NOVEMBER 10th, 2025 250th Birthday of the US Marines
Tomorrow is Veterans Day
Abbreviated notes today, normal summary on Wednesday
Politics
The US budget struggle is reportedly holding up movement of support to NATO allies and from there, to Ukraine. A senior State Department official, speaking anonymously, noted that with some personnel furloughed, the normal process and timelines have been disrupted for material that falls under the Arms Control Export Act, and that more than $5 billion of weapons transfers have been delayed. The officer noted that the DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs, which plays a major role in arms transfers, is currently at 1/4th manning due to the lack of a budget.
Combat Operations
Fighting continues along virtually the entire line, but there was a slight drop in level of activity in certain areas, in particular around Pokrovsk. Of note, Russian forces continued to make small gains north of Kharkiv, and fighting continues in Kupyansk. Both sides also posted gains, with Russian forces pushing closer to Siversk, and Ukrainian forces pushing into southern Chasiv Yar. Various reports as to the situation south-east of Kostiantinivka are confusing and contradictory, as they are in Pokrovsk and just east of Pokrovsk in Myrnohrad (please see my thoughts).
Of note, Russian forces in the south, along the front that runs roughly north from the Hulyaipole area to the Vovcha River, continue to grind out gains, and my guess is that this may be of as much or more concern as the potential fall of Pokrovsk, and that there is a very real possibility of more rapid Russian gains here than anywhere else on the front line.
And, Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone and missile strikes; Russian forces continue to strike infrastructure targets, particularly related to the power grid, and over the weekend Ukraine reciprocated, hitting several power grid substations in Belgorod and Volgograd.
Thoughts
Assessments of the status of front lines in and around various cities took a strange turn over the past week with some very wide differences from different sites. As neither government reports accurately on the front line, one is left trying to infer from, in some cases, wildly different assessments. So, there were claims that the Ukrainians had ordered the withdrawal of all forces from Myrnohrad, leaving only 1,000 troops in the Pokrovsk pocket (there has been an estimated 11,000 as of the middle of last week), there was claim of a Ukrainian push into the middle of Chasiv Yar, a claim that only a scattering of small recon teams (a total of 60 - 80 men) remained in Kupyansk, etc.
I think if you pull it all apart what it reflects is several things happening at the same time:
Tactics - The Russian tactics involve the movement forward of small numbers of personnel and the taking and holding positions with just a handful of men, usually fewer than 20 men total, often fewer than 10 men. These teams are then supported by artillery and drones, and later drone teams will move forward and join the teams. The result is that the front “line” is not a line in a classic sense. When added to the now freely admitted manpower problem in the Ukrainian side, the result is that the forward area looks very much like a patchwork, some times several miles across.
Movement of people - Both sides are moving forces. This results in gaps that sometimes means the other side moves forward and this is reported as if there were a dramatic thrust into the enemy position. Technically there was, except the enemy (whoever it might be) wasn’t really trying to hold it. This is particularly the case with the Ukrainians who, as noted before, move more quickly than the Russians and can push more readily into a seam between two units. They rarely hold these small salients for long, but it makes for a confusing front line.
Tenacity of Ukrainian defense - The Ukrainian defenders do not readily give ground, and the high command doesn’t like withdrawals. This has probably resulted in substantially more casualties than might otherwise be the case, but it also means that small pockets of Ukrainian troops remain as Russian forces push forward. At the same time, there have clearly been cases where the Russians could have rolled over a Ukrainian position and have not, letting the Ukrainians reinforce it, so that Russian artillery and drone strikes can inflict more casualties. Put that all together and you quickly end up with what you have in Pokrovsk right now: the Russians seemingly in control of somewhere between 2/3rds of the city to may 80%, except that there are small pockets of Ukrainians scattered across the city in hardened positions.
These positions, by the way, are very hard. Usually small apartment buildings - 4 or 5 floors, heavily reinforced with concrete, they are often impervious to direct fire except after repeated rounds, or, as drones have become more capable, by flying drones into windows or other entrances and detonating inside. The only sure means to take out these positions is Russian tacair and the use of FAB 500 precision munitions (essentially the same as a US JDAM).
Raw Numbers - It has now become, if not officially accepted, commonplace to note that the Ukrainian army has a manpower shortage. The result is that the Ukrainians are engaged in shuffling units about the front lines. The Russians do the same, trying to reinforce the line when they appear to be getting some sort of breakthrough. This, too results in reports of few troops in one spot, and assessments that troops are withdrawing.
Combine them all, and add in that reports don’t come in, in any order, and this looks much more disorganized than it is. I think simply put, Ukrainian forces are trying to hold, and Russian forces, using much the same technologies as the Ukrainians, and similar tactics, are grinding forward.
That said, the issue of numbers seems to be coming more and more to the front in assessments of Ukrainian forces at various points along the front.
Where does that leave the war? The latest reports suggest that Russian forces reduced activity in and around Pokrovsk and the Pokrovsk pocket over the weekend as some additional units are moved into the area and they prepare for a renewed push with more forces. There are currently, per one fairly conservative site, some 18 Russian brigades or regiments within a 5 mile arc (arbitrary distance on my part) of Pokrovsk or the Pokrovsk pocket’s eastern edge (note that no one’s sits are at 100% Maning, so, actual numbers become a bit of a guess). That is an increase of 4 or 5 brigades since the end of October. Ukrainian forces opposing them are perhaps 12-14 brigades, with various estimates of forces remaining inside the pocket (as low as 1,000 troops, as high as 11,000 troops), and an unknown number inside Pokrovsk itself, but in excess of a battalion (perhaps a brigade?), but fighting out of widely scattered hard-points across the city.
As it now stands, Ukrainian forces need to resupply these small elements scattered across the battlefield, Russian forces need to address them, one by one. It is a situation that favors the force with the most numbers.
v/r pete
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