Vital US Interests

January 5th, 2025

It’s a good idea when engaged in war to make an honest assessment of what your prospects are. Consider the British war with Zanzibar in August 1896. The British were upset at the succession of Sultan Khalid bin Barghash, following the sudden death of the previous Sultan. London wanted Sultan Hamoud bin Mohammed. So, three Royal Navy cruisers - HMS St George (flagship for RADM Harry Rawson), HMS Philomel, and HMS Raccoon - and two gunboats - HMS Thrush and HMS Sparrow - steamed in to Zanzibar Port. Lord Salisbury (the Prime Minister) sent a message to RADM Rawson: "You are authorised to adopt whatever measures you may consider necessary, and will be supported in your action by Her Majesty's Government. Do not, however, attempt to take any action which you are not certain of being able to accomplish successfully.”

Involvement was in England’s interest - as long as the action was successful.

As it turned out, that message probably should have been given to the Sultan. On the 27th, starting at 0902, the Royal Navy began to shell the palace in Zanzibar town. At 0940 the town was quiet and the Sultan surrendered; 38 minutes - the shortest war.

Of note, England ruled Zanzibar until 1963. Which dovetails with something Clausewitz noted: the results of war are never final. In this case it took 67 years, but the Empire was no more, and the ruler of Zanzibar was soon someone of whom the British did not approve.

What has that got to do with Ukraine or the US?

From the perspective of the US, two things: first, is it a vital US interest that Ukraine regain its old borders? Secondly, can Ukraine win it alone?

As for question one: is a Ukrainian win a vital US interest? Pundits keep talking about weakening the Russian military on the one hand, and not giving Putin a win on the other. But there’s a simpler question here: is this a vital US interest? Folks will say that is subjective? Perhaps. But restate it this way: if it this a vital US interest, we should be willing to have US troops die protecting those interests. Are we willing?

I have not intention of answering that, that answer needs to come from the Oval Office. And it needs to be crystal clear - yes or no.

And if it is a vital US interest, can Ukraine win on its own? 

Certainly, every war is winnable and every war can be lost. That is, either side can win (with few extreme exceptions), and every war can be lost, no matter your advantages. It all depends in how much you’re willing to commit to the fight and how long you’re willing to fight. But before considering weaponry, training, tactics and strategy, there’s the issue manpower: are you or aren’t you so egregiously outnumbered that that there’s every reason to believe that you’ll be erased.

That is what happened to many smaller nations, and particularly nomadic groups throughout history that came into contact with larger, more organized, urban empires. Rome as it spread either wiped out (the smaller tribes) or absorbed and assimilated tribes for 800 years from their earliest days as a small village, to the conquering of Italy, to the fusion of all of Italy, to the spread of empire. 

For Ukraine, this is a real concern. A look at Ukraine’s population tells a dire tale: in 1991 the population was 52 million. By 2021 the populations was nominally 43 million, of which more than 3 million were already living in Europe. Today, after 3 years of war, the most favorable estimates place the population at 33 million. Other estimates place the population as low as 28 million. 

Further, there is the fertility rate. Ukraine has one of lowest rates of births per adult females in the world, right at 1.0 per. Replacement rate - that necessary to sustain a population at its current level is 2.1 - said differently, unless there is a dramatic change, Ukraine has a dim future.

And, while the numbers are nearly impossible to come by, there’s enough evidence to reach the conclusion that Ukraine is suffering roughly the same number of casualties as Russia, though Russia has 5 times the population.

Given the problem of manpower, is it reasonable to assume that a large, well equipped, well trained Ukrainian army could force the Russians out of Ukraine?

The answer lies in the assumptions: large, well trained, well equipped. Ukraine is having a difficult time recruiting new troops, and an equally difficult time getting troops trained up to a high enough level that they can survive on the battlefield. Desertions run rampant and casualties are high enough that new units are sent forward and then pulled apart as men are sent to fill in units with high losses.

Even before they reach the front lines there are large numbers of desertions. A recent story reveals that a Ukrainian brigade (nominally 3,500 troops) formed in March, and now in France, receiving training, has had more than 1700 desertions.

So, while a large, well trained and well equipped army might be able to do wonderful things, first there is the problem of creating such an army.

Assuming you had one, could a large, well equipped army that had already swept Russian forces out of the Donbas force its way onto Crimea and clear Crimea of Russian forces?

Certainly possible, though the losses would be prodigious. And there’s always a possibility that Moscow would consider that a real red line and not accept that result. But, more to the point, someone - inside the Pentagon - needs to take a hard look at the real  plan, with real manpower numbers, and real loss expectations and assess whether it is credible. Soon to be SecDef Hegseth needs to look at all the numbers with a jaundiced eye, pull it all apart and put it back together. If it is credible, then let the President know and let him decide what we do. If it is not credible, the President needs to be “armed” with that knowledge, and his envoy needs to work to some other solution - a Korea type, “100 year” ceasefire, perhaps.

These aren’t pleasant questions and even less pleasant answers. But they need to be asked and the correct answers presented to President Trump. If his Presidency means anything, it is about seeing to US interests first. What exactly are US interests in Ukraine and are they worth US lives - soldiers as well as civilians and the real possibility of escalation if US soldiers were fighting Russian soldiers.

 January 3rd, 2025

On the Ground

Overall, there has been little change to the front line in the last few days, but Russian forces continue to slowly grind forward. Although there is hard fighting going on along the entire line, the greatest level of activity is from Toretsk south to Velyka Novosilke. Of note, Russian forces continue efforts to “straighten the line" (take small pockets and would-be salients) and keep the Russian line as short as possible, and as free of possible weak point as is possible.

That said, there are no obvious points on the line where there is going to be a breakthrough in the next few days. In fact, there is no reason to believe there is going to be a breakthrough. The reason why is the subject of my ramblings today.

Thoughts

A good friend (and scholar / intelligence officer / Soviet analyst / observer of the human condition) recently pointed out that this is a war of attrition, but I have been reporting terrain gains and loses, not personnel.

Accordingly, today I want to discuss casualties. First, a very short background.

As you’ll recall, the Russian invasion was based on an abysmal strategic assessment that if the Russian army showed up, the Ukrainian army would break, the Ukrainian government would fade away, and the invasion would be a cake walk.

Following that strategic error Russia was left with two options: 1) abandon the field, or 2) apply a low risk strategy to the problem to ensure they could recover from their strategic error. The low risk strategy they applied was to turn this into a war of attrition. The Ukrainians in fact accepted this change, refusing to readily cede ground, and rather to fight for every square foot of terrain. The result has been a tremendous number of casualties - on both sides. 

And make no mistake, Russian generals, as early as the middle of 2022, were telling their subordinates that their mission was “to kill Ukrainians.” 

This has led to a long series of tactical actions that are mis-reported in much of the western press. Russian forces are not “getting bogged down” in various towns, they are using the towns as kill zones. Attack a town, let a fight develop, and then slowly grind the units inside the town - and the town - down to rubble. Russian forces have pounded into dust town after town. They are clearly not interested in “capturing” the towns, as there is usually little to nothing left of them.

Tactically, the war, and this is particularly true of the last 18 months, has been fought overwhelmingly at the platoon level and below.

By that I mean that there are few troops movements or assaults that involve a force larger than a platoon. In fact, on any given day there might be 150 - 200 “assaults” by the Russians. A single assault will involve 1 or more squads, each of 7 - 10 troops, moving on a Ukrainian position. The two or more squads aren’t tightly coordinated, they are simply attacking at the same time in the same general area. The assault usually includes being moved to the forward lines in 1 or 2 armored personnel carriers (APC) and dropped off before the APC is engaged by the Ukrainians. The squad then breaks up into fire teams of 3-4 troops and start working forward. They work forward as far as they can, searching for Ukrainian troops. Once found, the Ukrainians are engaged by the Russians using both their own weapons and whatever else they have available for the day (armed drones (that carry weapons), FPV drones (First Person Video drones (suicide drones), artillery, and aviation if available. 

The attack continues until everyone in the slit trench, bunker, building, etc., in front of them is dead. Then they move on. 

As can be seen, using such tactics, and with the goal of killing Ukrainian soldiers vice taking land as priority one, there is unlikely to be any sort of “breakout."

On any given day a platoon sized attack is unusual and stands out as such. In any given week there might be one or two company sized formations attacking across the entire war zone, and a battalion sized movement is much more rare than that.

So, let’s look at the numbers.

First, the numbers from the battlefield perspective are all, at best, wild guesses. No one is accurately counting bodies. If there are accurate numbers they would be obtained by getting the other guy’s report up echelon as to their casualties. There is no indication that that is what is being reported by either side.

The one fairly authoritative number for Russian casualties is the number produced by a Russian oppositions group - Mediazone - which conducts exhaustive searches of thousands and thousands of Russian websites to find reports of individual family members who have died in combat. These numbers have tracked remarkably close to estimates by various outside observers who have used confirmed reports of various units and then scaled up those numbers to get estimates.

Mediazone reports that current Russian dead (end of December 2024) is just short of 87,000 and give an upper bound of 120,000 to that number. Checking of their numbers shows that about 17,000 have did in the last 100 days - the period of the renewed Russian “offensive.”

How many wounded does that translate into? Between 3.5 and 4 times that. Using the widest range of numbers (87,000 and 120,000 KIA), yields WIA numbers of 305,000 - 480,000. This would mean total Russian casualties - maximum numbers, 120,000 KIA and 480,000 WIA and roughly 15,000 desertion - so, total maximum casualties of 615,000, minimum casualties 407,000.

Note that the Ukrainian General Staff claim of 40,000+ Russian casualties per month simply does not bear up under close scrutiny and probably overstates the case by at least 100% (they are more than doubling the numbers).

What about Ukrainian casualties? No one is reporting on Ukrainian but there are data points that the government has that provide the opportunity to make estimates.

In the first 3 months of the war Ukrainian forces suffered roughly 10,000 KIA and 25,000 WIA (evacuation of wounded was very poor during the first few months). This was before Russian forces switched to a war of attrition. So, after this casualty rates went up, reporting on casualties was suppressed.

Later, after the war of attrition gained momentum, President Zelenskyy commented that they were losing 100 - 200 killed per day. Digging through the available data showed that number was simply 200 per day.

Various overall numbers were later released. President Zelenskyy noted 31,000 KIA by December of 2023, but that was hardly credible. It should also be noted that there were hints that the official designation of “Killed In Action” was tightly controlled. (Other countries do this - DOD numbers on dead in Vietnam and what was a “KIA” led to some fairly significant differences in numbers.) Zelenskyy’s numbers would suggest just 21,000 KIA in 19 months. And in fact, a member of the Verkhovna Rada later commented that from September 1st to August 31st 2023 and again for the same period ending in 2024, the Ukrainians had suffered 38,000 KIA, 19,000 per year. That represents half the rate of losses from before the start of the war of attrition.

On the other hand, President of the EU von der Leyen posted a statement at the end of 2022 that Ukraine had already suffered 100,000 KIAs. She then changed the number to total casualties, then deleted the numbers completely.

Elsewhere, a series of polls has shown far higher casualty rates. Perhaps of greatest note were polls among Ukrainians, one of which showed that 77% have lost a friend in the war and 22% have lost a family member in the war. Depending on what statistics you use to sift through those numbers the results are disturbing; the lowest estimate of KIAs based on these two numbers places Ukrainian KIAs at more than 160,000, and perhaps over 200,000.

Using my own tracking methods and estimating based on what data I could find, my most conservative number for current Ukrainian losses is 108,000 KIA and 375,000 WIA. But, the more likely numbers are 160,000 KIA and 640,000 WIA.

In addition, Ukrainian desertions are tremendous. As of the middle of December it was being reported by several different sources that there were more than 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers who had been charged with desertion. 

Giving credence to this huge number is a recent story that a Ukrainian brigade (nominally 3,500 troops) formed in March, and now in France, receiving training, has had more than 1700 desertions.

Finally, there is the larger problem behind these casualties: Ukrainian demographics. In 1991 Ukraine had a total population of 52 million. In 2022, just before the war started, the population was listed as 43 million, but perhaps 3 million had already moved west into the rest of Europe.

Following the start of the war more than 6.8 million sought refuge in Europe, per the  UN High Commission in Refugees (UNHCR). The current population of Ukraine is listed at 33 million but the best estimate is that it is now less than 28 million.

All said differently, Russia is suffering huge losses, but in absolute terms, Ukraine’s losses are probably worse. When taken as a whole, against the fact that Russia has a population of nearly 150 million (5 times larger than Ukraine), the war of attrition is not sustainable. The fact that recruiting is a problem, and desertions are a huge problem is suggestive that these numbers, if not exactly accurate, are close enough to capture the essence of the problem.

All said differently again, Ukraine needs to change its strategy.

v/r pete