Thursday, August 7, 2025

 August 7th 2025  


Politics  - Trump and Putin to meet?

- 25% Tariff - India


Combat Ops - Russian forces take Mryne and Sobolivka


Weather


Kharkiv

79 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Mostly sunny through the weekend, rain and thunderstorms on Monday. Daily lows near 60, daily highs near 80. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.


Melitopol

84 and cloudy, gusting over 20. Cloudy on Friday, then mostly sunny for the next week. Daily lows in the mid 60s, daily highs in the upper 80s. Winds northerly, 10-15kts.


Kyiv

72 and sunny, gusting to 25. Partly to mostly cloudy for the next week, rain on Monday. Daily lows upper 50s, highs in the upper 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Politics 


President Trump and President Putin may meet in the near term; President Trump commented yesterday afternoon that he was hopeful a meeting would be set up soon with Putin and President Zelenskyy. One Kremlin spokesman suggested a meeting between Trump and Putin could happen as early as next week. Apparently this was one of the subjects discussed yesterday between Ambassador Witkoff and Putin.


SecState Rubio added that such a meeting is only possible if certain signs change:

"We have a better understanding of the conditions under which Russia will be ready to end the war. Now we will need to compare this with what the Europeans will agree to and what the Ukrainians will be ready to do. We need to understand how to bring these positions closer to each other. If we manage to bring them close enough - what the Russians want and what the Ukrainians want - then the President will have the opportunity to hold a meeting in which both Putin and Zelenskyy will participate.”


President Putin later commented on meeting in the UAE: "I think we will decide, but this would be one of the quite suitable places.”


Per the Polish on-line ‘newspaper’ “Onet” the US proposals presented to Putin by Ambassador Wykoff yesterday included: 

  • A ceasefire in Ukraine (not a peace agreement)
  • De facto recognition of Russian-occupied territories (status would be postponed as much as 99 years)
  • Lifting of most sanctions on Russia

There was no mention of guarantees to limit NATO expansion.

There was no mention of limits to military aid to Ukraine.


A Gallup poll of Ukrainians shows 33% do not expect Ukraine to join NATO in the next 10 years, the highest number since the war started, up from 12% in 2022.


President Trump signed the Executive Order imposing a 25% tariff on Indian exports to the US, starting on August 31st, targeting India’s continued purchase of Russian oil. Trump also commented that he might announce similar tariffs on China.


The State Department okayed $104 million in FMS (Foreign Military Sales) to Ukraine, for maintenance and sustainment for Ukraine’s M777 (155MM) howitzers.


Ground Operations


SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS


Fighting continues north of Sumy city, with fighting particularly noted near Kindrativka and Yunakivka, but there were no confirmed changes in the front line.

North of Kharkiv, Russian forces regained control of the aggregate plant (the ruins of the aggregate plant) in Vovchansk, and there are unconfirmed reports that the Russians now control all of Vovchansk north of the river, with other, marginal, advances elsewhere in the two small salients north of Kharkiv.


NORTH OF THE DONETS


Imagery confirmed Russian forces have pushed into Sobolivka - immediately south-west of Kupyansk, and have control of both that town and Myrne (Moskovka), as was speculated yesterday. Reporting indicates that Russian forces, using artillery and drones (particularly drones) have cut the P07 roadway that runs west out of Kupyansk (and runs about 1,000 yards south of Sobolivka) The P07 is the main Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) into Kupyansk.

There is only one paved road and one dirt road running south out of Kupyansk that remain in Ukrainian hands, but the roads south can be interdicted from Russian forces just east of the Oskil River, and the conditions in Kupyansk will deteriorate fairly quickly if Ukrainian forces cannot regain control of the P07 roadway.

Further south, Russian forces south of Karpivka, pushing southward along the Nitrius River, have pushed into the northern end of the town of Serednie. Seradnie is another small farming village (population of 156 in 2022) consisting of perhaps 40 - 50 houses, mainly located on one street).


BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK


North-east of Bakhmut, imagery confirmed incremental Russian gains near Vyimka (4 - 5 miles south-east of Siversk). Russian forces appear to be working slowly up a small river (the Sukha Plotva River) and a rail line that roughly parallels the river; both run into the south-east end of Siversk.

South of Chasiv Yar imagery confirmed that Ukrainian forces have pushed forward just north-west of Stupochky; a Ukrainian element appears to have made a dash up the T0504 roadway and taken a small piece of the forest long that road, north-east of Stupochky. Meanwhile, other Ukrainian forces are holding the south edge of the same woods.

Further south, Russian forces in the Bila Hora - Oleksadnro Shultyne area have made small gains pushing westward.

Further south, in the pocket between Toretsk and the Kleban Byk reservoir, there are multiple reports of incremental Russian gains, but Ukrainian forces continue to hold, while Ukrainian sources report increased Russian attacks on Ukrainian GLOCs into the pocket and into Ukrainian controlled positions along the front line.

East of Pokrovsk, Russian forces continue to push westward along the H32 (T0504) roadway and are now roughly 1 - 1.5 miles east of the eastern edge of Myrnohrad. At the same time, Russian forces are about 1.5 miles north of the north edge of that town. Multiple reports suggest extensive Russian drone use to interdict the GLOCs leading into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.


SOUTHERN UKRAINE


Fighting continues along much of the front line south of the Vovcha River and across southern Ukraine, and despite extensive reports, there are no confirmed changes in the front line except at the very west end of the line where imagery confirms that Russian forces have pushed north and have reached the southern edge of the town of Stepnohirsk.


Air Operations


During the night of August 6th-August 7th Russian forces launched 112 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated by EW, 89 drones. 

Damage from missile, drone strikes and air strikes was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Sumy oblasts. Power is out in parts of Kherson and there is an evacuation ongoing in certain neighborhoods of Kherson city (bridges connecting parts of the city to others have also come under attack, which is part of the reason for the evacuation).

RuAF tacair struck 14 Ukrainian towns.


During the night of August 5th-August 6th Russian forces launched 45 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or defeated by EW, 36 drones. 

Damage from missile, drone strikes and air strikes was reported in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

RuAF tacair struck 4 Ukrainian towns.


Interesting note: Russian forces conducted a fiber-optically controlled drone strike from Kinburn Spit into Mykolaiv Oblast, over 12 kilometers (7 miles) of open water (I have no idea what the sea state was, but the fiber held together.) 


Economic Reporting


Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 May8 Jun9 July8 Aug6 Aug7

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      61.93 66.80 70.44 68.45 67.02

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      59.00 64.89 68.65 65.98 64.53

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15    3.64 3.69 3.35 3.06 3.07


Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17     5.34 5.49 5.49 5.08 5.18

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    82.45 79.27 78.47 80.23 79.14

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 41.55 41.55 41.80 41.51 41.45

Urals 56.56    54.13 60.84 64.07 63.93 64.96

ESPO 48.90 63.97 71.58 69.84 69.09

Sokol 57.39 61.51 64.38 64.04 63.53


The Russian Central Bank reports that Russian GDP grew by 1.4% in the first quarter of 2025, and 1.8% in the second quarter, less than the 2% and 1.9% forecasts, respectively 


Thoughts


Cleary, if the meeting moves forward and there is some real progress on a ceasefire… If If If … we shall see…

In the meantime, assuming Russian forces retain control of the P07 GLOC, Ukrainian forces will be fairly quickly squeezed out of the terrain immediately east and south-east of Kupyansk. Following Russian practices so far, the likely course of action would be to then push down the east bank of the Oskil River, straightening lines, and where possible, circling Ukrainian elements remaining east of the River. Once that is complete, they would then press west and north-west from Kupyansk toward Shevchenkove and Velykyi Burluk, and, further south, toward Izyum. Presumably, Russian engineers would also move in and build new defense positions along and near the Oskil River. 

For Ukrainian forces, regaining control of Kupyansk may be very difficult indeed, and probably at this point would involve regaining control of the P07 roadway, holding east of the Oskil as long as possible, then withdrawing and dropping the bridges over the Oskil and holding on the line of the river.

The Russian seizure of Moskovka and Sobolivka is of note in that it happened quickly. I am lacking a host of tactical details but looking at the various web sites - pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian - and trying to find some accuracy amongst the reports, there is no doubt that the Ukrainians understood what the Russians were trying to do but simply could not stop it, and could not appreciably slow the Russians.

Rather, it seems as if the Russians, without changing their tactics, simply kept coming forward. What that suggests to me is that there is a manning problem in the Ukrainian units in that area and the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) doesn’t have the reserves to flow towards that problem. If that is correct, and the Ukrainian army’s strategic reserve has already been committed to battle, there are likely to be other gaps developing in the near term, with no real answer possible from the UGS. What they are likely to do is strip whatever other assets they have in the rear and send forward maintenance and supply and admin personnel as infantry, a practice they already have used in the past 6 months.

I guess we’ll see how things shake out in the next few weeks, but right now the situation looks poorly for the Ukrainian army.


v/r pete   




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