Okay, not
really.
But, there’s
been lots of talk about “military” vs. civilian control, with 3 retired
officers (3 civilians) selected for senior positions in the Trump
administration. Hmmm…
First: they’re
retired. They were in the military.
We’ve had retired military serve in government before; it’s never been a
problem. In fact, 60 years ago a guy on active duty occupied the Oval Office.
Eisenhower, a
5-star officer, was on permanent active duty. Interestingly, Eisenhower was
perhaps the most vocal critic of Pentagon ‘overreach,’ the man who coined the
term - as a warning - the ‘military-industrial complex.’
But there’s
another issue, and it’s central to any effort to improve efficiency and
effectiveness in the Department of Defense (DOD) – or the rest of government:
the Civil Service.
Some
history…
Prior to 1883
federal jobs weren’t protected. Every civilian employee could be fired at “the
pleasure of the President.” A “spoils” system developed, jobs turning over with
every president. But, the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act (1883) made
hiring, retention and promotion a merit based process.
The concept is
sound; the system functioned well throughout much of the last 100 years. But,
now there are problems, centered on two issues: First, the number of federal
civilian employees. In DOD alone there are 750,000 civilians. That compares to
1.3 million Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. In World War II there were
2.6 million civilians in the Departments (War plus Navy), compared to 13
million in uniform.
Since 1971 the
total federal civilian work force has outnumbered those in uniform. In 1999 the
civilian work force was double the number of military personnel, though the
number in uniform grew a bit after 2001. By 2014 we were back to 2 civilian
federal workers across the government per each Soldier, Sailor, Airman and
Marine.
What isn’t
apparent to those who’ve never dealt with it, inside the services these
civilians have a great deal of real power, much more than it might otherwise
appear. There are two reasons for this. First: those in uniform cycle in and
out on 2-3 year orders; ‘back to the fleet,’ as the Navy says. Because real
power in Washington is in budgets, and budget cycles are complex, multi-year
issues, if you’re present for 2-3 years and then you leave, you’re going to
have less impact on things then you might suspect.
The second issue
is bureaucratic. If a general finds a senior civilian who opposes certain
changes, and is passively resisting, the general’s ability to move around or
bypass that individual is less than you might think. In many cases it’s
effectively zero.
A friend of a
friend – a pilot, 2-star officer – is responsible for weapon system
acquisition. Despite titular authority service intentions are routinely
frustrated by careful and subtle stalling and manipulation by civilian
personnel who disagree with the general’s course. Knowing they can’t be fired,
and that, in a year or two, the general will be gone, they simply hang on, drag
their feet, and prevent change.
That
is the real civilian control of DOD. And it’s extremely expensive.
And it’s also
apparent that a majority of the civilian work force in Washington DC aren’t
supporters of Mr. Trump, and they will ‘slow-roll’ his appointees.
So, what can be
done?
1) Fundamentals
of civil service reform were, and are, overwhelmingly correct. Hiring and
promotion based on merit is the obviously correct answer. But…
2) The civil
work force is too large. While automation has made irrelevant many
administrative positions, the federal government, and DOD in particular,
abounds with large, complex staffs and huge administrative offices. If these
offices clearly provided increased efficiency and effectiveness in procurement
and management of DOD programs, they might be defended. But the opposite is
true.
Many offices
report things no one cares about, to people with no real authority. We need to
ID and eliminate billets, reports, processes and functions that benefit no
warfighting requirement. Where appropriate, move them out of Washington.
3) For SES and
GS-15s the law must be clarified: within the context of their job, a legal
order from a superior constitutes a legal requirement. Failure to conform is
therefore either an indication of incompetence, or willful disobedience. Either
should constitute grounds for dismissal.
Finally,
employment by the US government isn’t a right. The administration must work
with Congress to identify means to reduce the civilian force, identify and
remove personnel who’ve risen past their level of competence, and tightly focus
DOD on warfighting.
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