Tsushima, Jutland and Eisenhower 

April 13th, 2025

For years historians pooh-poohed President Eisenhower as some sort of bureaucrat general who could keep everyone happy and sort of stumbled into the presidency, but really wasn’t terribly capable or terribly smart. Thing is, 72 years after he entered the Oval Office he is looking increasingly like a strategic genius.

One of the things Eisenhower pointed out was not simply the danger of deterrence of a great power with conventional arms, but the associated run-away costs and the concomitant growth of a massive bureaucracy that would weaken the essence of a true representative government… 

The idea that a large and technologically advanced military could deter another great power was, and is, a great attraction. After all, no one wants to actually use nuclear weapons. And new technology is exciting and the purveyors will explain in detail how this new technology will solve a plethora of problems. But, in fact technology is not a panacea and there are very few battles in history in which technology has been the deciding factor. In fact, it is worth looking at one of the instances often referenced as a demonstration of the value of superior technology to see what it might reveal.

The Battle of Tsushima straight (May 27-28, 1905) was one of the more lopsided victories in the history of naval warfare. Much is made of the fact that the Japanese had better ships with better armor and better engines, better guns - with higher energy propellant and higher energy explosives, and better command and control.

All of this is true, yet, the Russians were able to get the first hits of the battle. More telling was the very poor material condition of the Russian ships (after 7 months at sea), the poor training in gunnery, and the very poor senior leadership. Add to that a navy essentially devoid of any naval traditions, lacking experienced leaders, and suffering from overall poor morale and you have all the ingredients for a massacre. In fact, the results show the complete mismatch - far more than a simple problem of less capable ships.

Japanese losses were 117 killed in action and 3 torpedo boats lost. Russian losses included 7 battleships sunk and 4 captured, along with 14 other ships sunk and 3 captured, and more than 5,000 killed. The commander of the Russian fleet, Admiral Rozhestventsky, was himself captured. 

With the benefit of 20-20 hindsight it’s clear that the better leadership, better training and the high standards of maintenance and readiness of the Japanese fleet were the real keys to victory. The Japanese navy was more willing to exploit new technology, and to accept more risk - the use of more powerful propellants and more powerful explosives as a case in point, but these are as much leadership issues as technology issues: senior officers who embraced change, new technology, yes, but also new training and tactics to exploit that technology.

The point is, new technology is nice to have. But it was and is by no means sufficient to achieve victory. We need to remember that as we eye the Chinese navy. We all need to be aware that just because they have new ships, they are not ten feet tall. Do we understand them? Do we know the places where they are 10 feet tall - there are those places, but also the places where they are only 4 feet tall? 

But, that is tactics and technology. And while this is a necessary part of every great power national security training, tactics and technology are not sufficient to deter a war, and certainly not sufficient to win a war. As demonstrated by the less than stellar US success at true victory in wars since World War II, tactical success is not a guarantor of strategic success - nor has it ever been.

It’s worth remembering, for example, that Hannibal won every engagement with the Romans for 17 years, only to be drawn back to North Africa and defeated more by chicanery than force of arms. In that sense, World War II in both Europe and Asia was a an aberration in providing such a crystal clear answer to the question: “Who won?”

Consider another great naval battle, also a little over 100 years ago, that also taught some lessons that bear repeating. 

On the 31st of May, 1916, the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet squared off against the Imperial German Navy’s High Seas Fleet. The Germans had better ships: better armor, better overall design, better engines, better guns, and better gunnery. Their leadership was at least as capable. During the battle they inflicted more damage on the Royal Navy than they suffered. Yet, the aftermath of the battle was that they never again sortied from port as a fleet, never again challenged the Royal Navy for control of the North Sea and, in the end, the High Seas Fleet (if not the U-Boats) accepted the Royal Navy's blockade of Germany’s ports. The High Seas Fleet - and the leadership in Berlin - let their tactical success devolve into a strategic failure.

Jutland left in its wake a long list of “lessons,” most of which have been, and will continue to be, ignored. Perhaps two of the most significant are these (from Andrew Gordon’s masterpiece “The Rules of the Game”):

In times of peace, empirical experience fades and rationalist theory takes its place

The advent of new technology assists the discrediting of previous empirical doctrine

Naval theorists following WWI have credited Jellicoe (Overall Royal Navy commander) with a strategic insight that he may or may not have had. But his very conservative policy did, it the end, achieve the desired result: the British maintained sea control, irrespective of whether he stumbled into it or not.

As was said by one of the great naval strategists:

“The sterile glory of” of fighting battles, and still more of running risks, the object of which is not worth the possible loss… it can be attained equally well by other means , the battle fleet should be preserved as both a political and military factor of the first importance.” 

The speaker is A. T. Mahan, the “it” he refers to is sea control. 

Mahan, speaking in the aftermath of Jutland, was making a case for placing strategic interests ahead of the idea that the right battle fought at the right place with the right weapons would decide the war. In fact, clear goals, and a clear strategy must come before, and have priority over, technology and tactical assets. In every case it is necessary to keep strategic goals - and what really are grand strategic goals - the political and economic goals of the nation - at the forefront. Military goals follow from these. And as Eisenhower pointed out, a great power simply cannot afford to maintain a conventional (non-nuclear) force that is adequate to deter anther great power, particularly in cases in close proximity to that other great power. The only way to achieve such deterrence was with what became known as the US nuclear umbrella. And Eisenhower made this case while US defense spending was nearly 10% of GDP.

What does all this mean?

It means we need to ensure that the US “nuclear umbrella,” that is, the battle field nuclear weapons force, are modernized and credible, and understood by our possible adversaries as modernized and credible; that US forces - Navy, Air Force, Marines, Army, - train with, and in certain cases, deploy with, these systems and the world knows they train with these systems - and strongly suspects they deploy with them.

It means that US conventional forces are well trained, well led, and maintained in a high state of readiness. Training needs to be aggressive and understood to be aggressive. Leadership needs to be tough and willing to take risk. 

This must be done with enough clarity that it is all understood by potential adversaries. They must understand that fighting the US will be a very hard fight under any circumstances. They must also understand that there is a seamless transition from conventional forces to theater nuclear weapons. It must be clear that there is a line they must not cross, but it must be, essentially impossible to find the exact seam. That we will use the weapons must be clear and unambiguous; when precisely we will use the weapons must remain ambiguous.

And in the case of China, we must remain focused on one thing: the real goal here is to deter China - we do not want to get into a fight with them and beat them, but we will not simply avoid it at all costs.