July 22nd, 2025

Politics  - Ukraine - Russia talks - 23rd, Istanbul 

- More support - Patriots - for Ukraine 

- $120 billion for 2026

Combat Ops - Russian Gains

- Drone Strikes continue 

Weather

Kharkiv

85 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Scattered thunderstorms tonight and tomorrow, then partly cloudy rest of the week. Daily lows in the mid 60s, daily highs in the low 80s. Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

92 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Mostly sunny all week, daily lows in the mid 60s, daily highs in the 90s. Winds variable, 5-15kts.

Kyiv

81 and partly cloudy, gusting over 20. Rain and thunderstorms tonight and tomorrow, partly cloudy rest of the week, daily lows in the low 60s, highs in the 80s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.

Politics 

The Ukrainian government announced that Germany will transfer 5 x Patriot systems to Ukraine “in the near future.” Again, it is not clear exactly what is meant by a “Patriot system,” but it appears that the intent is to send full systems, with full ammo loads. A full Patriot battery (US Army standard) includes a radar van, a command van, several power and support vans, 8 launchers, and 162 missiles, and costs roughly $1 billion. Various NATO members have batteries with from 4 to 8 launchers. Also, improvements and upgrades, there are now 3 different radars available - depending on year of purchase and what upgrades have taken place; again, it isn’t yet clear what will actually be transferred.

Germany will also transfer 200,000 rounds for the Gepard 35MM vehicle mounted cannon. Gepard has had some detractors (it is, reportedly, difficult to reload), but it is also reportedly very effective against the various Russian drones such as the Shaheds) 

There were also reports of money transfers from Canada ($14.6 million), Netherlands ($380 million) and Norway ($1.7 billion). Ukraine has stated that it will need $120 billion in defense spending for 2026.

Investments will be used to increase the output of the Ukrainian defense industrial base. Ukraine (and Russia) continue to increase their small drone production capacity. Russia produced over 2 million drones last year, Ukraine slightly less. But Ukrainian sources suggest they will produce 4.5 million in 2025 and that capacity by the end of the year will exceed 10 million per year.

Ukraine proposed a third round of talks with Russia, in Istanbul, to begin tomorrow (the 23rd). 

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting continues along about 18 - 20 miles of the Russian - Ukrainian border, where Russian forces have occupied a strip roughly 4 - 8 miles wide. There is also a continued engagement in the vicinity of Tetkino (about 25 miles north-west of Sumy City), on the Russian side of the border. The front line continues to slowly shift back and forth, and Ukrainian forces took back portions of 3 small towns in the last two weeks. These three towns have all been exchanged at least twice; whether Russia reinvests them or not, the Ukrainian commitment of forces to hold - or take the towns back - forces continual assessment of the trade off and opportunity cost, particularly as Russian forces continue their grind in the Chasiv Yar - Toretsk - Pokrovsk line.

Note that these advances are, as has become routine in this war, small, usually several hundred meters, rarely as much as a kilometer, and generally are more a function of moving from one tree line to another rather than any sweeping advance across any sort of terrain.

Also of note, Russian forces appear to have crossed the border near Bezsalivka (a small farming village of perhaps 15 - 20 houses, just inside Ukraine, about 5 miles east of Tetkino). What is interesting is that the Russians have again used a small river as a means of channeling their effort, following the small Volfa River line across the border. Here and elsewhere in Ukraine Russian forces have used rivers as a shorthand to define an effort, such as the case of the Vovcha, Mokri Yaly and Solane rivers south-west of Pokrovsk, the Oskil and Zherebets and Donets east of Kharkiv, and of course the Dnepr river.

North of Kharkiv fighting continues around Vovchansk, but there has been little change in the front line in that area.

Fighting also continues in and around Milove (about 25 miles due north of Kupyansk), a town which had population of 5,000 in 2020, and was the site of a railhead and numerous warehouses but now appears to be burned out.

Also, there is an unconfirmed report that the Russians have taken the village of Dehtyarne (less than 10 houses), a tiny “peninsula" of land that juts into Russia, about 35 miles north of Kupyansk.

NORTH OF THE DONETS

Fighting continues just west of the West Bank of the Oskil river, from the Russian border down to a point just north-west of Kupyansk. 

While there have been no confirmed changes in the lines for several days, Russian forces now appear to control all of the P-79 roadway north of Kupyansk, and fighting was reported about 1 mile north-north-east of Kupyansk, as well as on the very north-west edge of Kupyansk, just east of the town of Myrne.

South of Kupyansk, Russian forces continue to slowly grind forward; north-east of Borova Russian forces have made gains towards the Oskil and just north-west of Zelenyi Hai have now pressed to within 3.5 miles of the Oskil, even as Russian forces are now about a half mile south of Zahryzove, on the Oskil.

Further south, Russian forces are now about 3.5 miles west of Karpivka, and north of that town are beginning to try to slowly straighten the lines and close up would-be salients in the line, while south-east of that town fighting continues but with few discernible changes.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

Fighting continues east and north-east of Siversk, and there are claims of Russian gains near Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), but there are no confirmed changes to the line.

There has been little change in and just west of Chasiv Yar over the last 2 weeks, but south of Chaisv Yar there are reports that Russian forces have taken the small town of Bila Hora (about 3500 people in the last census) and further reports that they have pressed another kilometer west of Bila Hora into Oleksandro Shultyne. Bila Hora lies along the Balmutka River, a bit more than a mile north-west from Dyliivka, which was taken by the Russian earlier in July. This mainly cuts in half the pocket that exists between Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, as the Russians continue to “whittle down” the pocket on either side of Torestk, facing Kostiantinivka.

Further south, around Toretsk, Russian forces continue to grind out gains west and north-west of that town. Russian forces have pushed westward and now have full control of the roads that lead out of the pocket east of the Kleban Byk Resevoir, leaving Ukrainian troops east of the reservoir’s only withdrawal route a 2,000 foot wide piece of mostly open terrain (cut by two rivers) just south-east of the reservoir, and a similar, 2,000 foot wide swath of woods and marsh, also cut by a river, just west of the reservoir. How many troops are left inside the pocket west of Toretsk is not clear.

Further west (west of the T0504 roadway), Russian forces appear to have full control of Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and several other small towns in the general area, and have pushed further west, to the east edge of the town of Rodynske, and now can apply direct fire on the T-0515 roadway running north out of Pokrovsk.

In addition, this movement westward is creating another pocket, this one to the east of Pokrovsk.

Russian forces just outside of Pokrovsk made some gains into the town of Pishchane, just south Pokrovsk, and further to the south-west Russian forces continue operations around Udachne, cutting the T-0406 roadway that runs into Pokrovsk from the west. Overall, there is only one road into Pokrovsk that isn't either occupied by the Russians or under direct fire, the M-30 roadway that runs out to the north-west. This road is, however, under fire from drones.

The Ukrainian General Staff reports that Ukrainian forces have eliminated Russian sabotage and recon elements that trie to infiltrate Pokrovsk… What that means is that the Russian probes are now pushing into Pokrovsk itself...

South-west of Pokrovsk Russian forces have pushed west along the Solone river, almost to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, as well as on the north bank of the Vovcha,and have pushed into the town of Dachne, a bit over a mile inside Dnipropetrovsk. The near term effort would seem to be to press along the Vovcha and Solone until the two forces meet, creating another pocket, and then straightening the front lines again.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

South of the Vovcha and slowly arcing westward, Russian forces continue to probe, and there have been some small gains along the southern side of the Vovcha, and also at the other end of the line, where it appears that Russian forces have pushed through Kamyanske, along the Dniper River, and are now perhaps a mile north of that town.

Air Operations

During the night of July 21st - 22nd Russian forces launched 42 x Shahed drones, and the UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with EW 26 of the drones.

Damage from missile strikes was reported in Donetsk, Kherson and Odessa oblasts.

RuAF airstrikes were reported in Donetsk, Odessa and Sumy and 6 other cities.

A power plant in Kherson was reported to be on fire as a result of a Shahed drone strike, and Sumy was suffering from a power blackout.

During the night of July 20th - 21st Russian forces launched 5 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 4 x Kalibr cruise missiles, 1 x Iskander and 14 x Kh-101 cruise missiles and 426 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated with electronic warfare 403 drones and all the missiles. A total of 23 Shahed drone hits were reported in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.

Russian Air Defense claimed it shot down 132 Ukrainian drones Monday night, 40 drones Sunday night.

Russian reporting never includes the number of incoming drones or reports of damage, just the number of drones they claim they shot down.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 Jun9 July8 Jul22

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 66.80 70.44 68.26

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 64.89 68.65 66.14

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15    3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.69 3.35 3.24

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17     5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.49 5.49 5.50

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 79.27 78.47 78.50

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.55 41.80 41.75

Urals 56.56    68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 60.84 64.07 65.15

ESPO 71.50 70 48.90 63.97 71.58 71.21

Sokol 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 61.51 64.38 64.59

Thoughts

The Institute for the Study of War is suggesting that Russian leadership (Putin) will only consider a negotiated settlement if Russia suffers serious losses on the battlefield.

That may well be true, but it raises the obvious question: how would Ukraine inflict a major battlefield defeat on the Russians?

One of the reasons for the grinding war of attrition that the Russians have chosen to fight is that it is low risk. Lines move forward slowly, defenses are being constantly built and upgraded, defensive lines are moved forward, etc.

Last summer’s Ukrainian attack into Kursk is instructive: Ukrainian forces used 5 or 6 of their very best brigades, they attacked Russian border guard forces - light infantry with marginal training. The Russian high command let the border guards get badly handled and allowed them to slowly withdraw, while they shifted forces into the region. The Ukrainian attack slowed, never got more than 18 - 20 miles from the border at any points and then was slowly - 9 months - pounded into little pieces. 

In short, the Russians appear to have some idea how to trade space and time to slow an advance and prevent a major defeat. 

How then might Ukraine inflict a major defeat on Russia? The Russian Air Force got egg on its face, the Russian Navy has been rendered utterly irrelevant, but the Russian army grinds on…

I suppose it’s possible to put together a large ground force, with superior training and superior equipment, and make a bold strike into Russian occupied Ukraine and circle a large segment of the army. But what troops will they use? Where will they be trained? What prevents the Russians from slowly falling back - into well prepared defenses?

In the end, the manpower problem keeps reappearing. And the problem of training any large force isn’t far behind it.

And finally, if the Russians were on the verge of suffering some truly catastrophic defeat, wouldn’t Putin feel free to use nuclear weapons against this future Ukrainian army?

v/r pete