October 30th Russia - Ukraine
I am unable to pull together the full summary for the next 10 days but there are some developments and I’ve been talking them over with some smart folks so here are a few paragraphs to chew on.
A comment from BG Marchenko (Ukrainian Army) early yesterday (morning of the 29th) set off alarm bells, but they were to some extent expected; Marchenko suggested that the front south-east of Pokrovsk was collapsing:
"We all know, I won't reveal a military secret if I say that our front has collapsed. Unfortunately, the "orcs" have already entered Selydove and are entrenched there. I think that in the near future they will circle it and capture it completely, which will give them a tactical exit to Pokrovsk.”
Marchenko commented that the army suffered from lack of ammunition, insufficient manning, and "unbalanced management” - no elaboration on the last point.
By this morning it appears the Selydove has indeed been taken by the Russian army.
But the Russian army is gaining elsewhere, as well. In the “corner,” where the eastern front and the southern front come together (the town of Vuhledar), Russian forces are pressing northwards and westward, have captured 3 towns in the last several days and the reporting suggest they’re still moving, that at least at this point along the front that resistance has broken down and the Russian army is advancing steadily.
If this reporting is accurate, within several days here will be a “cauldron” holding a brigade or more of Ukrainian troops, circled by Russian troops, in the terrain (roughly) between Marinka, Kurakhove, and Yelyzavetivka, and the Russians will control the terrain east of the road from Kurakhove to Velyka Novosilke.
And north of the Donets River, Russian forces are pressing on Terny in the south and further north Russian forces west of Pishchane have reached the Oskil River and pushed south along the banks of the river and are now pushing into Zahryzove.
Nowhere along the front do the Russians appear to be losing ground.
Which warrants looking at what BG Marchenko said: there is a manpower shortage.
In the last few weeks as you’ll recall, the numbers have filtered out on Ukrainian recruiting, Ukrainian desertions, and Ukrainian casualties. Of course, it doesn’t matter how many losses you’ve suffered, if you still have enough people to man your units.
But an interesting number that I saw this morning is that the Ukrainian army is starting a recruiting drive to bring in another 160,000 recruits and that with 160,000 more troops they could raise their combat force manning to 85%, in an army currently of 1,050,000.
A “back of the envelope” calculation suggests that operational units in the Ukrainian army are currently manned at somewhere between 60 % and 70%. Anecdotal reporting suggests the same thing. Further, very few of these units have had time “off the line.” Some, in fact, have been on the line, engaged in combat, for more than a year, with casualties replaced by raw soldiers who have never trained as a unit.
Mix all the rest of the numbers: Ukrainian casualty estimates - conservative numbers: 115,000 KIA, 550,000 WIA, 90,000 desertions, and with very poor morale both in the army and cross the country, and BG Marchenko’s comment that the front has collapsed is understandable. (These numbers compare to Russia’s of about 95,000 KIA and 350,000 WIA, and about 10,000 desertions.)
The high desertion rate, and the high casualty counts, explain the tremendous number of army recruit eligible ages men in Europe (more than 800,000) who are uninterested in returning to Ukraine. When Poland, in concert with the Ukrainian government, tried to generate enthusiasm for a Ukrainian - Polish legion this past summer, only 186 of those 800,000 expressed any interest at all in joining such a legion.
Said differently, morale is very poor. So, the fear now, of course, is that a front will break and the poor morale will make recovery of the line that much more difficult.
And this morning it appear that indeed, Selydove (about 10 - 12 miles south-south-east of Pokrovsk) has been taken by the Russians.
Taking Selydove sets the Russian army up to drive further west, to a position south-west of Pokrovsk, allowing them to attack the town beyond the heavy defensive lines to the east and south-east.
This will also further isolate the terrain between Vuhledar and Marinka.
What we can expect in the next few weeks - and maybe less if Marchenko was accurate when he used the term “collapsed” - is a further hard push by the Russians to push further west past Selydove while also straightening their lines to the south, closing up the would-be pockets west and south-west of of Donetsk City.
And there will be more “fierce” fighting along the Oskil and Zherebets Rivers.
The problem is manpower, as BG Marchenko said, but also policy: Ukrainian forces needed to build a strong defensive line deeper into the country and once built fall back and hold them. Instead, they tried to hold ground and traded casualties instead. The high command accepted the Russian way of war - attrition - and now it appears they may be running out of people.
v/r pete