OCTOBER 29th, 2025

Politics - Gripen’s for Ukraine

- Changes in Russia’s draft law

Combat Ops - Marginal gains

- Strikes hit Power Grid

Weather

Of note, cloud cover and rain showers continue to limit commercial satellite imagery of many areas, resulting in fewer confirmed changes on the ground, while also limiting effectiveness of reconnaissance drones and allowing more aggressive Russian operations.

Kharkiv

44 and cloudy. Rain tonight, rain again on Friday, mostly cloudy all week. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

52 and partly cloudy. Partly cloudy through the weekend, daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the low 60s.  Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

46 and cloudy. Cloudy for the next week, rain on Friday. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds westerly, 10-15kts.

Politics 

Yesterday President Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine has reached an agreement with Sweden to begin production of Gripen fighters inside Ukraine. He is also in talks with France covering the purchase of Rafael fighters.

Gripen is made by SAAB Aerospace  (SAAB AB - Svenska Aeroplan Actiebolaget - Swedish Aeroplane Company), is a "light fighter," (max take off weight of 36,000 lbs), was designed in the 1970s-1980s, first flew in 1988. The aircraft has been updated with digital systems, and future Gripens will be equipped with AESA radars, and can carry a wide range of current NATO weapons.

Of particular note, Gripen is noted for ease of maintenance and has the lowest cost per flight hour of any operational Western fighter, at $5,800 per hour (F-16 block 50 is $8,700 per hour, F-18 E/F is $13,600).

Russia’s Duma has passed legislation, effective January 2026, that will change the military draft process from a bi-annual event (April through mid-July, and October through mid-December), into a “round the year” process, with medical exams, psych tests, draft boards, etc. being conducted on a continual basis.

However, under the new law new recruits will still be transferred to operating units only twice per year(April - mid-July, October - mid-December).

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

There were no confirmed changes to the front line north of Sumy City.

Imagery of Vovchansk showed Ukrainian forces had gained ground in central Vovchansk. Central Vovchansk has been “exchanged” repeatedly during the last year and has been reduced to rubble.

There were no reported changes along the border north of the Oskil River.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER.

There were no confirmed charges in the line in Kupyansk or in the immediate area, though Russian sources claim some gains west of Pishchane (where Ukrainian forces were noted making gains several days ago). 

The Ukrainian government notes that fewer than 600 citizens remain in Kupyansk.

Further south there were claims of some Russian gains east of Borova, but these were not confirmed, nor were there any confirmed gains along the Nitrius River or north of Lyman or near Zarichne, though there are multiple Russian reports of gains west of Yampil and Zarichne. Some of this is probably the now regular “see-saw” exchange of positions and small gains “traded” between the opposing forces, but for the time being these changes provide no substantive change in the tactical situation.

There is an unconfirmed claim that Russian forces have cut the road between Lyman and Yampil (the T0513 roadway), which would be of note if it proved true.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

Fighting continues around Siversk but there were no confirmed changes in the front line.

South-west of Chasiv Yar fighting continues in and around Predtechyne (immediately east of Kostiantinivka). As noted yesterday, Ukrainian forces have pushed eastward and retaken the 10 eastern-most blocks of Kostiantinivka. This leaves the Russians sitting on the opposite (east side) of a large, open field, as well as in a small wood, just north of the T0504 roadway. But imagery does establish that Russian forces now control most of Predtechyne.

North of the Pokrovsk area, on the east side of the August salient, Russian forces pushed into the terrain east of Shakove in what was reportedly a battalion sized attack - a very large attack for this war (after the summer of 2023), which, according to Ukrainian forces included 29 armored vehicles (a mix of tanks and IFVs). Ukrainian for claimed they destroyed 2 tanks and 12 IFVs. 

Note that (depending on the country in question) a tank company has 10 - 12 tanks and 10 -12 IFVs, a full-up battalion, with 3 armored companies and several addition vehicles for the command element, might have 35 - 40 tanks and 40 - 45 IFVs, and 400 or so troops. This attack may have included a battalion command element, but was probably less than 2 companies of vehicles and troops. 

Around Pokrovsk, imagery confirmed Russian gains in south-east Myrnohrad, and unconfirmed reports suggest additional Russian gains in the north-eastern corner of that town as well. At the time the Ukrainian General Staff UGS) denied reports that any part of Myrnohrad was under Russian control. At the same time, the UGS did note Russian forces control parts of Pokrovsk.

There is an unconfirmed report that border guards and national police elements are being moved into the Pokrovsk area as there are no combat capable additional forces to reinforce the city.

Ukrainian reporting also notes that Russian forces now have direct fire or drone strike capability over all roads into and out of Pokrovsk.

Fighting continued west and south-west of Pokrovsk, down to the Vovcha River, but there were no confirmed changes in the front line.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Russian forces continue to attack westward along a north-south line extending from the Vovcha River to a point just east of Hulyaipole, but there were no confirmed changes to the line.

Further east, there was no confirmed change in the line of contact on the west end of the front line (west of Orikhiv), but imagery confirmed Russian recon elements inside Prymorske - about 2 miles north of the the previously assessed Russian controlled Prymorske train station, along the Dnepr River; Ukrainian forces were counter-attacking.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of October 28th-29th Russian forces launched at least 1 x Iskander ballistic missile and 48 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 26 Shahed drones. 

Damage was reported in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odessa, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Damage reported included damage to the power grid and the water system; the ballistic missile struck Kryvyi Rih, and multiple power outages were reported in most of these oblasts. This damage seems to broadly spread for a night with only 48 Shaheds.

Casualties reported included 4 civilians killed.

Note, a report from the governor of Zaporizhzhia claimed 396 Russian drones were launched into his oblast; this has not been reflected elsewhere.

During the night of October 28th-29th Ukrainian drones struck a chemical production facility in Budyonnovsk (200 miles or so east of the Kerch strait) and an oil terminal in Novospasskoye, Ulyanovsk Oblast (about 750 miles south-east of Moscow. There is no confirmed damage report.

TASS reported that Ukrainian drone strikes during the past week killed 20 civilians in Moscow alone.

During the night of October 27th-28th Russian forces launched 38 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 26 Shahed drones. 

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts. Damage reported included damage to natural gas infrastructure (pipes and pumping facilities).’

Economic Reporting

Feb22   July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct8 Oct28 Oct29

Brent      94.71    70.44 66.90 67.03 66.18 64.43 64.81

WTI     92.10    68.65 64.29 63.26 62.48 60.17 60.47

NG       3.97         3.35 3.06 3.12 3.44 3.34 3.27

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.18 5.22 5.06 5.33 5.32

Ruble     85          78.47 79.74 84.03 81.28 79.24 79.66

Hryvnia 28.6 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.48 41.97 41.98

Urals 91.66 64.07 63.17 60.12 61.15 58.86 56.92

ESPO 94.52 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.74 67.42 66.20

Sokol 99.31 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.91 61.92 60.87

Thoughts

Two items: Drone numbers, and Putin demands

An Ukrainian Forces spokesman claimed that in some portions of the front Russian forces enjoy a 10 to 1 advantage in FPV drones over Ukrainian forces. 

This hasn’t been confirmed and production numbers for each side aren’t clear; Ukrainian government statements claim that Ukrainian drone production is almost 100,000 drones per month; the only number that has been regularly repeated (and can be trusted at least a bit) for Russian production is that they are producing roughly 50,000 tethered drones per month; numbers for untethered drones is unknown.

Assuming the statement is roughly correct - that there is a substantial Russian drone advantage over Ukrainian forces, it still seems unlikely that Russian drone production has dramatically outstripped Ukrainian drone production, which is receiving substantive support from Europe and the US.

However, a combination of additional Chinese drones, as well as the demonstrable Russian advantage in electronic warfare (jamming) could result in an apparent numbers advantage in favor of the Russians, that is, when all is said and done, substantially more Russian drones are reaching Ukrainian targets than Ukrainian drones are reaching Russian targets.

But, this remains anecdotal - there are no hard, confirmed numbers as to drone production, usage or success rates.

Ukrainian sources claim that President Putin ordered that Pokrovsk be taken by mid November; referencing a Financial Times report that cited anonymous sources.

These reports surface regularly, that Putin has ordered a town taken by a certain data or some such thing, though the sourcing is invariably second or third-hand (or further removed). Perhaps he has given these orders, but in 3 years none of the “ordered” dates has come to pass, and it seems to be more propaganda from pro-Ukrainian sources seeking to discredit Putin or the Russian army than anything else.

Of course, it might be Putin puts markers out so that if he later wants to fire some generals, he has ready reasons to do so.

v/r pete  

 OCTOBER 28th, 2025

Politics - Russia, Ukraine exchange bodies of soldiers 

- US Ambassador calls for Hungary to end energy purchases from Russia

Combat Ops - Marginal gains by both sides along the front

- Fighting ratchets up in Kupyansk and Pokrovsk

Economy - Russia weakening?

Weather

Of note, cloud cover and rain showers continue to limit commercial satellite imagery of many areas, resulting in fewer confirmed changes on the ground, while also limiting effectiveness of reconnaissance drones and allowing more aggressive Russian operations.

Kharkiv

44 and cloudy. Rain Wednesday and again Thursday night, cloudy all week and into next week. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

49 and light rain. Mostly clear through the weekend, daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the low 60s.  Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

44 and cloudy. Rain tomorrow, cloudy for the next week. Daily lows in the 40s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics 

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted another transfer of soldier’s bodies, with Ukraine turning over the bodies of 31 Russian soldiers, Russia turning over the bodies of 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers.

If my math is correct, Russian forces have, since the beginning of the year, turned over the bodies of 14,067 Ukrainian soldiers, and Ukraine has turned over the bodies of 133 Russian soldiers.

Russia appears to have carried out a test of the 9M730 Burevestnik (NATO designation SSC-9 Skyfall) nuclear powered cruise missile. When operational, it will be nuclear armed as well. The missile has been flight tested at least 13 times since 2016, along Russia’s Arctic coast, with 3 successful flights (assuming this last flight was successful).

The missile flew 14,000 kilometers in 15 hours - an average speed of roughly 1,000 kilometers per hour - high sub-sonic.

Of note, the US had a nuclear powered cruise missile program in the 1950s, SLAM (Supersonic Low Altitude Missile, Project Pluto being the nuclear engine for the missile). The US missile was designed to fly at Mach 3 at very low altitudes (200 feet) and carry 16 nuclear warheads. The theoretical range was estimated at 113,000 miles (four-an-a-half times around the planet…). The project was canceled in 1964 as ICBMs became ever more capable and reliable.

Lithuania’s PM Ruginiene announced that Lithuania will begin to shoot down smuggler balloons that cross the border from Belarus.

EU Commission President von der Leyen called the balloons a “provocation” and “hybrid threat” and another reason for the EU “Eastern Flank Watch” and European drone defence initiatives.

US Ambassador to NATO Whitaker called on Hungary to stop energy purchases (oil and natural gas) from Russia.

"The United States expects countries like Hungary, Slovakia, and Turkey to develop a plan to wean themselves off Russian energy and implement it. You know, Hungary, unlike many of its neighbors, has not developed any plans and has not taken any active measures. Therefore, we will continue to work with them, as well as with their neighbors, such as Croatia and other countries that can help them wean themselves off Russian energy… [the US] is ready to help Hungary get rid of this dependence.”

Per a report in Bild, the EU was Russia’s 3rd largest trade partner in 2024, with 67.5 billion euros ($78.3 billion) in trade between the two. China led the list with $244.8 billion in trade with Russia, and India was second, with $130 billion in trade.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting continues north of Sumy City; during the last week, there have been marginal gains and losses by both sides but no real changes in the front line along the would-be Russian buffer zone north of Sumy City.

North and north-east of Kharkiv, there were as well no changes in the front line. Reporting does suggest that Ukrainian drone strikes on Belgorod Reservoir Dam has caused enough damage to force release of some water from the reservoir and that this has negatively impacted Russian logistics support as well as simple troop movement in the area to immediately west of Vovchansk.

As you will recall, Ukrainian forces used flooding and various water obstacles to good effect in the first few months of the war to restrict and channel Russian force movements.

There have been no confirmed changes along the border north of the Oskil River.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Russian forces appear to have made small gains further south into Kupaynsk and appear to have firm control over the city north of the P07 roadway, west of the Oskil River. Russian probes are now operating well into the south side of the city, perhaps 1.5 miles south of the P07 roadway, and Russian forces also appear to have made some gains west of Kupyansk, taking more of Myrne under their control.

At the same time, imagery confirmed Ukrainian forces gained ground east of the Kupyansk near Pishchane (9 miles east of Kupyansk). 

Further south, near the southern end of the Zherebets River, Ukrainian forces appear to have regained control of Zarichne, and the terrain just south of the town.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

North of Bakhmut, fighting continues south, east and north of Siversk but there appears to have been little change in the front lines in the last week.

Ukrainian forces regained terrain north-west of Chasiv Yar (just south of Maiske), what appears to be mainly trading control of farmland (moving from tree line to tree line). Between Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, Russian forces appear to have gained control of some land north and south of Predtechyne (east of Kostiantinivka) even as Ukrainian forces appear to have regained control of some land on the east edge of Kostiantinivka, in Predtechyne.

This is of note as there has been a bit of a propaganda “fight” as to whether the Russians had moved into and taken control over parts of Kostiantinivka, or whether it was only recon probes. It appears the former was correct, but that they have now been pushed out of the east edge of the city.

Just west of Toretsk, Russian forces appear to have made some small gains at the eastern end of the Kleban Byk Reservoir, but a Ukrainian element, of unknown size, continues to hold ground immediately south of the Reservoir.

West of Toretsk - north-east of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces have made some gains on Russia's August salient, squeezing the salient on both sides, and in particular gaining ground east of Bilytske and south of Kucheriv Yar.

At the same time, Russian forces appear to have shifted emphasis a bit and may be pushing more forces into the fight for Pokrovsk. Anecdotal reports suggest at least two additional brigades (and perhaps a third) have been moved into this fight, and Russian forces appear to have gained ground along much of southern Pokrovsk, as well as immediately to the north-east in Rodysnke, Krasni Lyman and just east of Myrnohrad.

Fighting continues along virtually the entire front line in this area.

What is particularly of note is that there are Ukrainian army reports of Russian forces in central Pokrovsk, noting that Ukrainian forces control the area north of the railroad station; the implication being that the city south of the station is now contested.

A good deal of this fighting, and the gains by both sides, is consistent with the fighting for the last 2 years, with a constant “see-sawing” of control of relatively small portions of land, or sections of towns. In the end, this continues to evolve as one would expect in a war of attrition.

South and south-west of Pokrovsk, and north of the Vovcha River, there were no confirmed changes in the front line.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

South of the Vovcha River both Ukrainian and Russian forces had confirmed gains.

Russian forces continue to press slowly westward, in particular gains north and south of Verbove, and north-east of Hulyaipole. Russian forces were pressing westward and had claimed - though it wasn’t confirmed - that they had control of Yehorivka. However, imagery over the weekend confirmed Ukrainian forces had regained control of the town; Russian forces remain just east of that town.

A bit further south, imagery confirmed Russian control of Pryvilne and Novomykolaivka (both about 9 miles north-east of Hulyaipole

Further west, west of Orikhiv, Ukrainian forces made gains in the towns of Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky.

Russian forces continue to conduct recon probes across the Dnepr into the general Kherson area; reports of large-scale Russian assaults across the river, and concomitant Ukrainian reports of large-scale casualties in these Russian forces both appear to be mainly propaganda.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of October 27th-28th Russian forces launched 38 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 26 Shahed drones. 

During the period from October 20th through October 27, Russian forces launched 29 x Iskander or S-300 ballistic missiles, 4 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 13 x cruise missiles of various types, and 984 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 6 Iskander ballistic missiles, 10 cruise missiles, and 633 Shahed drones. 

Damage from missile and drone strikes was reported across much of Ukraine, with the attacks focusing on the power grid and related infrastructure. Multiple power outages were noted across much of the country.

At least 5 civilians were killed and 29 wounded.

Russian drone and missile strikes to date have reduced Ukrainian natural gas production from 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year to just 8 billion cubic meters per year.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct8 Oct16 Oct28

Brent      94.71    70.44 66.90 67.03 66.18 62.25 64.43

WTI     92.10    68.65 64.29 63.26 62.48 58.62 60.17

NG       3.97         3.35 3.06 3.12 3.44 3.04 3.34

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.18 5.22 5.06 4.96 5.33

Ruble     85          78.47 79.74 84.03 81.28 80.47 79.24

Hryvnia 28.6 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.48 41.74 41.97

Urals 91.66 64.07 63.17 60.12 61.15 56.48 58.86

ESPO 94.52 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.74 63.71 67.42

Sokol 99.31 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.91 58.89 61.92

India’s oil refineries have not bought or bid for Russian oil after the latest sanctions. Reuters quoted one source inside the Indian oil industry as stating that:

"We have not placed orders yet for fresh cargoes and have cancelled some that were booked from traders with links to the sanctioned entities.”

A second source noted:

"We need to ensure that our purchases are not linked to sanctioned entities as banks will not facilitate payments.”

India represented approximately 40% of Russian oil exports so far this year.

The Telegraph is reporting that the Russian economy is weakening and that Putin fears a coup, noting that the economic troubles are now pressing on the average Russian as well as businesses, and in particular the cost of money is soaring, with interest rates of 14.5% and government bond rates of 15.2%.

Gasoline prices are up 40% since January.

President Trump noted to reporters that:

“All of a sudden this economy is going to collapse.”

Thoughts

There has been a good deal of talk about the Russian economy weakening, though I suspect some of the speculation is more wishful thinking than substantive analysis. And overall, economic forecasts have a long record of fair to poor accuracy.

Nevertheless, as was clear in the 2019 Rand Studies ("Overextending and Unbalancing Russia” and “Extending Russia” - and to which I have returned again and again since 2021), the most effective way to squeeze Russia was - and is - through energy pricing; lower energy costs (higher us oil and gas production levels). Making things more difficult, the Biden administration at first did not want to promote the US oil and gas industry, and much of Europe is still sending mixed messages, as they try, some would argue not trying hard enough, to wean themselves of Russian energy.

Thus, recent reports (noted above) suggest the economic crunch in Russia is getting worse.

So, here is one slice, a look at some numbers that might tell a slightly different story, showing the average price of gasoline (dollars per liter, as of October 20th, 2025), the average hourly wage as of December 31st 2024), and the number of hours of labor needed to purchase 100 liters (an arbitrary amount):

USA $0.90 $41.50 2.17 hours

Ukraine  $1.45 $3.85 37.66 hours

Poland $1.61 $9.86 16.33 hours

Belgium $1.79 $26.87 6.67 hours

UK $1.80 $21.10 8.53 hours

France $1.91 $18.80 10.16 hours

Germany  $1.91 $34.10 5.60 hours

Italy $1.96 $14.80 13.24 hours

Netherlands $2.25 $24.60 9.15 hours

Russia $0.79 $13.20 5.98 hours

Further, while Russia is engaging in creative financing for the war, many other governments have done such things in the recent past and still survived.

None of this accounts for the psychological impact on a citizen on Russia over the rising cost or the reason for the rising cost. But it does show that the numbers that are being used can be taken out of context, just as the question of Russian federal debt rising too quickly; Russia’s debt to GDP ratio has now reached almost 20% (some say the real number is closer to 30%). Of course, the US debt to GDP ratio is 124%.

And real wages in Russia are as high as they have ever been, and unemployment is below 3%. The economy may buckle; it probably will. But when?

v/r pete