December 1st, 2025  

Politics - Comments about the negations, but nothing definitive 

Combat Ops - Grind continues, little change on the ground

- Substantial drone and missile strikes over the weekend, power outages

 

Weather

Cloudy weather continues, temperatures still not cold enough to freeze the fields. Thick fog has been reported in the Pokrovsk area.

Kharkiv

37 and cloudy. Cloudy all week. Daily lows in the mid 30s, daily highs in the upper 30s. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

45 and cloudy. Cloudy all week. Daily lows in the mid 40s, daily highs in the upper 40s. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

37 and cloudy. Cloudy all week. Daily lows will be in the mid 30s, daily highs in the high 30s. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Politics

President Zelenskyy talked with UK PM Starmer and Ambassador Witkoff:

Zelenskyy comments to the press followed.

"Together with Emmanuel Macron - Keir Starmer was also in touch - we have just spoken with Rustem Umerov and Steve Witkoff following the talks in Florida. We agreed to discuss more details in person - the teams will agree on schedules for possible further contacts.”

"Frankly, the territorial issue is the most difficult. The issue of funding for recovery, in my view, without the involvement of our European partners, is neither simple nor easy, because the money is in Europe. I do not think this is entirely fair. And the issue of security guarantees, which is very important, specifically from the United States of America and specifically from Europe. So I would say these are the three main topics, the main components and at the same time the triggers. And we need to be very cautious here.”

Pres. Macron (France) and Pres. Zelenskyy spoke. Comments by Macron: 

"Today's meeting has allowed us to advance the consultation between all Europeans and to reiterate everyone's commitment to a just and lasting peace…security guarantees cannot be negotiated without the Ukrainians and the Europeans."

"The United States of America, Ukrainians, and all Europeans want peace. Russia must end its aggression.”

"Ukraine is the only one that can discuss territories, they are its own.” 

"Peace must become truly reliable. The war must end as soon as possible.”

EU ForPol Chief Kallas:

"I fear that all the pressure will be put on the weaker side, because Ukraine's surrender is the easiest way to end this war.”

Ambassador Witkoff will go to Moscow and meet with President Putin, tentatively on December 2nd.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting was reported in both border areas (north of Sumy City and north of Kharkiv), but there were no significant changes in the front lines. Imagery did confirm at least one Russian recon probe into southern Vovchansk.

Fighting was reported along the perimeter of the Russian occupied terrain just north of the Oskil River, near the Russia-Ukraine border, but there were no significant changes to the front lines.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues in and around Kupyansk; the situation remains quite confused, with Russian forces continuing to assert that they have control of much of the city and Ukrainian forces asserting pretty much the same thing. Trying to parse some sort of accuracy out of the various claims leaves this: the fighting is very hard, small Ukrainian and Russian elements are again mixed up in a sort of checker-board arrangement, and both sides are holding on like death to a dead mule. Drone and artillery support will be important, but this fight looks to go to the side that will commit the most men.

Russian forces continue to hold a small Ukrainian element (1 battalion perhaps) in a small pocket (about 2 miles across and a mile north to south) centered on the small village of Nova Kruhlyakivka, about 5 miles north of Borova, The pocket is just east of the P79 roadway (the road that parallels the Oskil river (on the east side of the river in this area)). Again, this is all manicured farmland, and the village has perhaps 25 - 30 houses, all strung out on a single street.

Further south, fighting continues around Lyman and near the south end of the Nitrius river; reporting suggests Russian recon probes into Lyman but there has been no change to the front lines.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

North of Bakhmut fighting continues on the south, east and north-east edges of Siversk, as well as to the north-west of Siversk, just north of the T0513 roadway that runs westward out of Siversk. But there are no confirmed changes in the front line, or in Russian holdings in Siversk, nor any clear indication that Ukrainian forces can no longer run supplies into Siversk along the T0513 GLOC.

South-west of Bakhmut, north-west of Toretsk, Russian forces continue to probe into Kostiantinivka from the south-east and there are unconfirmed reports that Russian probes have reached the rail yard which is crossed by the T0504 roadway. If so, that is of note, and will be watched.

There are indications that Russian forces now have a secure hold on both the east and west end of the Kleban Byk reservoir, which would isolate any Ukrainian elements remaining just south of the reservoir.

North of Pokrovsk Ukrainian forces pushed back into Nove Shakhove and claim to now control that town and Ivanivka (immediately south-west of Nove Shakhove). This puts pressure on the Russian forces that are trying to penetrate the Pokrovsk Pocket from the north, as well as Russian forces in Rodynske that are trying to keep the pocket closed. At the same time there are claims that Ukrainian forces have pushed into Rodynske and have regained control of part of that town as well.

In Pokrovsk itself, and in the pocket centered on Myrnohrad, there are a series of conflicting reports again suggesting a patchwork arrangement of Ukrainian and Russian forces. But in this case the Russians seem to have committed more forces; my count places 24 Russian brigades or regiments in Pokrovsk, around Myrnohrad, and in southern Rodynske. A fair number of those forces are facing north, against Ukrainian forces, but the preponderance of force in the city, and in the pocket, is Russian.

That said, Russian forces, contrary to some reporting, appear willing to use artillery and drones (and an occasional 500KG bomb) to work their way into those areas held by Ukrainian forces, keeping Russian casualties lower, even if it takes longer.

Further south and south-west of Pokrovsk, fighting continues around and in Novopavlivka, but there does not appear to have been a change in the front lines in that area. Just to the south-east, north of Dachne and east of Filiia, Russian forces continue to gradually straighten their lines and seize open farmland.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

From the Vovcha River southward Russian forces remain on the offensive. There were no confirmed gains (again, in large art due to the weather), but reports suggest Russian forces north of Hulyaipole continue to work westward to the Haichur River and small elements appear to have reached the town of Varvarivka. East of Hulyaipole Russian forces continue to grind forward, trying to clean out small pockets of Ukrainian forces; Russian probes continue into Hulyaipole itself.

Fighting also continues along the front line westward to the Dnepr River, There were no significant changes and again Ukrainian elements continue to hold onto positions as Russian forces push up on either side of them, leaving a series of small salients along the line west of Orikhiv. Assisting in this, reporting suggesting that fog has been very dense over the past several days.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of November 30-December 1st, Russian forces launched at least 89 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or otherwise defeated with EW, 63 drones. 

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv and Odessa oblasts. Targets included the power grid; there were power blackouts in Kyiv, and a partial blackout in Odessa.

At least 4 civilians were killed and 40 civilians were wounded in last night’s strikes. 

RuAF tacair conducted strikes on 10 towns.

From the night of November 25th-November 29th Russian forces launched at least 7 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 5 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 27 cruise missiles of various types and 932 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated with EW, 4 Iskander ballistic missiles, 1 Kinzhal ballistic missile, 14 various cruise missies, and 817 drones.

Damage was reported across virtually all of Ukraine, with multiple blackouts in major cities. At one point 400,000 homes in the Kyiv area were without power

Casualties included at least 3 killed and 52 wounded.

Some data on Ukrainian air and air defense activity in November:

Shot down or defeated 9,707 targets (compared to 11,269 in October):

- 26 x Ballistic missiles 

- 93 cruise missiles

- 9,588 drones of various types

UAF flew 368 total sorties, to include 200 air defense (anti drone), and 70 strike and air support missions.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Aug8 Sep9 Oct8 Nov7 Nov26 Dec1

Brent      94.71    66.90 67.03 66.18 63.86 62.27 63.38

WTI     92.10    64.29 63.26 62.48 59.94 57.25 59.54

NG       3.97         3.06 3.12 3.44 4.33 4.60 4.82

Wheat     8.52          5.18 5.22 5.06 5.32 5.39 5.36

Ruble     85          79.74 84.03 81.28 80.95 78.58 77.72

Hryvnia 28.6 41.39 41.23 41.48 41.89 42.28 42.33

Urals 91.66 63.17 60.12 61.15 56.56 53.78 54.42

ESPO 94.52 68.63 68.32 66.74 65.18 59.22 56.88

Sokol 99.31 62.57 62.97 61.91 60.71 59.30 60.43

Thoughts

The negotiations grind on, the fighting grinds on, and Europe looks and sounds less than competent. The comments by President Macron seem to be blindingly obvious, but don’t seem to advance the ball an inch down the field. 

Ditto for Starmer, Merz, von der Leyen and Kallas. 

Some observers suggest that Ukraine’s small successes show Russia’s victory isn’t given and Ukraine can still win. Yet Russia’s economy is not breaking. Still we are told Ukraine still can win, but no one says how.

A few months ago I sat down with one of my real smart Army pals and we talked about what Ukraine would need to militarily defeat Russia, particularly in light of Russia’s very slow, risk averse way of war, as well as their new “combined arms” concept that integrates drones, aircraft with stand-off weapons, 4th generation air defense assets, very good electronic warfare and cyber warfare, and a grinding artillery and infantry force. To defeat the Russians the Ukrainians have to develop a force that can defeat that.

I won’t go into the details, but a minimum force would be on the order of 300,000 and a combat support force of at least 200,000. That’s one planner’s take on the problem.

This is In Addition To the current army, who are needed to hold the line.

And this force would require advanced unit training for brigades and divisions. And so, the following - best - time line: training begins March of 2026. Force fully trained and ready: January 2027. The attack starts when the ground hardens - March or April 2027 - best case. Could Ukraine last that long?

And note, Russia get’s a “vote.” They could fully mobilize. They could invite in a Korean or Chinese army. They could use nuclear weapons… 

In the middle of 2022, as Russia struggled to transition to a new war plan, one of attrition, I commented that “If Russia solves its manpower problem, they’ll win this war.” By the end of 2022 it seemed that they had, even as Ukraine was pushing them back. It was the high tide of the war for Ukraine. A friend commented Ukraine needs to “sue for peace right now. After this, it will get worse.”

It has. Three years later it seems Europe and Ukraine are out of ideas, and Ukraine is slowly but surely running out of manpower; Ukraine is running out of time.

v/r pete 

 No Sense of Urgency

In 1938 Boeing began concept development, and the Army Air Corps ordered two prototypes in 1940 of the long range bomber. The first plane was flown in December 1942. By December 1943, 100 aircraft had been delivered, but only 15 were operational. Gen. Hap Arnold interceded and changes were made in the engines, and by April of 1944 150 aircraft were operational. The first combat mission was flown the 5th of June, 1944. The 1,000th B-29 was delivered in February 1945. By the time production ended, Boeing had made 3,970 aircraft.

In October 1939 Henry Kaiser called together members of 11 shipyards, as well as people from the Navy and various contractors, to study the plans of the Ocean class freighter, to simply, improve and standardize the design. In 1940 they began to build, in the next 4 years they not only trained a new work forces, they produced 2,710 liberty ships.

In November of 1954 the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force approved an idea that was one page of text long; in July of 1955 the first U-2 flew.

Design work for what would become the A-12 (from which was later developed the SR-71) began in 1957, and it first flew in April of 1962 (the SR-71 first flew in August of 1963).

Between 1940 and 1945 US shipyards built 15 Essex class carriers.

In 1950 concept work began on a nuclear powered submarine - the first nuclear powered ship. The keel was laid in 1952, launched in 1954, she left on her shakedown cruise in 1955.

USS Enterprise was ordered in 1957, the keel was laid in 1958, commissioned in 1961, and following a shakedown cruise, the ship deployed for the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  Yet, in 1996 I heard a brief for the yet to be built Joint Strike Fighter. The first flight was 2006 (10 years), the aircraft wasn’t operational until 2015. To put that in perspective, 10 years after design work began on the B-29 was three years after the end of World War II.

Consider the Zumwalt class destroyer: $22 billion for 3 ships that took 5, 6 and 10 years to build, only two of which have been commissioned, and the operational activities of the two ships has been, shall we say, thin.

The list goes on and on.

It has been argued by some that the US, the service staffs, have no forcing function - whether a hot war or the Cold War. If there were only a forcing function, then the system (and the system is the service staffs - Uniformed AND civilians, contractors, and unions) would respond. Really? How has artillery shell production, or Patriot missile production or a dozen other weapon production rates increased since the start of the war in Ukraine? The answer is: not well.

Who is to blame? The accurate answer is “they all are.” The service staffs, the contractors, and the unions, settled on a process that is nearly impossible to change, a very difficult process to really stop anything at all, wrapped up in clever manufacturing schemes that ensures that many, many congressional districts are involved in virtually any program at all. Larger programs often have hundreds of Congressional districts contributing to a weapon system. I heard of one large program that had parts from 400 Congressional districts. (This isn't new: the first six frigates made for the Navy ended up having parts from all 13 states…) So, there have always been problems. But “it’s always been this way” isn’t a viable excuse for messes like the Constellation class and its now quite necessary cancellation.

Things used to get done. But what we have here now is a strange acceptance of this process by the people inside it. They don’t want change, they seem to actively resist  change. And everyone, the contractors, the unions and civilians (especially senior civilians in the Pentagon) all share the blame.

But, that said, no one gets a larger share of the blame than the uniformed officers, the senior uniformed officers in the services. 

Many - far too many - admirals and generals have accepted all the praise, all the accolades, all the de facto hero worship that a grateful citizenry has given them. Concomitant with those accolades is a belief that our senior officers are the very essence of professionalism and devotion to duty. But their performance in all these programs belies that belief. By squandering not only money, but precious time, we - our nation - has lost opportunities to have the right ships, the right weapons, the right training for our forces, for the defense of the nation and the taxpayers for whom they all work. It is not too much to say that because of their at best passive acceptance, and certainly in some cases active agreement, in this process, that many have disgraced the uniforms they wear and dishonored the flag under which they serve. 

Yes, there are good admirals and generals out there. But there are too many who seem to view self and career as more important than the nation. How else can you explain a debacle like Afghanistan? The Ford class CV mess. The Constellation class, the LCS, programs all the way back to A-12. The debacle of Afghanistan is illustrative: it wasn’t simply 2021, it was years and years of operations that arguably left the nation no safer but expanded manpower and taxpayer dollars and resulted in two decades of strategic misdirection and lost opportunities.

Ask yourself this: in the last 25 years how many admirals and generals pushed back on waste or indolence or tried to make the system work and got steamrolled? How many questioned a strategy in the Mid East that led to tremendous expenses but in the end left us with something, well, let’s just say, well short of victory? How many oversaw procurement programs that dragged on endlessly and then took jobs with defense contractors when they retired? 

How many admirals saw the signs of trouble: ships not getting needed maintenance, aircraft growing old and worn, weapons stockpiles ever more depleted, and never pounded on someone’s desk, never gave clear honest answers when called to testify, who even thought of resigning in protest?

In the end, it devolves down to a finely developed, rationalized (what’s good for me is good for America) careerism coupled with no sense of urgency. The bulk of the 3 and 4 star officers of the US Navy, to include the last 4 or 5 CNOs, and the last 4 or 5 commanders of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), even though retired, should have letters of reprimand put in their official records. Thought should be given to reducing them in rank at least 1 grade. The civilian Executive Directors should be treated analogously. 

And then the senior officers, and senior civilians, the contractors, the union bosses need to have a fire lit under them. China’s navy is already larger than the US Navy and they are building ships faster than we are. Congress, and the Navy and the contractors are running out of time.

 NOVEMBER 28th, 2025 Abbreviated format today

Politics 

The negotiations continue. Of note, President Putin yesterday commented on the Trump Peace Proposal: 

 “In general, we agree that this can be the basis for future agreements.”

While this is of note, it isn't really clear that Putin is prepared to start talks based on the 28 point plan, or the revised 19 point plan that has been generated in Geneva, a derivative of the first plan.

The latest from Kyiv: President Zelenskyy’s Chief of Staff Yermak is resigning; President Zelenskyy stated: 

"I want no one to have any questions about Ukraine. Therefore, today the following internal decisions will be made: the Office of the President of Ukraine will be rebooted. The head of the Office, Andrii Yermak, has written a letter of resignation." 

Correction - the Witkoff conversation noted on Wednesday was with Putin’s ForPol aide Yury Ushakov, not Putin aide Kirill Dmitriev. Ushakov had spoken to Dmitriev, but Witkoff had not.

Combat Ops

Fighting continues along the essentially the entire line of contact. Russian forces had gains in several areas over the last two days, as did Ukrainian forces. But, in the key points along the front: Kupyansk, Siversk, Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole, while there were some Ukrainian gains, the tide is still in favor of the Russians. What is of particular note is that there seems to be a growing difference between what is being reported, a sort of “three-corner hat” of analysis. At one corner is the Kyiv “map,” at another corner is the map of what might be called the European “map" (the pro-Ukrainian analytic community), and at the third corner is the Moscow “map.” The differences have always existed but they seem to be growing. One blogger analyst suggested that the others are now in denial, and I think it is fair to say that one capital or the other is going to be shown to be clearly out of touch with the battlefield. Which one remains to be seen.

All that said, While there were minor gains by both Ukrainian and Russian forces around Kupyansk, south of Kupyansk, (north-east of Borova) a Ukrainian force of unknown size, probably about a battalion) appears to have been circled by Ukrainian forces, but they are holding their position.

Just a bit further south Russian forces appear to have made some small gains both on the east side of Siversk and west of that city,

But it is around Pokrovsk and around Hulyaipole that the Ukrainian forces are having trouble. There is a great deal of detailed reporting, much of it contradictory, but sorting through it all, and the various biases from both capitals, it appears that Russian forces control all of Pokrovsk except small, isolated Ukrainian elements scattered across the area. As for the Pokrovsk pocket, which now mainly consists of the city of Myrnohrad, it seems that, at a minimum, the last roads and paths out of the pocket are under direct fire from Russian artillery. And while there is not yet definitive proof, the GLOC was probably cut on Wednesday or Thursday; the pocket is closed. 

How many Ukrainian troops remain inside the pocket is not known, but speculation seems to cycle between 1,000 and 2,000 troops, elements of 3 different brigades.

Further south, Russian forces continue to press into open farmland and straighten their lines, and north of Hulyaipole the Russians continue to press westward. As with other cities, the actual front line in or through or around Hulyaipole is hard to know, but it appears that the Russians have taken the high ground east of the city, and have closed to the northern and north-eastern edge of the city. Probes continue into the city as do drones and artillery strikes. It is impossible to know, but it would seem Hulyaipole could fall during December.

Thoughts

There three overlapping issues here: the status of combat operations, the various versions of the Trump Peace proposal, and the growing corruption scandal, obviously make things very difficult for all concerned. My own sense is that the Ukrainian army is weakening, and that is a function of manpower losses that are overwhelmingly among the combat arms, and especially the infantry. The loss of perhaps a thousand combat troops (and maybe more) just underlines the problem.

The peace proposal machinations grind forward but there is reason to wonder what Putin “agreed” with: the 28 point version, or some version of the European amended proposal. My guess is that Putin is not going to accept any proposal unless it includes Donetsk, Luhansk and the current front line, and at the same time, no NATO forces stationed in Ukraine. The size of the army is, I think, not significant as Ukraine, a country of 31 million, will not be able to support an army of 800,000 or even 600,000. A force of 2% of your population is simply too expensive and could only be maintained if Europe paid the bill.

As for the corruption issue, there are three obvious schools of thought: 1) Zelenskyy is innocent of any corruption and he needs this investigation to proceed and ending the war might facilitate that; 2) Zelenskyy is involved so he would want to keep the war going so he remains powerful enough to keep his position; or 3) Zelenskyy is involved and he would want to use the peace process to gain immunity. 

Whichever the reality, Yermak has been his friend and closest advisor for years; the loss of Yermak is going to weaken him politically at least in the near term.

v/r pete