March 25th, 2026

Politics - Bodies of fallen soldiers exchanged

- Hungary’s PM Orban threatens to cut off gas supply

Combat Ops - Large scale air attack

- Ground war grinds forward

- Russian Spring Offensive

Politics

On February 26th Ukrainian and Russian forces exchanged the bodies of fallen soldiers, with Russian forces turning over 1,000 Ukrainian dead, and Ukrainian forces turning over 35 Russian dead. This is the first exchange since January 29th, and brings the count of bodies turned over in the last 14 months to (per my tally) 18,273 Ukrainian soldiers and 264 Russian soldiers.

While most of this 14 month period Russian forces have been advancing (albeit slowly) and hence able to pick up some of the dead, there have been some Ukrainian gains, particularly in the last 2 months north of Hulyaipole, and this wide divergence in number of bodies has not been explained; even the BBC has finally recognized that the public casualty counts quoted in the Western Press do not make sense given these discrepancies.

Hungary’s PM Orban posted  on Facebook that Hungary will end natural gas supplies to Ukraine if the Druzhba pipeline is not repaired and reopened.

"Gas supplies from Hungary to Ukraine will be gradually suspended, and the volume of gas that remains in Hungary will be stored in Hungary.”

He commented that Hungary has: "successfully defended itself against Ukrainian blackmail" adding that Hungary must "break the oil blockade.”

"Until Ukraine provides oil, it will not receive gas from Hungary… We will protect Hungary's energy security, we will maintain the protected petrol price and the reduced gas price!”

Air Operations 

Russian forces launched the largest air operation of the war on the 23rd and 24th, launching 948 strike drones as well as 7 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 18 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 5 x Iskander cruise missiles, and 4 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The UAF shot down 797 drones and 25 cruise missiles. 11 oblasts reported damage and there were at least 4 civilians killed in the attacks.

Damage was reported to energy, and transport infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zaporizhia oblasts. And more than 150,000 people were without power in Chernihiv.

Ukrainian drones struck the Russian power grid in the Belgorod area and left nearly 500,000 without power.

Ground Operations 

It has been a bit more than two weeks since the last report and a review of the maps shows that Ukrainian forces continue to gain small amounts of terrain in the south-east, in an area centered about 15 miles south-west of Pokrovsk, and a second one about 15 miles northeast of Hulyaipole. There have also been some smaller gains south-west and south-east of Kostiantinivka, and small gains north-east of Slovyansk. Overall, the Ukrainian General Staff reports that since the beginning of the year Ukrainian forces have retaken some "400 sq. Km” of land (about 155 sq. miles) of terrain. 

All other things being equal, that’s good for the Ukrainians and shows an ability to take the initiative on the battlefield, at least in certain areas. What is not known is the number of casualties incurred by both sides nor the expenditure in weapons to take this terrain.

Once again, the Ukrainians have shown themselves to be more agile tactically, capable of exploiting a “seam" between two Russian units and penetrating into Russian territory. Russian forces on the other hand almost seem to not care, grinding forward with little regard for what is happening to neighboring units.

It’s also not clear that the Ukrainian forces have penetrated the Russian defensive positions. Note that the Russians have built a series of defensive lines, each consisting of bunkers, fighting positions, tank and vehicles barriers and trenches and mine fields. As their forces move forward, engineers then come in and build new defense lines. There are also less developed defensive lines that usually are just behind the forward line of troops. These are more easily penetrated. But the fully constructed defense barriers have proven very difficult to penetrate and my guess right now is that the Ukrainian forces have not penetrated these fully built defensive lines in either area where they are engaged in counter-offensives.

All told, Russian forces have made small gains west and south-west of Hulyaipole, have continued to slowly expand their positions west and north-west of Pokrovsk, are engaged in the now-familiar “see-saw” struggle for terrain in eastern and south-eastern Kostiantinivka, and continue to grind forward in the area east of Slovyansk. North of the Slovyansk area, all the way to Sumy oblast, there has been virtually no change in the line, with just very minor give and take. 

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Mar10 Mar25

Brent      94.71   63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 106.40 92.17 110.20

WTI     92.10   59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 103.60 89.13 88.48

NG       3.97      4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 3.37 3.13 2.92

Wheat      8.52  5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 6.25 5.99 5.90

Ruble     85          80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 78.20 78.61 81.00

Hryvnia 28.6 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.86 43.87

Urals 91.66 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 90.97 100.67 98.99

ESPO 94.52 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 84.99 97.96 96.29

Sokol 99.31 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 101.55 91.81 107.32

Thoughts

Before commenting about combat operations, it’s worth taking a look at the oil prices: operations were necessary to terminate the Iranian nuclear weapons program and provide safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz, but Russia is benefiting from the higher energy prices.

It should be noted that, while I am looking at this war from a “100,000 foot perch” and there is little change, still, on the ground, in the mud, this remains a brutal fight with hundreds of squad and rifle-team sized elements engaged every day, FPV drones constantly on the prowl, artillery ready to strike. And in the towns Russian glide bombs continue to strike reinforced fighting positions.

But what strikes me after staring at the maps for the last several weeks, and then comparing them from mid-February to today, is that the Russian grind continues. It isn’t elegant, but it still grinds forward. The long-term trend is in the Russian favor, no matter how you look at it. What we don’t know is the casualty count. 

It’s of note that the Ukrainian offensive south-east of Verbove (15 miles or so north of Hulyaipole) began on February 3rd. On February 26th there was a body exchange and Ukrainian forces turned over 35 Russian bodies. 

Several days ago the UGS claimed that the Ukrainian army had inflicted 1,710 casualties (killed and wounded) on March 17th, labeling it the worst day of the war for the Russian army. Perhaps. 1,710 total casualties would suggest more than 300 KIA. But the number of dead transferred certainly raises questions as to the accuracy of that sort of reporting. It will be interesting to see how many Russian dead are returned at the next body exchange.

Meanwhile, despite some very well publicized reports on Russian casualties, the best count places the Russian KIAs at roughly 205,000 - 220,000. There is an equal number of those wounded who will never return to duty. Rounding up, call it 450,000 “KIA or Severely Wounded.”

The official Ukrainian KIA count, per President Zelenskyy, is 55,000. Using the number of bodies returned in the last 14 months as an average would suggest the Ukrainian KIA count is above 65,000, assuming that something near 100% of KIAs are being picked up by Russian forces, which would also suggest that no Ukrainian soldiers are killed on the Ukrainian side of the front line, an unreasonable assumption, especially given that 80% or more of all casualties are from artillery and drones.

And there have been times when the Ukrainian government releases extreme Russian casualty claims to mask bad news on the Ukrainian side, which would obviously include high casualty counts, perhaps from the limited counter-offensive they have been pursuing since early February. Where that leaves the actual Ukrainian casualty count I don’t know, but when added together with the reports of numbers of amputations, and other reporting, my guess is that the Ukrainian casualty count (KIAs and several wounded) is roughly the same as the Russian casualty count.

Finally, there is now anecdotal reporting that the “Russian Spring Offensive” has begun. Use of that phrase again requires some caveats: for the Russians, this remains a true war of attrition: the overarching goal is to cause casualties, and then, and only then, take ground. So, if (“IF”) the offensive has begun, it will mean more units pushed forward on the line, more drones, more artillery, more glide bombs. But there will be no deep, knife-like thrust, no great flanking movements, no mad dash across open terrain. And even if the Ukrainian line were suddenly stripped of a unit, the Russian army simply isn’t organized to conduct some Rommel-like dash into the Ukrainian rear. The grind continues.

v/r pete