January 31st, 2025 

Ground Ops - Russian gains around Pokrovsk

- Russian Gains in Chasiv Yar

- Russian Gains in the mouth of the Dnepr

Politics - US plan leaked?

- Former Press secretary calls for ceasefire

Weather

Temperatures remain will drop below freezing by Sunday night and are expected to remain below freezing all next week, which should improve mobility. Clouds remain however, which degrades reconnaissance operations.

Kharkiv

43 and cloudy. Rain on Saturday, cloudy all next week. Daily lows in the 30s through Sunday, then back below freezing. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

44 and cloudy. Mostly cloudy for the next week; rain showers Saturday night, rain to snow mix Monday. daily lows in the 30s into Monday, then back below freezing all next week. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

43 and cloudy, gusting over 20. Cloudy for the next week. Temperatures in the mid to low 30s through Sunday night; by Monday back into the 20s and remaining below freezing through next week. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Ground Operations 

Kursk Salient

Unconfirmed reports suggest Russian forces continue to gain ground near Zhuravka (just inside the Ukrainian border, just west of the salient) as part of an effort to flank Ukrainian forces holding the western edge of the salient.

Elsewhere, fighting was reported along much of the perimeter but there were no confirmed changes to the front line.

North of Kharkiv

Ukrainian forces made small gains inside Vovchansk, north-east of Kharkiv.

North of the Donets River

Fighting continues north of Kupyansk. Gains remain unconfirmed but some reporting suggests Russian forces made some gains both north-west of Dvorichna and north of Dvorichna.

Fighting continues east and north-east of Borova, but there does not appear to be any change in the front lines.

West of Terny the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) reports multiple engagements and Russian forces, based on UGS reporting, appear to have pushed another mile west from Terny (now about 4 miles west) but this has not been independently confirmed. Fighting was also reported in the Serebrianske forest.

Bakhmut

Fighting continues north and north-east of Bakhmut but there were no confirmed changes to the front line.

Russian forces continue to push south-west through the center of Chasiv Yar and appear to have taken most of Chasiv Yar proper and are now approaching Shevchenko - the western half of Chasiv Yar. Russian forces now control the west side of Chasiv Yar, northern and central Chasiv Yar, and much of eastern Chasiv Yar, leaving the Shevchenko area and neighboring villages of Stupochky and Predtechyne in Ukrainian control.

Further south, Russian forces continue to clear pockets in the northern Toretsk and Krymske area. Russian forces have now pushed through Krymske and are pushing into the residential area immediately south of Dachne. At the same time it appears that Russian forces now control 1 of the 3 slag and waste hills on the north edge of Toretsk.

Donetsk City

Fighting continues west, south and east of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces made marginal gains south-west of Pokrovsk to the west of Novoandriivka, but Russian forces continue to hold the town. Elsewhere, Russian forces continue to make small gains, slowly moving north from positions west of Pokrovsk, and moving north and north-west from positions east of Pokrovsk. Russian forces continue to push both east and west along the T0504 Roadway, north-west of Vozdvyzhenka.

Finally, pressure mounts on the small city of Myrnohrad, just east of Pokrovsk and the residents have now been ordered to evacuate. The city held 50,000 residents prior to the war, but many have already evacuated and fewer than 20,000 remained into the city by last summer, and the current population is less than 3,000. The city has no electric power.

Russian forces continue to advance south, and west of Kurakhove.

South of Kurakhove Russian forces continue to press westward, slowly collapsing the box south-west of Kurakhove and pushing Ukrainian forces westward. At the same time Russian forces appear to have pushed through the eastern end of the town of Andriivka (about 8 miles west of Kurakhove) and have reached the Northern bank of the Vovcha River. Meanwhile, Russian forces to the south continue to try to take Ulakly (south of Andriivka, but Ukrainian forces continue to hold their positions.

North and west of Andriivka Russian forces have straightened their lines and control all the terrain east of a line from Andriivka north to Novoandriivka, and from there, north to the Solona River in the area of Novooleksandrivka.

Of note, both sides continue to reports heavy fog and its degradation of drone operations.

Russian forces continue to push north and north-west from the Velyka Novosilke (VN) area and now appear to control all of the west bank of the Mokri Yaly river and are pushing into Novoocheretuvate  (immediately north of Novyi Komar). 

Southern Ukraine

Probes and artillery strikes continue. Imagery confirmed Russian forces had taken control of Velykyi Sokolin island at the mouth of the Dnepr River on Wednesday.

There are reports of Russian forces pushing into the center of Kamyanske (on the Dnepr) but this has not been confirmed.

Air Operations 

On the night of 30 - 31 January Russian forces launched an unreported number of Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space; the UAF claimed it shot down 59 drones.

On the night of 29 January Russia forces launched 81 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 37 drones but gave no number for drones defeated by EW (“lost”). Various damages were reported in Sumy City and Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Poltava oblasts.

Air strikes with smart glide bombs were reported at multiple sites, to include Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk; heavy damage was noted in Pokrovsk.

Politics

Newsweek reports that the Ukrainian news outlet Strana obtained a copy of the Trump administration plan to end the war, and has published it.

President Zelenskyy’s office has denied that it is an authentic plan.

Nevertheless, the plan contains what most have postulated must be in any plan: 

- Ceasefire (by Easter)

- Ukrainian troops withdrawing from Kursk Oblast

- Once withdrawal complete, beginning of peace talks, goal - for a rough plan by May 9th

- End to Martial Law and Mobilization in Ukraine 

- Ukraine can’t join NATO, but can join EU by 2030

- Ukraine cedes occupied territory to Russia

- EU leads Ukraine reconstruction 

- Ukraine continues to receive military aid from US

The key element is the ceasefire. Then the talks begin. But, as with Korea - a ceasefire can last a long time.

Ukraine’s Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) opened criminal proceedings after the publication of alleged statements by LTGEN Budanov, specifically, a statement Budanov made in a closed meeting in which he said that the survival of Ukrainian would be threatened if serious negotiations did not begin by the summer of 2025.

The Ministry of Defense denies he made the statement.

President Zelenskyy’s former press secretary, Yuliya Mendel, noted in Time Magazine that Ukraine should agree to a ceasefire, noting that 7.5 million Ukrainians have left the country, an additional 440,000 in 2024.

“Even an imperfect ceasefire can give Ukraine the opportunity to strengthen its defenses, which was impossible to do under constant shelling…I call on our allies, our leaders and, above all, my compatriots: think about the value of the ceasefire. Let us accept this difficult path not as a capitulation, but as a necessary step towards securing the future of Ukraine…. naivety today lies not in seeking respite, but in believing that an endless war of attrition can lead to victory."

Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution calling for “peace through strength” and stating that negotiations can only be conducted from a position of “Ukrainian strength."

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Sep9 Dec9 Jan8 Jan29 Jan31

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 71.74 72.63 76.69 77.03 76.86

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 68.37 68.85 73.94 73.33 72.83

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.20 3.17 3.66 3.40 3.04

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.67 5.59 5.37 5.51 5.61

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 90.75 100.84 105.18 98.57 98.62

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.55 42.33 41.90 41.68

Urals 56.56    67.61 78.83 66.19 71.76 70.06 70.40

ESPO 65 77 78.19 78.53 78.36

Sokol 66.23 65.32 72.79 73.19 72.81

Thoughts

Clearly, something is brewing. Whether in fact the plan that appeared in the newspapers was the real one, and was leaked to block it from moving forward, or it was fake, but leaked to complicate any peace talks, it’s clear that there is a great deal of stress in the system.

An additional example of stress:

The British newspaper “TheGuardian” reports that the Ukrainian desertion problem continues to worsen, and Forbes reports that a second Ukrainian brigade is suffering large number of desertion as it heads to the front line.

The brigade, the 157th, is said to have insufficient training, and comes on the heels of the 155th suffering 1700 desertions in 9 months, out of a total of 5,500 soldiers.

The Ukrainian army is attempting to stand up eight brigades: 151st, 153rd, 154th, 155th, 156th, 157th, 158th and 159th Mechanized Brigades. The brigades are all big - 5,000 or more soldiers - and all are said to suffer from insufficient training and inexperienced leadership, as well as insufficient equipment. Now the army is trying to slow down the process of moving these unit forward and extending the training periods.

Add all this together, on top of the continual grind of the Russian army and what do you get?

The part that should be disturbing to the Ukrainian General Staff is the concern that the army can hold together long enough. What is clear is that without a great deal of outside support, the Ukrainian army will not stop the Russian grind. To stop the Russian army the Ukrainian army needs time to train new units, something that they simply do not have, as demonstrated by desertion rates of the 155th and 157th brigades.

Without that extra time, plus all sorts of extra assets, Ukraine faces a real possibility of a collapse of the army in a given sector and a tremendous setback on the battlefield. The idea of regaining currently occupied lands is smoke and mirrors without some sort of massive change in support from the US and Europe, which simply doesn’t seem possible. Sustained support yes, a substantial increase in support - not likely.

Zelenskyy’s former press secretary has said what everyone else is thinking: time for a ceasefire.

v/r pete   

 

Too Many Chefs

It is said that too many chefs spoil the broth. The point is obvious: if you are making something (pretty much anything) someone - some ONE - has to be in charge. If two people are in charge of making the soup, it is likely to come out a bit off.

This idea of concentrating leadership, or at least avoiding any unnecessary diffusing of leadership, is nowhere as important as in an army or navy. The reason is obvious: fast, crisp decisions are necessary to survive and win in combat, and fast, crisp decisions are difficult or impossible if there are too many people trying to be in charge.  On a ship, where there is limited space and no escape, the necessity for good order is obvious and the more difficult the situation the greater the need.

Not only is a clear, uncluttered chain of command a central element of successful military units, the reverse is also true, top-heavy commands (too many chefs) run higher risks of poor decisions, and even when they make good decisions the decision-making process will normally be slower, and hence they run the risk of unsuccessful operations; said differently, top heavy armies and navies run higher risks of losing.

Between 1941 and 1945, 17 officers served as 4 star admirals; this number includes Adm. Kimmel, in command of the fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, Adm. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations on December 7th, and 5 officers promoted to 4 stars during the spring and summer of 1945. Of those 4 stars, 3 of them were actually wearing 5 stars by the end of the war. The last officer to be promoted to admiral during WWII was Samuel Robinson, promoted to 4 stars on 27 August  1945. Technically, that’s after Japan surrendered, but before the formal end of the war, September 2nd, 1945. Robinson was the 66th 4-star admiral in the Navy since its birth (Farragut was the first, in 1866).

Since 1945 the Navy has promoted 172 officers to 4 stars, and currently has 8 - four star admirals; there are a few other differences.

One of those differences is in the process of what is called in the military  “command and control” (known as “C2”). The DOD defines command and control as the exercise of authority over assigned forces by a properly designated officer in the accomplishment of an assigned mission (it varies a bit from service to service but the gist of it is the same). To do so, the commander needs to know what his own forces are doing and what the enemy is doing. Keeping the commander informed, and being able receive tasking from the commander is, therefore, central to C2.

Since WWII a great deal of money has been spent on improving C2. This has centered on the technology and process of passing and displaying data both up and down echelon; keeping the boss informed, and then receiving his orders; speed and accuracy and completeness of data - in both directions - is essential. 

How fast could we pass data 80 years ago? By the early 1950s the Navy was operating communications systems that could pass text between 100 and 200 words per minute (PER MINUTE). The best rates during WWII were 74.2 baud, which, if using binary coding, would equate to 74.2 bits per second. In practice, it was less than 74 bits per second. But, if running well, this translated into something on the order of 50 to 100 words per minute - atmospherics being an important factor in the final rate on any given day.

Note, this was all text. There was no true data link. Locating data was spelled out and then someone on the other end had to take “12 degrees 1 minute N 134 degree 47 minutes E” and go plot that on a map.

This means that passing precise data was very difficult even on your own ship and aircraft, never mind what you thought the enemy was doing. Accordingly, there was need for decision-makers to be present at each critical spot, and the answer was to have more senior officers present with forces.

It’s worth noting that one of the common justifications through the years for funding more advanced communications equipment is that increased data rates and increased security will allow centralization and streamlining of command and control and allow for more rapid AND better command decisions, with the need for fewer command centers and a simpler, leaner command structure. 

By the 1980s we had developed an array of data links as well as satellite communications. Link 16, an example of just one of several data link systems, and now the common data link for NATO, passes data (per WIKIPEDIA) at one of 3 rates: 31,600, 57,600, or 115,200 bits per second. And this is just one of multiple data links. This works out to data rates between 500 and 1500 times that which was available in 1945.

And about that Navy ( https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html#1938  ): in 1945 the Navy had 51 battleships or fleet carriers, 71 escort carriers, 72 cruisers, 738 destroyers and frigates, 232 submarines, and nearly 6,000 other ships, plus a merchant marine of 11,000 ships, manned by more than 3.3 million officers and sailors.

Today the US Navy has 328,000 officers and sailors, 10 aircraft carriers and 297 total ships, which happens to also be the number of admirals listed in the US Naval Institute’s Naval Review issues of May 2024.

So, to restate: in World War II the US Navy (and the US Army and the US Army Air Force) had no data links, no automated displays of where ships and aircraft were, no means to automatically identify whether a whip or aircraft or truck was friendly or enemy, no “Blue Force Tracker” that allowed the automated following of own forces, no digital communications, and a data transmission rate of less than 100 words per minute.

The Navy was commanded by fewer than 300 x 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 star admirals. Of note, by summer of 1945, the US Army (with 90 divisions and more than 8 million soldiers, and the same data rates as the Navy, had 188 generals of all ranks. 

So, if we have a total force that is less than 1/10th the size of the force in WWII, and a command and control system that is in excess of 1,000 times more effective, why do we need more admirals now then we did then? 

The US Navy is not top heavy, it is not “fat” with senior officers; when we consider both the much smaller size and the much more capable command and control, the US command structure is morbidly obese. The other services are as well. 

Some in Congress seem upset that the President just relieved 1 admiral (US Coast Guard - they have the same problems). But the truth is that if there is any desire to make the command structures of the Navy and the other services more effective and more efficient, the number of senior officers - and the number of senior civilians - requires drastic reduction. Congress needs to understand that most of the admirals, and most of the senior civilians, have become impediments to efficiency and most importantly, to effectiveness. They need to be prepared for many admirals and SES being asked to retire and not being replaced. And it needs to begin immediately.

 January 29th, 2025  Next Summary 31 January

Ground Ops - Russian forces take Velyka Novosilke

- Russian advances around Pokrovsk 

- Russian advances in Southern Ukraine

Politics - MinDef Umerov under investigation 

Weather

Temperatures remain above freezing until Monday across most of Ukraine, raw, damp, unpleasant for the infantry, but the fields will remain muddy, making logistics and movement more difficult. Also, many days will have low, solid overcasts, and some fog in the mornings, all degrading reconnaissance operations.

Kharkiv

41 and cloudy. Cloudy for the next week, rain or snow showers Saturday through Tuesday. Daily lows in the upper 30s, highs in the low 40s. Winds variable, 5kts.

Melitopol

43 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Cloudy for the next week; daily lows in the upper 30s to low 40s, daily highs near 50. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

45 and cloudy, gusting over 20. Cloudy for the next week, rain showers Friday night and Saturday. Temperatures will be in the mid 30s to low 40s through Saturday night; Sunday and Monday temperatures around freezing all day. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations 

Kursk Salient 

Fighting continues along much of the perimeter of the salient, but there were no independently confirmed changes in the front lines. Reporting of activity levels suggests Russian forces are maintaining a high ops tempo along the entire perimeter.

The somewhat Orwellian named Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reports that North Korean units in the Kursk salient may be withdrawing from combat due to losses; this has not yet been confirmed.

North of Kharkiv

Fighting was reported near both Vovchansk and Starytsya, but there were no changes in the front lines.

North of the Donets

Russian forces north of Kupyansk appear to control most of Dvorichna - all but one street leading northwest out of the town. Russian forces also continue to attack on the eastern edge of Kutkivka (north-west of Dvorichna) and on the east side of Zapadne, per the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), but there were no observed gains.

Further south, fighting continues north-east of Borova, near Zelenyi Hai, and east of Borova near Kopanky, but there were no confirmed gains in the area.

Fighting also continues west of Kreminna, with Russian forces still pushing west from the Terny area but there has, again, been no confirmed gains in the area.

Bakhmut

Fighting continues but there were no changes to the front line north and north-east of Bakhmut.

The UGS reported fighting in central and southern Chasiv Yar, and south of Chasiv Yar, in Predtechyne and near Bilo Hora, all of which supports an assessment of slow, but real Russian gains, but there were no confirmed gain or losses of terrain.

Russian sources appear to be slowly absorbing Toretsk, though Ukrainian forces appear to have made small gains in the northern edge of the town. There are small slices of Toretsk, Krymske and Dachne still in Ukrainian hands, but those area are getting smaller.

South of Toretsk Russian forces now control terrain from perhaps 2 miles north-north-west of Niu York, dues south about 6 miles to a spot about a mile north of Novobakhmutivka along the Pokrovsk salient’s northern edge.

Donetsk City

Some “see-saw” gains and losses of terrain are taking place just south of Pokrovsk, with Ukrainian forces regaining control of slices of Kotlyne and Zvirove, but overall Russian forces continue to gain ground, and the UGS reports that Russian forces have pushed into Udachne (8 miles west-south-west of Pokrovsk), and now control Uspenivka and Novoandrivka.  Forces east of Pokrovsk continue to attack both north and west and continue to make small gains.

South-west of Kurakhove Russian forces continue to push westward from the east side of the pocket. The east edge (running north-south) is now lined up with the west edge of the town of Dachne, and the pocket is now less than 3 miles wide (east to west). North-west of Kurakhove Russian forces have taken Slovyanka and pushed into the surrounding farmland. 

Reporting suggests that clearing operations continue in Velyka Novosilke (VN), but VN is under Russian control, as is Novyi Komar (just to the north), and Russian forces are now attacking Ukrainian positions west of Rozdolne (north-east of VN).

Southern Ukraine 

The UGS reported that Russian forces have taken the town of Stepove, about 7-8 miles east of Kamyanske (15 miles west of Orikhiv, astride the T0812 roadway), but did not say when the Russians took the town.

This event highlights one element of the nature of the fighting in the south - there is very little reporting on it. Even among the many bloggers who try to follow the war, there is so little raw reporting coming out of the south, it is difficult to maintain a solid grasp of what is happening.  The UGS reporting routinely suggests that little is happening, but there are sporadic reports, such as this one, that the suggests much more Russian activity.

Air Operations 

Wrap up of the strikes on the 27th: Russian forces launched 1 x Iskander cruise missile and 1004 x Shahed droned into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down 65 drones, 28 drones were “lost” (defeated by EW), 2 drones flew into Belarus air space. Damage was reported in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa Poltava and Sumy oblasts, to include damage to "critical infrastructure” (probably electric power generation related equipment) Cherkasy Oblast, resulting 72 towns temporarily losing power. The cruise missile and several drones struck power grid in Odessa oblast.

Politics

Reuters is reporting that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau has launched in investigation into actions by Minister of Defense Umerov, specifically that he improperly failed to renew a contract with the head of the Defense Procurement Board after the Defense Procurement Agency unanimously recommended the contract be extended.

The US transferred 90 x Patriot Missiles to Ukraine.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Sep9 Dec9 Jan8 Jan28 Jan29

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 71.74 72.63 76.69 77.40 77.03

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 68.37 68.85 73.94 73.46 73.33

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.20 3.17 3.66 3.54 3.40

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.67 5.59 5.37 5.40 5.51

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 90.75 100.84 105.18 98.60 98.57

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.55 42.33 41.92 41.90

Urals 56.56    67.61 78.83 66.19 71.76 70.16 70.06

ESPO 65 77 78.19 78.90 78.53

Sokol 66.23 65.32 72.79 73.29 73.19

Thoughts

The report of Russian forces taking Stepove is of note. Assuming the UGS isn’t telling a lie (why would they?), the Russians have not only taken Stepove, they presumably also took the town between Stepove and the Russian lines, Piatykhatky, and  more importantly, the T-0812 roadway, which runs right through Stepove, providing support to terrain between Orikhiv and Kamyanske which now becomes vulnerable. As a reminder, Russian forces operating north-west of Robotyne (which sits due south of Orikhiv) have already reached the general area of Novoandriivka, just west of Orikhiv, on the same roadway. There is a strip of land, about 2 miles wide north of that road, farmland with no major villages, and no defensive positions in it; presumably the Russians will begin or work their way into that terrain, as soon as they can bring engineers forward and prepare more defensive positions. Of course, what is unknown is the extent of Ukrainian forces occupying the two defensive lines which run roughly east - west from Novopavlivka to Pavlivka to Stepnohirske (on the Dnepr).

Russian forces can now push north towards central Eastern Ukraine. The $64,000 question now becomes”What forces do the Ukrainians have manning those defensive positions?”

Overall, Russian tactics remain unchanged, using small team to probe, and find Ukrainian troops and guns and then using artillery and drones to attack the positions, followed by infantry assaults - normally, multiple rifle teams (3 - 5 soldiers) attacking, or perhaps in squad sized element (7-10 soldiers), rarely as platoons. 

Also, a look at the map shows the Russian forces squeezing Pokrovsk while also slowly grinding “forward” from Chasiv Yar (heading to the west-south-west) from Toretsk (heading north-west) and from just east of Pokrovsk (heading to the north-east). These three vectors all meet at Kostiantynivka, the southern most of the major defensive positions remaining in the major Ukrainian defensive positions built up in 2014.

v/r pete