Whither Ukraine 

I spend a good deal of time trying to make sense of the war in Ukraine. Over the course of the last 28 months the war has changed, expanded, and is slowly but surely escalating as more and more ideas are creeping into planning cells: leaders in France, Poland and the Baltic states have suggested that they are willing to send troops into Ukraine, Ukrainian forces have begun to strike Russian infrastructure targets just as Russian strikes continue to damage Ukrainian infrastructure targets, consideration is being given to Ukrainian Air Force aircraft - in particular the soon to be delivered F-16s - being maintained at Polish Air Force bases, with the inherent risk of accidental escalation, etc. And beyond all that, the ongoing, ever-rising casualty count.

The latest casualty estimate - not from Kiev - suggests Russia has suffered some 55,000 Killed In Action (KIA), though that number may be as high as 85,000. This would expand into some 200,000 - 300,000 wounded in action (WIA).

At the same time, Ukrainian casualties are of the same scale, certainly over 40,000 KIA, and it could easily be more than twice that, also with 3 to 4 times that many WIA. Remember, Russia has a population 4 times that of Ukraine, and Ukraine’s demographic trend lines - prior to the war - were substantially worse than Russia’s.

This week President Zelenskyy suggested that before the end of the year he will have a plan to achieve peace. At the same time he commented that the war must not be allowed to go on, that Ukraine has already suffered too many casualties. What specifically he means by that isn't clear, but looking at the increased effort to mobilize the nation, it's possible that the Ukrainian population is approaching some sort of demographic  “knuckle in the curve” beyond which it will be increasingly difficult to meet the demands of the army for new troops.

This demand has come in the wake of the lessons learned from last summer’s offensive, and the gruesome grind of Russian forces as they inch westward. Russian forces in the south have recovered a significant number of the trench lines they were pushed out of last June and July, and in addition Russian engineers have been building new and improved fighting positions and trenches across much of occupied Ukraine. Ukraine has reportedly become the most heavily mined terrain on the planet, which, given the density of mines in the DMZ in Korea, would represent some prodigious mining efforts.

Which means what?

Hard to say. Assuming the Ukrainian army has the additional 400,000 - 500,000 recruits, and the time to train them (6 months to a year), and they can neutralize Russian artillery and drones with their own artillery and drones, and the flow of ammunition to the front lines is sustained, then some future Ukrainian winter offensive might be successful in dislodging the Russians and forcing them to withdraw. But there is a long list of variables that makes any such prediction, without hard data on both your own capabilities and limitations, and the enemies, a fools errand. We shall have to see.

If Ukrainian casualties are, in fact as high or higher than Russian casualties, it’s very possible that a detailed assessment would yield essentially no meaningful chance of a successful counter offensive. 

Meanwhile, there is no real chance of a Russian “breakout” as the Russian army simply is not organized to execute such an operation even if the opportunity presented itself. What is left is a Russian army slow-crawling across Ukraine, and each town they reach is reduced to rubble. The Russian army is extremely unlikely to “win big,” or win in a hurry, but neither is it likely to lose.

And the Ukrainian army may be well be approaching a point inside of the next year that they will forced to change their policies because of manpower issues.

Where does that leave them? As I don’t know the real manpower numbers on either side, but knowing that Russia has a population 4 times that of Ukraine, and that, despite the bravado in the western press, Ukraine is suffering casualties of roughly the same magnitude as Russia, it’s difficult to imagine a dramatic success in the next year. 

What they are left with is the Korean peninsula solution: a ceasefire. Not a peace treaty, no relations with the other side, borders not agreed to, just "no shooting.”

Meanwhile, tomorrow will mark the 161st anniversary of the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg. The battle lasted for 3 days and in the end Lee was forced to withdraw southward. Union losses in the 3 days were 3,155 KIA, 14,529 WIA and 5,365 missing. Southern losses were 3,903 KIA, 18,735 WIA and 5,425 missing.

In A. L. Long’s “Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,” a story is related of wounded Union soldier on the battlefield as Lee withdrew on the 3rd:

"I was at the battle of Gettysburg myself. . . . I had been a most bitter anti-South man, and fought and cursed the Confederates desperately. I could see nothing good in any of them. The last day of the fight I was badly wounded. A ball shattered my left leg. I lay on the ground not far from Cemetery Ridge, and as General Lee ordered his retreat he and his officers rode near me.

As they came along I recognized him, and, though faint from exposure and loss of blood, I raised up my hands, looked Lee in the face, and shouted as loud as I could, “Hurrah for the Union!”

The general heard me, looked, stopped his horse, dismounted, and came toward me. I confess that I at first thought he meant to kill me. But as he came up he looked down at me with such a sad expression upon his face that all fear left me, and I wondered what he was about. He extended his hand to me, and grasping mine firmly and looking right into my eyes, said, “My son, I hope you will soon be well.”

If I live to be a thousand years I shall never forget the expression on General Lee’s face. There he was, defeated, retiring from a field that had cost him and his cause almost their last hope, yet he stopped to say words like those to a wounded soldier of the opposition who had taunted him as he passed by. As soon as the general had left me I cried myself to sleep there upon the bloody ground.”

There are all sorts of acts of barbarism in any war, and this war in Ukraine has seen its sad share.

If there is a realistic chance of actually winning this war without the risk of massive escalation, and if doing so will not destroy what is left of Ukraine, then fight on. But if not, and only those who know the real numbers can honestly answer that, if the likely result will simply be more fighting and more slaughter, and little gain, then there needs to be a ceasefire, sooner rather than later. 

It is too easy to forget one’s humanity, as that Union soldier almost did. It would be worse if an entire nation did. President Zelenskyy needs to take a hard look at the facts and make that call. The US and NATO will support him, but he and his people need to make that call.

 Strategic Vision in Wonderland  (From January 14th, 2024)

Alice: “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”

The Cheshire Cat: “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to.”

Alice: “I don’t much care where.”

The Cheshire Cat: “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go.”

From 1775 to 1783 the 13 Colonies were just trying to be free of England. It was a simple enough vision: independence. 

Following the war the vision shifted to anther very basic vision: just staying “afloat,” trying to make some sort of nation function as a nation. 

We created a Constitution - a remarkable feat, a document that was the envy of the world for 220 years - and still is if you want the root explanation of why millions of people are trying to get into the US and not so much anywhere else. (How many people tried to sneak into China last year?) 

Then we had to fight for our survival again. And then we had a goal of taming this great continent - and that vision truly did override a whole list of other considerations. 

We also struggled - and finally succeeded - in ending slavery. 

With the closing of the frontiers in the 1890s our vision changed, perhaps the most successful changes in focus any nation has ever executed, without some great geopolitical catalyst to push it. Massive change in just a decade straddling the turn of the last century - led by perhaps the most energetic, and perhaps smartest, of our presidents. The US assumed a new vision, America taking a leadership roll on the world stage.

And we did. And that role was critical in the next great goals or visions: Win World War I, then prepare for - and win - the next Great War (from a strategic perspective everyone who was thinking about it knew WWII was coming) and we reached that goal, we achieved those visions. 

Then came two great visions: first, the vision of a world free from communism (really, the USSR), and the space race. Again, both visions were achieved.

In each case the grand vision “percolated down” to the individual and was transformed into something that was personal - everyone saw, at least to some small extent, that they were part of this great challenge, this great adventure.

What is the lesson learned? Simply, the United States has benefited for most of its existence with an obvious grand goal in mind, and that goal has provided enough focus that other problems - and some have been severe - have been overcome or pushed aside.

Then the Soviet Union went away and the space race had not only been won, what remained was boring to most people, except when there was a tragedy.

But since the USSR broke up the US has lived in a strategic vacuum. The nation has no clear goal, no electrifying vision, poor leadership, and a distinct lack of visionaries in Washington. During the 90s there was a seeming lack of any effort to construct a meaningful grand vision and hence grand strategy to achieve that vision. Arguments among the doyens of US foreign policy seemed to focus on whether in fact history had ended, that “liberal Government" - legislatures and market economies - were now the accepted forms of government. Everything else was given short shrift. 

And since the end of the Cold War the US has had no great vision. The 1990s, a strategic vacuum, was followed by 2001 and 20 years chasing terrorism and trying to bring peace to the Mid East. 

In short, since 1990, with a few minor exceptions, the US has been reacting, not acting, following the violent and chaotic events caused by civilizations grinding against each other, never staking out any great vision, never charting an independent course; always following world events, never leading them..

And so here were are, having left Afghanistan, we watch central Asia deteriorate. Time-late efforts at deterrence failed in Ukraine, and 2 years later we are watching war rip apart that country, and we still have no plan, because we have no clear goal. Our leadership has made a point of saying that it’s up to Kiev, we are with them to the end.  That’s not leading; we’re following them. Those are the words of a second tier nation, not a great power, and certainly not a superpower. 

Israel, once one of our closest allies, finds itself in an existential struggle and we find ourselves giving them weapons on one hand and confusing advice on the other.

China keeps expanding (as it has for 30 years) and we find it difficult to marshal the gumption to kick start our industries to deter her aggression.

A rag-tag group of terrorists, backed by Iran, upset global maritime trade, we find ourselves in another war, and again reacting, not acting.

It might help if we asked why should we care? Like Alice, we don't seem to care where we are going. So, like Alice we’ll be led by events, not lead them. We will be a re-actor, not an actor.

Where does that leave us?

In the short term it means that we are going to find ourselves responding to events and that means almost assuredly we will be surprised. 

But more to the point, it’s going to mean that getting out of any of these situations is going to take longer, be more expensive, and will probably be much more destructive.

Is there a way out? Sure. We need to begin a national dialogue about what is next for this country, a goal that’s worthy of a great nation and a great people, a goal outside ourselves, a grand goal. Begin by asking a simple question: What do we want?

Or we cannot care, we can continue inside the strategic vacuum.

Problem is, the rest of the world will fill that vacuum. And we probably won’t like how it’s filled.

 June 28th, 2024

1914 - Assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife Sophie (Archduke Franz Ferdinand Carl Ludwig Joseph Maria of Austria) 

Overall 

Ground Operations - Marginal Russian gains continue

Air Operations - F-16s - Manage expectations

Politics and Diplomacy

Weather

Kharkiv

83 and partly cloudy, gusts near 20. Sunny for the next 4 days, lows in the upper 60s, highs near 90. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

84 and mostly cloudy, gusts near 20. Partly cloudy tomorrow, then mostly sunny for several days, lows in the mid 60s, highs near 90. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

90 and sunny. Sunny for the next 4 days, lows in the 60s, highs in the upper 80s to 90s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations 

North of Kharkiv

Fighting was reported near Lyptsi and Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv) and in Vovchansk (north-east of Kharkiv), but there were no confirmed charges to the line. Of note, Ukrainian commanders continue to report that Russian engineers are digging defensive positions across the area.

Russian special operations personnel raided across the border near Solnytskyi Kozachok, about 25 miles north-west of Kharkiv, and about 20 miles west of the Russian positions inside Ukraine, due north of Kharkiv. The unit withdrew after a short fire-fight with Ukrainian border guard troops.

Donets River

Fighting continues along the line of contact, amidst unconfirmed claims of Russian gains north-east of Kupyansk, and Ukrainian gains east of Terny.

Bakhmut

Russian forces made confirmed gains north of Bakhmut in the area of Siversk and Bilohorivka and may control the bulk of the latter town.

Fighting continues in the eastern-most sections of Chasiv Yar; it appears that the Ukrainians have pushed the Russians back from the section of the Donets canal that runs through this section of the town. At the same time, Russian forces have begun to use thermobaric rounds in the artillery (rocket) fire into Chasiv Yar.

As noted earlier, in many of these towns the Ukrainians have taken medium sized apartment buildings (5- 7 floors) and reinforced them, making them essentially into 50 foot tall pillboxes and observation posts. These positions have proven to be very tough to defeat (Vuhledar is a particular case in point), but use of a thermobaric round (also known as a fuel-air explosive (FAE)) may well be able to clear one of these vertical bunkers without having to bring it down.

Further south of Bakhmut, in the general area west of Horlivka, Russian forces claim to have entered into the south side of Niu York and are pressing on  the east edge of Torestsk, but these gains have not been confirmed. These operations are likely meant to “straighten the line” of terrain held by Russia, preventing the development of a salient between Bakhmut and Donetsk City, but Niu York has extensive defensive positions; this will be a long fight.

Donetsk City

Russian forces continued to grind out small gains west of Avdiivka, with gains noted around Karlivka and north of the Karlivka reservoir. Specific reference is made to hard fighting north of the reservoir and the two water features (reservoir and the Vovcha River) represent an opportunity to bottle up one part of the Russian push westward.

Other fighting and marginal Russian gains were noted north and north-west of Avdiivka.

South-west of Donetsk City fighting continues in Kostyantnivka, Krasnohorivka and Heorhivka, as well as in the general Vuhledar area; Russian forces appear to have made small gains in both Konstyantnivka and Krasnohorivka.

Velyka Novosilke (VN)

Fighting was reported north of Staromaiorske and Urozhaine, but there were no changes in positions held by either side.

Orikhiv

Fighting continues north and north-east of Robotyne, but there were no changes noted in positions held by either side.

Dnepr River

Fighting was reported around Krynky, and near the ruins of the Antonovsky bridge, but there were no confirmed changes in terrain held.

Air Operations

Russian forces launched 4 x Kalibr cruise missiles, 1 x Kh-59/69 cruise missile, 1 x Kinzhal ballistic missile, and 23 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space yesterday, with reportedly many of these assets targeting Ukrainian air fields (See my thoughts, below). The UAF claimed it shot down all but the Kinzhal missile.

This morning the Russians launched at least 1 x Iskander M ballistic missile, with cluster warhead, into the Odessa area; the UAF claimed the cluster munitions landed in a field, started small fire but were otherwise ineffective.

MGEN Jan Dam, Chief of Staff of the Danish Air Force, commenting on F-16s for Ukraine:

"There are very high expectations for these fighter planes. And we probably have to be more realistic there. The F-16s will certainly have an impact, but it won't be a game changer. Neither this month nor the coming months.”

"My recommendation to the Ukrainians is to become really good at using these planes before they carry out any risky missions. And I am talking to the head of the Ukrainian Air Force about that.”

“…they will still need lots of training in Ukraine. And it can take months and years before they create a decisive operational effect.”

"Right now they are practicing night flying, even though we are in the middle of the shortest nights of the year. But we simply have to do that in order to get through the program.”

MGEN Dam noted that it normally requires 3 - 4 years in the aircraft to become a competent F-16 pilot.

Maritime Operations 

File under Blinding Flash of the Obvious: President Putin met with his Defense Ministry to discuss shipbuilding and other naval issues. Putin pointed out the need to equip Russian navy ships with defense systems - hard and soft kill - that can defend against drones - UAV, USV, UUV, as well as the need to improve defenses at naval bases. 

Of note, the Russian navy will reportedly take delivery of 40 ships and patrol boats this year.

Politics and Diplomacy 

Despite earlier reports, there is no evidence that North Korean engineers are now or have been operating in western Russia or in Ukraine in support of Russian combat operations.

The director of the Ivano-Frankivsk administration (in western Ukraine), Svitlana Onyshchuk, commented yesterday that the Burshtyn Thermal Power Plant (TPP) cannot be repaired and is a total loss.

"More than 12 attacks were directed at our energy facility, and accordingly, all services also worked every time. But for a certain period of time, we understand that the Burshtyn TPP cannot be restored. It is extremely badly destroyed.” 

The TPP was struck repeatedly over the winter, the last strike being in March.

The Czech Republic is looking for more donors to aid in their plan to purchase 155MM howitzer rounds for Ukraine. 18 countries are now signed up, with a goal to raise enough money to send 1 million rounds to Ukraine; the first shipment reached Ukraine this week.

Two years ago 155MM shells cost about $1100 apiece. Latest prices are in the neighborhood of $3,500 apiece, making a purchase of 1 million rounds a $3.5 billion effort.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Sep8 Feb8 Apr8 Jun7 Jun27 Jun28

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      90.95   80.93 90.13 80.06 85.60 86.71

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      87.77   75.49 86.13 75.81 81.22 82.11

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15        2.63       1.95 1.83 2.82 2.77 2.75

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      98.11     91.09 92.69 88.77 85.92 85.27

Wheat     8.52        12.94    10.71    6.17        6.00     6.02 5.67 6.40 5.59 5.80

Urals 56.56     74.34    66.28 77.31 67.61 67.61 67.61

ESPO   67.02     80.88     74.85 85.96 74.63 79.90 80.25

Thoughts

The Russian strike on air bases in central and western Ukraine received a good deal of coverage. How many rounds actually hit, and damage done, is still not clear. But targeting air bases is hard. Obviously, hitting the aircraft itself is desired but aircraft are easily moved. Cratered runways can usually (not always) be repaired quickly. Hitting tool sheds, parts warehouses, engine test facilities, etc., can yield more satisfying results, as also with a strike on ammo and fuel bunkers, or an attack on barracks for flight crew and maintenance personnel.

This leads to the obvious solution of performing maintenance in Poland or somewhere else in Eastern Europe. Might they then be attacked there? Sure. The USAF flew aircraft out of Thailand, over Vietnam, for 15 years and there were a number of attacks by the North Vietnamese, mainly attempts to sabotage aircraft. Today, drones would probably be more effective. But, if Ukraine does place aircraft in Poland, we should expect some sort of response by the Russians.

As for the F-16s (there are a few folks on my distro who know far more about tactical aviation than I ever will - I apologize ahead of time!)

So, two thoughts from two friends, one an F-15 guy, Red Flag instructor, etc. “Up to the 3rd generation of jet aircraft you could, if you were a good pilot, and had a good deal of experience, catch up to the airplane. As the 3rd generation (early F-15s, F-14s, etc.) aircraft became more sophisticated you reached a situation where the airplane was sophisticated enough that you could find yourself trying to catch up and never quite do so. By the time you got to the 4th generation aircraft, such as later models F-16s (or F-16s with the latest software), F-18s, etc., even a very experienced pilot will find himself trying to figure out what the airplane is doing if he isn’t studying the airplane and the mission all the time. It is very easy to be behind the airplane all the time.”

The second thought is from another friend, another phenomenally capable pilot - F-14 guy, who commented one day to a group of junior officers: “You now have 500 hours in the airplane, you think you know the airplane; you are now entering the most dangerous period of your flying career because you aren't as good as you think you are.”

Both these thoughts occurred to me as I read an account of Ukrainian pilots in training to fly the F-16, alongside MGEN Dam’s remarks. Besides the fact that all the training is in English, they are still not quite ready. Basic flight in the airplane will take relatively few hours. But learning how to use the airplane effectively will take many hours and a good deal of effort. Getting pilots capable of using the full capabilities of an aircraft means hundreds of flight hours, plus simulator time, plus study. While the public perception is that new aircraft are so sophisticated that anyone can fly them, the reverse is true: they are so sophisticated that to properly employ the aircraft, its systems and the associated weapons is a task that requires constant study and effort on the ground and detailed preparation before every flight.

And that does not account for the threat.

Early in WWII flight training for a bomber pilot was 10 weeks and 75 hours each for primary, basic, and advanced - so, 30 weeks and 225 flight hours if there were no mistakes - and there were always mistakes. Then pilots were sent to learn how to drop bombs. A year after starting, they were sent overseas to become co-pilots in a flight crew and integrate into the squadron, with more training to come. This was all lengthened in 1944 by 50% when we could afford it. And while the B-17 was a complicated aircraft for its time, it is substantially less sophisticated than a modern fighter aircraft. 

v/r pete