Sunday, August 24, 2025

 


Ending the War

August 24th, 2025


Numbers are just numbers. But they can tell a sad, sometimes horrible, unforgiving story; they can tell of a country in trouble. Ukraine has such numbers.

In Ukraine’s case, the numbers are demographic in nature.

On August 24th, 1991, following the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine gained its independence, its first true independence since 1667. 34 years ago Ukraine’s population was 52 million. By 2022 the population had dropped to 43 million; it was estimated that several million Ukrainians had moved westward into Europe. By the end of 2022 that population had dropped to something approaching 35 million. The number that now live in those parts of Ukraine not controlled by Russia hovers around 31 million. 

Meanwhile, since the war’s start the death rate has climbed and, adjusting for the number of people who are now living in Ukraine, there are an additional (approximately) 120,000 deaths per year. These deaths represent the deaths caused by the war, which includes soldiers killed in combat, civilians killed by enemy action, civilians who died to to lack of medial care either because of where they live, the inability to get to medical care, greater stress on those with certain conditions, etc. In as much as perhaps 25,000 civilians have died in the war to date, this data suggests the number for those Ukrainian troops killed in action may be approaching 100,000 per year, even as the population shrinks, birth rates are down, and deaths from all causes rises. 

One more statistic: there are currently 280 deaths for every 100 births in Ukraine (said differently, just 36 births for every 100 deaths). It doesn't take a math genius to figure out that Ukraine is in dire straits. And that this war needs to end so that they can address these other, very serious problems.

Which leads, on their independence day, to the question a good friend asked last night: What can we do to force an end to this war?

The answer everyone seems to want, viscerally, is a military one. Can we (the US and Europe, mainly the US) give the right assortment of weapons and other military assistance to Ukraine that would allow them to either cause enough damage to Russia itself, or enough damage to the Russian army, that it would cause the Russian army to break, or the Russian people to rise up, or perhaps even push Putin to throw in the towel?

Sure…I’d need to see that war-gamed out in detail before I’d believe it. My own sense is that increasing the number of attacks on Russia will do just what those attacks have done to the Ukrainians - make the people (of Russia in this case) furious.

What about putting some European forces into Ukraine? A German fighter regiment, a Polish Army Corps, etc?

Well, European forces - IF they could - and assuming they came equipped with enough ordnance (and aircraft, and command and control, and intelligence, etc., etc.) presumably could defeat the Russian army. But such an action would be seen by Russians (not just Putin) as an invasion and would be intolerable. If there’s an act that would push Putin - or any Russian leadership - to use nuclear weapons, this is probably it.

What about the hard sanctions that have been discussed: 2nd party embargoes and all the rest; might they bring Russia "to its knees?”

Well, they might. But, to begin, the record on forecasting national economies more than a few months into the future is actually worse than guessing. And the various intelligence agencies in the US and our allies are actually worse than Wall Street when it comes to predicting economic events and outcomes. So, while pursuing sanctions on Russia and squeezing Russian access to international banking, cutting off trade, limiting oil sales, limiting grain sales and Russian trade, etc., all sounds good, and certainly should be pursued as best we can, these are slow processes, that not only can result in odd 2nd order effects, they can also hurt our allies even as we try to squeeze Russia.

It’s illuminating that in an article about Russia’s economy last week, the key figure the author used was Russia’s debt to GDP ratio, which he pointed out has now grown to more than 20%. 

That sounds bad, but he forgot to mention that the average debt to GDP ratio in Europe is over 80% and the US debt to GDP ratio is more than 100%. And while there are few who argue the Russian economy is healthier than it looks, it’s probable that President Xi of China won’t let it fail in any case. So, waiting for the Russian economy to collapse may take awhile.

Collapse also begs the question: What do you mean by collapse? And when the economy collapses, what would happens to Russia's 5,000 nuclear warheads? 

So where does that leave us? If somehow the Ukraine war existed in an otherwise peaceful and idyllic world, and all our allies had healthy economies, and we accepted the 100,000 dead Ukrainians per year as a “necessary cost,” perhaps we could just keep the war going and eventually the Russians might quit. This is sort of the "I’m sure it will all work out in the end” plan. But no part of that is a true, or a good idea.

And the US still has the problem that China wants to flex its muscle in the East China Sea (just as it is flexing its muscle in the South China Sea).

President Trump has, to some extent, pushed the Ukraine problem onto Europe. But it’s worth noting that Europe is nearly over its head already. Assuming President Trump can get the Europeans to actually pull together and work the Ukraine war, we need to remember that we will have no meaningful assistance from Europe if something develops in the Western Pacific.

The long and short is that there are a host of problems developing around the world, courtesy of the strategic vacuum in Washington DC for much of the last 30 years, tied to some really expensive domestic policies. Europe needs to step up and take care of Ukraine; US industry needs to step up and rebuild the US arsenals, and overall, the DOD and US policy officers need to remember why the Eisenhower nuclear doctrine was created: because conventional forces cannot deter a great power in their own sphere; it’s time to refresh US theater nuclear forces.

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