June 27th, 2024

Overall 

Ground Operations - Marginal Russian gains continue

Air Operations - some strikes 

Politics - Rutte as next NATO SecGen

US Attache in Kiev found dead - no foul play

Weather

Kharkiv

76 and partly cloudy. Sunny for the next 4 days, lows near 60, highs in the mid 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

81 and partly cloudy, gusts near 20. Sunny for the next 4 days, lows in the lower 60s, highs near 90. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

83 and sunny, gusts over 20. Sunny for the next 4 days, lows in the low 60s, highs in the upper 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations 

Overall there has been little substantive change in the picture on the ground. 

North of Kharkiv

Fighting continued north of Kharkiv in the small border towns north and north-east of the city. There has been little movement in the last 2 weeks, and no appreciable change in terrain held in that period. Russian forces still control central and western Volchansk, Ukrainian forces hold eastern Volchansk, fighting continues at the center of the town in the industrial facility.. 

Russian AF assets dropped 11 x FAB 500s on Lyptsi yesterday and there was fighting on several sides of that town, but overall there is little change in terrain held from 2 weeks ago.

However, Russian force presence in the area remains at 4 regiments / brigades and a couple of attached battalions, Ukrainian forces have increased over the last 2 weeks to include  12 x brigades in the area of the Russian incursions, as well as an additional 7 brigades in the area of Sumy. If this was an effort to tie up a part of the Ukrainian army, it succeeded.

Russian air strikes in support of these operations continue, to include multiple RuAF airstrikes and an increase (numbers not available) in attack helicopter activity.

Donets River

Russian forces have continued to grind out small gains along the line over the past two weeks. Of note, Russian forces east of Kupyansk appear to have to overrun a tunnel and bunker structure just east of Synkivka, north-east of Petropavlivka, in the last few days. If accurate, this would allow them to hold onto the terrain immediately north of the bunker and thereby establish better fire control of the east-west road and logistics line in that area.

Further south Russian forces entered the small town of Stelmakhivka, north-west of Svatove, a town on the Zherebets river, which remains a a key tactical objective of the Russian operations north of the Donets River.

 Bakhmut

Russian forces continued small unit infantry attacks across the Bakhmut area and have managed to make marginal gains in the last 2 weeks. Anecdotal reporting suggests that Ukrainian units are tied down and having difficulty rotating to the rear. 

Pro Russian sources report Russian units are clearing buildings in Spirne, suggesting they control that town, but this has not been confirmed.

Fighting continues on the east edge of Chasiv Yar, but Russian forces have not been able to reach and cross the canal.

South of Bakhmut, Russian forces appear to control most if not all of the high ground just west of Klishchivka, but Ukrainian forces continue to hold just west of the town.

Fighting was also reported west of Horlivka, and Russian forces appear to now hold terrain north and south of the town of Shumy, and have advanced near Pivdenne.

Donetsk City

Fighting west of and north-west of Avdiivka shows little change, most significant being further slow grind forward by Russian forces on both sides of the Karlivka reservoir, and slow expansion of the terrain held by the Russians north and immediately north-west of Umanske.

Velyka Novosilka (VN) and Orokhiv 

South of VN Russian forces pushed north from Staromaiorske for marginal gains, and continue to slowly grind into the middle of Urozhaine.

Dnepr River

Ukrainian forces conținue to hold a position in Krynky, Russian forces continue to attack, attrit them, and the Ukrainian forces replace their loses.

Air Operations

Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike against both the Kiev area and southern Ukraine. No count has emerged yet of the total number launched or the number intercepted. Russian sources claimed the strikes were focused primarily on airfields, and included at least 2 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles.

Russian forces did launch an Iskander - M ballistic missile and a Kh-59 cruise missile into southern Ukraine, with the ballistic missile striking a facility in the Odessa area.

Politics and Diplomacy

Ukraine has signed a security agreement with the EU which will provide 5 billion Euros ($5.4 billion) in military assistance to Ukraine through the end of 2024, and further money in 2025.

Aid will include 1 million rounds of 155MM howitzer ammunition, as well as air defense assets.

North Korea is reportedly sending at least one construction brigade from its army to assist in reconstruction in Donetsk oblast. South Korean TV reported that North Korea may send as many as 4 of its 10 construction brigades to assisting the rebuilding.

There is no confirmation of this report.

Ukraine Pravda reported, and it was later confirmed by the US Embassy, that a US diplomat had been found dead in the Hilton Hotel in Kiev.

Other sources later reported that the deceased was on the Defense Attache staff.

His death is being attributed to natural causes.

Former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte was formally selected as the next Secretary General of NATO. He will officially relieve Jens Stoltenberg on 01 October.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Sep8 Feb8 Apr8 Jun7 Jun14 Jun27

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      90.95   80.93 90.13 80.06 82.86 85.60

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      87.77   75.49 86.13 75.81 78.60 81.22

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15        2.63       1.95 1.83 2.82 2.97 2.77

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      98.11     91.09 92.69 88.77 89.30 85.92

Wheat     8.52        12.94    10.71    6.17        6.00     6.02 5.67 6.40 6.20 5.59

Urals 56.56     74.34    66.28 77.31 67.61 67.61 67.61

ESPO   67.02     80.88     74.85 85.96 74.63 77.95 79.90

Thoughts

Back in the saddle, as it were. Couldn’t be helped, needed to go help a friend.

Breaking from this daily report for nearly two weeks offers a bit of perspective on the situation in Ukraine; two things stand out:

The first is that the ground war is still progressing - at a very slow pace - in Russia’s favor, Russian forces still continue to slowly grind forward, despite the flow of US and EU armaments. Further, the operational discontinuity between the Russian ground war and the rest of the war remains; Ukrainian forces may be hurting Russian forces in the rear, picking at Russian air forces, denying Russian naval forces, etc., and… Russia’s ground forces don’t care; they grind forward. 

It points to a serious problem: Ukraine continues to have a strategy - policy disconnect. Ukraine continues to try to retaliate for Russian attacks on the power grid, on port structures, etc. But that is not affecting the war itself. Ukrainian efforts need to address the ground “game.” They are losing the ground game, and are probably taking substantial casualties doing so.

The second thought is that the Swiss Peace Conference may have sown the seeds of a strategic crisis. The conference called for peace only under the terms of the Zelenskyy plan, which requires Russian forces out of every square inch of Ukrainian territory before negotiations, and for bringing senior members of the Russian government to trial. This is tantamount to a call for the fall of the Russian government, an unlimited war. In practical terms that means a “forever war.” When placed opposite the horrible demographics of Ukraine, this is a policy for which a real strategy is difficult to imagine…

I think there is also a question as to whether actions such as the ICC issuing warrants for senior members of the Russian government helps the situation or simply fosters greater intransigence and a general sense of animosity the average Russian will hold against the west. In short, someone needs to ask whether such actions, in effect, improve Russian morale.

Worth noting that an authoritative, independent estimate of Russian KIAs places that number as currently in the range of 45,000. This would support a wounded estimate of 160,000 - 180,000.

The most conservative Ukrainian casualty count, based on the 31,000 KIA figure President Zelenskyy gave 6 months ago, which was presumably a narrowly defined number (see US casualty figures for Vietnam), would suggest that Ukrainian KIAs are now in the area of 38,000, and in fact, total number of dead (not narrowly defined as “killed in action”) is well above that.

That leaves Ukrainian casualties as the same or higher than Russian casualties; my own estimates place Ukrainian casualties far higher than the official number - more than twice as high.

President Zelenskyy effectively made this point yesterday when he commented that the war must not be allowed to go on, that Ukraine has already suffered too many casualties.

If so, someone should be taking a hard look at their strategy…

v/r pete

 Strategic Costs

One of the questions that keeps popping up in editorials, at least in the last month or two, is whether or not the folks in the White House want Ukraine to win the war with Russia. There are, of course, two obvious answers to that question - yes and no. But I have an unpleasant sense that the correct answer is “maybe.”

By that I mean, in a very real sense they haven’t thought through what they really want, and more importantly, what it will cost. To be sure, if you ask senior folks in the West Wing, the State Department, at the Pentagon, they are all going to say roughly the same thing: Russia needs to leave Ukraine, one way or the other and we are standing with Ukraine to the end.

But, the uncomfortable fact is that stating some goal, but having not worked out a strategy to achieve that goal, will in the end mean failure.

So, going back to basics, consider what strategies are, and how they get made.

There are some hard truths about strategies, and they more or less apply at virtually every level. But those truths are virtually carved in stone when you get to the level of any great power trying to achieve something which is in direct opposition to the strategy go another great power. 

Perhaps the most important rule is this: your goal, that thing you are trying to achieve, has to be crystal clear. There are all sorts of ways for a strategy to fail. But if you are not crystal clear on your goal, it is a certainty that your strategy will fail.

But there’s more to it than that. Every strategy is really a very simple thing, at least in concept. A strategy, to quote Jay Luvaas (who was paraphrasing Frederick the Great) is nothing but the bridge that connects your assets to your goal. So, you have a goal. But before you can construct a meaningful strategy you must answer the question “what will it cost?” Or, in the world of geo-politics, what are you willing to spend?

This means everything: money, people, and “stuff” (gear, weapons, etc.) certainly. To use the jargon of Washington, this is a “whole of Government” solution. So, also non-tangibles: time, reputation, relations with other countries, etc. A good strategist will insist on a comprehensive account of what the leadership is really willing to spend.

Of course, he won't get an answer. No one gives an answer to certain questions: Never mind the simple one: How much are we willing to spend? But what about the hard questions: How many troops are we willing to lose, killed and wounded? How much time are we willing to fight this war? How many of the enemy are we willing to kill?

Try getting a war plan approved that begins with: “War Duration: 20 years.” 

This, by the way, is what makes fighting a truly existential war much simpler to get your head around, the answers come easily: we will spend every dime we have, we will fight as long as it takes, we will fight to the last man, and we will kill until there are no more enemies. 

But what if it’s not your war?

What if your ally is saying “this is existential,” but you have other concerns?

Israel is in an existential fight. Hamas has called for the death of every Jew in the world. So has Iran. The attack on 7 October was a clear statement by Hamas that they mean to kill Jews. And there is nowhere for Israelis to go. They can’t surrender to Hamas, there is every reasonable expectation that they’d be killed. They can’t leave, no country would take them. They can’t flee overseas, how would you evacuate 8.5 million people?

Israel, therefore is in an existential fight. This makes the “left side” of the strategy question, that is, “assets available,” easy. The answer is “everything.” And the plan is, in many cases, simpler.

Or should be. The fact that much of the world is screaming at Israel for attacking into Gaza and causing civilian casualties - to a certainty far fewer than the ludicrous numbers passed out by Hamas - and the Israelis are adjusting tactics in response, is a dangerous warning-sign for Israel’s long-term survival. The majority of the residents of Gaza support Hamas. And even so, Israeli forces are trying to minimize casualties. I understand the impetus. But we all need to remember this is truly existential.

What about Ukraine?

Is it existential? I would argue that it is, but they may have already lost; the precipitous crash of the Ukrainian population over the past 30 years - and again in 2022 - has left Ukraine with a de facto population - people who are actually inside Ukraine - of perhaps 30 million - or less. This from a population of 52 million in 1991.

Further, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians who have fled westward into Europe do not wish to return. 

The Ministry of Education released data this past week that shows that graduates of colleges and other post-high school trade schools, etc. for 2023 was 360,000 graduates. The same number for 2008 was 630,000 graduates.

There are a number of possible reasons why that number would be smaller - people joining the army is okay. But recall that the draft age in Ukraine is 27, deliberately set high to allow Ukrainians to finish school. But the other possibility, people fleeing the country, goes to the heart of the problem. In 2008 the population of Ukraine was 46.1 million, but by 2022 it had decreased to an official 43 million and was probably closer to 35 million. 360,000 suggests a population closer to 25 million.

Add to this a fertility rate: Ukraine’s fertility rate (pre-war) was 1.16. There are only 3 countries on the planet with a lower rate. The replacement rate is 2.1 - the fertility rate in Ukraine is 1/2 of what’s needed to sustain the population. And that number is from before the start of the war. To a certainty it’s now lower. Said differently, before the war Ukraine’s population was contracting at almost 1% per year. Add to that the fact that most of the refugees who fled west, and who don’t want to return, are women. 

Add all that up and you have a country that is in a death spiral.

What has all this to do with the US?

Again, the folks in Washington need to ask themselves what is our real goal in Ukraine? Is it defeat of Russia? Or is it saving Ukraine?

And what are we really willing to spend to achieve that goal?

 June 14th, 2024 1775 - US Army 

1777 - Stars and Stripes

Overall 

Ground Operations - Russian gains continue

Air Operations - Another attack on the power grid

Aid - More weapons plus G7 Loan

Diplomacy - US - Ukraine Bilateral Agreement Text

Weather

Kharkiv

78 and mostly cloudy. Run starts tonight tapers off Tuesday afternoon. Daily lows in the 60s, daily highs near 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

86 and cloudy. Rain starts tonight, tapers off Monday night. Daily lows in the 60s, daily highs in the 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

72 and cloudy. Rain starts tonight, ends Monday night to Tuesday morning. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations

 

North of Kharkiv

Ukrainian forces made small but confirmed gains south-east of Hlyboke (due north of Kharkiv), while Russian forces made gains in and around Vovchansk. A Ukrainian army spokesman said that the Russians are digging in, in these areas, that Russian army engineers have arrived and are building defensive positions. 

Donets River

Fighting continues the length of the line of contact, and there are claims that Russian forces made gains south-east of Kupyansk, along the P07 roadway, but these gains have not been confirmed.

Bakhmut

Fighting continues west and south of Bakhmut but there were no confirmed gains or losses by either side in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff characterized the situation around Chasiv Yar as “tense.”

Russian forces have been confirmed to have made gains south of Siversk (north-east of Bakhut) and now pressing on Rozdolivka (about 7 miles south of Siversk). In addition, Russian sources are reporting that the Chalk quarry is now under Russian control.

Donetsk City

Russian forces completed the assault near Novopokrovske and have been confirmed to be in control of the town. Russian forces have already pushed out from the town and are attacking to the west and south-west. Russian forces also continue to advance elsewhere in the general area west of Avdiivka and Donetsk, significantly, pushing north and north-west out of Umanske.

Russian forces remain active south-west of Donetsk city and are clearly trying to reach the O-0532 roadway that runs between Marinka and Vuhledar, straightening their lines and closing one approach to the town of Vuhledar; fighting also continues in Heorivka and Kranohorivka, but there were no confirmed changes in terrain held.

Velyka Novosilke (VN) and Orikhiv

Fighting continues in the general area south of VN and south of Orikhiv, but there were no changes in terrain held.

Dnepr River

Fighting continued in the vicinity of Krynky but there were no changes in terrain held. One blogger characterized the fighting in the area as “the area of duels, artillery duels, drone duels, and FPV duels.”

Air Operations

Russian forces struck power infrastructure on the night of the 13th - morning of the 14th with an attack of:

10 x Kh-101/555 cruise missiles

3 x Islander M ballistic missiles

1 x Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missile

17 x Shahed drones

The UAF claimed it shot down 7 x Kh-101 cruise missiles and 17 drones; the attack appears to have caused a large fire at a large fuel depot, the second depot to be hit in as many nights.

The Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) reported that, in addition to the below data, on the 13th Russian forces launched 4 x S-300 missiles and conducted 54 x air strikes dropping 73 x FAB 500 bombs on various targets. They also noted that the Russian forces used 613 kamikaze drones. 

Russian forces reported that during the night of 13 - 14 June Russian air defense assets intercepted 87 x Ukrainian drones, and reported several towns had temporarily lost electricity.

As for the 13th, final count: the attack on Thursday included:

20 x FAB 500 glide bombs

19 x Shahed drones and 72 smaller drones.

The UAF reported that is shot down several cruise missiles and a total of 86 drones in the last 8 days, including 28 Lancet loitering, battlefield drones. 

This seems to be far too few drones than normal, (11 per day)…

Diplomacy and Politics

The US - Ukraine bilateral agreement is attached.

Meanwhile, Reuters reports that Communist China is working diplomatic channels to lobby various countries to support the PRC - Brazil 6 point peace plan rather than the Swiss conference that begins tomorrow. The PRC - Brazil plan calls for meetings between Russian and Ukraine.

Prime Minister Orban of Hungary and NATO have reached an understanding, and Hungary will not block NATO support for Ukraine, and NATO will not force Hungary to participate. Urban put it that Hungary would not hinder NATO efforts in Ukraine, but it would not participate.

"31 out of 32 NATO member states want to defeat the Russians. Hungary’s position is that we consider this a mistake. Even if it means that we stand alone opposed to the other 32 states.”

Orban insists that there should be peace talks now, between Russia and Ukraine.

Putin on a ceasefire:

Ukrainian forces "must be completely withdrawn from the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts within the administrative borders…

Ukraine must declare its refusal to join NATO…If these conditions are met, Russia will immediately cease fire.”

"I emphasize that it is from the entire territory of these regions within their administrative borders as they existed at the time of their accession to Ukraine. As soon as Kyiv declares readiness for such a decision and begins the actual withdrawal of troops from these regions and also officially announces the abandonment of plans to join NATO, from our side, immediately, literally at that same moment, the order to cease fire and begin negotiations will be issued. I repeat, we will do this immediately.”

He called this: “…not about a temporary truce but a final resolution.”

Aid

Republic of Korea Defense Minister Shin Won Sik told Bloomberg News that North Korea has shipped more than 10,000 containers, containing as many as 4.8 million artillery shells, to Russia since deliveries first began last autumn. 

Deliveries have also included ballistic missiles (still well less than 100), probably Kn-23 missiles, which are about 10% smaller, but with a substantially greater maximum range.

Germany delivered another package of weapons and systems to Ukraine this past week, to include:

• 20 MARDER infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs)
• 10 LEOPARD 1 A5 tanks
• 1 x IRIS-T SLM air defence system (3 x previously delivered)
• 1 x IRIS-T SLS (1 x previously delivered)
• 3 x HIMARS
• 21,000 x 155mm rounds
• 2 x bridge-laying tanks
• 2 x DACHS engineer vehicles
• 1 x armored recovery vehicle
• 4 x WISENT 1 mine clearing tanks
• Assorted sensors, jammers, spare parts, etc.

A few more details on the G7 plan to use frozen Russian assets to finance a $50 billion loan to Ukraine.

The assets are now worth about $300 billion, and they generate about $3 billion per year in income. There was talk of turning the assets themselves over to Ukraine but that has, on the whole, been rejected.

The assets (and 2022 values) are located predominantly in Europe

• France ($71 billion)
• Japan ($58 billion)
• Germany ($55 billion)
• US ($38 billion)
• UK ($26 billion)
• Austria ($17 billion)
• Canada ($16 billion)

Funds are expected to reach Ukraine in 2025.

Russia has responded by noting that there are still significant assets of US and European companies inside Russia that could be confiscated.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Sep8 Feb8 Apr8 Jun7 Jun13 Jun14

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      90.95   80.93 90.13 80.06 82.12 82.86

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      87.77   75.49 86.13 75.81 77.97 78.60

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15        2.63       1.95 1.83 2.82 3.03 2.97

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      98.11     91.09 92.69 88.77 87.96 89.30

Wheat     8.52        12.94    10.71    6.17        6.00     6.02 5.67 6.40 6.17 6.20

Urals 56.56     74.34    66.28 77.31 67.61 67.61 67.61

ESPO   67.02     80.88     74.85 85.96 74.63 78.20 77.95

The Hryvnia fell to 41.1 to the dollar yesterday, which represents a 12% drop in value since it was floated last October.

Thoughts

The bilateral agreement is fairly complete, and from my first read of it, a fairly straightforward agreement. The key points I noticed are:

- Article IV concludes with the statement: “The US affirms that Ukraine’s future is in NATO.”

- A clear statement that Russia must be made to pay for damages.

- The agreement does not “give rise to rights or obligations under domestic or international law.”

The last point means simply that it is a promise made by the President, Congress has no say, and the agreement has no force of law. The next President (or even this President) can simply ignore it, if he chooses.

The line about NATO is interesting as that is one point that both Orban of Hungary and Fico of the Czech Republic have said they don’t support; NATO membership requires unanimous approval.

A NATO official, speaking anonymously, is reporting that Russian forces in the incursion north of Kharkiv have been suffering 1,000 killed per day on average; he stressed that this was the number dead.

1,000 KIA per day, would mean at least 2,000 WIA, and probably 3,000. Even if WIA and KIA match, 1,000 per each, this would mean almost a brigade per day — but there was no major force movement in and out of the area. Russian forces crossed the border in the first week of May - 35 days ago. Even at 500 per day that would work out to 17,500 KIA, and certainly more than 25,000 WIA per day, or 42,500 total casualties. (At 1,000 KIA per day the total would be well past 50,000.)

Yet, there were only 51,000 Russian troops in the entire area from Sumy down to Kharkiv, and only 4 Russian brigades (or regiments - which in this case have similar manning totals) have been engaged in this thrust, about 12,000 troops, they have not rotated any units out, the original units are still fighting and holding ground, against a larger Ukrainian force. 

This is being stated for some reason, but what it is, isn’t clear. One possibility is that, in the past, claims of excessive Russian combat losses have come out when the Ukrainian army has suffered a serious loss, or is about to withdraw from some point, and this reporting is used to deflect any criticism in the event the loss is leaked to the press, or the withdrawal is poorly received.

v/r pete