November 19th, 2024 Lincoln Delivers Gettysburg Address

This day, 1863

Biden Decision - Ukraine may use US Weapons against targets in Russia

Ground Ops  - Russian gains in south-east

Weather

Kharkiv

35 and clear. Mostly cloudy through the weekend, rain or rain - snow mix on Thursday and again on Saturday, tapering off early Sunday morning. 40s to 50s Wednesday and Thursday, then dropping into the 30s on Friday. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

40 and clear. Mostly cloudy for the next 4 days, rain Thursday night and again on Saturday. Wednesday and Thursday lows in the 40s, highs near 60. Friday morning temperatures could drop to 30, then will climb again through Saturday morning, reaching the mid 50s, then will drop steadily and by Sunday morning lows will be in the low 30s. Winds variable, 15-20kts.

Kyiv

37 and mostly cloudy. Cloudy for the next week; Wednesday will be windy, winds over 20, rain or rain-snow mix starting Wednesday night and continuing on and off through Saturday morning. Tomorrow lows in the low 40s, highs near 50; after that daily lows will be in the upper 20s, daily highs in the low to mid 30s. By Friday windchills will be in the upper teens to low 20s. Winds variable, 10-20kts.

Strikes into Russia

President Biden has authorized the Ukraine to use US weapons to strike into Russia. The French and British governments initially commented that they had not yet provided a similar authorization, but it now appears that they have.

Ukraine then apparently used 8 x ATACMS in a strike on a Russian ammunition storage facility in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainians report that they launched 8 x ATACMS and that Russia shot down 2 of the missiles. Russia claimed it shot down 5 of the missiles.

A fire was reported at the facility but there is no comprehensive damage assessment yet.

Ground Operations 

Kursk Salient

Russian forces continued to make incremental gains in the Kursk salient, with small gains of terrain east of Korenevo and north of Sudzha. A Ukrainian force, probably consisting of a brigade sized element, remains west of Malaya Loknya but its line of communication with the rest of the Ukrainian forces and with Ukrainian territory is being pinched by Russian forces and is now no more than several thousand meters across.

Weather - low clouds - continues to reduce the effectiveness of drones and muddy roads are slowing movements on both sides.

North of Kharkiv 

Russian forces continued attacks in both small salients north of Kharkiv, but there were no confirmed gains; Ukrainian forces noted thick fog and Russian attempts to exploit reduced visibility.

Donets River

Russian forces noted gains at both the north and south end of the line of contact, with continued fighting in eastern Kupyansk, and there was “heavy” fighting noted on Dzerzhynsky street (the P07 roadway becomes Dzezhynsky street as it enters East Kupyansk). This means that the Russians have pushed south and east out of the positions they held near Petropavlika to the east, and in the woods to the north-east, and have raided forward perhaps 2 miles, which is probably a good indication of very poor weather and the ability to move without being detected by drones.

Further south, there has been no appreciable change in the terrain held along the Oskil River, nor, due east of Svatove, have the Russian taken any more land west of the Zherebets River, but they continue to pressure Terny from the north, trying to advance southward along the Zherebets River towards that town.

Bakhmut

North-east of Bakhmut, Russian forces had small confirmed gains south of Bilohorivka and also south of  Vyimka.

In the vicinity of Chasiv Yar Russian forces are now west of the Donets Canal just to the north, on the eastern edge and to the south of the town. There were no gains on Monday but over the past several days there have been incremental gains by Russian forces. Russian and Ukrainian forces are now engaged just east of the Chasovoyarsky Refractory Plant (which produces industrial clay products), which sits on the north edge of the town center.

Russian forces are also pushing west on the T0504 roadway and there have been engagements about a mile north-east of the center of Stupochky.

Further south, fighting continues in and south of Toretsk, and Russian forces continue to try to press into that town. Russian and Ukrainian forces are now engaged just east of the central market in Toretsk. Just south of Toretsk Russian and Ukrainian forces have engaged on the eastern edge of Shcherbynivka, north of Leonidivka.

Donetsk City

Along the perimeter of the Pokrovsk salient there were multiple (more than a dozen) minor advances by Russian forces beginning in Hrodivka and continuing around to Glinka, north of the Kurakhove reservoir. Of note, Russian forces pushed north-west and west and south-west from the general area of Selydove, to include advancing up the M04 roadway, about 7 miles down the road from Pokrovsk, and Russian elements have raided further up the road to within 4 miles of Pokrovsk.

Fighting continues around Kurakhove and Russian forces now control perhaps 3/4ths of the north side of the Kurakhove reservoir. The pocket that used to exist south of the Pokrovsk salient is all but gone. Fighting continues inside Kurakhove, but there has been little change noted inside the town, and Russian forces control perhaps the eastern 1/8th of the town.

Further south, Russian forces have pushed through Dalne, and are now closing on the T0501 roadway west of Dalne.

The rectangle of land north of Vuhledar - the land that Russia has seized since Vuhledar fell, now measures perhaps 8 wide (north to south) by 12 miles long (east to west) and is still expanding to the north, north-west and west. Depending on which blog site you use, Russian forces in the north-west corner of that square are now between 1 and 5 miles from Bahatyr along the N15 roadway that runs from Zaporizhzhia to Donetsk (I would guess closer to 5 miles than 1 mile).

Southern Ukraine

Engagements continue along the southern front but there were no confirmed gains by either side. However, Russian forces appear to be making continual incremental gains in the general areas south of Orikhiv, Hulyaipol and Velyka Novosilke.

Air Operations

Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes into Ukraine on the night of the 17th-18th. At least 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 1 x Kh-59 cruise missile and 11 x Shahed drones were launched; the UAF claimed it shot down 8 drones.

Aid

North Korea has reportedly provided Russia with 50 x 170MM Koksan (Chuche’po) self-propelled howitzers and 20 x 240MM MLRS.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Sep9 Oct8 Nov12 Nov15 Nov19

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 71.74 77.30 72.25 72.41 73.05

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 68.37 73.59 68.50 68.62 68.68

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.20 2.74 2.97 2.71 2.97

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.67 5.93 5.66 5.48 5.66

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 90.75 96.83 98.36 99.59 100.47

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.22 41.40 41.31 41.28

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 78.83 73.30 67.53 66.84 67.80

ESPO 65 77 77 77 77

Sokol 66.23 72.10 65.19 65.22 66.84

This is the Lowest Ruble Rate versus the dollar in 13 months 

Thoughts

As expected (though earlier this year) President Biden has approved the use of US weapons for strikes into Russia.

This all makes sense, but causes worry; Victor Davis Hanson perfectly framed the problem yesterday: 

There is no end in sight after three years of escalating violence. But there are increasing worries that strategically logical and morally defensible—but geopolitically dangerous—Ukrainian strikes on the Russian interior will nonetheless escalate and lead to a wider war among the world’s nuclear powers.

I would make one correction; he said that this will escalate. In fact, it already has, after all, adding anything is a de facto escalation.

But is it a substantive escalation? That is, does this materially change the balance of power? If it does, will that change in the balance of power persist and have a significant impact on the outcome of the war? And is there a path, a plan, tied to this decision, to de-escalate if we get the desired result?

As to the first question, will this use of weapons achieve certain results that the Ukrainian armed forces can exploit or which directly benefit Ukraine as a whole?

My sense here is that there will be a few tactical and operational gains, which will be much trumpeted, but then the Russians will adapt and, just as with regard to HIMARS, the military efficacy will rapidly tail off.

 But whether it has great impact or not, will Russia perceive it as a substantive escalation?

That depends on what targets they hit. If the Ukrainians are rigorous in applying these weapons to military targets only, I think Russians will shrug and accept it, and fight on, with no major change up or down in Russian morale or support for Putin. If they hit culturally significant targets - a round through St. Basil’s in the Kremlin if you will (beyond the range of ATACMS), I would not be surprised to see the Russian people get very angry and demand a more aggressive war, and see a very rapid escalation.

Generally, striking at militarily related targets (counter force targeting) doesn’t really impact a country’s morale. Targeting items of social and cultural significance (counter-value targeting) has historically had very negative effects, stiffening the spine of even the most reluctant “warriors.” 

Said differently, a mistake here can have tremendous negative effect for the Ukrainians, convincing Russian citizens that Putin is right.

As for the second question, unless we give them a great many weapons, I don’t see how they can strike enough targets that it really starts to “hurt” Russia. As a case in point, I recall a power grid targeting campaign to break a power grid in a country much smaller than Russia, smaller in fact than Ukraine - just the power grid. It involved over 1,000 aim points.

That said, even if we were to give the Ukrainians a great many weapons, it isn’t clear that it would suddenly convince Russia to quit. It is also worth noting that Russia, as President Zelenskyy informed us today, launched 1,000 missiles against the Ukrainian power grid since the start of the war. That has not convinced the Ukrainians to surrender. I’m not sure why anyone believes that strikes into Russia are going to change Russia’s mind at this point.

There are a host of variables here, but it would not be surprising if the Russians adapt fairly quickly and, as with the HIMARS, these strikes into Russia simply fade into the background of the war.

Russian morale is, at this point, remarkably solid. Strikes into Russia may make it weaken. But if history tells us anything in this regard, it would be the opposite, strikes into Russia will stiffen the resolve of the Russian people, irrespective of the fact that Putin started the war.

There is a real concern, however; what if Putin perceives this as a real threat, aligned with the latest Russian nuclear use policy: ballistic missile attack on Russia. We are escalating the war, the point in doing this is to break Russia’s will. As Russia responds to these strikes there will be an almost autonomic response to strike back at Ukraine and the West. Is there a plan in place to act quickly in that even and contact the Russians and de-escalate? ANd is there a real plan if Putin uses a low-yield nuclear weapon? And what if he used a low yield weapon in Ukrainian troops inside Russia? 

Is there any plan to de-escalate? Or are we simply escalating until we hopefully break Russia’s will? That is a risky proposition.

Whatever happens, hopefully it will be in the interest of the US. Of course, hope is not a course of action.

v/r pete