USS Panay, Taiwan, and Mr. Trump

 December 3rd, 2016

On December 12^th, 1937 twelve Imperial Japanese aircraft attacked USS Panay, a gunboat anchored in the Yangtze River near Nanking. Panay was strafed and hit by two small bombs, and then sank; 2 US sailors and one Italian reporter were killed, 43 were wounded.

The Japanese claimed it was a case of mistaken identity (there were US flags all over it and a large one painted on the deck), and paid the US for “damages”). But Panay was out of the way, mission accomplished. And Japan, the expansionist power of the day, went on to destroy Nanking (the city fell, 13 December) and expand across Asia.

And…

Last week (December 2^nd), 7 weeks short from inauguration, President-elect Trump talked to President Tsai of Taiwan. Taiwan, as you’ll recall, isn’t really part of the People’s Republic of China, which more or less takes a dim view on other nations recognizing Taiwan.

Beijing is now in a bit of a tizzy. As are, of course, the foreign policy wonks in Washington.

So…

Mr. Trump has now served notice to Beijing that he isn’t going to kowtow to their world-view and that he’s more than willing to talk to Taiwan if folks in Taiwan are interested. In short, Mr. Trump will set the US agenda in Asia, not Beijing, thank you very much. This is a substantive change – YUGE, you might say.

But, one lesson from the Panay incident is: don’t put yourself (or your ships) someplace where you might lose them, if you don’t have a plan.

So, do we have a plan if things, as they say, go sideways?

Well, it so happens President-Elect Trump has called for a 350 ship Navy; that’s the right place to start.

Consider our current Navy and what is planned (from the Navy 2016 budget and the Congressional Research Service):

Total ships:                                     282 (2016)    308 (2021 (as 

                                                                                     planned))

Aircraft Carriers:                              11                  11

Cruisers and Destroyers                   87                  88

LCS and Mine Warfare                    22                  52

Amphibious Ships                            31                  34

Submarines

      (attack/cruise missile)                57                  48

Ballistic Missile Subs                      14                  12

Logistics and Support                      60                  63

This reflects a construction rate of 1 carrier every 5 years, 2 destroyers and 2 subs per year and 3 amphibious ships every 5 years, and retirement of several cruisers and subs.

Some thoughts. First, let’s not count ballistic missile submarines – that’s just a whole different story. We need them; just pray they’re never used. So, the adjusted total is 268 ships now, 296 in 2021. That leaves 208 combatants now, 233 combatants in 2021. Second, the LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) has been a disappointment. It’s (too) lightly-armed, and has proven to be delicate, easily sustaining damage. Perhaps they can be fixed. Meanwhile, if they’re omitted (as is likely if the US ever engaged in combat at sea), the numbers shrink to 197 combatants now and 192 in 2021. This isn’t to minimize the importance of logistics and support ships – such ships are vital. But it is to make the point that when people talk about our 300 ship Navy, they aren’t all ships bristling with guns and missiles.

But if we were to set a course ahead for building a bigger Navy, one 15 – 20% bigger (a 350 ship navy), could we afford it? The answer, of course, is yes.

First, we aren’t really talking about a great deal of money. Increasing destroyer and submarine production by 1 hull each per year works out to roughly $3 billion per year. Add additional weapons and training, etc., and it’s less than $4 billion per year, about 2/3rds of 1% of the DOD budget. Some budget adjustments would yield the maintenance money to extend the lives of the cruisers until the new hulls can take their place, and set the US on course for a 350-ship navy.

Second, despite the caterwauling, the US spends less on defense and security as percentage of our GDP now (currently less than 5% on all security spending (DOD, Intelligence, Homeland Security, etc.) then it did all through 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s and most of the 1990s. And this while still prosecuting several wars in the Middle East.

But there’s much more to it than simply dollars and cents. Mr. Trump has served notice to China and the world that the US is going to look after its interests first, not pursue ill-defined “global interests.” And simply put, defending US interests is always going to be affordable, no matter the price.