June 3rd, 2025 1942 - Japanese forces attack Aleutians, start of

Operation Mi (the IJN attack on Midway Island

Politics - Russian Memorandum of Conditions

Combat Ops - Russian forces gain ground in Sumy Oblast

- Russian forces gain ground west of Toretsk 

Special Operations - Kerch Bridge Attacked

Weather

Kharkiv

86 and partly sunny, gusts near 20. Thunderstorms Wednesday morning, then several days of mostly sunny weather. Daily lows around 60, daily highs upper 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

815and sunny. Partly cloudy on Wednesday with afternoon thunderstorms, rest of the week mostly sunny. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

64 and cloudy, gusting to 30. Rain tonight, clearing by morning, Wednesday and Thursday sunny, then more thunderstorms. Daily lows in the upper 50s, daily highs near 80. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics and Diplomacy

As noted yesterday, Ukraine had already provided Russia with its memorandum of minimum conditions for negotiations, while Russia waited until yesterday to present their memorandum. The below is being passed around and is reportedly the Russian memorandum, though there continues to be some confusion and it has not yet received any sort of official imprimatur.

MinDef Umerov, who headed the Ukrainian delegation, said that the Ukrainian government would study the document and get and respond within a week. The Ukrainian team has proposed the next round of talks take place between June 20th and June 30th.

The key points of the Russian Memorandum are:

• Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporozhzhia internationally recognized as Russian 
• Ukraine doesn’t join NATO or any military bloc 
• Ukraine holds Elections 
• Ukraine withdraws troops from new Russian regions 
• Ukraine bans “Nazi” propaganda

Draft as of June 1, 2025

Proposals of the Russian Federation (Memorandum)

on the Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis

Section I

Key Parameters for a Definitive Settlement

1. International legal recognition of the incorporation into the Russian Federation of Crimea, the LPR, the DPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions; full withdrawal from these territories of Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) units and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations;
2. Neutrality of Ukraine, implying its refusal to join military alliances and coalitions, as well as a ban on any military activity by third-party states on Ukrainian territory and the deployment of foreign armed formations, military bases and military infrastructure there;
3. Termination of all existing international treaties and agreements inconsistent with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Section, and refusal to conclude any such agreements in the future;
4. Confirmation of Ukraine's status as a state without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, with a direct ban on their receipt, transit and deployment on Ukrainian territory;
5. Establishment of maximum limits for the size of the AFU and other Ukrainian military formations, the quantity of armaments and military equipment, and their permissible specifications; dissolution of Ukrainian nationalist formations within the AFU and National Guard;
6. Guarantees of the full rights, freedoms and interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking population; granting the Russian language official status;
7. Legislative prohibition of the glorification and propaganda of Nazism and neo-Nazism, dissolution of nationalist organizations and parties;
8. Lifting of all current economic sanctions, bans and restrictive measures between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and refusal to impose new ones;
9. Resolution of issues related to family reunification and displaced persons;
10. Waiver of mutual claims for damages incurred during hostilities;
11. Removal of restrictions imposed on the Orthodox Church of Ukraine;
12. Gradual restoration of diplomatic and economic relations (including gas transit), transport and other connections, including with third-party states.

Section II

Ceasefire Conditions

Option 1.

Commencement of complete withdrawal of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations from the territory of the Russian Federation, including the DPR, LPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, and their pullback from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties, in accordance with Provisions to be approved.

Option 2. "Package Proposal":

1. Prohibition on redeployment of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations, except for movements aimed at withdrawal from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties;
2. Cessation of mobilization and commencement of demobilization;
3. Cessation of foreign supplies of military products and foreign military assistance to Ukraine, including the provision of satellite communication services and intelligence data;
4. Elimination of military presence of third countries on Ukrainian territory, cessation of participation of foreign specialists in military operations on Ukraine's side;
5. Guarantees of Ukraine's renunciation of sabotage and subversive activities against the Russian Federation and its citizens;
6. Establishment of a bilateral Center for Monitoring and Control of the Ceasefire Regime;
7. Mutual amnesty for "political prisoners" and release of detained civilians;
8. Lifting of martial law in Ukraine;
9. Announcement of the date for elections of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;
10. Signing of an Agreement on the implementation of provisions contained in Section I.

Section III

Sequence of Steps and Timeline for Implementation

1. Work commences on drafting the Treaty text;
2. A 2-3 day ceasefire is declared for collection of bodies of the fallen in the "gray zone";
3. Six thousand bodies of AFU servicemen are unilaterally transferred to the AFU;
4. A Ceasefire Memorandum is signed with specific dates for fulfillment of all provisions, determining the date for signing the future Treaty on Final Settlement (hereinafter, the Treaty);
5. A 30-day ceasefire regime takes effect from the moment the AFU withdrawal begins. Complete withdrawal of AFU units from the territory of the Russian Federation and full implementation of the
   "package agreement" must be completed within these 30 days;
6. Elections are conducted and government bodies are formed on the territory of Ukraine;
7. The Treaty is signed;
8. The signed Treaty is endorsed by a legally binding UN Security Council resolution;
9. The Treaty is ratified, enforced, and implemented.

Ground Operations 

The most important fighting continues in the border region of Sumy Oblast, and in the pocket between Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk; President Zelenskyy commented that 125,000 Russian troops are now massed along the border in this area; there is no confirmation of this comment.

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLAST

Fighting continues in an arc north of Sumy city, an arc a bit more than 30 miles in length and from perhaps 4 to 10 miles wide. Recent imagery shows activity in the vicinity of Andriivka, due north of Sumy City, and reporting suggests Russian forces have also recently occupied Oleksiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Kindrativka, and moved into the area west of Yablunivka and Kostyantynivka.

Fighting also continued north-west of Sumy city in the vicinity of Tetkino but there were no changes in the lines in this area.

Anecdotal reporting suggests that Russian forces near Tetkino are having some difficulties getting enough supplies as a result of the two small rail road bridges (one in Bryansk Oblast, one in Kursk Oblast), that were dropped by Ukrainian Special Services personnel over the weekend.

There was no change in the front line with the forces located on the border with Belgorod Oblast, or with the units due north of Kharkiv city.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues along the length of the line of contact, but with the only confirmed changes west of Terny, where Russian forces gained ground in Karpivka, in a thrust west from Nove. Karpivka is a small town of about 400, sitting on either side of a reservoir formed by the Nitrius River, and sits about 8 miles from the Oskil River. Russian forces probably also made gains pushing north-west from Ridokub.

BAKHMUT AND THE RUSSIAN CENTER

There were no confirmed changes in the front lines north and north-east of Bakhmut, though there is a good deal of activity east of Siversk, in the area of Verkhnokamianka, and some unconfirmed reports suggest the Russians are concentrating forces in this area.

West of Bakhmut - south of Chasiv Yar, Russian forces were engaged with Ukrainian forces about 1 miles north of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar about 4 miles). As Russian forces were confirmed yesterday to have pushed north into the Dyliivka area (south of Bila Hora), and are pushing west from the Kurdiumivka area, it appears that the Russians are trying to close up the pocket between Toretsk, Chasiv Yar and the Donets Canal.

Around Toretsk, fighting continues north of that town but with no confirmed changes in that immediate area, though fighting was reported on the edge of Pleshchiivka, west-north-west of Toretsk. In the pocket between Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk, west of Toretsk, Russian forces made small gains, moving one or two tree lines at several points in the pocket, pushing north from Romanivka, and west (near the roadway) into the western edge of Yablunivka.

Fighting continues around Pokrovsk, as well, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting engagements in or near 13 different towns in this general area.

South of the Pokrovsk area, along the Vovcha River, there were no confirmed changes.

Further south, along the Novopil - Vesele line, Russian forces picked up ground west of Novopil, pushing to the southern edge of Ternyrivka, as well as pushing into the terrain to the south and south-west of that town.

There were no reported changes to the line across southern Ukraine.

Air Operations

During the night of  June 2nd-June 3rd Russian forces launched 112 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 60 drones, and 15 were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa and Zaporizhzhia Oblast but reports are not complete.

RuAF tacair struck 15 Ukrainian towns last night.

During the night of  June 1st-June 2nd Russian forces launched 3 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 1x Kh-101 cruise missile, and 84 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 15 drones, and 37 were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast but reports are not complete.

RuAF tacair struck 14 Ukrainian towns last night.

UAF reporting notes that Russian “smart glide bombs” (UDMK: УМПК; Унифицированный модуль планирования и коррекции, Unified gliding and correction module, informal referred to as JDAMski, and roughly equivalent to the US JDAM-ER (extended range)) continues to be modified and a new extended range weapon (UDMK-PD); previous range estimates were 60 - 80 KM (37 - 49 miles), but the extended range weapon is now estimated to have an effective range of 95 km (59 miles)

Special Operations

Operation Spider’s Web Damage Assessment

The below is from open-source assessment of commercial imagery and will take several days to settle to final numbers (weather, availability of satellites (orbits and other tasking, etc.)) all playing a roll in the final evaluation.

Open-source analysts on X assessed from available imagery published on June 2:

- Belaya Air Base, Irkutsk Oblast: 4 x Tu-95 bombers and 3 x Tu-22M3 bombers destroyed or damaged

- Ivanovo Air Base, Ivanovo Oblast: 1 x A-50 airborne early warning aircraft

- Olenya Air Base, Murmansk Oblast: 4 x Tu-95 bombers and 1 x An-22 transport 

Also, a correction from yesterday: the correct numbers on cruise missile launches and effectiveness by Russian bombers: Since the war began Russian bombers have launched 2,437 cruise missiles (mostly targeted at the power grid and port infrastructure) and the UAF has shot down 1,916 (79% loss rate, a 21% success rate). Yesterday I commented that less than half got through; in fact, less than 1 in 4 got through.

Explosions were reported in Kerch during the night; This morning the Secruty Services of Ukraine claimed that an 1100 KG charge (2428lbs) was placed underwater near a support for the Kerch bridge and detonated. Russian authorities are now examine the bridge, and the bridge is temporarily closed.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jan8 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 Jun2 Jun3

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      76.69 74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 65.33 65.28

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      73.94 71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 63.43 63.31

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15      3.66 3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.68 3.69

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17      5.37 5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.45 5.40

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    105.18 96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 78.93 78.86

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 42.33 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.68 41.54

Urals 56.56    71.76 68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 57.16 57.16

ESPO 78.19 N/A 71.50 70 48.90 63.15 63.23

Sokol 72.79 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 59.15 59.92

OPEC+ decide over the weekend to increase total production by 411,000 barrels per day in July, the 3rd increase in a row. However, as the market expected a larger increase, oil prices rose on the news of increased production.

Thoughts 

There is a school of thought, with a lot of bright people in it, that says that Putin will consider his losses so far, and particularly what happened over the weekend and the loss of the bombers, and, in light of hints of substantially greater sanctions, will turn to President Trump and accept the deal offered earlier.

This is certainly a possibility. 

As it now stands, nothing has changed in day-to-day operations and Russian forces on the ground - as has been noted before, carry on, oblivious to any other developments around them: political, economic, naval, or aerial.

If Putin is to take this event as an “inflection point,” as some have called it, then I would think he would need to sell it to Russians as an epiphany. Failing that, if he continues, he is likely to try to make it “worth it.” In effect, it would seem that - if he continues - he has accepted the “sunk cost” perspective, at which point, no cost is too high.

But that would seem to be a choice only Putin can make.

v/r pete        

 June 2nd, 2025

Politics - Meeting In Istanbul - Ukrainian Memorandum

Combat Ops - Operations Spider’s Web

Weather

Kharkiv

79 and sunny. Cloudy, thunderstorms Tuesday and Wednesday, then several days of mostly sunny wether. Daily lows around 60, daily highs upper 70s. Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

81 and sunny. Rain and thunderstorms on Wednesday, rest of the week mostly sunny. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

78 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Rain tonight, rain and thunderstorms tomorrow, then partly cloudy until Thursday night, then more thunderstorms. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the upper 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Politics and Diplomacy

In Istanbul, the talks concluded by 0900 EDT, lasting just about an hour. The only developments appear to be the Ukraine delegation handing the Russian a list of the names of missing children and the Russian handing the Ukrainians a memorandum listing minimum agreements and the plan for negations. Ukraine had already provide their memorandum to Russia; the Ukrainian memorandum is provide in full below.

The Turkish ForMin spokesman noted that the talks: “didn’t end negatively.”

The Ukrainian Memorandum:

Key principles of the agreement and the negotiation process

→ A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary prerequisite for peace negotiations.

→ Confidence-building measures – resolution of humanitarian issues: unconditional return of all deported and illegally displaced Ukrainian children. Exchange of all prisoners on an "all for all" basis. Release by Russia of all civilian hostages.

→ Non-recurrence of aggression : The goal of the negotiations is to restore a permanent basis for lasting peace and security and to ensure that aggression does not recur.

→ Security guarantees and involvement of the international community:Ukraine must receive reliable security guarantees. The parties will invite the international community to participate in the negotiations and provide guarantees to ensure the implementation of the agreements.

→ Sovereignty: Ukraine does not undertake obligations to be neutral. The state can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Kyiv’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance. No restrictions can be placed on the size, deployment, or other parameters of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, as well as on the deployment of troops of foreign friendly states on the territory of Ukraine.

→ Territorial issues: territorial gains made by the Russian Federation since February 2014 are not recognized by the international community. The contact line is the starting point for negotiations. Territorial issues are discussed only after a complete and unconditional ceasefire.

→ Sanctions: Some restrictions may be lifted on Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for reimposing sanctions if necessary. Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used to rebuild Ukraine or remain frozen until reparations are paid.

→ Agreement implementation: a clear, balanced and achievable "roadmap" for implementing and enforcing agreements.

The next step is to agree on a ceasefire and the agenda for the leaders' meeting.

→ after the meeting in Istanbul, the parties will continue negotiations, which will focus on a complete and unconditional ceasefire: its conditions and monitoring;

→ confidence-building measures;

→ preparing and agreeing on the agenda for future leaders' talks on key issues;

→ negotiations will be held with the participation of the USA and Europe.

Cease-fire

→ a complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea for at least 30 days (with the possibility of extension every 30 days) as a necessary prerequisite for peace negotiations;

→ monitoring of the ceasefire, led by the US and supported by third countries.

Confidence-building measures

→ after the successful exchange of prisoners of war as a result of the negotiations in Istanbul, the parties continue the process of exchanging all prisoners of war (the principle of "all for all").

→ an agreement on the unconditional return by the Russian Federation of all deported and displaced Ukrainian children, as well as the release of all civilian prisoners. These measures should apply to all categories of persons listed, starting from February 2014.

Leaders' meeting

The leaders of Ukraine and Russia will meet to agree on key aspects of a final peace settlement.

Key issues of the peace agreement that must be agreed upon by the leaders:

→ permanent and complete cessation of hostilities: conditions, monitoring, sanctions for violations;

→ guarantees of security and non-repetition of aggression;

→ territorial issues;

→ economy, compensation, restoration of Ukraine;

→ sanctions for violating the peace agreement;

→ procedure for concluding a final peace agreement.

Combat Operations

Due to the extent of air operations over the last several days I will focus on those actions.

Ground Operations 

The war continued on the ground over the weekend, across the entire front line, with fighting described as fierce. Russian forces made some gains north of Sumy City as they continue to try to carve out a buffer zone, and it appears that Russian forces now control the town of Kostyantynivka (due north of Sumy City) and terrain immediately south of the town, as well as the town of Oleksiivka (about 4 miles south-east of Kostyantynivka).

Russian forces also gained ground both north of Toretsk - taking control of the small village (perhaps 20 houses) of Dyliivka (about 2 miles due north of Toretsk, sitting astride the rail line from Horlivka to Kostyantynivka).

South and west of Toretsk Russian forces also made gains as they continue to slowly push north-west from Toretsk, and also continue to push lowly northward along the H-20 and T0504 roadways. There are conflicting claims as to whether the Russians made any gains in these area. Imagery confirms that they have taken the small town of Zorya - just west of Romanivka, and probably have control of parts of Popiv Yar, just west of the T0504 roadway. How far they have pushed up the H-20 isn’t clear but there was some fighting reported in the Yablunivka area. 

Elsewhere across the southern and eastern front fighting continued but there were no significant developments.

Air Operations

During the night of  June 1st-June 2nd Russian forces launched 3 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 84 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 15 drones, and 37 were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast but reports are not complete.

RuAF tacair struck 14 Ukrainian towns last night.

During the night of  May 31st-June 1st Russian forces launched 3 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 4 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 472 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot 3 cruise missiles, shot down 213 drones, and 172 drones were lost (defeated by EW). Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odessa, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. This is the largest drone strike of the war.

Of note, none of the ballistic missiles were successfully engaged and the UAF states that they are running low on PATRIOT missiles.

During the night of  May 30th-31st Russian forces launched 3 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, 2 x S-300 ballistic missiles, 2 x Jet-powered drones, and 107 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down the 3 cruise missiles and 42 drones, and 30 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Cherkasy, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.

During the night of  May 29th-30th Russian forces launched 2 Iskander ballistic missiles and 92 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down  26 drones, and 30 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odessa, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

RuAF assets conducted air strikes on 16 towns across the front.

Russian air defense forces claimed to have shot down 162 Ukrainian drones last night but did not report how many were believed launched into Russian air space nor were there any reports of damage.

During the night of June 1st - June 2nd - and airfield in Borisoglebsk (300 miles south-south-east of Moscow) was attacked by “a large number of drones."

Operation Spider’s Web

The Ukrainian Special Services struck 4 Russian bomber bases Sunday: Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. Ukrainian Special Services claimed the strikes damaged or destroyed 41 aircraft, a mix of TU-95 Bear and TU-22M Backfire aircraft as well as 1 A-50 Mainstay Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. Ukrainian Special Services reported that 117 drones were used in the operation (named "Operation Spider’s Web”), loaded into sealed crates and driven to the designated launch areas near the Russian AF bases by unwitting drivers, who were instructed to simply park the vehicles and wait. The crates were then remotely opened and the drones launched.

The results of the strike have not been confirmed.

The Ukrainian operatives reportedly had all left Russia by the time the attack took place on Sunday. 

Russia had, as of Sunday morning, 55 x TU-95 Bears, 56 x TU-22M Backfires, and just 5 x A-50 Mainstay. Russia also has 17 x TU-160 Blackjack bombers, for a total bomber force of 128 aircraft. Obviously the loss of 40 aircraft (more than 30% of your force) would be a serious blow to the Russian AF.

For nuclear accounting purposes, 52 x Bears and 15 x Blackjacks are listed as Russia’s nuclear strategic bomber force.

Imagery of Belaya Airfield showed 4 x TU-22 Backfires and 3 x TU-95 Bears “probably destroyed” and 1 x TU-95 damaged. Other analysis brings the total as I write this to: 8 x TU-95s, 4 x TU-22Ms and one An-12 have been destroyed or damaged; expect those numbers to change as the day progresses.

It is important to note the the loss of these aircraft, while a blow to Russian long range strike capabilities will have little impact on the war as a whole, and virtually none on the war on the ground. Over the entire course of the war (3 years and 3 months), the Russians have launched about 2,500 cruise missiles of various types, perhaps half of them launched by their bombers. In 2024 bombers launched 920 of nearly 1800 cruise missiles. Overall, Ukrainian Air Force personnel have noted a drop in cruise missile use over the last several months as the Shahed drones have increased in lethality, while remaining far less expensive than the cruise missiles. In addition, the UAF has been quite successful in engaging and defeating Russian cruise missiles, using both surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles, as well as electronic warfare, and on any given night fewer than half of the cruise missiles reach their targets and often lately none reach their targets.

Thus, the loss of the long-range bombers is unlikely to have a major impact on Russian targeting decisions on a daily basis. Further, the Russian bomber-launched cruise missiles have had virtually no impact on the battlefield, and have mainly (though not exclusively) been directed at infrastructure targets: the power grid and ports.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jan8 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 May30 Jun2

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      76.69 74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 63.89 65.33

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      73.94 71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 60.67 63.43

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15      3.66 3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.53 3.68

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17      5.37 5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.33 5.45

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    105.18 96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 79.13 78.93

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 42.33 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.57 41.68

Urals 56.56    71.76 68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 57.95 57.16

ESPO 78.19 N/A 71.50 70 48.90 63.15 63.15

Sokol 72.79 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 58.66 59.15

Thoughts 

The strikes on the airfields - the destruction of Russian strategic weapon systems - represents the start of a new phase of the war, directly impacting Russia’s great power status and representing a clear loss of face for not simply Putin, his regime, and the Russian military, but for Russia itself. 

It would seem that Putin has only a few options here and they are obvious: 

- Putin can attempt to ignore it and carry on, business as usual. That will be difficult to do, but will, at least in part, depend upon the actual BDA from the strike: a handful of aircraft lost and another handful damaged is one issue, the loss of 40 bombers out of a force of 128 is quite another. If Ukraine uses the fact of the strike to try to pressure Putin, Putin will probably find that he must respond.

- Putin could use this as an epiphany and sue for peace. It is unlikely, and would probably get 1 : 1000 odds in Vegas, but it is a possibility.

- Putin can deliver an ultimatum - publicly or privately - and wait a certain period of time and then respond - my guess is that this is the most likely course.

- He could say nothing but simply respond - this is unlikely - the Russian people will expect an explanation and Putin has to give one to spin a tale as to why he is not to blame.

Assuming he delivers an explanation and ultimatum, what is Putin then likely to do? He really has only a limited range of military options:

- Do more, without really changing anything, this is what he wants, but simply insisting that everybody “work harder” won’t mean much if he can’t actually expend more ammunition.

- Mobilization, put Russia on a war footing and use the entire army to fight the war - which might be necessary but would result in a very slow response, would further hurt the economy, and leave a large slice of the population frustrated.

- More missile strikes, specifically, ballistic missile strikes - but it isn’t clear that the Russians have more than the perhaps 500 tactical (conventionally armed) ballistic missiles so this would be unpleasant but would not materially affect Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war, unless the Russians were to focus on some specific targets, such as the bridges over the Dnepr. Whether they have enough missiles, given accuracy + reliability + warhead size, to destroy all or most of the bridges would be a key issue.

- Tactical nuclear weapons, which certainly could, for example, destroy all the bridges and leave eastern Ukraine separate from western Ukraine.

All in all, Putin’s choice will depend on the actual BDA to a lesser extent, and to a greater extent what others are saying: what did the Ukrainians say in private today in Istanbul, and what did the White House (the President, SecState, the various Ambassadors) say via phone or face to face. There’s also a question as to whether President Xi would add his voice to the mix, perhaps cautioning Putin to not use nuclear weapons as it would raise that issue in Xi’s calculus vis-a-vis Taiwan and the US response.

Of course, if the Ukrainians told the Russian negotiators that they can expect more of the same unless there is a ceasefire, I would think there is a distinct chance that Putin will very seriously consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

As I was told by an old Navy F-4 guy many years ago, when you drop bombs on people you piss them off.

I think we can expect President Putin to be pissed off. Just how much is the question now.

v/r pete   

 The Russo-Ukraine War: 

A New Phase

June 1st, 2025

It is a good bet that we are about to enter a new phase of the Russian - Ukraine war, that the war is going to escalate in some way. If you took the day off from the news, you may have missed what happened in Russia yesterday: Ukrainian special operations personnel conducted a quite imaginative strike on 4 different Russian Air Force bomber bases, one of them in central Siberia, and released video of several TU-95 Bears being destroyed.

The Ukrainians claim 40 aircraft were destroyed, a mix of Bear and Backfire bombers, as well as 1 x A-50 Mainstay, an AWACS-like aircraft. So far (I am writing this around noon on Sunday) 2 x TU-95 Bears have been confirmed as destroyed, 5 x Bears and 2 x TU-22 Backfires damages, and 1 x AN-12 destroyed; expect those numbers to change as the afternoon progresses.

The question is: what will this mean?

From a simple, tactical perspective, not much. Over the entire course of the war (3 years and 3 months), the Russians have launched about 2,500 cruise missiles of various types, perhaps half of them launched by their bombers. In 2024 bombers launched 920 of nearly 1800 cruise missiles. Overall, Ukrainian Air Force personnel have noted a drop in cruise missile use over the last several months as the Shahed drones have increased in lethality, while remaining far less expensive than the cruise missiles. In addition, the UAF has been quite successful in engaging and defeating Russian cruise missiles, using both surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles, as well as electronic warfare, and on any given night fewer than half of the cruise missiles reach their targets and often lately none reach their targets.

Thus, the loss of the long-range bombers is unlikely to have a major impact on Russian targeting decisions on a daily basis. Further, the Russian bomber-launched cruise missiles have had virtually no impact on the battlefield, and have mainly (though not exclusively) been directed at infrastructure targets: the power grid and ports.

The question is what effect this will have in Moscow and Kyiv.

In Kyiv the obvious impact will be on morale, this is an obvious morale boost.  It’s worth noting, however, that there’ve been few instances in history where nations have sought peace after being bombed, at least not until a great deal of damage has been done.  Rather, they usually “dig in.” And, as just noted above, it’s hard to see how this will affect the fight on the ground in any way.

In Moscow the question will be contingent on the actual amount of damage. If the losses are as listed above: 3 aircraft destroyed, and 7 damaged, then there may be no response. Russia’s bomber force is not huge: 55 x TU95 Bears, 56 x TU-22 Backfires, 17 x TU-160 Blackjacks. 128 total bombers, but even so, a loss of 2 and damage to 7 would be irritating but no more, and so that might - might - not draw a response.

But, if the numbers climb into the region claimed by Ukraine: 40 total bombers struck, and in particular the fact that one bomber base was several thousand miles from Ukraine, this will be perceived as a strike against Russia itself. It will not take a great deal of imagination, and a touch of propaganda, to suggest that the next strike might destroy St. Basil’s in the Kremlin. Russian spokesmen will invoke Rodina, and there will be every effort to stoke patriotic fervor.

The question that begs to be answered is: What are Putin’s options?

Remembering that negotiators from both sides are scheduled to meet tomorrow in Istanbul, Putin can choose to ignore this. And Kyiv could privately make the point that there is more in store for Russia if they don’t agree to a ceasefire. 

On the other hand, Putin could perceive this as a direct threat to his rule and, from his perspective, a threat to Russia, and therefore choose to escalate.

Escalation, of course, won’t mean much in terms of the Russian Air Force. The bomber force has been of little impact in the war (not to be confused with tactical aviation which has been quite effective, especially when using the JDAM-ER like FAB 500 and FAB 1500 bombs).

But Putin still has the option to mobilize, go to a war footing, and commit the bulk of the army, to include conscripts, to the war in Ukraine. Will that ameliorate those in Russia who insist on smashing Ukraine? Probably not, but it might be an interim step.

Might he consider a nuclear response? Certainly he will consider it. What no one knows - except Vlad Putin, is what is his real threshold for use. If he is convinced - or convinces himself - that the next attack will be either another attempt to kill him - and more likely to succeed as Ukrainian tactics improve, or to perhaps destroy St Basil’s and the Kremlin, it is possible he will consider the use of a low yield nuclear weapon (or two or three) in order to force a “reset.”

If he does, what should be the US response? And what does that mean for Taiwan ? And South Korea?And Japan?

What is important is to note that this attack is of high enough visibility that the visibility alone demands some response, which will presumably either be to now seek a ceasefire, or to escalate. If Putin is going to seek a ceasefire in the wake of this attack it would be very interesting, and more or less a first in the history of “air strikes." It would also mean running the risk of being deposed by those around him. It is more likely he will escalate; the question is: How?