Several articles ago I talked about the chiefs of the US military services calling on their services to articulate new strategies. I suggested that there was a failure on their part that needs to be addressed. Before I proceed further, we need a very brief discussion on the mechanics of how the US actually builds and maintains is armed forces.
Force Structure is a term in the DOD lexicon that means the people (uniformed – active duty and reserve and national guard, as well as civilians, and contractors), gear (ships, aircraft, tanks, submarines, artillery all the way down to mess tents and latrines) and organizations (from huge ‘Combatant Commands’ responsible for all US military operations in the Pacific and East Asia for example, down to an infantry platoon of 40 soldiers) that make up the US military.
The question at hand is how do we, as a nation, arrive at a given force structure?
The simplest answer is that the force structure is what Congress says it is. That is, Congress funds the military (and the rest of the government, obviously) and also passes the laws that say how the money is to be spent. How does Congress arrive at a given force structure? Chiefly, but not completely, based on inputs from the Department of Defense. Congress is always free to adjust literally any facet of the DOD as it feels free. Does it? Not really. While much is often made about Congress meddling in the DOD, whether it be weapon procurement or manpower or organization or mission, the fact is that usually Congress listens to what the DOD and the President say and gives them the vast majority of their desires, usually with some guidance attached.
In the end, within the broad confines of the debate that takes place on Capitol Hill, force structure is determined based on a balance of several major – and usually interrelated - factors: the stated requirements of the combatant commanders to meet their missions as they understand them, the consolidated interpretations of those needs as produced by the Joint Staff and the various military services, and the overall strategic guidance from the President.
The important point is that the combatant commanders have assigned missions, those missions are assigned by the Secretary of Defense acting for the President, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs and the Service Staffs.
The force structure is, therefore, based on an interpretation – by the Combatant Commanders and by the Service Chiefs – of their assigned missions, missions assigned by the President. And, of course, the added filter of how Congress responds to the President’s strategic vision.
So, if there is a fairly well defined force structure, and a fairly well defined procurement and manning plan, there must be a well-defined strategy. A strategy is, after all, nothing more than a plan that bridges the intellectual space between your assets on one hand and your goals on the other. But several chiefs of services have maintained over the past decade or so that their services needed new strategies. Very simply, you cannot argue that we need to buy a new ship or aircraft unless you have a goal and a strategy to reach that goal that justifies that particular ship or aircraft. Since there was never a clear articulation by them as to what exactly were the new goals that they were trying to reach, the conclusion that I have reached is that either a) these men were being foolish and using important words and ideas very loosely, or b) they weren’t at all interested in issues of goals or strategy or the like, but had instead become creatures of programs, who spent all their time trying to justify a specific procurement program.
The problem with this, of course, is that the United States does not have an infinite amount of money. We cannot afford to by weapon systems because they have become the gleam in some admiral or general’s eye. We really do need to pay attention to what it is that we are trying to accomplish and not simply engage in budget battles in Washington to secure the legacy of this or that general or admiral who honchoed through some particular program.
What this nation needs is a vigorous debate on what it is that we – as a nation - are trying to do, and what it is that we are not interested in doing and then move from there to a discussion of how best to accomplish that. Despite what some might think, a great deal of this discussion can safely take place in the public. We can debate these issues without risking the lives of our soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines. But, they must be debated as a whole, from the national perspective down, not from a service perspective up. Nor does this need to be a partisan debate. In fact, during the Cold War, when mistakes might have cost the world a great deal more, this nation had several vigorous debates about strategy and force structure, held them publicly, and key players in that debate sat on both sides of the aisle. It is worth remembering that Carl Vinson, John Stennis and Sam Nunn, all played key roles in the strategy debate, all played important roles in shaping and building the US military, and all were life-long Democrats.
We do not need to buy ships or aircraft because some admiral or general has spent most of the last ten years ‘stumping’ for that particular platform. But we do need a vigorous debate as to what are our major national goals, and what is the overarching strategy to achieve those goals. That debate will allow us to define our force structure and provide the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines with the tools they really need to carry out their missions.
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