Shelby Foote and the 28 Point Proposal

I was listening to a Shelby Foote interview the other day (from the late 1980s) and he had an interesting observation and conclusion: in July 1864 Harvard and Yale held their regatta (rowing regatta) and of the men in the heavyweight boats, not one went on to serve in the US Army, despite the very prevalent pro National sentiment.. His point was, as he put it, "the North fought with one arm behind its back,” the south was never going to win the war. He noted that the only remote chance was that England came in on the side of the south, which it was never going to do, and that even if it did, the south would still have lost; the US Naval blockade (first known as the Anaconda Plan) assured that outcome.

And, he added, in retrospect, the war was lost as soon as the consequences  of the Battle of Ft. Donaldson became clear: the Union taking control of Kentucky and most of Tennessee, including the industrial center that was Nashville.

What has that got to do with today?

One of the routine suppositions that is made in regard to the Russia - Ukraine war is that if Ukraine could inflict a massive military defeat on Russia, that Russia - for a number of reasons (loss of public support, loss of confidence in the army, loss of confidence in Putin, etc.) - would then sue for peace. This is also the issue around the attacks on the Russian oil industry: damage to the Russian economy, rising prices, falling standards of living, will all result in increased frustration and anger with Putin and he will be forced to sue for peace.

This has resurfaced in the wake of 28 point peace proposal. The proposal, which was apparently drafted in coordination between Secretary of State Rubio and Ambassador Wykoff (not by Russia as some in the press are now claiming) seeks to establish a permanent peace in Ukraine has been said by some to be very pro-Russian, as it cedes Donetsk and Luhansk and Crimea to Russia, as well as those parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts currently occupied by Russia. It also limits the size of Ukraine’s army and states that Ukraine will not enter NATO, among other issues.

President Trump has noted it is a starting point, but also noted that he wants quick movement on the proposal, suggesting acceptance by next Thursday as a goal.

President Zelenskyy has suggested that Ukrainians are now caught between either agreeing and sacrificing their national dignity, or losing their most valued ally (the US).

While there is obviously some room for changing points in the proposal, it is clear that the central point being argued here is that Ukraine cedes territory to Russia, and does not join NATO.

I think you can argue that the issue can be distilled to: Either accept that general concept OR continue the war until you win (or lose decisively). Which leads to the important question: Can Ukraine win the war against Russia? As with the South during the Civil War, the only real possibility exists if there is aid - significantly more aid - from allies.

But the rest of the question is how much aid would be necessary to defeat Russia.

The supposition has been and is still being made, that a rousing military defeat will bring Russia to negotiate a peace, and withdraw its forces. It’s pointed out that Russian oil exports are well down, that refineries have been damaged, and the overall Russian economy has been weakened.

That may miss the real problem. Russia is (again, go back to Shelby Foote’s point), like the Union, fighting with one arm behind its back. There has been no general mobilization, they are not in a true wartime economy. The counter argument is that Russians would not accept such actions and the economy, already struggling with 2.2% unemployment, could not economically endure a full mobilization. But, the old adage remains accurate: "the enemy gets a vote."

If it were made very clear that the US and the EU were backing Ukraine “to the hilt,” and that the goal of the coalition was the substantial destruction of the Russian army and the collapse of the Russian economy and the overturning of the government, as some have proposed, might it be that the Russian citizenry would unite against this threat? And might Russian leadership - Putin or his successor, view this as a true existential threat to Russia itself and respond more aggressively?

In short, militarily defeating a fully mobilized Russia might require substantial escalation on the part of the alliance, which would presumably result in a substantial additional escalation by Russia. Nor does this include any further effort by China, either to support Russia or take advantage of the war to act elsewhere (or both), further escalating and complicating a very complex problem.

To restate: Ukraine without outside assistance would lose the war. Ukraine with Europe and US assistance, fighting a Russia that has not fully mobilized, has been slowly losing the war since January 2023. Massive US and European assistance might change that, but it would also change the Russian calculus. And China remains a wild card, a black swan waiting to fly into the arena.

At the start of the US Civil War the US population was about 31.5 million, roughly the size of Ukraine today (the International Money Fund uses 32.8 million). In 49 months of fighting the US suffered some 650,000 to 750,000 deaths (the number has slowly risen over the last few decades as a result of new research). Ukraine has, over the course of 45 months suffered something on the order 200,000 deaths (officially lower, but probably higher). It is worth noting that during the course of the war the US population increased by more than 3 million, while Ukraine’s population has decreased by nearly 11 million in the last 4 years and is expected to continue to contract.

The question President Zelenskyy needs to ask is this: If Ukraine chooses to continue the war, is there a real path to victory? Or is Kiev in 2025, like Richmond in 1862, continuing a war that is already lost?