November 20th, 2024

Ground Ops  - Russian gains in Kursk salient

- Russian gains in south of Kupyansk

Air Operations - Minimal damage apparently on first ATACMS strike into Russia

Aid - New packages announced by Germany and US

Weather

Kharkiv

48 and cloudy, gusting near 20. Rain and windy tomorrow, temperatures in the 50s, then dips into the 30s and briefly clear on Friday, warms Friday and Saturday with more rain (into the 50s) and then by Sunday morning lows will be in the 20s, and highs in the 30s for a week or more. Winds variable 10-15kts, except tomorrow, with sustained winds from the south at 25.

Melitopol

50 and partly cloudy, gusting over 30. Rain tonight, tomorrow and again on Saturday.  Mostly cloudy for the next week. Tomorrow highs near 60 but dropping later in the afternoon and will reach 30 by Friday morning. Then heating up again, into the 50s on Saturday, but then drops once more and all next week daily lows will be in the 20s, daily highs in the 30s. Winds variable, 10-20kts.

Kyiv

50 and cloudy, gusting over 30. Rain - snow later tonight, continues into Thursday, then starts again Friday afternoon. Mostly cloudy for the next week. Temperatures dropping tonight; for the next week daily lows will be below freezing, wind chills will drop below 20. Daily highs will be in the mid to upper 30s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Ground Operations 

Kursk Salient

Russian forces continue to advance south-east of Korenevo, and imagery confirmed Russian gains near the town of Nizhny Klin. Further gains were reported due east of Korenevo, but were not confirmed. Russian bloggers are reporting that Ukrainian troops in the small forest due east of Korenevo (a forest that is perhaps 1.2 x 1.2 miles in size) are on the verge of being circled, and are trying to break out, and the Russian MinDef is claiming that Russian forces are already clearing it out, but this has not been confirmed.

North of Kharkiv

Due north of Kharkiv, just south-east of Hlyboke, imagery confirmed Ukrainian forces had advanced into the small woods in that area. Russian forces continued offensive operations in both small salients, but there were no confirmed gains.

North of the Donets River

Fighting continues along the entire line of contact, but there were no confirmed gains or losses by either side. Russian forces still hold a thin slice of eastern Kupyansk and continue to press on Ukrainian positions.

Further south, Russian forces appear to have solidified their hold along the Oskil Kruhlyakivka and are trying to press south. They now control a bit more than 3 miles of the river bank on the east side, and have pressed south past the bridge to Senkove (the bridge is down), and are trying to push into Kolesnykivka - the next town to the south.

Bakhmut

There were no changes noted north or north-east of Bakhmut.

Russian sources claimed some small gains in Chasiv Yar, but these were not confirmed by imagery. Ukrainian sources are reporting that Russian forces gained some ground immediately east of Stupochky, but this has also not been confirmed.

There were also no confirmed gains west of Horlvika, in and around Toretsk. Russian reporting however, suggests Russian forces may have pushed one or two streets further into central Toretsk. At the same time, it appears that the Russian forces are working to develop a pincer on Ukrainian positions to the north-east, attacking Ukrainian positions in Krymske from east and south. Fighting across the Toretsk area is said to be “very heavy.”

Donetsk City

Russian forces remains on the attack along the western and southern perimeters of the Pokrovsk salient but there were no confirmed gains. Reporting does suggest some marginal gains west of Selydove and elements of a Russian rifle regiment, operating west of Selydove, appear to be within about 1 mile of Zhovte, which, if accurate, places them about 5 miles due south of Pokrovsk.

  What appears to be hard fighting continues around the Kurakhove reservoir but there were no confirmed gains by either side.

Further south, in the area north and west of Vuhledar the fighting continues but there were no reports of gains or losses by either side. One fairly reliable blog - map does however reflect the north-west corner of the Russian forces pushing further to the north-west, with Russian elements now just 3 miles Bahatyr.

Southern Ukraine

Fighting continues south-west and south-east of Orikhiv as Russian forces continue to apply pressure on the towns along the T0812 and T0815 roadways. Further east, Imagery confirmed that Russian forces had seized Rivnopil, south-west of Velyka Novosilke, by some time before 19 November. Skirmishes and exchange of fire were reported along the Dnepr, but there were no changes along the Dnepr, and there are no Ukrainian elements on the east bank.

Air Operations

On the 19th the UAF launched 12 Storm Shadow missile into Russian air space but there is no report yet as to the target or the results.

Russian air defense assets claimed they shot down 44 Ukrainian drones last night. No word on how many drones were launched into Russian air space.

On the night of 18-19 November Russian forces launched 87 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down 51 drones, and 30 drones were “lost” (defeated by electronic warfare systems). 2 drones were reported to have struck an apartment building in Hlukhiv, about 50 miles north-west of Sumy, killing 12 and wounding 11.

The Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) damage assessment on the November 18-19 ATACMS strike into Russia begins with noting that there was a single initial detonation (presumably an ATACMS warhead) followed by 12 secondary explosions. This would suggest one ATACMS made it through the air defense system. The initial reports yesterday morning had noted “6 ATACMS" fired, later reports suggest perhaps 8 had been fired, with the UGS suggesting that the Russians had shot down 2, while the Russians claimed they had shot down 5 and damaged 1. 

The Russians also claimed that there were small fires but no casualties and no significant damage. It is not clear at this point that the facility suffered any damage.

It would seem in this case that the Russian claim was closer to the truth. 

Of note, Josep Borell, the EU High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stated that the US authorization for the use of US weapons in Russia stipulates that the Ukrainians strike no deeper than 300 KM into Russia. ATACMS has a maximum range of 300km (190 miles). The AGM-158 JASSM has a maximum range of 370KM (230 miles). Given that the AGM-158 is launched off an aircraft and there would be a buffer zone to keep aircraft from crossing the border (and entering into Russian surface-to-air missile engagement zones), a launch aircraft would be perhaps 20-30 miles back form the border at launch point. Said otherwise, the US limit will, at this point have little practical impact.

Aid 

Germany and the US both announced new military aid packages for Ukraine

The German package will include:

• 47 mine-resistant and ambush-resistant vehicles (MRAP)
• 4 Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers with spare parts
• 1 TRML-4D air surveillance radar
• 41,000 x 155 mm artillery shells
• 7 x M109 barrels
• 8 x Caracal assault vehicles
• 8 x combat engineer vehicles of different types
• 314 x reconnaissance drones of various types, with spare parts
• 26 other vehicle 
• 340 x HLR 338 sniper rifles and 74,000 rounds of ammo
• 8,000 x 40 mm grenades
• 100,000 rounds small arms ammo
• 100,000 occlusive dressings.

The US package, worth $275 million, will include:

• HIMARS ammo
• 155 and 105 artillery ammo
• mortar shells
• drones
• anti-tank weapons
• TOW anti-tank missile launchers
• small arms with ammo
• EOD equipment
• NBC gear

President Biden has also approved the transfer of anti-personnel mines to Ukraine. This has been widely condemned by a number of NGOs that oppose the use of anti-personnel mines for any reason.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Sep9 Oct8 Nov12 Nov19 Nov20

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 71.74 77.30 72.25 73.05 72.78

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 68.37 73.59 68.50 68.68 69.15

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.20 2.74 2.97 2.97 3.17

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.67 5.93 5.66 5.66 5.68

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 90.75 96.83 98.36 100.47 100.51

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.22 41.40 41.28 41.33

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 78.83 73.30 67.53 67.80 67.77

ESPO 65 77 77 77 77

Sokol 66.23 72.10 65.19 66.84 66.75

Thoughts

A few interesting statistics cornering the Donetsk Region and combat operations in the past several months: Between days 300 and 1000 of the war (the 19th of November) the Russians have captured 2,276 sq. km of Donetsk. Since August 1st, the start of the Kursk incursion, the Russians have captured  1,500 sq km of Donetsk. Between days 300 and 900 of the war Russian forces captured 776 sq km of Donetsk.

Further, Russian gains place them on the cusp of breaking through the last Ukrainian prepared defensive lines in the general area between Bakhmut and Donetsk. If they break through those defenses in the next several. Months there will be few defensive lines that the Ukrainian army can use to slow the Russian advance. 

At the same time, while there the Ukrainian General Staff claims massive Russian losses, the neutral (and even pro-Ukrainian, non-government) tracking of Russian casualties suggest that Russian casualties remain in roughly the 75 - 100 KIA per day, 300 WIA per day range, a number that is probably lower than overall Ukrainian daily casualty rates. 

Seen in that light, the Kursk incursion has been expansive to Ukraine and probably a substantial loss.

v/r pete

 November 19th, 2024 Lincoln Delivers Gettysburg Address

This day, 1863

Biden Decision - Ukraine may use US Weapons against targets in Russia

Ground Ops  - Russian gains in south-east

Weather

Kharkiv

35 and clear. Mostly cloudy through the weekend, rain or rain - snow mix on Thursday and again on Saturday, tapering off early Sunday morning. 40s to 50s Wednesday and Thursday, then dropping into the 30s on Friday. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

40 and clear. Mostly cloudy for the next 4 days, rain Thursday night and again on Saturday. Wednesday and Thursday lows in the 40s, highs near 60. Friday morning temperatures could drop to 30, then will climb again through Saturday morning, reaching the mid 50s, then will drop steadily and by Sunday morning lows will be in the low 30s. Winds variable, 15-20kts.

Kyiv

37 and mostly cloudy. Cloudy for the next week; Wednesday will be windy, winds over 20, rain or rain-snow mix starting Wednesday night and continuing on and off through Saturday morning. Tomorrow lows in the low 40s, highs near 50; after that daily lows will be in the upper 20s, daily highs in the low to mid 30s. By Friday windchills will be in the upper teens to low 20s. Winds variable, 10-20kts.

Strikes into Russia

President Biden has authorized the Ukraine to use US weapons to strike into Russia. The French and British governments initially commented that they had not yet provided a similar authorization, but it now appears that they have.

Ukraine then apparently used 8 x ATACMS in a strike on a Russian ammunition storage facility in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainians report that they launched 8 x ATACMS and that Russia shot down 2 of the missiles. Russia claimed it shot down 5 of the missiles.

A fire was reported at the facility but there is no comprehensive damage assessment yet.

Ground Operations 

Kursk Salient

Russian forces continued to make incremental gains in the Kursk salient, with small gains of terrain east of Korenevo and north of Sudzha. A Ukrainian force, probably consisting of a brigade sized element, remains west of Malaya Loknya but its line of communication with the rest of the Ukrainian forces and with Ukrainian territory is being pinched by Russian forces and is now no more than several thousand meters across.

Weather - low clouds - continues to reduce the effectiveness of drones and muddy roads are slowing movements on both sides.

North of Kharkiv 

Russian forces continued attacks in both small salients north of Kharkiv, but there were no confirmed gains; Ukrainian forces noted thick fog and Russian attempts to exploit reduced visibility.

Donets River

Russian forces noted gains at both the north and south end of the line of contact, with continued fighting in eastern Kupyansk, and there was “heavy” fighting noted on Dzerzhynsky street (the P07 roadway becomes Dzezhynsky street as it enters East Kupyansk). This means that the Russians have pushed south and east out of the positions they held near Petropavlika to the east, and in the woods to the north-east, and have raided forward perhaps 2 miles, which is probably a good indication of very poor weather and the ability to move without being detected by drones.

Further south, there has been no appreciable change in the terrain held along the Oskil River, nor, due east of Svatove, have the Russian taken any more land west of the Zherebets River, but they continue to pressure Terny from the north, trying to advance southward along the Zherebets River towards that town.

Bakhmut

North-east of Bakhmut, Russian forces had small confirmed gains south of Bilohorivka and also south of  Vyimka.

In the vicinity of Chasiv Yar Russian forces are now west of the Donets Canal just to the north, on the eastern edge and to the south of the town. There were no gains on Monday but over the past several days there have been incremental gains by Russian forces. Russian and Ukrainian forces are now engaged just east of the Chasovoyarsky Refractory Plant (which produces industrial clay products), which sits on the north edge of the town center.

Russian forces are also pushing west on the T0504 roadway and there have been engagements about a mile north-east of the center of Stupochky.

Further south, fighting continues in and south of Toretsk, and Russian forces continue to try to press into that town. Russian and Ukrainian forces are now engaged just east of the central market in Toretsk. Just south of Toretsk Russian and Ukrainian forces have engaged on the eastern edge of Shcherbynivka, north of Leonidivka.

Donetsk City

Along the perimeter of the Pokrovsk salient there were multiple (more than a dozen) minor advances by Russian forces beginning in Hrodivka and continuing around to Glinka, north of the Kurakhove reservoir. Of note, Russian forces pushed north-west and west and south-west from the general area of Selydove, to include advancing up the M04 roadway, about 7 miles down the road from Pokrovsk, and Russian elements have raided further up the road to within 4 miles of Pokrovsk.

Fighting continues around Kurakhove and Russian forces now control perhaps 3/4ths of the north side of the Kurakhove reservoir. The pocket that used to exist south of the Pokrovsk salient is all but gone. Fighting continues inside Kurakhove, but there has been little change noted inside the town, and Russian forces control perhaps the eastern 1/8th of the town.

Further south, Russian forces have pushed through Dalne, and are now closing on the T0501 roadway west of Dalne.

The rectangle of land north of Vuhledar - the land that Russia has seized since Vuhledar fell, now measures perhaps 8 wide (north to south) by 12 miles long (east to west) and is still expanding to the north, north-west and west. Depending on which blog site you use, Russian forces in the north-west corner of that square are now between 1 and 5 miles from Bahatyr along the N15 roadway that runs from Zaporizhzhia to Donetsk (I would guess closer to 5 miles than 1 mile).

Southern Ukraine

Engagements continue along the southern front but there were no confirmed gains by either side. However, Russian forces appear to be making continual incremental gains in the general areas south of Orikhiv, Hulyaipol and Velyka Novosilke.

Air Operations

Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes into Ukraine on the night of the 17th-18th. At least 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 1 x Kh-59 cruise missile and 11 x Shahed drones were launched; the UAF claimed it shot down 8 drones.

Aid

North Korea has reportedly provided Russia with 50 x 170MM Koksan (Chuche’po) self-propelled howitzers and 20 x 240MM MLRS.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Sep9 Oct8 Nov12 Nov15 Nov19

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 71.74 77.30 72.25 72.41 73.05

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 68.37 73.59 68.50 68.62 68.68

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.20 2.74 2.97 2.71 2.97

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.67 5.93 5.66 5.48 5.66

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 90.75 96.83 98.36 99.59 100.47

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.22 41.40 41.31 41.28

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 78.83 73.30 67.53 66.84 67.80

ESPO 65 77 77 77 77

Sokol 66.23 72.10 65.19 65.22 66.84

This is the Lowest Ruble Rate versus the dollar in 13 months 

Thoughts

As expected (though earlier this year) President Biden has approved the use of US weapons for strikes into Russia.

This all makes sense, but causes worry; Victor Davis Hanson perfectly framed the problem yesterday: 

There is no end in sight after three years of escalating violence. But there are increasing worries that strategically logical and morally defensible—but geopolitically dangerous—Ukrainian strikes on the Russian interior will nonetheless escalate and lead to a wider war among the world’s nuclear powers.

I would make one correction; he said that this will escalate. In fact, it already has, after all, adding anything is a de facto escalation.

But is it a substantive escalation? That is, does this materially change the balance of power? If it does, will that change in the balance of power persist and have a significant impact on the outcome of the war? And is there a path, a plan, tied to this decision, to de-escalate if we get the desired result?

As to the first question, will this use of weapons achieve certain results that the Ukrainian armed forces can exploit or which directly benefit Ukraine as a whole?

My sense here is that there will be a few tactical and operational gains, which will be much trumpeted, but then the Russians will adapt and, just as with regard to HIMARS, the military efficacy will rapidly tail off.

 But whether it has great impact or not, will Russia perceive it as a substantive escalation?

That depends on what targets they hit. If the Ukrainians are rigorous in applying these weapons to military targets only, I think Russians will shrug and accept it, and fight on, with no major change up or down in Russian morale or support for Putin. If they hit culturally significant targets - a round through St. Basil’s in the Kremlin if you will (beyond the range of ATACMS), I would not be surprised to see the Russian people get very angry and demand a more aggressive war, and see a very rapid escalation.

Generally, striking at militarily related targets (counter force targeting) doesn’t really impact a country’s morale. Targeting items of social and cultural significance (counter-value targeting) has historically had very negative effects, stiffening the spine of even the most reluctant “warriors.” 

Said differently, a mistake here can have tremendous negative effect for the Ukrainians, convincing Russian citizens that Putin is right.

As for the second question, unless we give them a great many weapons, I don’t see how they can strike enough targets that it really starts to “hurt” Russia. As a case in point, I recall a power grid targeting campaign to break a power grid in a country much smaller than Russia, smaller in fact than Ukraine - just the power grid. It involved over 1,000 aim points.

That said, even if we were to give the Ukrainians a great many weapons, it isn’t clear that it would suddenly convince Russia to quit. It is also worth noting that Russia, as President Zelenskyy informed us today, launched 1,000 missiles against the Ukrainian power grid since the start of the war. That has not convinced the Ukrainians to surrender. I’m not sure why anyone believes that strikes into Russia are going to change Russia’s mind at this point.

There are a host of variables here, but it would not be surprising if the Russians adapt fairly quickly and, as with the HIMARS, these strikes into Russia simply fade into the background of the war.

Russian morale is, at this point, remarkably solid. Strikes into Russia may make it weaken. But if history tells us anything in this regard, it would be the opposite, strikes into Russia will stiffen the resolve of the Russian people, irrespective of the fact that Putin started the war.

There is a real concern, however; what if Putin perceives this as a real threat, aligned with the latest Russian nuclear use policy: ballistic missile attack on Russia. We are escalating the war, the point in doing this is to break Russia’s will. As Russia responds to these strikes there will be an almost autonomic response to strike back at Ukraine and the West. Is there a plan in place to act quickly in that even and contact the Russians and de-escalate? ANd is there a real plan if Putin uses a low-yield nuclear weapon? And what if he used a low yield weapon in Ukrainian troops inside Russia? 

Is there any plan to de-escalate? Or are we simply escalating until we hopefully break Russia’s will? That is a risky proposition.

Whatever happens, hopefully it will be in the interest of the US. Of course, hope is not a course of action.

v/r pete