March 21st, 2025

Politics - Negotiations resume in Riyadh on Monday

Combat Ops - Ukrainian forces holding along the border in Kursk

- Minor Russian gains elsewhere

- Russian forces on islands at Dnepr mouth

Weather

Kharkiv

53 and partly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy for all of the next week. Daily lows in the mid 30s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds light, below 5kts.

Melitopol

54 and mostly cloudy. Mostly cloudy all next week. Daily lows in the 30s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

55 and mostly sunny, gusting to 20. Mostly sunny on Friday, mostly cloudy for the following 7 days, rain showers starting Monday, continue all week. Daily lows in the 30s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts through Saturday morning, then 10-15kts all next week.

Politics and Diplomacy

US and Ukrainian negotiators will meet in Riyadh on Monday, before US and Russian negotiators meet.

Grigory Karasin, chairman of the Russian Senate’s committee on international affairs, and Sergei Beseda, adviser to the head of Russia’s FSB security service, will attend.

US Special Envoy Kellogg commented that Ukrainian and Russian negotiators will be in different rooms during the meetings.

Combat Operations 

KURSK SALIENT

Russian forces remain on the attack; there were no confirmed gains but anecdotal reporting suggests that Russian forces are pressing into the woods (a short distance east of the border) where there are some defensive positions, and that the Ukrainian forces are using the woods for cover. There are also some defensive trenches along the border itself that the Ukrainians are trying to use, but they are mainly Russian positions, aligned to stop an attack form teh west, not the east. Reports from Kharkiv area note the very poor off-road conditions. Ukrainian forces in the woods have wide open terrain behind them; trying to withdraw across open, muddy terrain, having already abandoned their armored vehicles as well as most heavy weapons leaves them in a tight situation.

Further south, Ukrainian forces hold a thin slice of terrain on the Russian side of the border, from just south of Demidovka, to just south of Prilesye, a piece of terrain perhaps 5 miles long, but for the most part just several hundred yards wide. Russian reserve forces are said to be heading to the area to reinforce the border forces.

NORTH OF KHARKIV

There were no changes in the front line, but reports suggest a good deal of mud and little off-road mobility in the border area.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting was reported along essentially the entire line of contact, but there were no confirmed changes the front line.

BAKHMUT

There was no confirmed change in the front line north of Bakhmut.

In Chasiv Yar Ukrainian forces continue  to hold the small rectangle (2500 feet by 1000 feet) on the west edge of the city center; there were no confirmed changes. Russian tacair is active in the area.

In and around Toretsk, Russian forces made small but confirmed gains along the northern edge of Toretsk and into Druzhba. 

DONETSK CITY

East of Pokrovsk, Russian forces pressing north from the salient have slowly expanded their area of control along the T-0504 roadway that connects Pokrovsk to Kostiantinivka, gaining more terrain in the Vodyane Druhe area (just east of the big turn north in the roadway, about 12 miles east of Pokrovsk), as well as in open terrain east of Vodyane Druhe.

The Russian effort east of Pokrovsk appears to be focused on cutting one of the major supply lines that runs into Kostiantinivka, as well as taking the uncontrolled terrain just north of the Pokrovsk salient and straightening and shortening their lines.

Russian forces also made small, confirmed gains inside Shevchenko - just south of Pokrovsk.

Other attacks continued along most of the salient’s perimeter, with troops in contact reported in and around 18 different towns.

South of the Pokrovsk salient Russian forces continue to push west. Russian forces are pressing westward along the river lines and are both starting to circle the towns of Roslyn, Kostiantinopil, and are also attacking into the eastern edges of these towns. 

Further south, Russian forces north-west of Velyka Novosilke have pressed further into Pryvilne.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Russian ground operations west of Orikhiv (in the vicinity of Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky) but there were no confirmed changes in the front lines. 

Analysis by several different groups of bloggers support an assessment that Russian forces now control most of the islands in the mouth of the Dnepr River.

Pressing across the Dnepr River (and the other rivers of Kherson and moving west to take Mykolaiv (at one time the largest shipyard complex in the Soviet Union), and then Odessa and the port faculties in the greater Odessa area is undoubtedly still a fond desire in Kremlin planning circles. However, the Russian army west and north-west of Kherson city during 2022 showed overstretched supply lines and poor command and control. With no control over hard bridges across the Dnepr, a follow-on attack would be worse. There are probably enough Russian brigades available to conduct such an operation on paper, but actually crossing the river and sustaining the attack is not something the Russians have shown they can execute with any facility. The Ukrainian army would need to be a good deal weaker for a Russian attack to succeed in the bear term.

Air Operations

During the night of 20-21 March Russian forces launched drones against targets across most of Ukraine. 47 x Shahed drones were launched into the Kyiv area; the UAF claimed it shot down 27 drones and 20 were “lost” (defeated by EW). THere are no casualty or damage reports from eh Kyiv area yet.

Shahed drones were also fired into the great Odessa area, numbers not reported yet, which resulted in 15 different explosions around the city, several people being wounded, and multiple fires.

There is a story, thoroughly UN-confirmed, on “infobrics.org", that the Ukrainian Air Force F-16 shot down earlier in the year was shot down by an S-400 that was using an SU-35 radar to illuminate the target, which was well below the horizon, just a few hundred feet off the deck. If so, presumably Aviation Week will pull it apart for us…

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jun7 Dec9 Jan8 Feb7 Mar4 Mar20 Mar21

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      80.06 72.63 76.69 74.89 70.00 71.90 71.78

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      75.81 68.85 73.94 71.17 66.97 68.22 67.95

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15      2.82 3.17 3.66 3.37 4.44 4.04 4.03

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17       6.40 5.59 5.37 5.86 5.37 5.55 5.59

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59      88.77 100.84 105.18 96.88 89.50 84.93 84.58

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 41.55 42.33 41.46 41.40 41.54 41.57

Urals 56.56    67.61 66.19 71.76 68.32 65.49 65.49 65.49

ESPO 77 78.19 ??? 71.50 73.40 73.28

Sokol 65.32 72.79 70.92 67.20 67.04 69.35

Thoughts 

Much has been made of the idea that Ukraine needs to regain all its territory, that is, Ukraine as of 1991. I asked a smart friend, retired Army infantry, what an army would need to look like to force out the Russians, and reclaim the 1991 borders. 

First, he pointed out that they will need roughly their current army pretty much where they are, holding the front line. Then, they will need an army that can take on the bulk of the Russian army, has enough extra forces to sustain the attack, and has the logistics tail to support a lot of fighting and a lot of movement.

As a reminder, the Ukrainian army is roughly 40 brigades - which today represents a combat force of roughly 220,000 - 240,000 troops (50,000 short of desired manning), with a combat support and combat service support (the tail to the tooth) forces of about 600,000. Essentially all of these troops would continue doing what they are doing.

To then attack and soundly defeat the Russian force of 600,000 troops (more than 100 brigades and regiments supported by a very large tail that disappears into Russia) his estimate was roughly 500,000 combat troops, and perhaps 1 million combat support and combat service support. 

Of course, this is a quick study, and it is to develop a forces that is definitely going to win: 500,000 fully trained, properly equipped, and properly supported troops.

But even if his estimate is 40% too large, and they were willing to accept. More risk, this would yield a 300,000 soldiers force, with a 600,000 more in the tail.

But how long would it take to train such a force - from drafting through basic training, weapons training, small unit training, and on up through multi-bridged level training? That would take 12-18 months - or longer. 

And where would it be done?

And where are these extra weapons and systems coming from?

And how does Ukraine sustain itself while all this is taking place?

And finally, where is Ukraine going to get 1 million or more military age men?

And is Russia likely to let its army be wiped out? Or would a real red line finally be crossed?

Every war can be won, every war can be lost, by either side. And will is the foundation of all. But, plans and expectations have to be consistent with capabilities.

v/r pete