November 27th, 2024 Next Summary 29 November, 2024

Have a Great Thanksgiving

Ground Ops  - Russian gains

Air Operations  - More Large strikes, targeting power grid

Economics  - Russia’s 2025  Defense Budget - largest since Cold War

Weather

Low clouds and fog continue to limit the effectiveness of drones and also have complicated confirming the locations and gains and losses of various units.

Kharkiv

31 and cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy for the next week. Daily lows in the upper 20s, daily highs hovering around freezing. Winds variable, 5kts.

Melitopol

34 and cloudy. Partly cloudy for the next week. Daily highs in the mid to upper 30s, daily lows in the upper 20s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

26 and cloudy. Cloudy for the next 5 days, snow showers tomorrow. Daily lows in the low 30s, daily lows in the upper 20s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations

Kursk Salient

Russian forces remained on the offensive but there were no confirmed gains or losses of territory by either side.

North of Kharkiv

Fighting was reported to be very heavy, and Russian ground forces were supported by 19 air strikes in the two small salients, but there was no reported changes in the front line.

North of the Donets

There is again, as yesterday, a good deal of reporting that cannot be confirmed, most of it suggesting that the Russians have gained ground at multiple spots along the front line: to include crossing the Oskil River north-east of Kupyansk, pressing on the north-east edge of Kupyansk itself, slowly expanding their hold on the east bank of the Oskil just north of Senkove, and pressing on the town of Terny (along the Zherebets) from the north. There is also reporting suggesting Ukrainian forces regained land west of Kreminna - virtually none of this has been confirmed, and there have been Ukrainian reports that countered each item, but they were followed by additional reports that suggest the Russian did post these gains.

All combined, it reads as if there is still the same hard, brutal “see-saw” fight taking place, but the Russians are slowly making progress, almost a “three steps forward, two steps back” sort of affair.

Bakhmut

Russian forces continued operations east of Siversk but there were no confirmed changes to the front line.

Russian forces appear to have made some gains in Chasiv Yar and fighting is taking place around the industrial ceramics factory in central Chasiv Yar.

Fighting continues in and around Toretsk but there were no confirmed changes in the front line.

Donetsk City

Russian forces continue to push westward, particularly south of Pokrovsk, although there was some small, confirmed gains on the northern edge of the Pokrovsk salient. Of most significance are the continued gains to the south of Pokrovsk where there is more reporting suggesting that Russian forces are operating in the vicinity of  Lysivka, Petrivka, Zhovte and further to the south-west. This places the lead Russian elements west of Pokrovsk. 

Further south-east Russian forces are pressing west along the northern edge of the Kurakhove Reservoir and the pocket north of the reservoir has been nearly closed up and the Russian line straightened. That said, there is, reportedly, as nasty fight taking place on the north side of the reservoir as Ukraine forces try to hold their ground.

North and East of Vuhledar Russian forces continue to press north and west, and Russian troops have crossed the T0518 roadway and control about 4 - 5 miles of the road just north of Velyka Novosilke (VN). The pocket south of Kurakhove  - which was centered on a string of villages located along the small Sukhi Yaly River - continues to collapse. This river has been used as a defensive position by numerous forces - the Germans, the Ukrainians, the Russians - in previous wars and engagements. It is of note that the Ukrainians were not as successful this time exploiting it defensively; why that is so, isn’t clear, but my suspicion is that it is a manpower shortage issue.

In the fighting around Velyka Novosilke (VN), Russian forces south-west of VN, continue to push north; two thrusts, one from the vicinity of Novodarivka (about 7 miles south-west of VN) and another from just north of Rivnopil (about 5 miles south-west of VN) are pressing north and appear to have progressed to a point due west of VN. At the same time - based on two separate Ukrainian blogs - Russian attacks from the east appear to have reached the edge of the town, proper and are pressing in on VN from roughly the the “1:30 to 4:30” position. However, none of this has been confirmed due to the poor weather.

Southern  Ukraine

In the Orikhiv area there were claims of Russian units advancing roughly a mile northwards towards Mala Tokmachka (4 miles south-east of Orikhiv), but this hasn’t been confirmed.

Elsewhere across Southern Ukraine Russian units engaged in multiple small unit assaults but there were no confirmed gains or losses.

Russian forces are also reportedly reinforcing positions on Kinburn Spit (at the mouth of the Dnepr), out of concerns of Ukrainian raids onto the east bank of the river.

Air Operations 

On 26-27 November Russian forces claimed to have launched 89 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space, targeting the power grid and “strategic facilities.” There was no reporting on numbers engaged by the UAF or success rate.

Russian Forces launched 4 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 188 x Shahed and other drones into Ukrainian air space on the night of 25 - 26 November. (Note: the “other drones” refers to the practice of mixing some decoy drones into an incoming strike package to draw fire, force the UAF to use more missiles and ammunition.) The UAF claimed it shot down all 4 Iskander missiles as well as 76 drones. Another 96 drones were lost (defeated with electronic warfare), and 5 drones flew into Belarus. No details on the surviving drones.

Several drones were reported to have struck energy grid elements, and 2 additional Iskander ballistic missiles were launched into the Odessa region; 1 was shot down, the second missile hit some element of the power grid, but not it was not further identified.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Sep9 Oct8 Nov12 Nov26 Nov27

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 71.74 77.30 72.25 73.55 73.14

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 68.37 73.59 68.50 69.51 69.15

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.20 2.74 2.97 3.41 3.26

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.67 5.93 5.66 5.56 5.58

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 90.75 96.83 98.36 105.69 110.90

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.22 41.40 41.58 41.62

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 78.83 73.30 67.53 67.53 67.84

ESPO 65 77 77 77 77

Sokol 66.23 72.10 65.19 66.64 66.27

Lowest Ruble Rate since March 2022.

Russia’s Federation Council (their upper house of parliament) approved the 2025 budget, which includes the largest defense budget since the Cold War, 13.5 trillion rubles ($125 billion).

Ukraine received $4.8 billion from the World Bank, part of an overall $50 billion investment project.

Thoughts

The reporting on the Russian operations in the “southeast,” that is, west and south-west of Donetsk City, shows an army that has found a process to keep moving forward and beating the defensive positions, and forces, the Ukrainians are placing in front of them.  As noted before, the hardest Ukrainian defensive positions are either already behind the Russians (such as Marinka, Vuhledar and Avdiivka) or they are less developed and the Russians feel comfortable avoiding them - such as Pokrovsk, and swinging wide around them and continuing their slow but steady advance.

There is little new here but what is of note is that the Ukrainians haven’t been able to stop them. This isn’t through lack of trying but it does suggest that they are simply low on the most important item in attrition warfare: soldiers.

At the same time, capabilities that were hailed as “game changers” earlier are now no longer of great note - such as HIMARS and FPV drones. The Russians have adapted and now these items are just another element to deal with, but fuel depots and ammo depots and command posts for the most part are surviving and the Russians continue to grind forward.

It is also worth noting that the Economist now says that perhaps as many as 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed so far. Mediazone, the best single source of Russian casualties puts the Russian KIA total in the 80 - 120,000 — so, roughly the same casualty count. This should be remembered amid the steady drumbeat of propaganda that the Russians suffer from morale, poor equipment, poor tactics and terrible leadership: the Ukrainians have essentially the same casualty count (though 1/4th the population of Russia), and, for now, the Russians seem to be winning.

v/r pete