if it is to continue to grow. We can sit and wait and hope for someone else to solve our problem for us (hope is not a plan) or we can take action, and provide leadership for all the states of the Atlantic Coast. We need abundant, cheap, clean power and the means to ensure that, well into the future, is nuclear generators. Other sources and methods must suffice for the moment, but cheap, abundant power requires more large power stations. Commit to starting three nuclear reactors in Virginia before your term is up, and set the groundwork for Virginia to lead the nation into the 21st century in clean, renewable power generation.

Plan ahead – Develop comprehensive crisis response plans that work (as demonstrated by recent events in Hampton Roads, whatever is on the books is nearly worthless) and practice with them.

The People of Virginia have nearly limitless potential. But it will require leadership in Richmond to get the impediments out of their way and allow them to convert that potential into something real. That requires leadership and planning from the governor.

* Whoever has been used before needs to be replaced: pick some people from outside the system who have real planning expertise; there are a lot of us around. But do it, and do it as soon as you are in office – these roads are AWFUL.

Healthcare isn't Broken

It has become a ‘truth:’ healthcare is broken.

But, what is broken about it? Today, in the US, 100% of the people in this country, whether here legally or not, whether they can afford to pay for it or not, are accounted all the emergency care they need. If you have an accident, you will get health care.

Today, 85% of the citizens of this country have health insurance.

Today, the poorest 20% of the citizens of this country have health insurance.

If you are truly sick there are clinics and facilities in this country that can match or better those anywhere in the world, in the treatment of any affliction.

So, what is broken? The answer, the pundits will tell us, is that we spend too much on healthcare AND there are too many people who can’t afford comprehensive care AND there is that nagging 15% who don’t have health insurance. That constitutes ‘broken.’

So, let’s ask a few questions. How much should we spend on healthcare? Right now we – all of us – spend an average of (roughly) $9000 per year on healthcare, including government subsidies. Is that too much? We spend more than that on our cars.

Ask the question another way: how much is your health worth? Ask it in pieces: how much is your hand worth? Would it be worth spending $100,000 to have your hand put back together if it were severely damaged? Or would that be ‘too much?’ How sick would you be willing to be if you could spend $1000 less per year on healthcare?

There is a bumper sticker that says ‘If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.’ The same can be said of healthcare; if you think healthcare is expensive, try sickness.

Yet we are on the verge of turning control of healthcare over to the government. Is there a guarantee involved? If this turns out to be more expensive then $100 BILLION per year, can we roll this back? If the government starts rationing healthcare, can we end this piece of legislation? If the research labs that made all of the ground-breaking pharmaceuticals close up and stop their (expensive) research, will we fund their resurrection, just as we funded GM?

We have a healthcare system right now that is expensive, but very successful. But not perfect. We are about to turn it over to the federal government and a bureaucracy that has been repeatedly shown to have a great deal of difficulty managing the funds we already give them. Now we want to give them more funds AND the responsibility of managing our health. Does that really sound like the best path?

We as a nation can always seek to improve. We all certainly want the best healthcare possible – though we don’t know how to define that. What is certain is that the government program is not directed at producing more healthcare: it won’t ‘grow’ more doctors, nurses and hospitals; nor is it directed at improving healthcare: there is no comprehensive plan to improve research into new technologies, new treatments or new drugs. Yet, somehow things will “get better” if we centralize control and drop a bunch of money into a government owned bucket.

Our healthcare isn’t perfect. But the question is this: do you believe that centralizing the control of healthcare into a single bureaucracy will lead to improved and (mysteriously) lower costs? Or, is it more likely that centralizing the control of 1/7th of the economy will lead to the growth of a large and complicated bureaucracy that is likely to stifle creativity? What is the track record of the federal government with large programs? It’s worth asking the question: we are talking about our own health.

The Cost of Healthcare

I read in the newspaper today that the people at the Treasury (that would be the U.S. Treasury – the folks responsible for tracking the coming and going of roughly$3,000,000,000,000.00 of our money each year, as well as a fair number of other tasks) were unable to understand the pay and bonus plan of AIG.

That the execs at AIG are receiving bonuses is absurd. But, frankly, it is such small potatoes when compared to the total amount of cash – our cash – that flows through the Treasury that I can’t worry about it too much. Indeed, what is a few billion dollars when we are watching the Treasury push trillions around? And now they admit that they really can’t figure out a pay and bonus plan? (As an aside, did anyone say” “I can’t make sense of this. Everything stops until you explain it?” My guess is ‘no.’)

What does this have to do with Healthcare? Simply this: the same people who can’t figure out the pay and bonus plan for AIG are now telling us that the Healthcare plan they are helping to push through the Senate and the House will cost ‘only’ $800 billion over 10 years and will actually reduce the deficit.

Believe it if you want.

But here is some simple math: the U.S. spends some $2,000,000,000,000 to $2,400,000,000,000 per year on healthcare (depends on which number you use, and how various folks compute the numbers). That works out to $8100 to $9800 per person for the 245,000,000 Americans who have healthcare. Obviously, there can be great differences between individuals. But, when working with numbers in the tens of millions, these averages will hold.

The new bill winding its way through the Congress promises to add 25,000,000 people to the list of those with healthcare. So far, so good. But, they insist that this will only cost some $80,000,000,000 per year, or just $3,200 person. Now, they will point out that this is the cost to the federal government. But that is smoke and mirrors.

First, the real cost – total cost to the U.S. Economy - will be on the order of $200,000,000,000 to $250,000,000,000 per year – at least (as per the numbers above). Second, they are creating another entitlement program, that is people are ‘entitled’ to it; they get it whether they pay for anything at all and funds are allocated without further action by Congress. So, whether the money is available in the private sector or not, it will be spent. Third, the bill does little to increase the real supply of healthcare in the country (more doctors, nurses, clinics and hospitals). Nor does it do anything to eliminate those items which have continued to push up the cost of healthcare: increasingly complex technology, more effective and precise pharmaceuticals, more sophisticated treatments, increased specialization among healthcare workers (and no growth in the number of healthcare workers), and the impact of law suits on both medical practices and insurance costs.

So, what does all this mean? Simple: the cost will go up: at least $200,000,000,000 per year, every year. Other costs will continue to rise because the bill does nothing to address the fundamentals that have caused healthcare costs to rise, and the government, the same folks who can’t figure out the pay system for an insurance company and lack the leadership to simply say ‘stop, explain this,’ will be responsible for it all.

Swell.