April 6th, 2026 Orthodox Easter April 12th

Passover ends April 9th

Politics - Nothing Significant

Combat Ops - Strikes on energy and oil - by both sides

- On the ground few changes

 

Weather

Kharkiv

65 and cloudy, gusting over 30. Tonight rain, possible rain showers daily all week. Temperatures fall tonight, daily lows all week will be in the mid 30s, daily highs in the mid 40s. Winds variable, 5kts.

Melitopol

66 and sunny, gusting to 30. Rain tonight, and rain showers on and off all week. Daily lows in the upper 30s, daily highs in the upper 40s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

48 and raining, gusting over 20. More rain tonight, Tuesday and Wednesday, ending Thursday morning (with some snow showers possible). Cloudy all week. Daily lows in the mid to upper 30s, daily highs in the low 40s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.

Politics

The Ukrainian proposed Easter ceasefire (Orthodox Easter) is still being offered but at this point there seems little reason to believe one will occur.

Negotiations remain in limbo.

Combat Operations 

On the ground there continues to be a good deal of grind but not a great deal of change. Both sides posted marginal gains, with Ukrainian forces noting small gains north of Kharkiv and in the Pokrovsk area, Russian forces posting some gains south-west of Hulyaipole.

But, in all cases gains are mostly small elements probing into the enemy lines, and on occasion infiltrating behind enemy lines and seizing a small piece of terrain. And, a good deal of the changes are “see-saw” gains, one side taking a piece of terrain and holding it for a few days, then getting pushed off. 

The Ukrainian counter-offensive between the Vovcha River and Hulyaipole seems to have slowed to a crawl and Ukrainian forces still have not reached (never mind pressing through) the Russian defensive line. That line, which was a Ukrainian defensive line at one point, has been further strengthened by the Russians and it would seem the Ukrainian army does not, at this point, have the ability to penetrate it.

Russian forces continue to simply grind, and continue to push recon probes into Ukrainian held territory. Ukrainian forces also send probes into Russian held terrain, but the numbers are fewer. But in both cases, these forces move into forward positions, often the basements of bombed-out buildings, and continue to hold on. There remains a Russian element inside Kupyansk - apparently in the basement of the bombed out hospital, and they may have been there since mid-December, resupplied by drones, and there appears to be a Ukrainian element inside eastern Pokrovsk.

As far as the Russian Spring Offensive, several commentators continue to insist it began in March, but given the fairly sparse reporting on unit movements, that is hard to prove. Several Russian units (brigades and regiments) have been moved off of sections of the front and moved to the rear, presumably to be reconstituted and sent forward again, but I have only seen one or two definitive reports of new or reconstituted Russian units moved forward, and the total forces moved perhaps on the order of a half dozen brigades.

So, is there a new Russian offensive underway? I’m still not certain, despite what others are saying. I do get the sense that some people, on both sides, want to say an offensive is underway.

Of the pieces of terrain that were taken by either side, the one of note is that the Russians appear to have taken Pryvillia a small village (pre war population of less than 150), about 10 miles due east of Kramatorsk, about 12 miles south-east of Slovyansk, along the M03 roadway. This simply puts Russian drones and artillery in tactical range of Kramatorsk.

Air and Maritime Operations

Over the past three days Russian forces launched some 520 x strike drones into Ukrainian airspace the UAF claimed that it defeated, either by hard kill or EW, 434 of those drones. 

Strikes took place across much of Ukraine, and targets against were centers on the power grid. As of this morning nearly 400,000 people were without power in Chernihiv, nearly 17,000 houses were without power in Odessa, and as I write this there was an emergency shutdown of power in Kyiv.

Russian Air Force also continued to keep up the apace with glide bombs, and they have been maintaining an average of close to 50 glide bomb strikes per day, across a dozen or more towns.

Russian drones also struck the Naftogaz facility in Poltava on the 4th and 5th. Naftogaz is a state run corporation and Ukraine’s larges oil and natural gas company, and a fire was reported at the site. 

At the same time, Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian oil infrastructure, as well as the power grid in occupied Ukraine.

Last night Ukrainian forces struck the oil terminal in Novorossiysk and the facility was still burning this morning, though there is no independent assessment of the extent of damage.

Strikes on oil and gas facilities make for dramatic photographs but these sites are very tough and repairs will follow as operators learn how to take care of them. As an example, Russian forces have conducted 401 attacks on Naftogaz assets since the war began, 229 in 2025, and 40 since the beginning of the year.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Nov7 Dec8 Jan8 Feb9 Mar9 Apr1 Apr6

Brent      94.71   63.86 62.94 61.26 68.57 106.40 102.50 108.80

WTI     92.10   59.94 59.26 57.10 64.04 103.60 99.31 110.60

NG       3.97      4.33 4.96 3.41 3.20 3.37 2.87 2.84

Wheat      8.52  5.32 5.38 5.22 5.29 6.25 6.06 5.94

Ruble     85          80.95 76.52 80.35 77.40 78.20 80.60 78.88

Hryvnia 28.6 41.89 42.15 43.10 43.03 43.93 43.86 43.52

Urals 91.66 56.56 54.92 50.40 56.37 90.97 123.45 121.17

ESPO 94.52 65.18 61.95 52.28 59.77 84.99 111.97 117.03

Sokol 99.31 60.71 60.62 55.57 62.85 101.55 114.29 105.70

Of interest, Jet A fuel prices in Europe are up 11% in the last week, with some 40% of Europe’s Jet A coming from the Mid East.

Thoughts

There is anecdotal reporting of increased Russian attacks both west of Hulyaipole and along the edges of the Ukrainian counter offensive further north, and this is being cast as part of the Russian spring offensive.  But this has not been confirmed.

The key development here appears to be - led by the Ukrainians but with the Russians in close “trail,” the improvement in drone techniques. Ukrainian forces are flying more FPV drones (“First Person Video”) and they are flying them a little bit deeper, effectively turning them into “smart artillery.” The result is everything slows; the Russians continue to conduct recon and probes - all by small elements (normally 3 - 5 troops, who often meet up and form squad (about 10 men) to slightly larger elements (rarely above about 20 troops). But the presence of the drones and improved techniques has made movement for difficult and accordingly very slow.

The Russians were doing this very thing before the Ukrainians, basically all of 2025, because of the very effective command and control (C2) that they had developed using Starlink. Starlink was denied them as of February 1st and they are now only beginning to regain that level of sophisticated C2. While using Starlink, Russian interdiction was clearly more effective than the Ukrainian interdiction; not a great deal, but enough that it was noticeable. Ukrainian forces, who learned by copying the Russians, currently have the edge in this area and it has made Russian movements more difficult. 

The Russians are now working on ways to replicate the C2 they lost in February. It’s likely that they will find a means to do so - either through their own means or with Beijing’s help. Whether that will jump-start the Russian ground operations remains to be seen.

v/r pete