January 6th, 2026 January 7th - Russian Orthodox Christmas

Ukrainian Church now on Gregorian calendar

Politics - Coalition of the Willing meeting in Paris

- Bloomberg reports US role in Security Guarantees to be discussed

- Zelenskyy continues to form new cabinet

Combat Ops - Fighting along most of the line of contact, few changes.

- Unconfirmed gains in Hulyaipole

Weather

Winter has set in, temperatures below freezing, ground is solid, allowing off-road movement. Air temperatures at or below freezing, wind shills well below freezing, cloud cover and snow (and sometimes rain) showers also make conditions miserable for troops, and make reconnaissance more difficult. Bad weather also hampers independent verification of changes in the battlefield.

Kharkiv

32 and cloudy, gusting to 20, showers possible tonight. Cloudy all week, rain showers through Thursday night, snow on weekend. Daily highs in the mid to upper 30s, daily lows near freezing through Thursday, then much colder, temperatures in the low 20s or lower. Winds south-easterly, 10kts.

Melitopol

38 and cloudy, showers possible tonight. Cloudy all week, daily chance of rain through Sunday. Daily highs in the low 40s, daily lows in the 30s through Friday morning, then temperatures dropping into the 20s. Winds south-easterly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

25 and cloudy, gusting over 20. Snow and wind through Friday, then mostly cloudy. Daily highs will be in the upper 20s through Thursday, then much colder, highs in single digits from Saturday through most of next week. Lows after Saturday will be near zero, wind chill below zero. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics

President Zelenskyy is in Paris at a meeting of the “Coalition of the Willing,” with 27 other heads of state and foreign and defense ministers from 8 other countries to discuss the status of peace negotiations. Ambassador Witkoff and Jared Kushner are also in attendance. 

Bloomberg is reporting that one of the topics for discussion is whether US troops would be stationed in Ukraine as part of any security guarantee, as an element of a peace plan.

The US position has been that the US would help with ceasefire monitoring and intelligence support, as well as providing certain weapons, such as air defense weapons.

President Zelenskyy continues to “shuffle” people around his cabinet. Yesterday he designated Yevhen Khmara as the director of the SBU ( ) Security Service Ukraine. Khmara had previously been the head of the SBU’s special operations unit (“Center A”). Vasyl Malyuk, director until yesterday, will remain within the SBU, focusing on asymmetric special operations.

Also of note, on Friday  (the 2nd) Zelenskyy appointed LtGen Kyril Budanov, formerly director of Military Intelligence, as the new Chief of Staff for the Office of the President. It appears that Budanov will remain in the Ukrainian army. Reportedly, the previous Chief of Staff, Andrii Yermak, had lobbied repeatedly for Budanov to be sacked.

Foreign Minister Sybiha is also expected to provide recommendations Zelenskyy in the next few days for a shuffling of ambassadors and senior personnel inside the foreign office.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting continued north of Sumy city but there were no changes to the front lines. Unconfirmed reports note that Russian forces have pushed across the border about 18 miles south-east of Sumy city and occupied the village of Hrabovske. This was reported several times in December as well, and confirmed at least once, so not clear what is happening here. There is some suggestion that the Russians are attempting to open a larger front in this area, but total Russian forces in the area appears to be less than a brigade. The village had population of 718 in 2001.

Fighting continues north of Kharkiv city, as well as west of Kharkiv, along the border, but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues in Kupyansk, with Russian forces reportedly reduced to fewer than 60 troops inside the city, confined to three small lodgments. Imagery confirmed that Ukrainian forces had a small gain in terrain in the center of the city.

Despite Russian forces having been pushed out of Kupyansk, a good deal of fighting was reported north, north-east, and east of the city.

Fighting was also reported along most of the rest of the line of contact but there were no confirmed changes in the line.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK 

North of Bakhmut Russian  forces continue to consolidate their positions just to the west of Siversk, with Russian probes taking place in the Dibrova area (north-west of Siversk) and towards Riznykivka (west-south-west of Siversk. But, there were no changes in front lines.

Russian forces continue to press on the eastern edge of Kostiantinivka, and Russian probes were reported inside the city, but there does not appear to be any change in the front lines. Russian forces were confirmed by Ukrainian sources to have moved north of Yablunivka (due south of Kostiantinivka) as noted yesterday.

There were no reported changes in the front lines to the west and south-west of Pokrovsk, north of the Vovcha River.

There is a great deal of fighting reported along the entire line of contact from just north-east of Kostiantinivka to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines. Reporting emphasizes again and again that Russian forces are probing Ukrainian positions and then building up small concentrations and conducting local attacks. Russian forces clearly retain the initiative, Ukrainian forces continue to hold their positions, even at great cost.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Again, fighting was reported along essentially the entire line of contact but there were no confirmed gains by either side. Cloud cover and rain and snow is limiting independent confirmation of battlefield activity and the location of the front lines. Ukrainian Southern Command noted that all of Hulyaipole is now “contested,” and multiple reports seem to agree that Russian forces moving in from the north-east have, in the area of the city, pushed across the Haichur River and control the first few streets west of the river. Russian forces pushing up from the south-east have taken much of the south-east end of the city and have reached the center of the city and fighting was reported near the intersection of T0814 and T0401 roadways.

Air and Maritime Operations 

During the night of January 5th-January 6th, Russian forces launched at least 5 x ballistic missiles and 61 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 53 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Energy infrastructure was again the primary target.

Civilian casualties include at least 2 killed and 2 civilians injured.

RuAF tacair struck targets in 5 towns.

During the night of January 4th-January 5th Ukrainian forces struck the Energiya chemical plant in Yelets, about 200 miles south of Moscow; the plant produces, among other things, batteries used in various weapon systems.

Ukrainian sources are reporting that some Russian Shahed drones are being equipped with a single “VERBA” (Russian: Верба or “willow”) missile. VERBA, NATO code name SA-29 Gizmo, is a 4th generation MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense System), weighs 38lbs, has a range of just under 4 miles, and 3.3 lb warhead. The SA-29 is of note as it has a multi-spectrum seeker (near infrared, mid infrared, and ultraviolet) and has improved flare discrimination from earlier Russian MANPADS. The missile is mounted on the top of the drone, on centerline, facing forward.

During the night of January 4th-January 5th, Russian forces launched at least 9 x ballistic missiles (probably S-300 missiles) and 165 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 137 drones; they did not successfully engage any of the ballistic missiles.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Energy infrastructure was again the primary target and there was a blackout in Kyiv oblast.

Civilian casualties include at least 6 killed and 2 civilians injured.

RuAF tacair struck targets in 5 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Sep9 Oct8 Nov7 Dec8 Jan5 Jan6

Brent      94.71    67.03 66.18 63.86 62.94 61.16 62.12

WTI     92.10    63.26 62.48 59.94 59.26 57.74 58.62

NG       3.97         3.12 3.44 4.33 4.96 3.42 3.37

Wheat     8.52          5.22 5.06 5.32 5.38 5.08 5.12

Ruble     85          84.03 81.28 80.95 76.52 81.13 80.81

Hryvnia 28.6 41.23 41.48 41.89 42.15 42.41 42.55

Urals 91.66 60.12 61.15 56.56 54.92 49.22 51.38

ESPO 94.52 68.32 66.74 65.18 61.95 52.93 55.76

Sokol 99.31 62.97 61.91 60.71 60.62 58.50 57.32

Thoughts

The idea that US forces would be included on the ground in Ukraine as part of the security guarantee of any would-be peace agreement seems both obvious and impossible.

Obvious, because the US is the only force in NATO that could provide a meaningfully sized force, and then sustain it. Even if France or the UK or Germany were to provide forces, sustaining those forces for more than several months would begin to stretch those countries; the US would need to participate to make the Guarantor Force viable.

That said, it is difficult to conceive at this point that Moscow would agree to any NATO forces inside Ukraine, never mind US forces inside Ukraine. And it is also difficult to imagine President Trump agreeing to station US forces - especially in the significant numbers needed - inside Ukraine.

The departure of Yermak and the appointment of Budanov as President Zelenskyy’s chief of staff may have some impact on the negotiations; reports suggest that Yermak refused to share any negotiation details with anyone. We’ll see if Budanov is any better.

v/r - pete 

 January 5th, 2026 A Belated Happy New Year

Politics - Trump doubts attack on Putin

- Little note of Maduro Raid

Combat Ops - Russia has Siversk, but few other changes on front line

- Increased use of glide bombs by Russian Air Force

Weather

Winter has set in, temperatures below freezing, ground is solid, allowing off-road movement. Air temperatures at or below freezing, wind shills well below freezing.

Kharkiv

19 and mostly cloudy. Cloudy all week, daily rain or ice showers through Thursday. Daily highs in the mid to upper 30s, daily lows near freezing, next week much colder. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

29 and light snow. Cloudy all week, daily chance of light snow or rain through Thursday. Daily highs in the low 40s, daily lows in the 30s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

17 and cloudy. Solid overcast and snow likely every day for the next 5 days. Daily highs will be in the upper 20s, daily lows in the mid 20s, wind chill in the low 20s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics

Russia continues to claim that Ukrainian forces made a direct drone attack on President Putin, launching 91 drones at his residence in Novgorod, on December 28th. Ukraine has denied the attack took place. Russia reportedly turned over evidence to US Embassy Moscow personnel, but the substance has not been released and President Trump appears to doubt the claim: on Sunday he countered the Russian argument, suggesting that there was a raid in the area, but it was directed at a nearby target, not Putin’s house.

Moscow, and Beijing, have both spoken out against the US raid to grab Maduro, but the raid does not appear to be have had any substantive impact on the war yet.

That said, there is a possible impact on oil prices, noted below. 

There is also probably some concern about the would-be ally Iran, which is suffering through a damaged economy, a massive drought (caused by 45 years of poor policy decisions in Tehran) and a great deal of social unrest. 

Ground Operations

Ground operations have been marked by few changes in the past two weeks. In part this is the nature of the war, with the prime focus on causing casualties, not taking land; in part this is a result of weather, as the cold weather is just now making the terrain hard enough to allow heavy vehicle movement off of roads. 

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting has continued north of Sumy city over the past two weeks but there has been little substantive change in the front lines in that period. That said, Ukrainian forces are reporting that Russian ops tempo has picked up in the last few days. We should expect to see more small unit (squad or smaller) probes in the coming weeks.

North of Kharkiv Russian forces have made several recon probes south of Vovchansk in the last several days but there is no change in the front lines.

There has been no change in the front lines just north of the Oskil River, just inside Ukraine.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues in and around Kupyansk. Despite most Russian forces having withdrawn from the city proper, Ukrainian forces do not appear to have finished completely clearing the city. The current Ukrainian HQ claim is that there are fewer than two platoons (perhaps just 60 Russian soldiers) remaining in the city. Nearly three weeks ago the Ukrainian estimate was that there were only two platoons (80 troops), but they have not yet been cleared. Of note, it would seem there were never more than 2 battalions in the city and perhaps a good deal less than that, perhaps less than single battalion.

Ukrainian do continue to hold and slowly expand their positions just east of the city, as Russian forces south-east of the city keep trying to push westward from the Pishchane area. Russian forces claim to have taken Podoly, a small town about 3 miles west-north-west of Pishchane, but this has not been confirmed.

What appears to be hard fighting continues both north-east of Borova and in the area of the Nitrius River and Lyman, but there haver been no substantive changes in the front lines in this area.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

Of greatest note here is that Ukrainian forces withdrew from (or were pushed out of - depending on whose report you read) Siversk on December 23rd. Ukrainian forces have since been moved back to a line west of the high ground just west of Siversk. Russian forces moved forward and are now less than 2 miles from the small town of Riznykivka. Just north of Riznykivka and Sviato-Pokrovske there is a bluff, high ground about 150 - 200 feet higher than the terrain to the south. Russian troops appear to control this high ground and are pressing west; Ukrainian forces south (down hill) of the bluff, will be at a tactical disadvantage.

At the same time, there appear to be some small pockets of Ukrainian troops holding positions just north-west and south-west of Siversk, though it isn’t crystal clear.

South-west of Chasiv Yar - north-west of Toretsk, Russian forces pushed north out of Oleksadnro-Kolynove along the H-20 roadway and the terrain south of the Kleban Byk Reservoir appears to have been cleared of the last Ukrainian forces. Overall, Russian forces retain a hold on the south-east corner of Kostiantinivka, but there have been no substantive changes in terrain held inside the city.

The front line west from Toretsk to the area north of Pokrovsk has undergone minor changes, small gains and losses on both sides, but no major changes. Ukrainian forces control portions of Rodynske, as do Russians, but there is no indication that that situation is changing rapidly in either direction.

As for Pokrovsk and the Pokrovsk pocket and Myrnohrad, Ukrainian forces continue to hold portions of both Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and Russian elements continue to probe into those area held by Ukrainian forces, but the fight remains a close, nasty, grind and, as with other fights like this, the fight is likely to be decided by commitment of forces, both manpower and the total firepower committed; as noted below, the Russian use of more and more glide bombs may well be a deciding factor in the fight for some of these cities.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

As with the rest of the front line, there are few substantive changes in southern Ukraine, but Russian forces have made incremental gains in Hulyaipole as well as at several spots along the Haichur River, slowly grinding southwest into the city, while also pressing beyond the Ukrainian defensive lines that parallel the River. 

Russian forces have also made gains south-east of Orikhiv as well as north-west of of Kamyanske, along the Dnepr River.

Air and Maritime Operations

Of note is that Ukrainian reporting indicates that last week Russian forces launched 60+ missiles and 1,000+ strike drones into Ukrainian airspace, but almost 1,100 glide bombs, that is more glide bombs than missiles and drones combined. This is of significance because the impact is, in most cases (the exception is the Iskander ballistic missiles) the glide bombs are far more destructive than the drones or cruise missiles. 

The drones carry at most 110KG - 221 lbs - of explosives, and the cruise missiles carry between several hundred kilos to 500 kilos (500lbs to 1100 lbs) of explosives. The smallest bomb the Russian air forces employs with any regularity is the FAB 500 - 500KG (1100 lb) bomb. They also use 1500 and 3000 kg (3300 and 6600 lb bombs, though not as often.

The issue here is that the Ukrainian defensive positions in the small cities and towns are often built around heavily reinforced sections of apartment buildings, turned into 3 and 4 story high bunkers. These bunkers regularly survive direct hits by 152MM howitzer rounds, battlefield rockets (122MM rockets) and Shahed drones. They do NOT survive hits by FAB 500 bombs. That the Russians have used more than 1,000 glide bombs in less than a week speaks to an effort to reduce and clear hard-points as they attack Ukrainian held towns. 

During the night of January 4th-January 5th, Russian forces launched at least 9 x ballistic missiles (probably S-300 missiles) and 165 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 137 drones; they did not successfully engage any of the ballistic missiles.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Energy infrastructure was again the primary target and there was a blackout in Kyiv oblast.

Civilian casualties include at least 6 killed and 2 civilians injured.

RuAF tacair struck targets in 5 towns.

Russian forces claimed that they shot down 437 Ukrainian drones last night and this morning.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Sep9 Oct8 Nov7 Dec8 Jan5

Brent      94.71    67.03 66.18 63.86 62.94 61.16

WTI     92.10    63.26 62.48 59.94 59.26 57.74

NG       3.97         3.12 3.44 4.33 4.96 3.42

Wheat     8.52          5.22 5.06 5.32 5.38 5.08

Ruble     85          84.03 81.28 80.95 76.52 81.13

Hryvnia 28.6 41.23 41.48 41.89 42.15 42.41

Urals 91.66 60.12 61.15 56.56 54.92 49.22

ESPO 94.52 68.32 66.74 65.18 61.95 52.93

Sokol 99.31 62.97 61.91 60.71 60.62 58.50

The Urals oil spot price (49.22) is the lowest spot price since March of 2023 when it hit 48.06 per barrel.

Of note, Venezuelan oil exports to China are estimated to be roughly 4-5% of China’s total imports, making up more than half of Venezuelan exports over the last 3 years. As of late 2025 it was estimated that Venezuela was shipping a bit more than 600,000 barrels per day of crude and 130,000 barrels per day of fuel oil to China. This is now, ostensibly, ended. Given the problems Iran will have in increasing its exports, this would suggest a bit of a potential wind-fall for Russian oil exports, particularly the ESPO oil. I suppose it might also lead to China reconsidering financing the additional pipeline Russia wants to build.

Thoughts

Keeping allies may be getting tougher for Russia (and China). Maduro has gone, and while some in Caracas are holding fast, they may well find the squeeze a bit much.

At the same time, long-time Russia (and China) ally Cuba is teetering on the edge, as is Iran. Certainly there has to be some effort to the re-assess the balance of power and ask if there is another calculus that need be considered.

It would seem that there might be some small (perhaps obscure is a better word) chance, in light of the Maduro raid, the looming collapse of Cuba, the looming collapse of Iran, and the not terribly healthy economies of both China and Russia, to push Putin to consider there are some people he wants as friends (the US) and others he does not… (China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela), and that might be some incentive to step towards a ceasefire.

I realize I am grasping at straws, but the dynamic of a rising US economy, and a surging US military-political dynamic might push some in the Kremlin to reconsider. Add in the small, but never-the-less worth considering note that two western powers - the UK and France - felt it was safe to follow Trump’s cue and go strike people they didn’t like over the weekend (in Syria). The trend lines seem to be all headed in one direction; certainly something for someone in the Kremlin to think about… 

v/r - pete