November 29th, 2024

Military Situation  - Some Russian Gains

- Syrskyi commits reserves

Air Operations  - Large Strike

Corruption

Peace Plan

Thoughts - Manpower

Military Situation 

On the ground there was little change over the past 48 hours, with small gains by the Russian forces in the center; southeast of Pokrovsk and along a broad front west of Selydove, perhaps 6-8 miles north to south). Russian forces in this area, starting about 4 miles south pf Pokrovsk, are now a bit west of Pokrovsk and still pushing west.

Russian forces also showed gains both inside the town of Kurakhove, where Russian forces may control much as 2/3rd of the town, and north of the reservoir where Russian forces pushed into Berestky.

Russian forces continue to close up pockets and straighten lines.

What is of note here is the announcement that Gen. Syrskyi has pushed the reserve forces into the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove fight; this is the right place to commit the reserves, the question being whether he has committed them in time to stop the Russian advance.

In additionally, Syrskyi ordered additional ammunition pushed into the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove fights.

Air Operations

Russian forces conducted a large strike against Ukraine’s power grid on the 27th, launching a total of 190 missiles and drones into Ukrainian air space, including 62 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 28 x Kaliber cruise missiles and 100 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down more than 100 missiles and drones, including 76 drones. An unreported number were also brought down by electronic warfare (EW).

However, multiple strikes on the power grid were reported and more than 1 million houses in the Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts were left without electricity. Temperatures across Ukraine remained below 35 all day Thursday and remain in the low 30s, dropping below 30 at night.

Prime Minister Shmyhal commented that it was not possible to say when everyone would have power restored.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone and missile strike against Crimean targets on the 27th, with a combination of Neptune cruise missiles, S-200 ballistic missiles, Storm Shadow missiles and 40 x strike drones. The RuAF claimed it shot down 25 drones, and claimed that the strike targeted a Russian naval school in Sevastopol, but then claimed it had not been hit.

On the previous night Russian forces had launched 89 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace and the UAF had shot down 36 drones and 48 drones were lost (defeated by EW), however several did get past the air defenses and damaged the power grid.

Corruption

Sinclair & Wilde, a US “strategic advisory” firm, is accusing the National Police of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Defense, of corruption following the failure to pay a contract to supply military uniforms unit a bribe had been paid.

In a letter the firm said:

"Sinclair & Wilde categorically denies the false and baseless claims made in the recently released video by the National Police Force of Ukraine. It is clear that the release of this story is an attempt by the National Police Force to cover up its own internal corruption and the corruption of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in its continued attempts to deny payment to Sinclair & Wilde after it repeatedly refused to pay bribes requested of it.”

Sinclair & Wilde had 5 contracts to provide uniforms to the Ministry of Defense, for a total of $14.5 million. Sinclair & Wilde claim that:

"Throughout 2023, multiple individuals – including subjects of US and Ukrainian investigations – solicited bribes from Sinclair & Wilde to secure payment of the remaining $14.5 million owed to it. Sinclair & Wilde refused and reported these solicitations to US and Ukrainian authorities. In an attempt to obey the laws of both the United States and Ukraine, Sinclair & Wilde brought the solicitation of bribes and apparent MOD corruption to the attention of US Embassy in Kyiv, US law enforcement, and Ukrainian law enforcement authorities over one year ago.”

"The response of the National Police Force of Ukraine was to leak the details of the investigation to Maksim Hrytsenko, former Head of Procurement for the Ministry of Defense, and others, putting the lives of cooperating witnesses at risk in the process, one of whom is an American Citizen. And within days of a confidential meeting with the National Police, Roman Balykin – a supposed target of the current investigation – knew all of the details of the meeting. As a result, US authorities have refused to continue working with the National Police.”

Sinclair & Wilde added:

"Law enforcement organizations and defense officials have examined the uniforms and found the prices charged by Sinclair & Wilde to be BELOW fair market value, particularly when you account for the costs associated with shipping and logistics.”

What is of note is that this is one of the first corruption charges that has progressed to public accusations by the firm involved.

Peace Plan

A general peace plan seems to be taking place, and looks much as has been discussed over the past 2 years. To negotiate the plan President Elect Trump has named LtGen. Keith Kellogg, USA (Ret.); Kellogg commanded the 82nd Airborne Division and was national security advisor to Vice President Pence for almost 3 years.

It is important to note that a Gallup poll conducted earlier this month showed that 52% of Ukrainians are now willing to concede some land to Russia to reach a negotiated end to the war. (38% do not want to cede land, and 10% are unsure.)

The apparent plan (to start the negotiations) appears to consist of:

- a ceasefire; US would continue to provide weapons and training to Ukraine. Future aid, would hover, be contingent upon Ukraine agreeing to participate in the peace process.

- NATO membership for Ukrainian would be held in abeyance.

- Russian oil and gas sales would be taxed to fund rebuilding of Ukraine.

- Russia would be offered sanctions relief, provided they signed a peace agreement with Ukraine.

Politics

Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Control Oleg Morozov announced on November 27 that Russia Defense Industrial Base (DIB) faces a shortage of 400,000 engineering specialists in the next several years.

In June of this year Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov stated that the DIB shortage was already 160,000.

Thoughts - Manpower 

Russian losses, per Mediazone - the most comprehensive data base on Russian casualties - now stand at 80,973 Killed. They estimate the number may be as high as 120,000 KIA.

Of note, 18% of Russian casualties are convicts (15,000+ KIA)

There are no hard figures for wounded, but the estimate is that there are 3.5 to 4 wounded for every KIA (that ratio is believed to be roughly correct for both sides).

This place total Russian casualties at:

• 81,000 - KIA, 285,000 WIA, Total 366,000 to 120,000 KIA, 480,000 WIA, 600,000 total. Russia has had 9,000 desertions as well.

Ukrainian casualties from independent sources are not as diligently tracked as are Russian casualties, but counts on graves, and anecdotal reporting suggests it is higher than the figures released by Kyiv, London or Washington DC. Estimates run between 

105,000 and 160,000 KIA. Using the same ratios for KIA to WIA, this places total Ukrainian casualties at:

• 105,000 - KIA, 365,000 WIA, 470,000 total to 160,000 KIA, 640,000 WIA, 800,000

Total. Ukraine, as discussed below has between 100,000 and 200,000 desertions (see below).

Ukraine, of course, has a population just 1/4th of Russia’s.

There are new figures on desertions in the Ukrainian military. As you may or may not recall, in the middle of October there was reporting that desertions in the Ukrainian army were approaching 100,000 men. One Ukrainian legislator now suggests that the number is closer to 200,000, commenting that many men go home on leave, particularly medical leave, and simply do not return.

One account of the fall of the town of Vuhledar in south-eastern Ukraine, centers around the 72nd Brigade, which was the main unit holding the town. The brigade had one armored battalion and two infantry battalions, each with - on paper - 3 or 4 companies with 120 troops in each. But some companies had fewer than 10 troops left. Reportedly 20% of the soldiers in the brigade were AWOL. And when reinforcements were sent forward, they deserted as well.

Interestingly, there are several lawyers who have specialized in defending those accused of desertion, the defense being innocent due to psychological stress.     

In a statement that seems as if it came straight out of “Catch 22,” one of the lawyers, Tetyana Ivanova, noted, acquittals for this reason sets a troubling precedent  because “then almost everyone is justified (to leave), because there are almost no healthy people left (in the infantry).”

Which leads around to an observation by one of my astute readers:

While both sides have suffered heavy and about equal casualties, their armies have very different compositions.  The Russian army is made up of volunteers and mercenaries.  The Ukrainian army is made up of unwilling middle-aged conscripts, often press-ganged.  Not only does Russia have a much bigger manpower base but they're putting far less strain on it.

Where that leaves Ukraine is in a scary situation. As has been evident over the last several months, the Russian army is steadily “chewing out” gains. There is a real sense that the Ukrainian line, particularly in the south-east, is under great strain - as demonstrated by Gen. Syrskyi flowing the reserves to Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. If the line holds, then he acted soon enough. If the line doesn’t hold, are there any more reserve forces to move into position and hold the line? 

It also suggests that, if the above is roughly accurate, and if the Russians have been paying attention, they will flow more forces into the fight for Pokrovsk and Kurakhove (and other points in the south-east) and ensure that they push through the Ukrainian line. 

This fight looks to become quite desperate in the next two months.

v/r pete

 November 27th, 2024 Next Summary 29 November, 2024

Have a Great Thanksgiving

Ground Ops  - Russian gains

Air Operations  - More Large strikes, targeting power grid

Economics  - Russia’s 2025  Defense Budget - largest since Cold War

Weather

Low clouds and fog continue to limit the effectiveness of drones and also have complicated confirming the locations and gains and losses of various units.

Kharkiv

31 and cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy for the next week. Daily lows in the upper 20s, daily highs hovering around freezing. Winds variable, 5kts.

Melitopol

34 and cloudy. Partly cloudy for the next week. Daily highs in the mid to upper 30s, daily lows in the upper 20s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

26 and cloudy. Cloudy for the next 5 days, snow showers tomorrow. Daily lows in the low 30s, daily lows in the upper 20s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations

Kursk Salient

Russian forces remained on the offensive but there were no confirmed gains or losses of territory by either side.

North of Kharkiv

Fighting was reported to be very heavy, and Russian ground forces were supported by 19 air strikes in the two small salients, but there was no reported changes in the front line.

North of the Donets

There is again, as yesterday, a good deal of reporting that cannot be confirmed, most of it suggesting that the Russians have gained ground at multiple spots along the front line: to include crossing the Oskil River north-east of Kupyansk, pressing on the north-east edge of Kupyansk itself, slowly expanding their hold on the east bank of the Oskil just north of Senkove, and pressing on the town of Terny (along the Zherebets) from the north. There is also reporting suggesting Ukrainian forces regained land west of Kreminna - virtually none of this has been confirmed, and there have been Ukrainian reports that countered each item, but they were followed by additional reports that suggest the Russian did post these gains.

All combined, it reads as if there is still the same hard, brutal “see-saw” fight taking place, but the Russians are slowly making progress, almost a “three steps forward, two steps back” sort of affair.

Bakhmut

Russian forces continued operations east of Siversk but there were no confirmed changes to the front line.

Russian forces appear to have made some gains in Chasiv Yar and fighting is taking place around the industrial ceramics factory in central Chasiv Yar.

Fighting continues in and around Toretsk but there were no confirmed changes in the front line.

Donetsk City

Russian forces continue to push westward, particularly south of Pokrovsk, although there was some small, confirmed gains on the northern edge of the Pokrovsk salient. Of most significance are the continued gains to the south of Pokrovsk where there is more reporting suggesting that Russian forces are operating in the vicinity of  Lysivka, Petrivka, Zhovte and further to the south-west. This places the lead Russian elements west of Pokrovsk. 

Further south-east Russian forces are pressing west along the northern edge of the Kurakhove Reservoir and the pocket north of the reservoir has been nearly closed up and the Russian line straightened. That said, there is, reportedly, as nasty fight taking place on the north side of the reservoir as Ukraine forces try to hold their ground.

North and East of Vuhledar Russian forces continue to press north and west, and Russian troops have crossed the T0518 roadway and control about 4 - 5 miles of the road just north of Velyka Novosilke (VN). The pocket south of Kurakhove  - which was centered on a string of villages located along the small Sukhi Yaly River - continues to collapse. This river has been used as a defensive position by numerous forces - the Germans, the Ukrainians, the Russians - in previous wars and engagements. It is of note that the Ukrainians were not as successful this time exploiting it defensively; why that is so, isn’t clear, but my suspicion is that it is a manpower shortage issue.

In the fighting around Velyka Novosilke (VN), Russian forces south-west of VN, continue to push north; two thrusts, one from the vicinity of Novodarivka (about 7 miles south-west of VN) and another from just north of Rivnopil (about 5 miles south-west of VN) are pressing north and appear to have progressed to a point due west of VN. At the same time - based on two separate Ukrainian blogs - Russian attacks from the east appear to have reached the edge of the town, proper and are pressing in on VN from roughly the the “1:30 to 4:30” position. However, none of this has been confirmed due to the poor weather.

Southern  Ukraine

In the Orikhiv area there were claims of Russian units advancing roughly a mile northwards towards Mala Tokmachka (4 miles south-east of Orikhiv), but this hasn’t been confirmed.

Elsewhere across Southern Ukraine Russian units engaged in multiple small unit assaults but there were no confirmed gains or losses.

Russian forces are also reportedly reinforcing positions on Kinburn Spit (at the mouth of the Dnepr), out of concerns of Ukrainian raids onto the east bank of the river.

Air Operations 

On 26-27 November Russian forces claimed to have launched 89 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space, targeting the power grid and “strategic facilities.” There was no reporting on numbers engaged by the UAF or success rate.

Russian Forces launched 4 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 188 x Shahed and other drones into Ukrainian air space on the night of 25 - 26 November. (Note: the “other drones” refers to the practice of mixing some decoy drones into an incoming strike package to draw fire, force the UAF to use more missiles and ammunition.) The UAF claimed it shot down all 4 Iskander missiles as well as 76 drones. Another 96 drones were lost (defeated with electronic warfare), and 5 drones flew into Belarus. No details on the surviving drones.

Several drones were reported to have struck energy grid elements, and 2 additional Iskander ballistic missiles were launched into the Odessa region; 1 was shot down, the second missile hit some element of the power grid, but not it was not further identified.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Sep9 Oct8 Nov12 Nov26 Nov27

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 71.74 77.30 72.25 73.55 73.14

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 68.37 73.59 68.50 69.51 69.15

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.20 2.74 2.97 3.41 3.26

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.67 5.93 5.66 5.56 5.58

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 90.75 96.83 98.36 105.69 110.90

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.22 41.40 41.58 41.62

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 78.83 73.30 67.53 67.53 67.84

ESPO 65 77 77 77 77

Sokol 66.23 72.10 65.19 66.64 66.27

Lowest Ruble Rate since March 2022.

Russia’s Federation Council (their upper house of parliament) approved the 2025 budget, which includes the largest defense budget since the Cold War, 13.5 trillion rubles ($125 billion).

Ukraine received $4.8 billion from the World Bank, part of an overall $50 billion investment project.

Thoughts

The reporting on the Russian operations in the “southeast,” that is, west and south-west of Donetsk City, shows an army that has found a process to keep moving forward and beating the defensive positions, and forces, the Ukrainians are placing in front of them.  As noted before, the hardest Ukrainian defensive positions are either already behind the Russians (such as Marinka, Vuhledar and Avdiivka) or they are less developed and the Russians feel comfortable avoiding them - such as Pokrovsk, and swinging wide around them and continuing their slow but steady advance.

There is little new here but what is of note is that the Ukrainians haven’t been able to stop them. This isn’t through lack of trying but it does suggest that they are simply low on the most important item in attrition warfare: soldiers.

At the same time, capabilities that were hailed as “game changers” earlier are now no longer of great note - such as HIMARS and FPV drones. The Russians have adapted and now these items are just another element to deal with, but fuel depots and ammo depots and command posts for the most part are surviving and the Russians continue to grind forward.

It is also worth noting that the Economist now says that perhaps as many as 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed so far. Mediazone, the best single source of Russian casualties puts the Russian KIA total in the 80 - 120,000 — so, roughly the same casualty count. This should be remembered amid the steady drumbeat of propaganda that the Russians suffer from morale, poor equipment, poor tactics and terrible leadership: the Ukrainians have essentially the same casualty count (though 1/4th the population of Russia), and, for now, the Russians seem to be winning.

v/r pete