Something Versus Nothing

October 18th, 2026

As you may, or may not, recall, early on in the Russia - Ukraine war it was pointed out that the Russians were using tens of thousands of artillery rounds per day and the US and Europe started pushing artillery rounds into Ukraine to match Russian artillery. Several things followed and more howitzer rounds (155MM howitzers), mortar rounds, and battlefield rockets (HIMARS - the HIgh Mobility Artillery Rocket System) were rushed to Ukraine. And, the slow, then rapid production of drones - small, short range drones (the FPV - First Person Video - drones) followed.

In the last year or so the drones have captured seemingly all of the attention, but the artillery is still a major slice of the problem.

Now, Ukraine has done some marvelous things - granted, with the aid of components and funding from the West - and are hoping to reach a production rate of 19,000 drones per day (7 days per week) by the end of this year (Russian production is about the same). But they’re still using howitzers and HIMARS. When it became clear that more rounds were needed, a good deal of attention was focused on the US and European production of ordnance. This all was taking place by late 2022.

While this was going on, it was also pointed out that the Russian economy was not strong, that Western sanctions would weaken it further, and that there was a distinct possibility that the Russian economy would fail within a year or two, so the experts said. Nevertheless, it was deemed appropriate to fix various weapons programs and to more generally press ahead with weapon development programs and increased defense expenditures.

It is, of course, worth pointing out that the US and Europe combined have 3 times as many people and 20 times the collective GDP of Russia, as well as leading the world in virtually every field of technology.

So, how have we done?

Consider the 155MM artillery shell. As of early 2022 the US Army was buying some 175,000 shells per year. (Recall that Ukraine was using well in excess of 5,000 per day, some days more than 10,000 per day). Over the course of 2022-2025 Ukraine fired well in excess of 4 million rounds. The US Army, which overseas the manufacturing of 155 rounds, aimed to increase production to 100,000 rounds per month by October 2025. As of March of 2026, per the Pentagon’s Inspector General, production stood at 36,000 per month, with a goal to get production to 71,000 per month by September (last month). No word yet on whether that has happened.

As for Europe, they were producing a combined total (there are several plants) of perhaps 35,000 per month. They set a target goal of 167,000 per month (2 million per year) by 2025. Hard numbers have not been released this year but estimates suggest the total is a bit more than 100,000 rounds per month. But production will reach 150,000 per month in 2027.

As for battlefield rockets (like the that go into HIMARS), current production sits at just under 1,200 per month, with a goal of increasing production to about 1600 per month by 2028.

As Annie sang: Tomorrow is only a day away…

And the failing Russian economy? The Russians have sustained a steady production rate of 152MM (their analog to the 155MM), 122 MM, and 120MM Mortar rounds of 12,000 per day (4,000 each per day, 120,000 per month - 1.5 million each per year). And, the Russians seem to be maintaining a rate of 1400 - 1500 battlefield rockets per day (500,000+ per year). That would be the Russians with the failing economy and the broken Defense Industrial Base. So much for net assessments.

What about the big ticket items? What about Patriot missiles to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles?

When the war started production stood at 350 per year (call it 30 per month). Lockheed did manage to increase production slightly in 2023 to somewhere in the neighborhood of 500 missiles year (almost 40 per month), and in 2024 produced 500 (biggest year ever) and in 2025, reportedly 620. Finally, in January of 2026 a new contract was signed with the Pentagon to increase production to 2,000 per year by 2030. 

Finally!

Of course, Russian Iskander ballistic missiles and S-300 missiles (a surface-to-air missile that has been adapted to be used in both an anti-aircraft mode and as a surface-to-surface missile) can only be shot down by Patriot missiles (maybe by Aster 30s, but those haven’t been provided to Ukraine yet in any numbers yet). The Russians are producing 60  x Iskander missiles and 50 x S-300s per month. S-300 production is supposed to double by the end of 2026 (these numbers are per Ukrainian Intelligence, and are not otherwise confirmed). But even as production stands as of early 2026, the Russians are producing some 110 ballistic missiles per month. In addition, the Russians are making some 10 x Kinzhal aero-ballistic missiles per month, 4 x Zircons per month and 7 x Oniks per month - missiles that also can only be engaged by Patriot. That’s 130 missiles per month, rising to perhaps 180 per month by the end of the year, that can only be addressed by Patriot missiles. So, if 100% of Patriot production - in 2030 - were to go to Ukraine, it would roughly equal Russian missile production. Of course successfully engaging these missiles sometimes requires 2, or even 3, Patriots… 

So, answer this: How is it that with as clear a demand signal as is possible: a war on Europe’s doorstep, there is still this fumbling around, and this de facto lackadaisical approach, to the West’s defense industrial base?

And it’s not just in artillery and rockets.

How many years have we been hearing about China’s shipbuilding and yet the Navy staff is being dragged, seemingly kicking and screaming, into new shipyards and new ships. Does anyone think the Navy will begin work on a new ship any time soon? Anyone who knows the system knows the truth: there are bureaucrats - many in uniform - dug into places like NAVSEA and NAVAIR (and their opposite numbers in the Air Force and the Army) who deep down in their hearts of heart intend to wait out the current administration and then go back to business as usual.

Here’s the thing: it wasn’t always like this.

The U-2, which is still flying, progressed from approval of a basic idea to first flight in less than a year.

The A-12 / SR-71 went from approval to first flight in less than 3 years, for an airplane in which we had to develop technology that didn’t exist at time of approval.

USS Nautilus - the first nuclear powered ship of any sort - went from approval to her first shakedown cruise in 47 months.

USS Enterprise (CVAN-65 - with 8 nuclear reactors) was ordered in November 1957, was launched in September 1960, and was at sea on a shakedown cruise in January 1962, and was fully operational prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Meanwhile the USS Zumwalt, laid down in 2011, first deployed on 2019 - to Alaska, reached Guam in 2022, moved to Pascagoula for upgrades in 2023, and has evolved into a de facto white elephant.

The V-22 - which Secretary of Defense Cheney tried to kill - first flew in 1989, wasn’t fielded 2007. Similar stories about the F-35 and the USS Ford are familiar to all. And maintenance delays on virtually every ship are now nearly legendary.

C-17s are great airplanes but they’re all getting old. Don’t overthink it, just restart the program. We don’t need a new airframe, we just need airlift.

Simply put, better is the enemy of good enough. An old boss of mine, a superb sub skipper, used to note regularly whenever issues like this came up that you can’t beat something with nothing. A submarine without all the bells and whistles, or an aircraft, or a cruiser, may not be exactly what you want. But a basic cruiser here now, at sea, is far better than an empty ocean and a promise of a “really great ship” in 10 years.

Go back and look at the Navy’s ship building history from 1882 - 1932; the Navy went through more ship designs than one can easily count. Orders were stopped and designs were changed. We learned, the Navy evolved. Surely we can write contracts like that today, Surely there are a few people in Congress who understand. Surely there are one or two people at NavSea, et al, who get it. Surely there are some folks around who can fix the problem of a new forge for artillery shells NOW, not next year.

There are people at the top who are trying. God bless SecNav. But there are bureaucrats - and many Congressional staffers falls into this category as well - who have no sense of urgency. They believe they can continue to study the problem. They all need to go. And bring in some new people who will stop talking and start doing.