August 13th, 2025
Politics - Trump seeking a better understanding of how to end the war
- Macron: no territorial swaps
- Summit at Elmendorf AFB
Combat Ops - Russian salient remains, more Russian gains
- More than a dozen villages being evacuated
Weather
Kharkiv
78 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Partly cloudy to sunny all week. Daily lows near 60, daily highs near 80. Winds north-westerly, 5-10kts.
Melitopol
82 and sunny, gusting to 20. Sunny all week. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the mid 80s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.
Kyiv
78 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Mostly sunny all week. Daily lows in the mid 50s, highs in the upper 70s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.
Politics
The summit between President Trump and President Putin will be held Friday at Elmendorf AFB (Officially “Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson”… bleh), just north of Anchorage.
French President Macron after speaking with President Trump this morning
He assured reporters that ‘Donald Trump’s desire is to obtain a ceasefire,’ but that "Until there is a ceasefire and lasting peace, we must maintain our support for Ukraine...Territorial issues will only be negotiated by [President] Zelensky.”
Trump "will fight to obtain a trilateral agreement" [between the United States, Ukraine and Russia], that is, Ukraine will be present, nothing will be done without Ukraine.
"There was no discussion about territorial swaps… The principle that must be remembered is that these subjects of "territorial exchanges" must only be discussed by Ukraine.”
White House spokeswoman Leavitt characterized the meeting on the 15th as “a listening exercise for the president,” and that President Trump wants “to walk away with a better understanding of how we can end this war.”
SecState Rubio spoke with Russian ForMin Lavrov yesterday and, per the DOS spokesman, “both sides confirmed their commitment to ensure a successful event.”
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief MGEN Skibitskyi reported that there are 11,000 North Korean troops training in Russia and that they will be moved to the Kursk Oblast in the near future. Skibitskyi also noted that additional North Korean personnel will be sent to the area to assist in reconstruction in Kursk Oblast.
Russia and Belarus will hold ZAPAD-2025 (WEST 2025) in Belarus, September 12th through 16th. Initial Belarus statements suggest Belarus will commit 13,000 troops to the exercise, stressing defensive readiness. The exercise will include nuclear readiness drills.
Ground Operations
SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS
Fighting continues north and north-east of Sumy, but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines. There are, however, reports that Ukrainian forces pushed into and now control Novokostyantynivka, a very small village (about a dozen houses) on the western end of the Russian controlled territory north of Sumy City, though there is some dispute as to whether Russian forces were ever in that village.
Fighting was also reported near Tetkino, north-west of Sumy City, just across the border into Russia, but there were no details and no claims of land losses or gained.
There are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces gained ground near Synelnykove, about a mile and a half south of the Russian occupied terrain north of Kharkiv (about 2 miles south-west of Vovchansk), but this would be a significant gain and there seems little to back up the claim.
Further east along the border, Russian forces were confirmed to have made gains south of Milove and appear to be less than a half mile from the tiny village (about 15 houses) of Ambarne.
NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER
There were no changes on the ground around Kupyansk but reporting suggests increased Russian drone and artillery strikes on the Ukrainian Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs)
Further south, Russian forces had small gains west of Zelenyi Hai and it appears that the area is now controlled by the Russian troops (about 7 miles north-east of Borova).
Further south, there are more claims of Russian gains in the Serebrianske forest but these cannot be confirmed.
BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK
North and north-east of Pokrovsk Russian forces continue to probe to the north and north-west and there are confirmed penetrations of the towns of Vesele, Rubizhne, Kucheriv Yar and Vilne. The Ukrainian General Staff reports that these are “just" recon groups (teams of 4 - 6 men) and that some have already been "destroyed,” but did not elaborate on which had been destroyed. Conversely, Russian bloggers report that some of these towns are under Russian control, but that has not been confirmed.
Of note, the Ukrainian government has ordered the evacuation of Bilozerske, and the surrounding villages of Blahodat, Bokove, Vesele Pole, Vesna, Myrove, Novovodyanye, and Dobropilla and the surrounding villages of Viktorivka, Virivka, Kopani, Novoviktorivka, Novoukrainka, Stepy, and Svyatohorivka
This constitutes two larger towns and a spread of villages around each, which collectively straddle the T0514 and T0515 roadways, roads that connect Kramatorsk with Pokrovsk, and are two of the major GLOCs in this area.
At the same time, Russian strikes - drones, rockets and artillery - on the various ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into and through this area continues to degrade Ukrainian movement, and support to forward units. Ukrainian forces are also expressing that they are having trouble moving around the area as reserves are brought in to hold the line.
Elsewhere around Pokrovsk, Russian forces made gains just north of Pokrovsk, and now control most of Rodynske, and have also pushed in Udachni (west of Pokrovsk), and now control most of that town.
There were no other confirmed changes reported west or south of Chasiv Yar, or immediately west of Toretsk; there are a host of claimed changes but many are contradictory.
SOUTHERN UKRAINE
Fighting was reported across most of southern Ukraine, with Russian forces retaining the initiative, but there were no confirmed changes in the front line.
Air Operations
During the night of August 12th-August 13th Russian forces launched 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 49 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated by EW, 32 Shahed drones and both ballistic missiles.
Damage from drone strikes was reported in Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
RuAF tacair struck 8 Ukrainian towns.
During the night of August 11th-12th Ukrainian forces reported that Ukrainian drones struck a Shahed drone warehouse in Kzyi Yul, Tatarstan (about 450 miles east of Moscow), which was also struck on August 9th. There are no independent damage reports.
Ukrainian drones may have struck the Orenburg Helium Plant in Orenburg (about 800 mikes south-east of Moscow); there was no independent confirmation.
During the night of August 11th-August 12th Russian forces launched 4 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 48 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated by EW, 36 Shahed drones
Damage from drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson and Sumy oblasts. Per the Ukrainian army, the ballistic missiles were targeted at Ukrainian army training sits, and killed one Ukrainian soldier.
RuAF tacair struck 6 Ukrainian towns.
Economic Reporting
Feb22 May8 Jun9 July8 Aug8 Aug12 Aug13
Brent 94.71 61.93 66.80 70.44 66.90 66.28 66.00
WTI 92.10 59.00 64.89 68.65 64.29 63.52 62.98
NG 3.97 3.64 3.69 3.35 3.06 2.92 2.84
Wheat 8.52 5.34 5.49 5.49 5.18 5.10 5.04
Ruble 85 82.45 79.27 78.47 79.74 79.85 79.49
Hryvnia 36.4 41.55 41.55 41.80 41.39 41.48 41.39
Urals 54.13 60.84 64.07 63.17 62.82 62.52
ESPO 48.90 63.97 71.58 68.63 68.83 68.36
Sokol 57.39 61.51 64.38 62.57 63.36 62.30
Thoughts
Several thoughts about this Russian advance:
One significant battlefield development is Russian forces improved use of drones to strike Ukrainian drone teams. This is a function of the right sort of collection of data, a quick recognition of the “signature” of a drone team, and a well put together command and control process (and system) that links that intelligence to a Russian drone team in time for a successful strike.
I have not seen specific data on numbers - number of targets identified, number targets and engaged, number of actual casualties, but Ukrainian comments have noted the Russian targeting and the difficulty Ukrainian drone forces have had this summer as Russian tactics have improved; whatever the success rate is, the tactic is affecting Ukrainian capabilities.
As for the operation north and north-east of Pokrovsk, there are some questions. If the operation (the penetration of the lines) is simply being carried out by recon units - which have been averaging perhaps 6 soldiers per element - than this entire penetration is probably less than 100 men and certainly less than 200. If that is the case, we could expect this entire “operation” to dissolve in short order. If these elements are, as some have suggested, on the order of platoon sized each (30 - 40 men), this operations grows to 4 or 5 companies in size - a reinforced infantry battalion. If the Russians had already positioned reinforcements for each platoon and those are now moving forward, this grows to a brigade-sized operation or larger.
There is a danger here that the UGS is getting crossed threaded with the propaganda effort coming out of Kyiv. On the one hand the UGS is moving 1st Azov Corps to the area just north of Pokrovsk, a force with a hard-fighting reputation and, at least on paper, 7 brigades worth of infantry (plus some artillery, drones, armor and other assets). If this is a major Russian thrust then this movement is more than justified, concentrating a good deal of Ukrainian combat capability on this sector of the front.
Meanwhile, Kyiv says, in essence, “Don’t worry, it’s nothing. And we are already destroying them.” And at the same time, Kyiv is continuing the propaganda line that the Russian soldiers are only getting two weeks of training, they don't have all their gear, Russian morale is awful, Russian leadership is awful, etc. Yet, Ukrainian forces continue to take losses and keep getting pushed back. So, they’re losing to what kind of force?
On the line I suspect that, on both sides, there may be a great deal of hatred, but they also know that the soldier on the other side of the field in front of them is tough and is ready to fight to the death. So, this cross-threading doesn’t really matter on the front line, but the impact on rear echelon troops, and on public morale, can be disastrous, eroding public trust and negatively affecting public support for the war.
Public support is already dropping; in 2022 22% of Ukrainians supported a negotiated settlement, 73% wanted to fight ‘till victory. In 2024, 52% wanted a negotiated peace. In the latest poll, taken in July, with results just released, 69% of Ukrainians now favor a negotiated settlement.
v/r pete
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