Since early 1953 (in
Korea), the United States hasn’t lost a battalion sized force (or larger) in
combat operations. In Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Afghanistan,
Iraq, etc., the US has outfought every enemy. Since Desert Storm, including
Somalia, the US hasn’t lost any engagement larger than a platoon.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom
the US and its allies ground forces attacked into Iraq with a force perhaps
2/3rds that of Iraq’s army; the attacking force won decisively. In 8 years of
combat operations that followed the US always had the tactical advantage.
Combat operations were often slow and painful, particularly at the squad and
platoon level, because the US was determined to minimize innocent casualties.
But larger units – battalion and brigade sized units – were never threatened on
the battlefield.
A host of reasons explain
US tactical and operational success: excellent equipment, excellent battlefield
intelligence and surveillance, superb logistics, excellent communications,
superb small unit training, and superb (best in the world) senior enlisted
personnel.
Yet the wars still drag
on, long after repeated successes on the battlefield, yielding desultory
results, while costs in money, time and people, continue to climb.
Why?
During WWII the US didn't
have the best destroyers (Germany did), or the best subs (Germans), the best
torpedoes (Japan), the best tanks (Germans and Russians), best cruisers (Japan
or Germany), best infantry weapons (Germans), best soldiers (until late in the
war -- Germans), best aircraft carriers (Brits at the start of the war, the US
after the Essex class was commissioned), and so on.
But we won…
Throughout the 1920s, we
worked the Rainbow plans, adapting and adjusting plans to better use what we
had rather than trying to solve everything with a better “widget.” We
eventually developed plans that would work – and we won the war with them. And
despite those who suggest the US wasn’t innovative, the first plan to attack
Pearl Harbor with carrier aircraft was developed by Admiral Yarnell in Fleet
Problem XIII (1932), a tactic repeated by Admiral King in Fleet Problem XIX
(1939).
World War II combat
operations were followed by extensive (one might say vast) plans, an
overarching “grand strategy” integrating all elements of US (and allied) power
into a comprehensive plan to rebuild Europe, and Japan (and eventually Korea)
into the first world, western nations they are today.
Because of these plans, US
presence in Japan, Germany (and Italy, the UK, and a few other countries)
continues to this day – 71 years later. The presence of those forces serves US
interests - political, economic, social.
But today, while
succeeding brilliantly on the battlefield, we quickly become “confused” outside
of combat. The fault lies not in our combat forces themselves, the fault is in
the failure to develop overarching, “grand strategies” that begin with a
crystal clear enunciation of our goals – what planners call the “end state” –
followed by integrated departmental strategies across the entire government.
Everyone is complicit; senior military planners have grown sloppy in their
strategic thinking (tactical planning is much more interesting and rewarding
than strategic thought); and an entire generation of government and think-tank
personnel who are intimately familiar with governmental processes, but who pay
lip-service to integrated plans, eschewing the painful and unpleasant effort
associated with grand strategy.
Since the 1950s only
presidents Eisenhower and Reagan have successfully cobbled together anything
approaching a grand strategy. President-elect Trump can change that. But he
must begin immediately; once the “daily grind” starts he’ll find it virtually
impossible to get “in front of the bus.”
So, Mr. Trump might consider
spending a weekend framing how he wants the world to look in 10 years. To
cynics who say Trump can’t do this, my answer is that anyone who’s ever built a
building already thinks this way; he just needs to be “translated” into the
language of strategic planning.
2) Direct your national
security advisor to appoint a deputy for “grand strategy.” Provide him the
results of your weekend effort; that person (and a small staff) will
“translate” it into “commander’s guidance,” chopping it through you until it’s
in words you like.
3) Parse this to the
respective offices throughout the government for development of individual
elements of the grand strategy, then force them to integrate each element
across the executive branch.
And keep Congress and the
Citizenry fully involved.
You can repeat the
strategic successes of the past.
No comments:
Post a Comment