Whither Afghanistan?

What is the US interest in Afghanistan? The answer to this question is essential if the President hopes to correctly respond to Gen. McChrystal’s request for more troops. It comes before questions of what will work and what won’t, before questions of whether the last election was fair or not, before questions of which faction or tribe should have what say, before questions as to the eradication of the opium crop.

First, to simplify matters, US presence in Afghanistan should depend on only one thing: is it in US national interest? IF it is, then the US needs to be there, irrespective of who is in power, how that government was formed, or even if there is a government in Kabul.

On the other hand, if the US has no national interest in Afghanistan, then it should leave, and leave immediately. For those who object, who respond that the US would be abandoning a ‘friend,’ or that it would send the wrong signal, as long as the signal is not too serious, it doesn’t matter. And, as for ‘friends,’ countries don’t have friends, they have interests.

What if any are the US interests in Afghanistan?

What is clear is that the US interest in Afghanistan is not part of the ‘Great Game’ as it was played by Great Britain and Russia for nearly 130 years, where geopolitics dictated that control of the center of Asia meant the ability to leverage control over all of Asia; nor is the current US interest the same as it was in the 1980s, when the US played a dangerous and difficult ‘hand’ to stop the Soviet Union, remembering that proxy campaigns were fought in order to avoid direct war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

While some have lamented that the US should not have fought that proxy war as it did, this ‘Monday morning quarterbacking’ loses sight of the fact that the Cold War was often quite warm, and the stakes were exceptionally high. Under such situations trade-offs often had to be made, and trading a then present heavily armed nuclear adversary – the Soviet Union – for the lesser potential future threat from an anarchic Afghanistan was deemed to be worth the risk.

But it is neither the consequences of that proxy war nor the threat of further anarchy in Afghanistan itself that warrants US combat presence. The issue at hand is the very nature of the region. Afghanistan cannot be considered in isolation. To do so is to forget that it sits beside, one might say ‘on top of’ Pakistan. And Pakistan represents the core of the real issue.

That Afghanistan was, and might revert to being, a safe-haven for terrorists is a concern. But the terrorists come and go via, and are supported by factions within, Pakistan. Pakistan is home to more than 150 million, possesses a small but capable nuclear arsenal with the necessary delivery systems, but has a fragile political and economic system. It is this reality that makes US presence in Afghanistan a vital interest to the US.

Simply put, to fail in Afghanistan is to set off a series of what ifs: if the US departs Afghanistan, do the Taliban return and reestablish control over the country? If the Taliban take control of Afghanistan, and invite al Qaeda and associated parties back into the country, will they be able to further destabilize Pakistan, as well as some of the other neighbors – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, et al? If Pakistan begins to teeter, can we stop the collapse? And if Pakistan collapses, can we guarantee to our own satisfaction the security of that nation’s nuclear arsenal? Even if we can guarantee the security of the nuclear arsenal, what would be the impact on the region of anarchy in Pakistan, or the possible fractioning of that country, yielding several new states, one or more of which might be backers of extreme Islamic movements? What would be the necessary response from India – the world’s most populous democracy and one with whom the US needs closer relations? (And also a nuclear power.) How would US withdrawal from Afghanistan affect Iranian perceptions of US intent and would it embolden them further in their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons?

Admittedly, there are many ‘what ifs’ in the above. But while the risk is arguably small, perhaps not 1 in 1000, of all of the above taking place, the consequences of that happening are massive. That the loss of control of Pakistani nuclear weapons would lead to the detonation of one or more of those weapons is nearly a certainty. If we do not settle the question in our favor in Afghanistan (and hence in Pakistan) are we prepared to accept the associated risk? And if we do accept the risk, are we prepared to deal with the consequences? And what of the rest of the region, of Iran, of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the like?

As for anyone else in the world dealing with the consequences, the simple question is who? If a nuclear weapon is detonated anywhere, by anyone, the entire world will look to the US for the response. If Pakistan fractures, who will be called to provide both aid and security? If unrest spreads into other states, to whom would the world turn for leadership and action?

The Afghani-Pakistan region has always been a bit dangerous and unstable. Today, as a result of growing populations, weak economies, and weak political institutions, seasoned with nuclear weapons and radical Islamists, it is even more so.

Where does that leave the US?

Our choice is binary. We can either accept that we must remain actively engaged in the region, placing our people and assets in the region in an effort to bring greater stability, or we can decide that it is not in our national interest, and that whatever happens, happens - Que sera, sera.

If we decide that the region’s stability is in our national interest, then we need to commit the necessary assets to ensure: control of the Afghani country-side; ensure presence and stability – social and political – among and between the various tribes of Afghanistan, and establish control over the border region. We need enough forces working with the Pakistani Army to assist them in their efforts to establish control over their side of the border and the tribe dominated regions of both the border region and south-west Pakistan. And we need to do this whether the government in Kabul is deemed legitimate or not. If we believe Afghanistan is in our national interest we need to act now, not later, we need to move forces in before winter arrives (it will arrive soon in the high passes) and keep them in place where we can exploit our advantages – logistical, tactical and technical – throughout the winter and into the spring.

What we should not do is delay in our decision, which achieves little in our interest. Certainly, it is always good to work out one’s strategic direction. But that should have been worked out late last winter when the new administration came into Washington. That they did not do their jobs is now abundantly clear. But that is now water under the bridge.

We are now down to three questions: 1) Do we stay or go? 2) If we stay, what is the right approach - strategy – to achieve our goals in the region? 3) If we go, how fast can we get our forces out of there? The first question can be fully discussed in a matter of a weekend. Then the President needs to make a decision and run with it. Once that is done, the following two questions can be worked out. In the interim, if the answer is stay, send the troops in and give the operational commander what forces he wants while the long-term strategy is worked out. If the strategy then changes, adjust the force flow at that point. Such expenses in manpower, effort and material are minor in the long haul. If the decision is to leave, leave now, and begin to commit planning assets to develop a response for the consequence management following a break-up of Pakistan, chaos in central Asia, and the subsequent detonation of a nuclear weapon. And then pray that doesn’t happen.