November 26th, 2024
Politics - MinDef Umerov Out???
Ground Ops - Russian gains
Politics - Austria offers to host talks
- Selydove - Massacre?
Weather
Low clouds and fog continue to limit the effectiveness of drones and also have complicated confirming the locations and gains and losses of various units.
Kharkiv
31 and cloudy. Cloudy for the next week. Daily lows in the upper 20s, daily highs hovering around freezing. Winds variable, 5kts.
Melitopol
33 and cloudy. Cloudy to mostly cloudy for the next week, daily highs in the 30s, daily lows in the upper 20s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.
Kyiv
27 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Cloudy for the next 5 days, snow showers tomorrow. Wednesday low near 20, then warming, the following week will see lows in the upper 20s, highs in the low 30s, wind chills in the low 20s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.
Internal Politics - Umerov
The Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence has reported that 120MM mines [the pictures show 120MM mortar rounds] were defective and recommend MinDef Umerov be fired.
"An interdepartmental commission was formed, which included representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Strategic Industry, and representatives of the security and defense sectors. The commission clarified the reasons. A corresponding report of this commission was sent to the Committee on National Security and Development. I cannot disclose the details, but in general, it was found out that the main reasons are low temperature and high humidity. In dry weather, these mines did not cause any malfunctions.”
As a result, today a draft resolution in the Verkhovna Rada has gone forward to dismiss Defense Minister Umerov. The drafter of the resolution, Member of Parliament Oleksii Honcharenko, believes that Umerov should be brought up on charges.
"Umerov should resign. I registered a resolution to dismiss the Minister of Defense of Ukraine. After his dismissal, there should be criminal cases. And preferably a long prison term. I hope my colleagues will support and we will get rid of this POTUZHNYKas soon as possible.”
"The Ministry of Defense under the leadership of Umerov simply could not produce ammunition properly. The money was allocated. And the ammunition was produced defective. It was adopted and passed all the checks, and already on the FRONTLINE they realized that it was dangerous for personnel.”
“What to do now? We do not have ammunition. Which we need right now in the defense of Pokrovsk.”
Ground Operations
Kursk Salient
Russian sources claimed more gains south-east of Korenevo and in the vicinity of Darino. The Russian line now appears to run from the border north of Zhuravka, through Darino and Nizhnii Klin, to Zelenyi Shlyakh. Russian source also clamed some gains south-east and north-east of Sudzha. None of these claims have been confirmed, but the lack of glaring inconsistencies suggest that something like this is happening, that the Russians are using the “weight” of their force to roll back the Ukrainian positions.
North of Kharkiv
Fighting continued in the two small salients north of Kharkiv but there were no confirmed gains or losses by either side.
North of the Donets
Fighting continues along the line and there are a number of interesting claims, though there were no confirmed gains or losses due to poor weather.
North of Kupyansk there are reports that Russian elements crossed the Oskil and established a small lodgment on the West Bank, in the vicinity of Dvorichne (located between Dvorichne and Novomlynsk. This was also been reflected in Ukraine blogger reporting.
Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) acknowledged the action, but the UGS eported this afternoon that the Russian forces were pushed back across the Oskil. Neither action has yet been confirmed with any video or imagery.
Fighting has also been reported in the center of eastern Kupyansk and again, the UGS reported that the Russian forces had been pushed back and that eastern Kupyansk is now cleared of Russian troops. Again, this has not been confirmed.
Further south, the UGS reported Russian forces crossed to the western bank of the Oskil, just outside of Senkove, but there was no indication of the size of the Russian element.
Bakhmut
There was no significant change noted north or north-east of Bakhmut.
Russian forces remained on the attack in the vicinity of Chasiv Yar, particularly immediately north and south of the town, but there were no confirmed gains. That said, the unofficial Ukrainian reporting (which is more conservative in granting Russian gains than the Ukrainian General Staff) shows that Russian forces are operating west of the Donets Canal from Chasiv Yar south to Horlivka (further south the canal turns east and runs completely Russian controlled terrain). Ukrainian HQ reports that additional Russian forces have been moved into the area and the situation has been described as “dangerous.”
Russian forces pushed further into the south and south-west sides of Toretsk and the Ukrainian General Staff commented that the Russians are “attacking with incredible speed,” which seems out of character for the Russian forces and would suggest reduced resistance in front of them.
Donetsk City
Russian reports note continued gains south and south-east of Pokrovsk, gains that have probably resulted in Russian forces now occupying terrain about 6 miles south-south-west of Pokrovsk in the vicinity of the small town of Pustynka and further to the south-west near the town of Pushkine, as well as gains near Lysivka (south-east of Pokrovsk about 4 miles), with other Russian forces pushing slowly up the E50 roadway, just to the south-west of Lysivka. Ukrainian forces are claiming gains near Mykolaivka (due east of Pokrovsk about 5 miles) at the same time that reports suggest Russian forces are being withdrawn from due east of Pokrovsk and repositioned south of the town to support the ground gains in that area.
South of the Pokrovsk salient Russian forces continue to press westward in Kurakhove - they have reached roughly the center of the town - even as they work to close up small salients that could be exploited by the Ukrainian, and thereby straighten the Russian line. The would-be salient immediately north of Kurakhove is almost gone and the larger salient or pocket between Kurakhove and Vodyane is being steadily “eaten” by the Russian forces in the area.
West and north of Vuhledar Russian forces continue to press north - closing that once fairly large possible salient, and are pressing west and north-west. With this movement west, in concert with the movement north from the area of Rivnopil (just west of Velyka Novosilke), Velyka Novosilke is at risk of being circled in the near term (weeks to days).
Unconfirmed reports during the afternoon (US time) of the 26th suggest that some Russian elements have already probed into Velyka Novosilke.
In the north-west corner of this box the Russians continue to push the corner west and a bit north, even as forces press west from Dalhnie (just south of Kurakhove). Russian forces will presumably cut the N15 around Bahatyr, and then run up that road from the Kurakhove area. Once there, they can consolidate, and push further west, then they would have the choice of continuing west toward Zaporizhzhia City, or turning north and circling Pokrovsk.
It is important to remember that the fully developed, double defense lines that the Ukrainians had built from 2014 to 2022 were predominantly east of Pokrovsk (and a bit south-east of Pokrovsk) and south of the N15. Thus, by getting west of Pokrovsk, and taking control of the N15, they are effectively “behind the line,” behind the Ukrainain defensive line, and the Ukrainian defense is going to be less effective than it has been up to this point.
Southern Ukraine
Russian forces remain active in the Orikhiv area, in a broad arc north, north-west and north-east of Robotyne, but the have been no confirmed gains, as there have not been for several days as a result of poor weather preventing any commercial satellite coverage.
Ukrainian reporting notes repeated Russian attempts to land on and hold the islands in the mouth of the Dnepr River, with small units landing regularly and being driven off by Ukrainian drones and artillery fire.
Air Operations
Ukrainian Air Force assets reported shooting down 53 of 70 x Shahed drones in a preliminary report this morning.
On the night of the 24th Russian forces launched 145 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down 71 drones and another 71 were “lost” (deleted by EW); at least one drone flew into Belarus. At the same time, missile strikes (generically labeled) were reported in Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odessa. In addition, 1 x Iskander class ballistic missile struck an airfield near Dnipropetrovsk; Russian sources claimed the missile strike destroyed an F-16, but this has not been confirmed. A similar strike on Friday destroyed a UAF MiG-29. In that case (and in several cases earlier in the year) a Russian reconnaissance drone was observed in the area several minutes before the strike by an Iskander ballistic missile.
Politics and Diplomacy
Austrian Chancellor Nehammer told President Elect Trump that Austria is prepared to host peace talks to end the war in Ukraine.
In that regard, the latest Gallup poll (November 18th) shows that 52% of Ukrainians favor holding peace talks with Russia.
Russian reporting claims that 50 civilian bodies were found by Russian troops after they seized Selydove, and that the 50 had been executed by mercenaries fighting for the Ukrainian army. There is zero confirmation of this incident.
The NATO council held an ambassadorial level meeting to discuss the Russian RS-26 / Oreshnik ballistic missile strike on Dnipropetrovsk last Wednesday night (the 20th). The council sated that:
”The attack, which targeted Dnipro, is seen as another attempt by Russia to terrorize the civilian population in Ukraine and intimidate those who support Ukraine as it defends itself against Russia’s illegal and unprovoked aggression.”
During the past week week RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, and RAF Feltwell, all of which house US assets, were subject to surveillance by unidentified drones.
RAF bases in Suffolk and Norfolk were also surveilled.
Economic Reporting
Feb 22 Mar 7 Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Sep9 Oct8 Nov12 Nov25 Nov26
Brent 94.71 119.50 120.90 75.58 80.06 85.19 71.74 77.30 72.25 73.48 73.55
WTI 92.10 123.80 119.50 71.29 75.81 81.73 68.37 73.59 68.50 69.52 69.51
NG 3.97 4.45 8.41 2.15 2.82 2.38 2.20 2.74 2.97 3.39 3.41
Wheat 8.52 12.94 10.71 6.17 6.40 5.71 5.67 5.93 5.66 5.65 5.56
Ruble 85 145.70 58.48 82.59 88.77 88.18 90.75 96.83 98.36 103.89 105.69
Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.22 41.40 41.51 41.58
Urals 56.56 67.61 67.61 78.83 73.30 67.53 69.38 67.53
ESPO 65 77 77 77 77
Sokol 66.23 72.10 65.19 67.91 66.64
Lowest valuation of ruble since May 2022.
Thoughts
The Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) is now suggesting that the Ukrainain incursion into Kursk was to force the Russians to redeploy assets from the southern front where they were preparing to conduct an assault on Zaporizhzhia. At the time (first weeks of August) the UGS said that attack into Russia was to draw Russian forces off the push west from the Donetsk and Avdiivka area.
Now there is a follow-on report that Russian forces are massing to conduct an attack in Zaporizhzhia in the near term. Meanwhile, the Kursk salient is slowly being squeezed by the Russians
At the same time, UGS spokesman commentary on Russian operations along the Oskil River, near Kupyansk, or across southern Ukraine appear to have taken on a somewhat hyperbolic tone. In the case of the Russian advances along the Oskil and the Russian advances in the Kursk salient, Ukrainian casualty reports claim 5 to 1 kill ratios, and that the Russians are getting slaughtered, “ten men attack, two manage escape.” While the fighting is clearly very brutal, and these statements are not dispositive, the various HQs on both side (though particularly the Ukrainian) have usually claimed very high casualty ratios when they are, in fact, being beaten badly and are about to withdraw from some notable position.
In reality, south-west of Donetsk city the Russian forces appear to be on a steady grind and if they can take Velyka Novosilke and Kurakhove in the near term, which seems likely, they will then be able to consolidate the “south-east corner” and then push westward towards Zaporizhzhia. Unless the Ukrainian forces pull north from the southern line, they will have a difficult time stopping the Russians. The Russians have the Ukrainain line off balance; it will want to keep them off balance. The Ukrainian army on the other hand must stop the Russian grind and dig in. Perhaps they can use “General Winter” to do just that.
v/r pete
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