November 3rd, 2025
Politics - Chine refineries stop buying Russian oil
- Trump - Putin might meet at G-20?
Combat Ops - Pokrovsk Status worsening
- Drone and Missile strikes continue on power grid
Weather
Kharkiv
51 and sunny, gusting to 20. Partly to mostly cloudy for the next 5 days. Daily lows in the low 40s, daily highs around 50. Winds variable, 5-10kts.
Melitopol
55 and mostly cloudy, gusting to 20. Mostly cloudy through Thursday, then a few days of sunny weather. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.
Kyiv
51 and sunny. Cloudy up tonight, showers all day tomorrow, and into Wednesday morning, cloudy the rest of the week. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the low 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.
Politics
Bloomberg is reporting that a number of small oil refineries in China are, as of November 1st, no longer buying Russian oil, and that the immediate impact is a reduction in purchases of 400,000 barrels of oil per day. Turkey has also reportedly suspected any further Russian oil purchases, as of 01 November.
The G20 will hold a summit in South Africa November 22-23. President Stubb of Finland has suggested that President Trump and President Putin meet at the summit.
The G20 consist of the United States and Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union and the African Union.
Countries invited to the summit this year include Ukraine (President Zelenskyy will attend), as well as Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Ireland, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the UAE, and Vietnam.
Ground Operations
SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS
There were no confirmed changes to the front lines, though Russian bloggers claimed small gains near Andiivka, due north of Sumy city. Fighting has been reported near Bezsalivka (along the border, north-west of Sumy city) but the details are lacking.
Fighting continued north of Kharkiv but there are no changes in the front line.
Along the border north of the Oskil River, imagery confirmed that Russian forces had gains over the weekend near Ambarne.
NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER
Imagery of Kupyansk confirmed small Russian gains in central Kupyansk as of Friday, and Russian forces now appear to be in firm control of the center of Kupyansk. However, reports of Russian forces near or in Sadove (several miles south of Kupyansk) or west of Pishchane (south-east of Kupyansk) appear to have resolved themselves into recon elements probing into Ukrainian lines, and the Russian grind continues to move forward slowly.
Further south, imagery confirmed Ukrainian forces in Borivska Andriivka, about 5 miles north-east of Borova, having pushed back into that village.
Further south Russian forces appear to have made gains in the open terrain west of Serednie (west of the Nitrius River) and now control a block of farmland perhaps 10 square miles in area between the Nitrius River and the village of Korovii Yar.
BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK
North of Bakhmut both Ukrainian and Russian forces appear to have made marginal gains of terrain, with Russian forces making small gains south-east and south of Siversk, and Ukrainian forces making several small gains north-west and north of Chasiv Yar; in each case it appears that they have taken control of otherwise empty farm land.
Ukrainian army spokesmen are suggesting that Russian forces may be shifting forces toward the Pokrovsk pocket, pulling them away from the assault on Kostiantinivka, but at the same time, north-west of Toretsk imagery confirmed Russian gains on the east and north edge of Ivanopillia and west of Olexsandro Shultyne, and some reporting suggests Russian forces are again pressing onto the south-east edge of Kostiantinivka.
At the same time, unconfirmed reporting suggests Ukrainian gains in the open terrain between Yablonivka and Stepanivka, but this has not been confirmed.
Russian forces continue to press into Pokrovsk despite Ukrainian SOF units being sent to Pokrovsk, and the execution of a rare helo assault by Ukrainian SOF in one part of the city.
Russian forces are astride the major Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) from the south-west, just north of Udachne (which has been effectively cut for months) and Russian fiber-optic tethered FPV drones have been hitting the other GLOCs for much of the summer. Now, various Russian units have begun to move into the different sections of the city, first as small elements (2-5 soldiers), later squads (8-10), but now there are reports of company sized elements in some sections of the city. In fact, nearly every section of the city has had Russian troop activity, though they do not control the entire city, or even half of it. But Russian forces appear to have the south-center of the city, the west edge, and the industrial facility on the east side. Russian forces also appear to have taken several of the small villages immediately east of the city, Rih and Hnativka.
At the same time, Russian forces are pressing on Myrnohrad from the east side of the Pokrovsk pocket, and Russian forces are also in Rodynske, and the “jaws” of the Pokrovsk pocket continue to close, with estimates for the distance between Russian forces in the north and south running from a minimum of 2 miles to a maximum of 5 miles. Even at 5 miles, this is mainly manicured farmland, and several small residential areas of the city. And of note, the roads that lead into the pocket are either held by Russian troops or are under direct from Russian troops.
Elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have slowly retaken most of the terrain the Russians occupied in the August salient. The Russian forces that occupied this terrain were relatively few in number and the effort probably cost the Ukrainian army considerably more than the Russian army, but they have the terrain back. However, the fight for Pokrovsk is going to overshadow this entire evolution, particularly if the Russian army manages to seize Pokrovsk in the near term.
SOUTHERN UKRAINE
Russian forces continue to press westward in the general area north-north-east from Hulyaipole and appear to have reached the area of Hai (about 17 miles due north of Hulyaipole), which would place Russian forces a bit less than 2 miles east of the T0401 roadway, which runs north and then arcs to the west and runs into Dnipro city. Once cut, Hulyaipole would only have one major road, the T0814 roadway, connecting it to the Ukrainian rear.
Fighting was reported near the Antonovskiy bridge, up river from Kherson city, but there are no details.
Air and Maritime Operations
During the night of November 2nd-November 3rd Russian forces launched at least 3 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 4 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 5 x S-300 ballistic missiles and 138 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 1 Kinzhal missile and 115 Shahed drones, targeting the power grid.
Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, oblasts. Blackouts across most of Donetsk.
Casualties reported included at least 7 dead civilian and 13 wounded civilians.
RuAF tacair struck 8 towns.
During the night of November 1st-November 2nd Ukrainian forces struck the Tuapse oil terminal in Krasnodar (Tuapse is about 125 miles down the coast from the Kerch strait), and the port facility was on fire in imagery from that night.
During the night of November 1st-November 2nd Russian forces launched at least 2 x Iskander ballistic missile and 79 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 1 Islander missile and 76 Shahed drones, targeting the power grid.
Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odessa and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Some 58,000 houses were without power in Zaporizhzhia.
Casualties reported included at least 6 dead civilian and 10 wounded civilians.
During the night of October 31st-November 1st Ukrainian forces struck pipelines fromnthe Koltsevoy oil refinery near Moscow.
During the night of October 31st-November 1st Russian forces launched at least 1 x Iskander ballistic missile and 223 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 206 Shahed drones, targeting the power grid.
Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Poltava oblasts; the Iskander ballistic missile struck Mykolaiv city
Casualties reported included at least 1 dead civilian and 15 wounded civilians.
During the night of October 30th-October 31st Russian forces launched at least 1 x Iskander ballistic missile and 145 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 1 ballistic missile and 107 Shahed drones.
Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts.
Damage reported included extensive damage to the power grid; at least one ballistic missile reportedly struck Dnipro city.
Casualties reported included at least 1 dead civilian and 6 wounded civilians.
RuAF tacair struck 8 towns.
Economic Reporting
Feb22 July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct8 Oct31 Nov3
Brent 94.71 70.44 66.90 67.03 66.18 65.20 64.71
WTI 92.10 68.65 64.29 63.26 62.48 60.98 60.91
NG 3.97 3.35 3.06 3.12 3.44 4.07 4.18
Wheat 8.52 5.49 5.18 5.22 5.06 5.17 5.42
Ruble 85 78.47 79.74 84.03 81.28 80.81 80.80
Hryvnia 28.6 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.48 41.95 42.03
Urals 91.66 64.07 63.17 60.12 61.15 57.99 58.43
ESPO 94.52 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.74 66.80 66.87
Sokol 99.31 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.91 61.17 61.17
Thoughts
There is a good deal of reporting about the Pokrovsk pocket (the terrain immediately east of Pokrovsk) and everyone seems to be diving into the minutia, reporting gains and losses of yards, of attacks and counter-attacks that consist in some cases of assaults that consist of 2 men moving through bushes or past a burned-out building.
At the same time, an element of 200 or so Russian troops (roughly 2 infantry companies, so the bulk of a battalion) reported to be moving into the center of the city, and Ukrainian has committed SOF elements to the fight as they try to hold the city.
But, I think this discussion of the tactical fight misses the key point: Pokrovsk was (and ostensibly is) the intersection of several rail lines and major roads and was used as a central node for further onward movement of ammunition, weapons, supplies an personnel for much of the front line, from perhaps the Donets River south to Hulyipole. But that was already changing by mod summer as the city was struck by a good deal of long range artillery, battlefield rockets, drones and Russian tacair. The city has been depopulated, and the Ukrainians have had to adapt their logistics and personnel support processes as a result of these strike. Given the other roads that have also been cut, it is hard to envision any supplies now moving to Kostiantinivka, first passing through Pokrovsk. In that sense, Pokrovsk as an operational level of war logistics hub, ceased to exist months ago.
And none of this answers the central question - which no one outside of the a few capitals and a few intelligence agencies can answer: what is the real manpower count on each side? Ostensibly the various intelligence agencies do know, though it is worth remembering Churchill’s commentary that the most difficult intelligence to obtain was “what are the allies really doing?” I would suspect that not only are the Ukrainians and Russians trying to keep the other side from knowing, they are probably keeping it very closely held inside their own governments, so much of what being “shared” is nothing more than speculation.
That said, if (more “Ifs”) the Ukrainian shortage of trained infantryman is as bad as some have suggested, the Ukrainian army will have trouble keeping open the Pokrovsk pocket for more than a month or so and it “should” collapse before Christmas. However, the Russians may well, as has happened before, invest enough troops to sustain the grind, but not enough to fully collapse the pocket, with the intention of using this pocket - as they have others - as a place to grind down Ukrainian, causing casualties - killed and severely wounded - as long as the Ukrainian army holds ground.
Said differently, even if the pocket does not collapse, it still will not answer the question as to how many troops each side has in the fight.
And Pokrovsk’s value at this point primarily is one of morale: for the Ukrainians to hod it, for the Russians to take it.
v/r pete
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