June 29th, 2026

Politics - Putin again rejects direct negotiations

- Zelenskyy announces 40 day strike campaign 

Combat Ops - No substantive change on ground

- Strikes continue

Weather

Kharkiv

79 and mostly sunny, showers possible tonight. Mostly sunny all week. Daily lows in the 60s, daily highs in the upper 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

84 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Partly to mostly sunny all week. Daily lows around 70, daily highs in the low 90s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

74 and mostly sunny, gusting over 50, possibility of thunderstorms tonight. Mostly sunny through Thursday, thunderstorms on Friday and the weekend.  Daily lows in the mid to upper 60s, daily highs in the upper 80s to low 90s. Winds variable, 10-15kts, but high gusts.

Politics

President Putin again responded to President Zelenskyy’s offer to negotiate face-to-face and pooh-poohed the idea:

“It is clear why this proposal is being made, because our counter-strikes deep into Ukrainian territory are much stronger, have greater impact, and are, frankly, more destructive.”

“Given their catastrophic shortage of personnel, the Ukrainian armed forces apparently believe this could be their salvation. But saving the Kyiv regime is not part of our plans.”

President Trump on the 16th again called for Putin to negotiate, “Russia should make a deal. Russia has lost tremendous amounts of people, and so has Ukraine.” 

But Putin appears to have brushed that off as well as the issue of any sort of agreement in the August meeting in Anchorage, commenting that “Nobody signed anything, but we talked about certain possibilities for ending the conflict in Ukraine.” 

Instead, Putin made it clear where Russia was headed:

“The first task is to quickly and significantly ramp up production of those air defense systems that are most needed… All the strikes, wherever they hit our infrastructure, absolutely do not affect the situation on the front, on the line of combat contact.”

An Ukrainian soldier serving in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (south-west Ukraine) Has been charged with illegal sales of weapons, ammunition, and drones. Specifically, he was charged with selling 2 x AK-47s and 10 x F-1 grenades for a total of $4,000 and offered to sell a small quad-copter for UAH 150,000 ($3,400).

After his arrest, the Sate Bureau of Investigation reported that the soldier may also have been selling ammunition.

Ground Operations 

Fighting continues along the line. Russian recon probes and small unit infiltrations continued, particularly south-east of Kupyansk, in the Slovyansk to Pokrovsk arc, and north and west of Hulyaipole.

Russian forces made marginal gains south-east of Kupyansk and in Lyman and east of Slovyansk. More infiltrations were reported in Kostiantinivka and the “checkerboard” of Russian and Ukrainian forces continues to slowly grow. At the same time, Russian aircraft continue to strike Kramatorsk with glide bombs, destroying defenses in that city before infiltrations begin.

Further south, Russian forces have pushed into Rivne, north of Hulyaipole, retaking that town after Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out in March.

Elsewhere along the line there were marginal gains by both sides as they traded positions, but there were no tactically significant changes.

Air and Maritime Operations

Ukrainian Forces

President Zelenskyy announced a 40 day long-range strike campaign to push Russia to end the war. In particular, the strikes will focus on Crimea, gasoline production and interdiction of rear area logistics and logistics routes. 

Reportedly, there was a 2,000+ vehicle backup heading east over rate Kerch bridge (off of Crimea) on the 26th.

Ukrainian forces continued strikes on Russian ground lines of communication (GLOC), and parts of occupied Kherson and Crimea continue to suffer power outages.

While many of the strikes are “plinking,” striking individual vehicles as they move along the road networks (something the Russians do as well), Ukrainian forces appear to be more proficient at striking bridges, and imagery on the 27th confirmed a partially collapsed span on the M-14 roadway about 18 miles east of Melitopol, from a strike on the 26th, where the road crosses a small stream (the Korsak River).

During the night of June 27th-June 28th Ukrainian forces struck the Slavyansk oil refinery (about 60 miles east of the Kerch Strait) and the Yaroslavl refinery (about 140 miles north-east of Moscow). Imagery of both showed smoke and fires, but an independent damage assessment has not been published.

On the 26th a Ukrainian Flamingo missile reportedly struck the Titan-Barrikady plant that manufactures the Oreshnik IRBM in Volgograd, as well as an oil pumping facility also in Volgograd.

During the night of June 25th-June 26th Ukrainian forces conducted more strikes into Crimea, as well as Bryansk, Moscow and Tula oblasts. Russian air defenses forces claimed that they shot down 660 missiles and drones. There was no report on how many reached their targets. Normal rate of successful engagement by both countries has been consistently in the 90-95% range, which would suggest an overall strike package of 695 - 730 missiles and drones. 

Ukrainian forces also struck the oil depot in Poltavska, Krasnodar and two refineries in Ufa, Bashkortostan (about 600 miles east of Moscow, 200, miles south-west of  Yekaterinburg).

Commercial imagery shows damage to the main antennas at the Vladimir Space communications center following the June 22nd strike.

Ukrainian special forces claimed that drones struck two cable laying ships (Volga and Vyatka) and a ferry (Petropavlovsk) in the Zatoka Shipyard in Kerch. This has not been confirmed.

Russian Forces

Per President Zelenskyy, Russian totals for the week of 19-26 June included 19 missiles, 1,400 strike drones and 1,500 glide bombs. Note that these drones do not include the FPV drones (fiber optic and free flying) that are launched at a rate of more than 10,000 per day. 

What is of particular note is that glide bomb usage remains above 200 per day; the glide bombs are substantially more destructive than virtually any other weapon in either inventory wth the exception of the larger ballistic missiles.

During the night of June 28th-June 29th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace, with at least 1 ballistic missile and 108 x strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 82 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts; a ballistic missile struck Dnipro city.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure.

There were at least 7 civilian killed and 46 wounded as result of these strikes.

RuAF tacair struck at least 4 towns.

During the night of June 27th-June 28th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace, with at least 2 x Zircon cruise missiles, 6 x Iskander ballistic missiles, and 142 x strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 1 Zircon missile, all 6 ballistic missiles, and 125 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure.

Reports noted at least 2 civilians killed and 16 wounded in these strikes.

During the night of June 26th-June 27th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace, with at least  129 x strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 113 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy and  Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure.

There were 9 civilian wounded reported.

RuAF tacair struck at least 1 town.

During the night of June 25th-June 26th Russian forces launched strikes into Ukrainian airspace, with at least  7 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 189 x strike drones. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 3 ballistic missiles and 174 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odessa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Ballistic missile strikes were reported in Poltava.

Targets included the power grid and transportation infrastructure; a power outage were reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, eastern Poltava, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

There was at least 1 civilian killed and 8 civilians wounded in these attacks.

Economic Reporting

Feb22  Mar9 Apr8 May8 Jun8 Jun26 Jun29

Brent      94.71   106.40 91.78 100.50 93.82 72.71 72.95

WTI     92.10   103.60 93.53 94.91 90.59 69.44 70.38

NG       3.97      3.37 2.73 2.79 3.14 3.40 3.24

Wheat     8.52  6.25 5.79 6.14 5.82 5.92 5.85

Ruble     85          78.20 78.54 74.26 73.10 77.71 77.35

Hryvnia 28.6 43.93 43.45 43.90 44.64 44.88 44.85

Urals 91.66 90.97 124.85 92.56 86.33 60.11 57.40

ESPO 94.52 84.99 103.27 105.56 95.51 73.27 70.54

Sokol 99.31 101.55 96.88 95.96 89.90 69.78 69.37

Thoughts

Expect the Ukrainian campaign to continue through July and into August and expect the reports of hardships Russia to multiply. Also expect, as this is part of an aggressive InfoWar effort, that much of this will be inaccurate, but will continue to shape perceptions that the Russians are losing and the Ukrainians have gained the upper hand.

Have they? At this point no. Both sides continue to press on each other, and on the ground the Russians, despite making only marginal gains for several months, still, on the whole have the initiative on the ground, and continue to slowly grind down the center, from Pokrovsk, across Kostiantinivka and past Slovyansk. Russian forces also continue to re-strike the Ukrainian power grid and, short of a miracle (or a ceasefire and a flood of aid), Ukrainians are going to have a difficult winter.

Will Ukraine gain the upper hand? That depends on a host of unknowns. 

What are the real Ukrainian casualties? How do they stack up against Russian casualties? My sense is that the casualty count is essentially the same, each in the range of 300,000 - 350,000 KIAs and 250,000 severely wounded (those wounded who will not return to active duty). Ukrainian desertions remain very high, perhaps twice Russian desertions in raw numbers, an order of magnitude as percent of population. This has a tremendous impact on the ground situation, as drones can’t hold ground; infantry are needed for that.

What is the real damage to the Russian and Ukrainian infrastructure? The various governments should know that, but obviously won’t tell. The Russian oil industry has already shown itself to be resilient and in addition have a good deal of excess capacity. Will that be enough? That reminds to be seen. But regional impacts - Crimea and Moscow in particular - are likely to be severe.

The cumulative damage to the Ukrainian power grid is also an unknown. Clearly, the government in Kyiv knows. Do the governments in Europe know? They may have been informed by their intelligence offices, but maybe they choose to ignore reports. We’ll see.

How many missiles and long range drones does each force have? And what are their real production rates? Again, unknown. But presumably the money and parts and raw material continue to flow into Ukraine, and at least in part, China will continue to aid Russia to ensure they have most of what they need.

What will be the effect? This is, of course, the “$64,000 Question.” Russian strikes, on nearly a daily basis for 4 years, have not convinced the Ukrainian people to sue for peace. The Russians are, culturally and socially, very much like the Ukrainians. Both have a long history of enduring hardship. It would be remarkable to me that you would get a different response from the Russian people than from the Ukrainian people.

Rather, I suspect that the Russian people will respond to these strikes, and the gasoline lines, and some resulting hardships and deprivations in much the same way: with anger and a collective grim determination. In fact, I would be surprised if they did not. Which means this 40 day strike campaign will push the Russian people to be more determined than ever to win this war. President Putin’s desires will become less important and the desire of the Russian people to sate their anger will grow in importance. In short, these strike campaigns probably will not, in and of themselves, hasten an end to the war, but rather, they will escalate the war.

v/r pete